Sribhashya-second
adhyaya
First padha
SmrthyaDHikaraNam- 2-1-1
In the first chapter
it has been shown that Brahman is the subject matter of all Vedanta texts and
that Brahman is different from the insentient matter known from perception and
other means of cognition and also from the sentient soul, while in bondage
and in release. Brahman, who is free from imperfections and possessor of
infinite auspicious qualities, has been understood as the cause of the world of
sentient and insentient beings and the inner soul of all. Now this chapter
has begun in order to refute all arguments against this. First the view of
sankhya is taken up and refuted.
Suthra-1-smrthyanav akAsadhOshaprasa
nga ithi chEth na anyasmrthyanavakAsa dhOshaprasangATH- 2-1-1
If it is claimed that
there would be no scope for certain smrthis (like that of sankhya) it is
not so as otherwise some others will be having no scope.
The opponent argues that the smrthi texts serve the purpose of
elucidating the sruthi texts and the sankhyan smrthi by sage Kapila clearly
shows that praDHAna, the premordial nture is the material cause of the world.
It is true that if the smrithi is contrary to the sruthi it has to be set
aside. But this view can be true only when there is no ambiguity in the meaning
of the sruthi passages. Here the meaning of the vedantha texts is not explicit
and hence the Kapila smrthi which explains the thatthvas has to taken as
authoritative. The possible objection that in the smrithis like that of Manu
there are arguments in favour of the causality of Brahman is set aside by the
opponent by saying that the main purport of these smrthis is dharma and hence
has relevance to karamkAnada only whereas Kapilasmrthi deals with the
metaphysical and shows the path to happiness.As otherwise the Kapilasmrthi wiil
be meaningless the vedantha texts have to be interpreted according to it
This view is refuted
by the suthra. The smrthis like that of Manu do teach that Brahman is the cause
of the world and to accept the smrthi of Kapila will result in their being
rendered obsolete. We find in Manusmrthi the following passage: Beginning with
the words 'Aseedhidham thamO bhootham, this world existed in the form of
darkness,' and continues to say
'thathah
svayambhoorbhagavAn avyakthO vyanjayan idham; mahAbhoothAdhi vrtthoujAh
prAdhurAseeth thamOnudhah sOmiDHya cha sarirAth svAth sisrkshuh viviDHAh
prajAh, apa Eva sasarja Adhou thAsu veeryam apAsrjath.' (Manu.1-5-8)
This means, the Lord,
self originated and unmanifest, made this entire manifest. The
great elements and others came from the darkness and the Lord created from
His body all these beings, first creating the waters and placing His seed in
them.
In Bhagavathgita also
we have the declaration 'aham sarvasya prabhavah matthah sarvam
pravarthathE,(BG.7-6) meaning "I am the source of everything and from
Me everything proceeds." In Mahabharatha Bhishma was asked, from where is
this universe of movable and immovable objects are created and in whom all this
merges back at the time of annihilation and he answers 'nArAyaNO
jaganmoorthirananth AthmA sanAthanah, that it is Narayana, the eternal and
infinite self, who manifests as the world and further it is said that
from Him the unmanifest prakrthi constituted of three gunas originated. If
Kapila smrthi is taken as authoritative these smrthis will be of no validity
Ramanuja says that it
is true that the meaning of vedanta texts are not understood by those with
limited knowledge because the subject matter of those texts, being Brahman, is
beyond perception and other means of cognition. But there are many smrthis
composed by competent and reliable persons elucidating the purport of the
vedantic texts and there is no need to resort to the works such as Kapilasmrthi
which are opposed to the vedanthic view.
Even the smrthis like
that of Manu which are said to deal with the karamkanda they inculcate all the
works only as the worship of the Supreme self.'yathah pravrtthibhoothAnAm
yEna sarvam idham thatham svakarmaNA tham abhyarchya siddhim vindhathi mAnavah,'
(BG.18-46) which means, man achieves the highest by worshipping Him, from
whom all beings originate and by whom all are pervaded, through his own
actions. In vishnupurana the following text 'yaih svakarmaparaih nATHa
narairArADHithO bhavAn, thE tharanthyakhilAm EthAm mAyAm AthmavimukthayE, ' meaning,
by those who worship you, Oh Lord, with their own works this maya is
transcended. So even the smrthis which enjoin the various works for getting
result in this and other world, actually emphasise the performance of the same
works as an offering to the supreme self.
Ramanuja concludes by saying “yadhuktam "rshim
prasootham kapilam" ithi kapilasyaApthathayA samkirthanAth
thathsmrthyanusArEN a vEdhAnthArThavyavas THApanam nyAyyam ithi--thadhasath;
brhaspathEh sruthismrthishu sarvEshAm athisayitha jnAnAnAm nidharsanathvena
samkirthanAth thathpraNeethEna lOkAyathEna sruthyarTha vyavasTHApana prasakthEh
ithi”
What the passage means is this: If the smrthi of Kapila is to be accepted as being
authoritative on the basis of his being mentioned as competent in
the svethasvathara upanishad and the vedanta texts have to be interpreted in
accordance with it, then, it would follow that Brahaspathi being mentioned as
the most competent and wise person, the atheistic and materilistic view of the
smrthi composed by him should be held as being authoritative as well. What
Ramanuja means is that just as the materialistic and atheistic view, that of
the ChArvAkas, cannot be accepted being opposed to vedas, similarly the Kapila
smrithi also cannot be accepted.
But the opponent says since Kapila by his yogic perception had
intuited the truth his view must be true. The next suthra answers this.
Suthra-2-ithrEshAm
cha anupalabDHEh- 2-1-2
Because of the no perception of others of the view
Manu and others also had yogic perception but they did not come to
the same conclusion as Kapila. Hence, Ramanuja
concludes that the theory of Kapila is based on misconception.
This is the end of
smrthyaDHikaraNam
yOgaprathyukthyaDHi karaNam
Suthra-3-EthEna yOgah prathyukthah-
2-1-3
Here by the yoga is refuted
The doubt that even though the sankhya smrthi may be
rejected, the yoga smrthi can be taken to be authoritative in as much as it
recognizes Isvara, as the one who directs pradhAna and also because it was
propounded by Hiranyagarbha and proclaimed to be in accordance with the
vedantic texts.
This view is refuted by the suthra as this smrthi is also based on
error. Ramanuja gives the following
reasons for rejecting the yoga smrthi.
1. The praDHAna and not Brahman is mentioned as the cause of the
world.
2. Isvara is cited only as the efficient cause.
3.The yoga of meditation on the self and the Isvara as outlined in
the yoga smrthi is avaidhic, contrary to vedas, because the self is not
brhmAthmaka, ensouled by Brahman, and the Isvara who is only the efficient
cause is not the Brahman of vedanta , endowed with infinite auspcious
qualities and the cause of the world.
4. The one who expounded the smrthi, namely Hiranyagrbha is himself
a created being and liable to the influence of rajas and thamas.
Hence, yoga, which is also based on error, cannot be used to
support the vedanthic texts. Thus ends the yOgaparthyukthyaDHi karaNam.
vilakshaNathvADHika raNam- 2-1-3
Suthra-4-na vilakshaNathvAth asya
thaTHAthvam cha sabdhATH- 2-1-4
World being of contrary nature to it, Brahman cannot be the
cause and this is known from the scriptures also.
