German Intervention - Nationalist Submarine Warfare

The unsuccessful military coup, on July 1936, against the Spanish Republican government submitted Spain in a cruel war to be extent until 1939. The European political situation on those years invited to the foreign powers to participate in this conflict, either to preserve their own interests or those from their citizens in Spain, or adquiring a most active role supporting the forces from one or the other side.

Inmediatly after the beginning of the war the French government began to send aids to the Republican Popular Front and likely did the Soviet Union. This aid reached the top with the creation and intervention of the International Brigades.

The Nationalist side got the support from the German government and from the Mussolini's Italy (see, The Italian Intervention). Both countries contributed to the submarine war, doing a great service to the reduced Natonalist fleet, which had not any submarine.

The begining of the German intervention

The circumstances about the German intervention relatives to the submarine warfare have remained hidden to the History until few years ago. Such a lack of information was because to the confidentiality and secrecy conditions under these operations were developed and, even today, remain a lot of gaps.

In the evening of 17 July 1936, the Spanish naval attach� in Paris, liutenant commander Arturo G�nova, resigned his post and, at the early days of August, went back to Spain to get information about the naval situation. On those early days it was seen the need for getting the seas command because a great part of the Nationalist troops were blockaded in the Spanish Morocco by the Republican fleet, which had the control of the Strait of Gibraltar and, so far, the arms shippments from France and delivered to the Mediterranean Republican ports were multiplying as time went by.

G�nova, as a submariner, thougth that the solution was in the submarine warfare and began some contacts with the friendly powers to obtain a couple of submarines. He travelled to Germany and meet the Admiral Canaris, going after to Lisbon and Rome.

The German Naval High Command (OKM) and, mainly, the Admiral Raeder resisted the idea to loan any submarines to the Nationalist fleet, based on the political risks implied in such action. Germany was in a fast rearmament effort because of the Treaty signed between Germany and Great Britain in April 1935, and it did not wanted to attract the attention of the other countries.

At the early days of October, Admiral Moreno, chief of the Nationalist fleet, ask to the german liasson officer, commander Wagner, for at least one submarine. Wagner let Moreno to think that Germany would loan a Type IIA submarine for coastal missions under German command.That fact never took place.

On 24 October a meeting was held in Berlin between Hitler and Count Ciano, the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to sign the Rome-Berlin Axis. During this meeting, Ciano informed to Hitler about the intention of using two submarines for helping the Nationalist side and both countries agreed to increase its aid to such side, including the deployment of the German Condor Legion.

The Operation Ursula design

On 2 November the OKM developed a plan for sending two long range submarines to the Spanish coasts. Despite of the political risks it was thought that this action would be a good trainign exercise for the boats as well as for their crews in the event of a future Franco-German war.

The operation was designed as a training exercise and was named Ursula, tha name of cpatain Karl D�nitz's daughter, the commander of the German submarine fleet. The operation orders arrived on 6 november and Admiral Boehm was appointed as the operation commander and the liasson officer between the OKM and the submarines. Boehm should coordinate the German submarine actions with those from the Italian ones, stablishing two-weeks patrols and alternating the two countries' boats. The orders were to attack to the Republican warships, mainly battleships and cruisers. All the actions would be conducted in the highest secret.

For this mission, the submarines assigned were U-33 and U-34, both Type VIIA, that belong to the 2nd Flotilla "Saltzwedel" (Wilhelmshaven), and their regular commanders, Ottoheinrich Junker and Ernst Sobe, were replaced by more experienced submariners, the liutenants Kurt Freiwald and Harald Grosse. Grosse had already sailed in Spanish waters in 1931, during the trials of the E-1, a submarine designed by Yngenieurs Kontor voor Scheepsbouw from the Netherlands, a company finnanced by the Kriegsmarine, and built in the Spanish shipyards of Horacio Echevarrieta.

On 17 November the commanders Lange and Heye were sent to Rome to coordinate with the admirals Pini and Di Giamberino the submarine operations. In this meeting was agreed that the Italian submarines would patrol their areas up to 29 November, coming back after to their bases. On 30 November the german submarines would arrive to their patrol areas. On 11 December the german submarines would retire and be replaced by Italian ones. As a security, during the relief night none could launch torpedoes to another submarine. Furthermore, nobody but the operation involved officers should be informed. This point included the Nationalist government, this is the reason for which a great part of these operations have remained hidden until now. The German submarines, in an emergency, could use the Italian submarine base of La Maddalena, to which must come in under the Italian flag.