This suthra and the
next are poorvapaksha suthras. Here the
opponent resorts to tharka, reasoning, to prove that Brahman is not
the cause of the world. The reason given for
this is that the world is full of sorrow, insentient, impure and contrary to
Brahman , who, according to the vedantin, is omniscient,
omnipotent, free from imperfections and possessed of infinite auspicious
qualities. This difference is not only known through perception but also from
the scriptural texts like
'samAnE vrkshE purushah nimagnO aneesayA
sochathi muhyamAnah, (Svet.4-7)
In the same tree the
individual self immersed in sorrow grieves, being overpowered by his own
helplessness. ‘and ’aneesaschAthmA baDhyathE bhOkthrbhAvAth, the
individual soul, not being master of itself, gets bound, with the concept
of being an enjoyer. (Svet.1-8) As it has been shown through experience
that the cause is not different from the effect in nature by the example of pot
and clay, gold and ornaments etc. Therefore the cause of the world can only be
praDHAna of sankhya.
Further the poorvapakshin says that even though the scripture
is said to be independent of any other pramANa because of its content being
something beyond the sense experience, it has to be explained in accordance
with tharka. He quotes from Manusmrthi 'yastharkENa anusanDHatthE sa Dharmam
vedha nEtharah, only who investigates dharma by means of reasoning,
understands it and none else.' ( Actually this is only half the verse and
Ramanuja quotes the full verse in a later suthra in reply to this.) Moreover
the sasthra, verbal testimony, as a valid means of cognition requires three
conditions, namely, AkAnkshA, expectancy, sannidhi,proximity and yOgyatha,compatability
and hence these are to be proved by tharka.
Now it requires a little explanation as to what these three conditions
mean. There are three valid means of
cognition, namely,
Perception-prathyaksha,
Inference- anumAna
and
Sabda- verbal testimony
Which generally means
the vEdha, accepted by both sankhya and visishtadvaita, though advaita cites
three more, namely, upamAna, comparison, arthApatthi, presumption
and anupalabDHi, noncognition. Of these, the sabdhapramANa requires the
above mentioned conditions for validity. AkAnksha, expectancy is
the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence without other
words. For example,' a cow, a horse a man,' is not a meaningful sentence
without some other word denoting their connection. Sannidhi is
juxtaposition which means that a sentence will be meaningful only when the
words are uttered in quick succession and not with long intervals. YogyathA
is compatibility in the meaning of the words. For instance, the sentence
'sprinkles with fire' is not valid because of the incompatibility between the
words 'sprinkling' and 'fire.'
The opponent presupposes an argument by the vedantin that the
causality of Brahman being determined on the basis of sruthi texts sentiency
must be present in the world, which is the effect, and hence saying that the
world being insentient it cannot be the effect of Brahman is not correct. Even
in the case of pot etc, sentiency is present but as in the case of deep sleep
and swoon it is not manifest and this is the difference between sentient and
insentient beings. To this the poorvapakshin answers that when something is
always absent it only proves its nonexistence. Since the sentiency is not present
in the inanimate objects it proves that they are not sentient. To have potency
which is never exhibited is like the procreative power of a barren woman. T say
that just because the causality of Brahman is established through the sruthi
the sentiency is present in inanimate things and because it is present it
proves the causality of Brahman, is based on mutual dependence which cannot be
ascertained. It is not possible to show the relationship of cause and effect
between two things which are basically different.
Of course there cannot be similarity of all the characteristics
between the cause and the effect in which case the effect will not differ from
the cause but the essential characteristic persists in the cause and effect
which distinguishes it from other things as clay is distinct from gold.It
cannot be argued that the sattha, existence is the characteristic that persists
in Brahman the cause and the world ,the effect, because the essential
characteristics’ of Brahman such as being free from defects, having knowledge
and bliss as HIs nature and the Lordship are all not found in the world and
hence brahman cannot be the material cause.
It may be argued that the relationship of cause and effect
is seen in the world between things of different nature as in the case of the
hair and nails, which are insentient, coming out of the sentient being, or the
scorpion originating from cow dung or from the sentient spider the insentient
web coming out. But the poorvapakshin disagrees, saying that even in these
cases only the insentient part of the cause persists in the effect.
There is a fresh objection to the view of sankhya put forward now.
In the scriptures it is seen that sentiency is attributed to the insentient
things as in the texts such as 'tham prthivee abraveeth' the earth said
to him, '
Suthra-5-abhimAnivy apadhEsasthu
visEshAnugathibhyAm -2-1-5
But the reference is to the presiding
deities.
It is found in the
scripture passages such as 'hanthAham imA thisrO dhEvathAh,'
(Chan.6-3-2) where fire, water and earth are denoted as deities which means the
presiding deities of these elements. Also in AithrEya Aranyaka
‘AgnirvAg bhoothvA
mukham prAvisath, Adhithyaschkshurbho othvA akshinee prAvisath,vAyurprAN
ObhoothvA nAsikE prAvisath,
Fire became speech
and entered the mouth, the sun became the sight and entered the eyes and the
wind became the vital air and entered the nostrils, where the fire, sun and the wind are the presiding
deities of the sense organs.
The opponent
concludes by saying that since the world consists of insentient beings Brahman
cannot be the cause of it, which has been proved from the scripture and
reasoning and hence praDHAna is the material cause.
Suthra-6-dhrsyathE
thu-2-1-6
But it is seen to be so.
The argument that
Brahman cannot be the cause of the world because it is different from Brahman
is not correct. In the world there are examples of the cause and effect being
different as worms is seen to originate from honey and the scorpion from cow
dung. The explanation that the insentient part in both only has the
relationship of cause and effect is wrong. As per the contention of the
opponent the characteristic which distinguishes the cause from others must be
present in the effect. But it is not so in the examples cited. So the world,
even if it is assumed to be different from Brahman, could have originated from
Brahman.
Suthra-7-asadhithi cheth, na,
prathishEdfhamAthra thvAth-2- 1-7
If the effect is said
to be nonexistent in the cause, no, it is only denial of similarity
and not of oneness.
If the world and the
Brahman, though different are related as cause and effect it would mean
that the effect was not existent in the cause, says the opponent. But this
suthra refutes it saying that, it is only the similarity between the two is
denied as an essential requisite and not the oneness of the cause and effect.
Brahman is the cause which is modified into the effect, the world, which is not
different from Brahman in reality.
Suthra-8-apeethou thadvath prasangAth
asamanjasam- 2-1-8
Since at the time of
dissolution the cause becomes the effect the causality of Brahman is not
admissible. In dissolution the effect becomes the cause and if Brahman is the
cause it becomes one with the effect. In that case all the imperfections of the
world will adhere to Brahman. Then all the vedantha vakyas like
'yassarvajnah
sarvavith,''apahathapApmA
,vijarO vimrthyuh,' etc will become meaningless, says the opponent. This
difficulty, he says, cannot be got rid of by claiming the body- soul
relationship between Brahman and the world and explaining that as the
imperfections of the body do not affect the soul, those of the world do
not touch Brahman, because, the very relation ship is untenable. If it is
assumed to be so, the defects of the world, as the body of Brahman will affect
Brahman also. Moreover sarira is the result of karmaphala while Brahman is free
from karma. Vedanta texts also clearly describe Brahman as not having a body 'apANipAdhO
javanO grheethApasyathyach akshuh srnOthyakarNah, (Svet.-3-19) He
moves and grasps without feet and hands, sees, hears without eyes and ears.
Since He has no indhriyas to enjoy any experience He cannot have a body which
is the seat of enjoyment.
Nor can it be said
that the body is that which is subservient and controlled by the will of the
sentient soul and exists for its use, (that is seshathva) says the
poorvapakshin. The body which is injured or dead does not obey the will of the
soul inside and the puppets which are controlled by a sentient being do not
constitute his body.
Hence the sarira
sariri bhava cannot be accepted and if it is accepted the imperfections of the
world will find a place in Brahman.
Suthra-9-na thu dhrshtAnthAbhAvAth-
2-1-9
Not so. because of
examples.
The imperfections of
the world do not affect Brahman and the contention that the vedanta texts are
not valid in proving the causality of Brahman is not correct. It is seen that
the imperfections of the body do not adhere to the soul and the same entity can
remain with and without defects in two different states. The defects of the
body like old age, disease etc are not found in the self and the attributes
like joy and sorrow are not found in the body. Such as the state of childhood,
youth etc belong only to the body, the imperfections of the world do not belong
to Brahman who is the inner self. When Brahman expands and contracts by
creation and dissolution, these changes are only with respect to the world of sentient
and insentient beings and do not affect Brahman.
To say that the
sarira-sariri bhava of brahman and the world is not appropriate, says Ramanuja,
is only a kutharka, malicious reasoning on the part of those who do not
understand the real significance of the scriptural texts which are
substantiated by logical reasoning. There are enough evidence in the scriptures
to prove the sarira-sariri bhava. In BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad the passages
beginning from
'yah prthivyAm
thishTan ---Yasya prthivee sariram,(Brhd.3-7)
He who
is in earth as its inner self,'(Brhd. 3-7-12) and ending with 'yah Athmani
thishTan---- yasya Athma sariram, who is in the individual soul as
its inner self and of whom the individual soul is the body, enumerates each
sentient and insentient entity and declares the sarira-sariri bhava of Brahman.
In Subakla upanishad also similar passage is found ending with
'Esha
sarvabhoothAntharAt hmA apahathapApmA dhivyO dhEva Eko nArAyaNah, (Subal.7),
This is the divine Lord Narayana who is free from
evil and the inner self of all.
The definition of body as the instrument of enjoyment of the
fruit of actions as given by the opponent is not correct, says Ramanuja. The
declaration of earth etc as the sarira of Isvara does not satisfy this
definition. The sarira of the released souls also fall outside the scope of
this definition since there is no karma for them. The body assumed by the
supreme self in His manifestations is not made of elements and hence the body
cannot be said to be a combination of five elements to cite pradhAna as the
cause. Again the body can neither be defined as that of which the five vital
breaths are the source of life because in the case of the plants, though
they have life, the five vital breaths have no place in them. Nor is the body
the abode of indhriyas or cause of joy and sorrow always, as can be seen in the
case of body of stone or wood acquired through curse like that of Ahalya
and others.
Therefore the body is to be defined as a substance which is in
subordinate relation to a sentient soul, to be used for the purpose of that
soul and controlled by it. In the injured body the power of control is
obstructed as heat of fire etc. are obstructed by external agents. A dead body
is not fit to be called as such since the soul has left and it is only a
congregation of matter.Hence the whole universe of sentient and insentient
beings constitutes the sarira of the Lord, who controls and supports it for His
purposes and which is totally subservient to Him.
Suthra-10-svapkshad hOshAccha- 2-1-10
Also because of defects of the poorvapaksha view
This suthra points out the discrepency in the view of sankhya that
the praDhAna is the cause of the world. PraDHAna, that is, prakrthi, is said to
create the world by the mere proximity of purusha ,who in his turn gets bound
due to the superimposition of the gunas of prakrthi on him, while purusha
is said to be chinmAthra,pure intelligence free from all changes. Now, Ramanuja
asks, 'nirvikArasya chinmAthra rupasya prakrthidharmAdhyAs ahethubhootham
prakrthisannidhAnam kim rupam ithi vivechaneeyam. ' This means, it
has to be made clear what exactly causes the superimposition of the attributes
of prakrthi on the changeless purusha. Is it the very existence of prakrthi or
any modifications in it or in purusha. It could not be due to changes in
purusha who is changeless. The prakrthi is said to undergo modifications and
create the world due to the superimposition on the purusha and therefore it is
the effect of the changes and hence cannot cause them. If on the other hand it
is the mere existence of prakrthi and its proximity that causes the
superimposition, there would be no question of release because of the permanent
existence of prakrthi near purusha.Hence the sankhyan view is not rational.
Suthra-11-tharkApra
thishTAnAdhapi- 2-1-11
Because of defective reasoning (of sankhya and others)
Brahman is the cause of the world as established by sruthi because
the reasoning of sankhya is defective. The arguments of all the other schools
like nyayavaiseshika, buddhists, jaina and sankhya are mutually conflicting and
have to be set aside.
Suthra-12- anyathAanumEyam ithi
chethEvam api anirmOkshaprasangah -2-1-12
Even if it is said that the discrepancies can be resolved by
different arguments the difficulty cannot be surmounted.
The opponent claims that the criticisms of other schools could be
quashed by adopting a different way of argumentation but this suthra refutes
this. Any theory dependent on reasoning ability can always be outdone by a cleverer
opponent. In matters which transcend the sensory perception only the sasthra
can be authoritative. Ramanuja here quotes from Manusmrithi which says
‘Arsham DharmOpadhesam chavedhasAsthra aviroDHinA, yas tharkENa anusanDHatthE
sa dharmam vedha nEtharah, (the same text partly quoted at the outset by
the poorvapakshin) he alone knows dharma, who can support the
teachings of the rshis on it, in accordance with the scriptures.' Hence,
concludes Ramanuja, the praDHANakAraNavadha of sankhya is to be dismissed being
contrary to the scriptures.
Thus ends
vikajshaNathvADHika raNam.
sishtAparigrahADHIk araNam-2- 1-4
Suthra-13-EthEna sishtAparigrahA api vyAkhyAthah 2-1-13
By this the remaining systems of philosophy are also
explained.
All the other schools,
namely, nyAya, buddhism, jainism etc are also refuted by the argument that mere
reasoning cannot establish any theory against that of the vedas. Although
these systems are against sankhya, being based on the causality of
atoms, the nature of atoms and the process of creation are different in
each and hence all are refuted being contrary to the vedas.
BhOkthrApathyaDHika raNam-2-1- 5
Suthra-14-gothrApat thEh
avibhAgascheth- -syAllOkavath-
If it is said that being the enjoyer will make Brahman non-different
from the individual self, no. as can be seen in the world.
The argument of the opponent is that if Brahman has the sentient
and the insentient as His body he will be embodied like the individual
soul and will be the enjoyer of joy and sorrow. If it is said that this has
already been answered in the earlier suthra 'sambhOgaprApthirit hi chenna
visEshyAth,'(BS.1-2-8) it was only with reference to Brahman meditated as
being with in the heart. But Brahman having a body like the jiva the contingency
of experiencing joy and sorrow will arise as in the case of the individual
self. This has been confirmed by the sruthi also saying 'na ha vai
sasarirasya sathah priyApriyayOh apahathirasthi, asariram vA va santhamna
priyApriye sprsathah,' that as long as the soul is in the body there is no
escape from joy and sorrow but when he leaves the body there is no contact with
joy and sorrow.Brahman being the material cause, the nature of cause and effect
being the same, as in the case of mud and clay or gold and ornaments, the
imperfections of the world will affect Brahman also.Therefore the theory of
causality of pradhAna of sankhya alone is valid.
This view is refuted by the suthra saying that there is difference
between the individual soul and Brahman as we can see from the experience in
the ordinary life. The joy and sorrow are caused by merit and demerit and not
due to the embodiment alone. Since Brahman has no karma and hence no bondage
resulting from karma even though having the subtle and gross universe as HIs
body, He is not the enjoyer of sukha and duhkha.. We see that in ordinary life,
the king is not affected by the punishment meted out to his subjects though he
is also embodied like them. Like wise the Lord also being the dispenser of the
fruit of actions to all, is not affected by them.