The Operation Ursula

On 20 November both the U-33 and the U-34 leave the Elba. Both boats must be unseen, even from German ships. Thus, the should erase all the identification elements and to lower the flags until their return. If any of them were seen, she should withdraw inmediatly. The crews were instructed to maintain the maximum secrecy for all their lives under pain of death.

They pass through the English Channel on 22 November and the Straigth of Gibraltar on the night of 27-28 November, where saw a Republican destroyer which did not discovered them. At their arrival to the Mediterranean Sea, they wait for the Italian submarines to retire from their patrol areas. During this time, the U-34 was diverted to the Malaga waters in search of opportunity targets.

On the evening of 29 November, the Italian submarines went back to their bases. The U-33 headed to the east of Cape Palos, patrolling from this point to the north, up to Cape Nao. The patrol area for the U-34 was from the west of Cape Palos to Cartagena. On the evening of 30 November both boats were on their stations, ready for action.

During the following days, the confusion prevailed between the submarines' skippers, the liasson officer Boehm and the OKM. The orders arrived slowly and the operation rules wre often changed due to the political risks. The submarines just only received orders by the night, when going away twenty miles far from the coast to surface and recharge their batteries. On that moment, Boehm unknew which orders were vailed for his commanders.

On the twighlight of 1 December, the U-34 attacked to a republican destroyer that was on patrol off the port of Cartagena. The torpedo failed, went to the coast and exploded. Nobody was worried to search the causes of that explosion, thus the operation secret remained. In the following night, Grosse initiated another attack but was canceales by a British destroyer. At dawn on 5 December, a new torpedo was launched to an Almirante Antequera class destroyer, without reaching her. On 8 December a new attack to a destroyer and a new failure. The rest of the day, the German torpedo boat Wolf patrolled off the port of Cartagena avoiding new attacks.

The U-33 had not better luck. Her operating area show less traffic and, thus, less attack opportunities. On 2 December a convoy was seen but the escorting destroyer avoided the attack. On 5 December a darkened destroyer was seen without identifying her and not being attacked. On the next night, Freiwald saw to the M�ndez N��ez cruiser and two destroyers but he was unable to identify them.

On 11 December both boats leave their patrol areas and began to come back. On 12 December, the U-34 was again diverted to Malaga.

The Republican submarine C-3 was sailing on surface in front of the coas of Malaga. After the luch, the sailormen de la Orden and Liz�n went up to the deck in order to throw away the food wastes. In the conning tower were the commander, Antonio Arbona, and the Merchant Navy Captain, Agust�n Garc�a. At 1419 a big explosion took place broadside. The sailormen on the deck were projected to the sea, as well as the Captain Garc�a. The boat break in two and sunk quickly, dragging down the rest of the crew. The U-34 was hitted her first target. The sinking of the C-3 was first imputed to a foreign submarine, but the forwarding research determined that the cause was an incidental explosion. How far were the researchers from the truth! Once again, the presence of German submarines remained hidden.

On 15 December the German submarines went back home. On 1939, their commanders and crews were awarded by Hitler.

The Operation Ursula conclusions

The Operation Ursula cannot be considered as a military success due to the shortage of practical results. The special characteristics of the operation and the secrecy under it was developed avoided a grater effectiveness of the submarines. Nevertheless, it served as a training for the incoming war in the next years. During the operation, the meetings between the German and Italian officers determined that it would be the Italian Navy which would be in charge of the submarine warfare in the Mediterranean Sea, leaving the Atlantic Ocean under the German command. For that reason, no relief German submarines were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea.

The bombing of the Deutschland

On 29 May 1937, the German pocket battleship Deutschland was anchoraged in the Bay of Ibiza toghether with the destroyer Leopard. At 1912, two Republican bomber aircrafts Katiushka launched several bombs form which three hit the battleship killing 20 people and 80 injuried plus several damages to the ship.

As a reprisal, on 31 May, the battleship Admiral Scheer and the destroyers Seeadler and Albatross did a naval gunning against the port facilities and coastal batteries of Almeria.

The German government launched a communication accusating the attacks against Italian and German ships, advising about the measurements to avoid them. Between 1-7 June, several surface units were sent to Spanish waters. Also, the submarines U-28, U-33, U-34 y U-35 were sent...

To be continued... (Document dated 1999 - scwmofs webmaster)