Ramanuja quotes from DhrmidabhAshyakAra to illustrate this
point.
'yaTHAloke
rAjaprachuradhantha sookE GHOrE anarTha sankatE api pradhEsEvarthamAnah
vyajanAdhyavaDHooth adhEhah,'
just as a prince
staying in an uncomfortable infested with mosquitoes etc does not feel the
discomfort being fanned and given all comforts by his attendants, so too the
Lord is not touched by the defects of the world, His power acting as the fan,'thaTHA
asou lOkesvaah bhramathsAmarthya chAmarah dhOshairna sprsyathe.' As the
sruthi vakyas ascertain that brahman is free from imperfections and
changes the comparison with clay and gold is not applicable. Thus ends the bhokthrApathyADHika raNam.
ArambhaNADHikaraNam -2-1-6
Suthra-15-thadhanan yathvam ArambhaNa sabdhAdhibhyah- 2-1-15
The non-difference is known from the texts beginning with
the word 'ArambhaNam.'
After answering the
criticism of sankhya of the causality of Brahman and establishing that Brahman
is the material and efficient cause of the world, now the view of Naiyayika,
logicians, is taken up.
According to the
naiyayaikas the cause is totally different from the effect and hence this
school is diagonally opposite to that of sankhya. The arguments to show that the effect is different from its
cause are given as follows:
1. BuddhibhEdha
the cause and the effect are two different concepts.
2. SabdhabEdha -the
cause, thanthu, the thread and the effect. pata the cloth are
called by different names.So are the clay and the pot etc.
3. kAryabhEdha- the
purpose is different for both. Water is not carried by clay nor the hut
is constructed by pot.
4. kAlabhEdha- the
cause belongs to the past and the effect to the present.
5. AkAra bhEdha -the
form is also different.
6. sankhyAbhEdha-
difference in numbers, the lump of clay being one and the pots are many and the
cloth is one while the threads are many.
7. KAraka vyApara
vyarThyam- If the cause and effect are one then there is no need of the
process of transformation of the cause into effect.
If the effect which is eternally existent in the cause requires a
causal operation to make it manifest, then as manifestation requires another
manifestation it will run into infinite regress or if the effect is independent
of manifestation it will be perceived eternally. In simple terms what this
means is that if the effect exists already in the cause then it must be
perceived without the causal operation, the need of which proves that the
effect is something produced anew. To the argument that if the causal operation
is for producing something which did not exist before then the process of
weaving can produce a pot, naiyayaika replies that it is not so. The cause has
the potentiality to produce only that effect which it is capable of. What they
mean is this. The potency of producing a pot exists in the clay but the pot
produced, that is, the effect, is something new and not a mere transformation
of the cause.
Advaitin here interrupts and says that there is identity between the cause and the effect because the
cause alone is true as claimed in the text
'vAchArambhaNam
vikArah nAmadDHEyam mrtthikEthyEva sathyam,'(Chan.6-1- 4) because the effect is only an appearance due to avidhya. As
the clay alone is real and the pot etc. is only names and forms, similarly, the
attribute less Brahman alone is real and the effect, the world is unreal. It
cannot be said that while in the case of shell-silver and rope-snake which are
proved to be unreal by later sublation the things of the world are not
sublated. Since it is only the clay etc which persists throughout while the
effects like pot are destroyed, it is said to be real. Similarly the cause,
Brahman alone is real and the effect the world is unreal. But it is not unreal
in the sense of a non-existing thing like the horn of a hare and hence it is
said to be sadhasadhvilakshana, or anirvachaneeya,
indefinable.
Advaitin further says
that only to show that the cause alone is real it is said that clay etc are
only real and the effects, pot etc. are unreal but strictly speaking even the
causal substances in the world are unreal as Brahman alone is real. This is
confirmed by the texts such as
’EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thathsathyam, (Chan.6-8-7)
all this has that as self and that is true,
''nEha nAnAsthi
kimchana,(Brhd.4-4-19)
there is no plurality,'
'Yathra hi
dvaithamEva bhavathi thadhitharaitharam pasyathi, yathra thu asya sarvam
Athmaiva abhooth thath kEna kam pasyEth.(Brhd.2-4-13)
Where there is
plurality there one sees another, but when all became the self how one will see
and whom?'
It could not be
argued that the perception denies this because the sruthi is the stronger means
of cogntion of the two. The unreality of the world does not make the
individual soul also unreal because it is identical with Brahman as could be
seen by texts such as
'anEna AthmanA anupravisya nAma rupe
vyAkaravANi(Chan.6-3)
will enter with this self and make name and form,'
'Eko
dhevassarvabhoothEs hu goodah sarvavyApee sarva bhoothAnthrAthmA, (Svet.6-11)
That self is hidden in all beings, pervading all and the self of
all
‘nAnyathO asthi
dhrashtA,'
(Brhd.3-3-23) there is no other seer.
The opponent of advaitin, here, naiyayika, says that if Brahman is
the self of all, the joy and sorrow of any one embodied being will be experienced
by all and besides there will not be any distinction between the teacher and
student and released and bound souls etc.
This is explained away by the advaitin saying that the individual
souls are only the reflections of Brahman as the faces reflected in the
mirror. As the defects of the mirror seem to adhere to the face
reflected, the joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure etc. only belong to the
reflection on account of the reflecting medium, namely avidhya. In reality the
individual self is not different from Brahman and not different from each other
and free from impurities but seem to be so because of the limiting adjuncts due
to avidhya.
Advaitin is questioned whether the illusion of the difference and
the imperfections of the reflection is due to the avidhya or to the individual
self or Brahman.It cannot be avidhya which is insentient. It cannot be the
individual soul as the existence of the individuality of the soul is itself the
effect of avidhya. If it is Brahman then it would be the abode of avidhya,
which is contrary to the sruthis. Moreover to say that Brahman, which is pure,
non-differentiated and self-illumined, is affected by avidhya and sees
plurality in itself is contrary to all valid means of knowledge. There can be
no valid argument to contradict that the cause is different from the effect on
the basis of the unreality of the effect.
The argument that the cause alone is real because it persists
while the effect is unreal because it is perceived and destructible is not
sound, says the naiyayika. It has been proved earlier that the absence in
one place and time does not preclude the presence of the object elsewhere at
different time. And, the quality of being perceived and being
destructible is not the criterion for proving that it is unreal but it
only shows its being not permanent. A thing is unreal only if it is sublated at
the same place and time and hence the pots and other things as well as the
individual self are real only.
If everything else except Brahman is unreal then even the scriptural
learning is futile as the scriptures also belong to the realm of avidhya and
all endeavors to attain release will also be in vain as it is based on the
knowledge of the scriptures. So is all the reasoning, put forth to prove
that Brahman is undifferentiated, as it is based on avidhya. The vedic
declarations are claimed to be true on the basis of the absence of any
sublation but that alone cannot prove the validity because if there is a later
declaration by some authority that everything is a void, that will be taken to
be true in the absence of any later sublation. Hence the conclusion is that the
effect is real and different from the cause and, the world, the effect is real
and different from Brahman, its cause.
Thus the poorvapakshin rests his argument and the refutation
of it by the suthra is explained by Ramanuja.
The suthra refers to the passages beginning with the word 'ArambhaNa,'
namely 'vAchArambhaNam vikArah nAmadhEyam mrthikWEthyEva sathyam,' followed
by 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth,EkamEva adhvitheeyam, the Being only
was at the beginning ,one only without a second' and 'thadhaikshatha
bahusyAm parajAyEya thatthEjo asrjatha, it willed to become many and
created fire,' and 'anEna rupEna AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupE vyAkaravANi, I
will enter along with this individual self and make names and forms,' and the
passage ends with 'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam thath sathyam thathvamasi
svEtha kethO, all this is ensouled by Brahman that is the truth that
thou art svEtha kethu.' These texts confirm the non-difference of Brahman from
the world which exists in the relation of body and soul with
Brahman.
This is the purport of the whole passage beginning with the
question whether Svethakethu has learnt all that is to be learnt and when he
answered in the negative, the father instructs him, saying that by knowing that
everything is known as by knowing the clay all its effects like pots are known
etc., thus showing that Brahman is the cause of the world and also
non-different from the world, its effect.
For the sake of activities such as fetching water etc the clay
attains a new name and form but the substance persists as clay only. Therefore
it is said that the clay alone is true as it persists even when the name and
form is lost. Ramanuja says that
the statement
'mrtthikEthyEva sathyam' means 'pramANEna
upalabhyatha ithyarTHah, na thu dravyAntharathvEna; athah thasyaiva
mrdhiraNyAdhEh dhravyasya samsTHAnAntharabhAv athvamAthrENa buddhisabdhAnthrAdh
ayah upapadhyanthE, yaTHaikasyEva dhevadhatthasya avasTHA bhedhaih
bAlah,yuvA,sTHavira h ithi buddhisabdhAntharAd hayah kAryAvisEshAscha
dhrsyanthE.
This means as follows:
The clay or gold alone is known to be true through valid
means of cognition because the pots, ornaments etc are not
different entities altogether but only another state of existence of the
causal substance just as the same individual Devadattha is seen to change
into different forms such as a boy, youth, old man etc according to different
stages in life.
When the pot is destroyed only the particular form is destroyed
and not the substance, as it exists as potsherds and other forms but the clay
persists in all stages and hence the argument that origination and destruction
makes the effect a new substance is not correct. To say that if the effect
pre-existed in the cause then its origination is meaningless, says Ramanuja, is
the argument of the one who has no knowledge of origination and destruction.
What originates is only a different form of the cause and that alone is
destroyed. Hence the sathkAryavAdha, that is the effect is real and
non-different from the cause, is not affected. It is not also correct to say
that if a nonexisting form of the cause is originated it is asathkAryavAdha
because the same sustance is cognised as existing through out as when the clay
becomes pot it gives up its previous form only and again when broken assumes
the form of potsherds.
Then Ramanuja proceeds to explain the passage beginning with 'sadhEva
soumya idham
Brahman being the self of all the whole world of sentient and
insentient beings constitutes the body of Brahman and hence the imperfections
of the body cannot adhere to the soul, that is Brahman who is free form evil
and the abode of all divine attributes. Ramanuja quotes from other scriptural
texts also to prove the non-difference between Brahman and the world, that is,
between the cause and the effect- 'sarvam khalu idham brahma,'(Chan.3-14-
1) all this is brahman 'nEha nAnasthi kimchana' (Brhd.4-4-19)
there is no plurality here, 'yathra hi dvaitham iha bhavathi thadfhithara
itharam pasyathi,yathra thvasya sarvam Athmaiva abhooth thath kEna
kam pasyEth,' (Brhd.2-4-13) where there is plurality one sees another but
when all has become his self what he will see, by whom? That is, non-difference
is only real.
Thus all words denote Brahman only as the sentient and insentient
beings are His modes being His sarira, says Ramanuja, 'chidhachitvasthu
sarirathayA thatprakAram brahmaivasarvadhA sarvasabdhAbhiDHEya m.' When the
sentient and the insentient are in subtle state nondistinguishable by name and
form it is the causal state, kAraNAvasTHA and when they are in gross state
cognisable by name and form it is the state of effect,kAryAvasThA. Hence the
world is not different from Brahman.
Ramanuja dismisses the theory of unreality of the world saying
that in that case the non- difference between the cause and effect
cannot be established. Like wise he sets aside the views of bhEdhAbhEdhavAdhin
also as being in conflict with the declarations of sruthi smrithi and
purANas.
All sruthi along with smrthi and puraNa proclaim in one
voice that the Lord of Lords, all-knowing all -powerful, of infallible will,
free of blemish, not conditioned by place, time or entity, of unlimited
transcendental bliss, as the one supreme cause.
Ramanuja quotes from
several texts to prove the above declaration especially from Mahanarayana upanishad
‘EkO ha vai nArAyaNa Aseeth na brahmA nesAnO nEmE
dhyAvaprthivee na nakshatrANi nApOnAgnirna
sOmO na sooryah,'
There was no other
deity than Narayana in the beginning, as Brahman and narayana are synonymous in
visishtadvaita. Ithhasa and purana also confirm this, says Ramanuja, quoting
from Manu the text beginning with 'thathah svayambhoorbhagavAn, the self
manifested Lord,' and continuing to say, 'apa EVa sasarjAdhou thEshu veeryam
apAsrjath, He created waters and planted His seed into it.'
To the possible objection that the effects are known to be
different on account of the different terms and ideas and as such they
cannot be merely different states of the same entity. This is answered by the
next suthra.
Suthra-16-bhAvE cha upalabDHEh-2- 1-16
Because the cause is seen in the effect
In the
ornaments of gold, the cause, that is gold, is recognized and not any other
cause such as clay. Therefore as in the case of Devadatta, who is recognized in
all his different stages of childhood, youth and old age, the cause itself
exists as the effect in a different state. Even the naiyayika who claims that
the effect is different, acknowledges the different state of the
effect as compared to the cause, which alone accounts for the difference in name
and form and hence there is no need to assume that the effect is a new
substance.
Ramanuja
refutes the view that the similarity of the cause and the effect is due to the
jati, that is the generic property or due to the inherent cause, the samavayi
karana, because both disprove the origination of a different effect. While
it is said that scorpion etc are perceived to emerge from cow dung in which the
opponent sees no continuation of the causal substance, Ramanuja says that it is
the earthen element which persists as the body of the worms or scorpion. Then
the opponent comes up with the argument that in smoke there is no presence of
fire to which Ramanuja replies that it is the contact with wet fuel that is the
cause of smoke, which is recognized to persist in the smoke through smell, and
not fire. Therefore it is proved that the cause and the effect are not
different.
Suthra-17-satthvAth cha aparasya-2-1- 17
Because of the existence of the effect in the cause
The effect
exists in the cause as proved by such statements as 'all these pots were clay
in the morning.' Similarly it is said that sath alone was in the
beginning.
Suthra-18-asadvyapa dhEsAth na ithi chEth na;
dhrmAnthrENa; vAkyaseshAth yukthEh sabdhANhrAccha
It cannot be
said that the effect was non-existent in the cause on account of the
declaration 'asadhEva idham Aseeth 'nonexistence was in the beginning
because it was due to another attribute, from another subsequent text, by
reasoning and by other texts.
The attribute
of being the world of nama and rupa was alone nonexistent in the beginning, as
the pot was nonexistent as such, before its creation and by its name. From the
subsequent passage that the nonexistent created, willing to become, 'thadhasdhEva
samabhavOakurutha syAm ithi, ' it is proved. Reasoning also makes us
say that the pot exists when it is seen in the particular shape and that it
does not exist before its creation when it is present in the form of clay or
when it is broken into pot sherds. Also from another text which says 'kuthasthu
khalu soumya Evam syAth, how can this come about,' thus dismissing the asath
as the cause and establishing that the existence only was there, 'sadhEva
soumya idhmagra Aseeth.'
Suthra-19- patavaccha-2- 1-19
And like the piece of cloth.
As the threads
alone bear the name of a cloth in their state of effect Brahman becomes the
world in its kAryAvasthA.
Suthra-20 yaTHA
cha prANAdhih-2- 1-20
Like prANA etc'
Just as the
same life breath assumes different names like prANA APana etc within the body,
Brahman being one only manifests as the variegated world. Therefore,
concludes Ramanuja, 'paramakAraNAth parasmAth brahmaNah ananyathvajagathah
siddham, the world is not different from the supreme cause, namely the
supreme Brahman.
Thus ends Arambhanadhikaranam
itharavyapadhEsAdhi karaNam-2- 1-7
Suthra21-itharavyap adhEsAth
hithAkaraNAdhidhOsh aprasakthih- 2-1-21
The 'other' (individual soul) being stated (as non different from
Brahman) the defects of not doing what is beneficial will accrue.(to Brahman)
This suthra is of the nature of poorvapaksha. An objection is
raised on the basis of the texts such as 'thathvamasi','ayam Athma
brahma,'etc. declaring identity of the individual soul with Brahman. The
opponent says that if the soul is identical with Brahman, the latter would be
responsible in creating a world not conducive to welfare to its own self
as the world contains the thApathraya,namely,, Adhidaivika,Adhibouthika
and AdhyAtmaika , the three ills arising out of destiny, elements and
own attitude and actions.
The sruthi texts denoting the difference have been relinquished by
those who profess identity. (This criticism seems to be directed against
advaitin.) If it is said that the difference is due to adjuncts, upADHi, which
is denoted by the differential texts while the natural identity (the view of
the bhEdhAbhdhavAdhin) is stressed by the texts of identity, the opponent puts
a question. If Brahman is aware of the identity it could not have created the
world full of suffering for itself and if Brahman is unaware, it will be
against the sarvajnathva, omniscient nature of Brahman. If the difference is
due to ajnAna, ignorance, it should be real difference if the soul is the abode
of ajnAna, and ajnana cannot rest with Brahman, who is self-illumined,
the light of which when concealed by ajnana will result in self
destruction of Brahman who is of the nature of light.
The next suthra
answers this objection
Suthra-22-aDHikam thu bhEdha
nirdhEsAth-2- 1-22
Because of the difference stated Brahman is something more
The sruthi refers to brahman as being something more than the
individual soul by texts such as 'ya Athmani thishTan Athmanah antharah yam
AthmA na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmAnam antharO yamayathi sa tha AthmA
antharyAmyamrthah, (Brhd.3-7-22) He who is in the Atman and whom Athma did
not know etc. and in the passage 'dvAsuparNA' it is said 'thayOh
Ekah pippalam svAdhu atthi,' of the two birds, Brahman and the
individual self, the latter eats sour and sweet fruit, meaning that it
experiences joy and sorrow while the other, Brahman looks on, without being
affected. Hence Brahman is different from the individual self.
suthra -23-asmAdhivath cha
thadhanupapatthih- 2-1-23
Identity is impossible as in the case of stones etc.
Just as the stones, logs and other inanimate things are different
from Brahman in the same way the individual self is also different. The nature
of Brahman, says Ramanuja, is
'niravadhya-
nirvikAra- nikhilahEyaprathyan eeka-kalyAnaikat hAna-svEtharasam sthavasthuvilaks
haNa-ananthajnAn Anandhaikasvarup a- nAnAvidha anantha mahAvibhoothi
brahmasvarupa, '
Faultless, changeless, free from all evil, abode of
auspiciousness, of infinite bliss and has such multifarious glory as His
svarupa.
Both
the insentient objects and the sentient souls are different from Brahman
because of, the imperfections of the insentient and joy and sorrow
experienced by the sentient soul. The non-difference of the cause and effect is
true in respect of Brahman and the world, on account of the world, devoid of
names and forms existing in subtle state, which is denoted by the causal
state of Brahman, the same when manifested in gross state with names and forms
is Brahman in the state of effect. This is what is expressed by the sathkAryavAdha
by the passage beginning with 'sadhEva soumya idham
Thus ends the itharavyapadhEsADHi karaNam
UPASAMHaRA DHARSANadhIKARAnAM 2 -1-8
Suthra-24-upasamhAr a dharsanAth na
ithi cheth, na , ksheeravath hi-2-1-24
If it is said that Brahman cannot create without external
aid, it is not so, as can be seen in the case of milk.
After establishing that Brahman, the inner self of all, having the
chit and achit as HIs body is not in any way hampers His omniscience,
infallible will and being different from everything, now, this suthra shows
that the creation by mere will is not in any way inappropriate.
The opponent says that in the world it is always seen that the
agent of production, who represents the efficient cause, is able to
produce anything only with the help of external materials such as clay, gold
etc. The material cause is always different from the efficient cause and
hence Brahman cannot be both material and efficient cause.
The suthra refutes this by citing the example of milk. It is seen that the milk changes into curd without any
extraneous material. Similarly water turns into ice without any external aid.
Any substance that is added to milk for instance to make curd out of it is only
to hasten the process. Likewise Brahman becomes the world, by itself.
Suthra-25-dhEvAdhiv adhapi
lOkE-2-1-25
Even like devas in their own worlds.
As the devas create by their will in their own worlds Brahman can
also create through his will. upasamhAradharsanAD hikaraNam ends
krthsnaprasakthyaDH ikaraNam- 2-1-9
Suthra-26-krthsnapr asakthih niravayathva sabdakOpO vA-2-1-26
Brahman becoming the world is against the declaration of the
sruthi that Brahman is without parts.
This again is a poorvapaksha suthra. The opponent says that if Brahman, said to be without
parts from the texts like 'Eka Eva adhvitheeyam ' etc. becomes the
world, it would mean that either it has parts which become the sentient and the
insentient or the whole Brahman is transformed into the world. In either case
it will oppose the texts that say Brahman is without parts, one only without a
second etc. hence Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. This objection is
set aside by the next suthra.
Suthra-27-sruthEsth u
sabdhamoolathvAth- 2-1-27
There is no discrepancy because of the powers of Brahman
declared in the scriptures
Brahman is declared by scriptures to be without parts and also of
possessing wonderful powers. So it cannot be generalized on the basis of
worldly experience because in the case of matters beyond the sensory
perception scripture alone is the authority.
Suthra-28-Athmanich aivam
vichithrAsch hi-2-1-28
The self also has different properties that the insentient matter.
It is seen in the
world that fire and water have special characteristics different from each
other and so is the sentient self is different from the matter and possesses
special powers. Similarly Brahman has supreme powers.
In
Vishnupurana ParAsara answers the question,
'nirgunasyApramEyas
ya suddhasyApyamalAthm anah kaTHam sargAdhi karthrthvam brahmaNObhyupagamya thE,
How can the creation be attributed to Brahman who is
attribute less, immeasurable and pure,' as follows
“sakthayah sarva
bhAvAnAm achinthyajnAna gOcharah, yathO athO brahmaNah thAsthu sargAdhyA
bhAva sakthayah, bhavanthi thapathAm sreshTa pAvakasya yaTHOshNathA.”
The numerous powers of Brahman beyond all thought are the
nature of Brahman as the heat is to the fire which makes the actions like
creation possible.
The sruthi also says, 'kim svidvanam ka u sa vrkhsha
Aseeth yathah dhyAvAprthivee nishtathakshuh, ' which is the
woods, what is the tree from which the heaven and earth were
created and supplies the answer as 'brahma vanam brahma sa vrksha
AseedhyathodhyAvApr thivee nishtathakshuh,' Brahman is the woods and the
tree from which the heaven and earth were fashioned. Hence the general
observations do not hold good in the case of Brahman whose power is supreme and
different from all else.
Suthra-29-svapaksha dhOshAccha-
2-1-29
Brahman as the cause is indisputable because of the defects
of the view of the opponent also.
The objection that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world
because of being devoid of parts holds good on the part of the opponents also.
PraDHAna of sankhya and the atoms of naiyayika are also without parts. This
difficulty cannot be surmounted by the sankhyan contention that the three
guNas are the parts that combine to produce the world, says Ramanuja, because
if the gunas are constituents of praDHAna they must be included under the
thathvas giving rise to evolution, but they are not specified so, and if
praDHAna is the effect of the guNas then the claim that praDHAna is the primal
cause will be disproved.
Suthra-30-sarvOpEth A cha
thaddharsanAth- 2-1-30
Brahman is denoted as being endowed with all powers.
The powers of
Brahman are confirmed by the sruthi texts such as
'para asya sakthih
viviDhaiva srooyathE svAbhAvikee jnanabalakriyAcha,
His powers are supreme and His knowledge,
might and action are spontaneous. '(Svet.6- 8) and that Brahman differs in
nature from all else is denoted by the text
'apahathapApmA
vijarOvimrthyuh vishOKO vijiGHathsO apipAsah,
Free from evil,
oldage, death, grief, hunger and thirst,' and then
'sathyakAmah
sathyasankalpah,
Of infallible will and wish,' which shows His supreme power.(Chan.
Suthra-31-vikaraNat hvAth na ithi
cheth thadhuktham
If it is objected on account of being without organs, it has been
explained.
The objection is raised based on the declaration
' na thasya kAryam karaNam cha vidhyathE, there is no effect nor any
instrument for Him,' and Ramanuja says that the answer has been already given
in the suthra 'sruthEsthu sabdamoolathvAth, ' (BS.2-1-27) the power of
Brahman being based on the sruthi which shows the difference of Brahman from
all else. The text 'pasyathyachakshuh srNothyakarNah,' proves that
Brahman has no need for sense organs being omniscient and omnipotent.
This is the end of krthsnapraskthyaDHi karaNam
prayOjanathvADHikar aNam-2-1- 10
suthra-32-na pryOjanavathvAth- 2-1-32
Brahman is not the cause because of the absence of
motive
This suthra is one of poorvapaksha. The opponent says that even though Brahman may be endowed
with supreme powers there is no motive for His creating the world, being
Himself avApathasamastha kAma, one who has no unfulfilled desire. Usually
things are produced in the world either for one's own use or for that of
others. The first alternative is shown to be absent because Brahman is avApthasamasthakAma
and the second also can be disproved. If Brahman creates for others it must be
as an anugraha or for showering grace in which case He would not have created
this world full of sorrow, as He is full of mercy. The next suthra replies to this.
Suthra-33- LOkavatthu
leelAkaivalyam- 2-1-33
The creation is a leela, a sport as in the world.
A king who has everything undertakes some action as a mere sport,
so also Brahman creates sustains and annihilates this world as a mere sport.
Suthra-34-vaishamya nairGrNye
na,sApEkshathvAth thaTHA hi dharsayathi- 2-1-34
Partiality and cruelty cannot be, considering other reasons,
also declared by sruthi
An objection is raised based on the previous suthra that if the
creation is a mere sport for Brahman He will be charged with partiality and
cruelty in creating a world full of inequalities and making the beings suffer.
But the scripture declares that Brahman takes into consideration the karmas of
the souls in creating the different conditions of the beings in the world.
'sAdhukAree
sAdhurEva bhavathi pApakAree pApo
bhavathi,,
'A man becomes good by good work and bad by bad work.'
('Brhd.3-2-13)
Suthra-35-na karma avibhAgAth ithi
cheth na,anAdhithvAth upapadhyathEcha apyupalaBhyathE cha-2-1-35
If it is said that there was no karma in the beginning, it is not
so because karm is anAdhi, beginning less, which is reasonable and according to
scriptures’.
The objection that in the beginning only Brahman alone existed and
hence no karma can be attributed to the first being created is answered that
the individual souls and their karma are beginningless. The sruthi confirms
this by saying 'na jAyathE mriyathE va vipaschith. The sentient soul is
neither born nor dies,'(KatO.
Ramanuja concludes the argument by saying,
'athah
sarvavilakshaNathvA th sarvasakthithvAth leelaika prayOjanathvAth
kshEthrajnakarmAnug uNyEna vichithrasrshtiyOgA th brahmaiva jagathkAraNam. '
That is, Brahman alone is the cause of the world, because of being
different from all, being all powerful, having sport as the sole purpose and
created the world in accordance with the karma of the individual souls.
Suthra-36-sarvadhar mOpapatthescha-
2-1-36
Because all the attributes are proved in Brahman
Since all the attributes essential for being the cause of the
world are proved in Brahman which are shown as being absent in praDHAna or
atoms, Brahman is the cause of the world of the sentient and the insentient.
Thus ends the prayojanathvADHikar aNam
The end of the first pAdha of the second
aaDhyAya of sribhAshya
padha2
RachanAnupapatthi aDHIkaraNam 2-2-1
RachanAnupapatthEsc ha nAnumAnam pravrtthEscha- 2-2-1
That which is inferred cannot be the cause because of the
impossibility of construction and of the activity.
In the previous sections the objections raised against the
causality of Brahman were refuted and the cause of the world of the sentient
and the insentient has been established as being Brahman only. Now the theories
of the nonvedantic schools are examined and refuted in order to establish
firmly the view that Brahman is the only cause of the world.
Ramanuja gives the reason for demolishing the views of
others whose theories are nonconforming to that set out in the scriptures as
otherwise through clever reasoning it might lead some dullwitted persons to
believe that these views are authoritative.
First the theory of sankhya is taken up which, Ramanuja
says, is in accordance with the
sathkAryavAdha of the scriptures and hence may lead to misconceptions.
Ramanuja quotes from Sankhya kArika of Isvarakrishna, whcih is at
present the basic authority on Sankhya philosophy.
moolaprakrthih avikrthih mahadhAdhyAh prakrthivikrthayah saptha
shodasakascha vikArO na prakrthirnavikrthir purushah (SK.kArika-3)
The meaning of the karika is as follows: the moolaprakrthi, premordial nature, which is changeless,
is the cause and not the effect of anything. There are seven entities which are
both evolvents and evolutes..Namely, mahath, ahamkara, and the five
thanmathras, while the indhriyas, eleven in number and the five gross elements
are only evolutes, totalling to sixteen and the purusa, the sentient soul is
neither an evolvent nor an evolute
The prakrthi or pradhana of sankhya is constituted of three
gunas, satthva, rajas and thamas, which are of the nature of light, action
and inertia respectively. The three attributes are in a state of
equilibrium before creation and the purusha has no action or attributes.The
prakrthi by the sheer nearness of the purusha starts the creation which results
in the intermingling of the gunas which are otherwise in equilibrium. From the
moola prakrthi the mahat or buddhi is produced and from that the ahamkara.
According to the three gunas the ahamkara is of three kinds sathvik, rajasik
and thamasik. From the sathvik ahamkara, the five jnnendhriyas and the five
karmendhriyas and the manas are created. From the thamasik ahamkara the five
thanmathras, that is, the five elements in their subtle form are created which
in their turn produce the five gross elements. The rajasika ahamkara is
only assisting the other two being the fountainhead of activity.
Purusha is the sentient soul different in each sarira. Due to
ignorance the attributes of prakrthi are superimposed on the purusha who
imagines himself as the doer and enjoyer identifying himself with the three
gunas of prakrthi. Just as the crystal appears red due to the nearness of a red
flower the activity of prakrthi is identified with purushsa, whose sentiency is
superimposed on prkrthi in its turn. By the knowledge of the prakrthi and its
evolutes the purusha understands that he is different from it and this is the apavarga,
release of Sankhya. The causality of
pradhana is based on anumana, inference and by demolishing of the reasoning of
Sankhya thus dismisses the whole theory of the causality of pradhana. This adhuikarana of first padha of the second chapter of
the Brahmasuthra sets out to accomplish just that.
The argument of the sankhyas to prove that pradhana is the cause of
the world is as follows:
There must be one primal cause for everything as otherwise
there will be infinite regress because a causal substance producing an effect
through its parts is itself created from its parts which in turn from their
parts etc. The process does not end even in the case of atoms which also
must have parts to combine. So a primal cause such as pradhana which has
for its constituents the three gunas in equilibrium alone will have the
power to produce this variegated world by the combinationf of the gunas.
This is shown in the karika
bhEdhAnAm parimAnathsamnvayAt h sakthithah pravrtthEschakAraNa kArya
vibhAghAth avibhAghAth vaisva roopyasya, kAraNam asthi avyaktham (SK.karika-15, 16)
The unmanifest cause (prkrthi) exists because of the finite nature
of specal objects, homogeneity, evolution being due to the efficiency of the
cause, the differentiation between the cause and effect and the merging of the
whole world of effects in the cause in dissolution.
The world being an effect it must have a cause which is similar to
its nature and hence the unmanifest prakrthi constituted of the three gunas
must be the cause, as everything in the world is made up of three gunas.
Sankhyan justifies this by saying that it is always seen the the effect is of
the nature of cause as in the case of pots and ornaments.since the thathvas
like mahath and ahamkara are also finite it points out to a cause which is
unmanifest with gunas in equilibrium, that is, before their combining to
produce the finite world.
This suthra refutes the argument of sankhya by saying that the
pradhana of sankhya, referred to as 'that which is inferred' is not the
cause because of the impossibility of construction and of the activity.
Pradhana being insentient cannot be the cause of the world as it
is seen that any causal activity involves a sentient being. Wood and other
materials cannot transform themselves into palaces or chariots without the
operatiion of a sentient soul. The three gunas, sathva rajas and thamas are
only the causes of light, action or inertia and they cannot produce effects.
The whiteness of a cow is not its cause but a quality. Similarly sathva rajas
and thamas are also qualities and not substances. And that is why they are
called gunas.
The contention that there must be only one cause is also disproved
by their own theory that the world is created from the three gunas and not
one.The gunas are also said to be unlimited and hence being all pervading they
cannot become less or more to combine and create the world.
Suthra2-payOmbuvacc hEth thathrApi-2-
2-2
If it is said that it is like milk or water there also.
Sankhyan answers to the above objection that it needs a sentient
principle to create, that in the case of milk and water it is seen to
transform without any aid of sentient principle. That is, the milk becomes curd
and the water which is of same taste being discharged from the clouds, when
taken in by the plants, is transformed into juices of different tastes in
cocoanut, palm ,woodapple and other fruits. Similarly the pradhana also, though
of homogeneous before creation changes into different objects due to the
disturbance in the equilibrium of the gunas. This is indicated in the sankhya
karika as 'pariNAmathah salilavath prathiprathiguNAsra yaviseshAth'
(SK-16) the pradhana changes according to the gunas like
water.Therefore pradhana is capable of creation unaided by a sentient
principle.
This is refuted by the suthra. Even on the case of milk and water
there is no creational activity without the intelligent agent, meaning that
even the plants need some one to take care of them and milk does not
become curd without someone adding curd into it.Moreover, that there is a
sentient principle even in inanimate things has already been shown by the
scriptural texts such as those which say that it is Brahman who is inside earth
and other entities as their inner controller and self. Even the suthra 'upasamhAra
dharsanAth na ithichETh na ksheeravath' (BS.-2-1-24) where it is said
that Brahman does not need any external aid like milk turning into curd is only
to denote the supreme power of Brahman and not to dismiss the presence of
sentient principle as Brahman is the sentient principle required for creational
activity.
Suthra-3- vyathirekAnavasTHIT Heh cha
anpEKshathvam- 2-2-3
Pradhana being independent of any guiding sentient principle there
will always be creation and no possibility of pralaya at all. So pradhana must
be controlled by brahman and hence cannot be the sole cause of the world. But
the opponent says that if Brahman who is described as avAPthasamasthakAma, with
no desire, of nature of bliss etc. is the cause of the world the defects like
cruelty and partiality will accrue to Brahman. But, says Ramanuja, which the
creation is like sport and the inequalities are due to the karma of the
individual souls, is already explained in the earlier suthra.
The opponent now comes with the question, if the state of bondage and release and the inequalities in
various beings are all due to karma then what is the function of Brahman in
creation and annihilation? On the other hand it is pradhana which acquires
different forms and states according to the karma of the individual self which
explains the differences in experiences and hence pradhana is fit to be the
cause of the world.
To this Ramanuja says,
the opponent is ignorant of the nature of merit and demerit, puNya and pApa,
which are responsible for the karmaphala. This cannot be understood unless one learns the sathras. It is
said in the scriptures that the puNya and pApa consists of the actions like
worship etc which please the LOrd and the actions that displease HIm are
pApa.His grace and retribution are the fruits of action resulting in joy
and sorrow
'Paramapurusha aArAdhana rupEkarmaNee
puNyApuNyE;thadhanu grahanigrahAyatt hE cha thathphale sukah duhkE'
Hence the Lord who
has infallible will, with no desires, omniscient omnipotent and of the nature
of bliss etc. is the dispenser of the fruits of actions and bestows on all
beings the body and other instruments to work out their karma, as effortlessly
as a sport. There is no question of cruelty or partiality in administrating
justice. As the punishment for a crime is to check the tendencty of evil, so
too His retribution is for redemption, as it is said in the Bhagavatgita,
'thEshAm sathatha
yukthAnAm bajathAm preethipurvakam dhadhami buddhiyogam tham yEna mAm upayAnthi
thE;thesham EvAnukampArTHam aham ajnAnajam thamah nAsayAmyAthmabhAvas THah
jnANadheepEna bhAsvathA.'
(BG.X-10-11)
The lord says that He
gives jnana to those who resort to Him with devortion by destroying their
darkness of ignorance out of compassion by the light of wisdom. Therefore
pradhana cannot be the cause of the world. The opponent argues that
pradhana can transform itself without a sentient principle like grass and water
changes into milk in a cow. The next suthra answers this.
Suthra-4-anyathraab
hAvAccha thrnAdhivath- 2-2-4
Not like grass etc because milk does not exist other than
cow.
The example is not correct as the grass etc does not turn into
milk when eaten by a bull or when not eaten at all. It is the sentient agent,
the cow which turns the grass into milk.
Suthra-5-purAsmavat h ithi cheth
thaTHApi-2-2- 5
If it is said like man and the stone that also
It is argued by the
opponent that even though the pradhana is insentient and the purusha is
actionless, the creation takes place by the mere proximity of purusha which
induces the pradhana to create.it is commonly found in the world also as a
blind man who could not see is able to move about with the help of a lame
person whom he carries on his shoulders.Similarly the magnetic stone, though
actionless attracts the iron by its mere proximity. In the sankhykarika it is
said
'purushasya
dharsanArTHam kaivalyArTHam thaTHA praDHAnasya, pangvanDHavath ubhayOrapi samyogah
thathkrthassargah.'
In order that the
individual self, purusha may perceive pradhana and (knowing himslf different
from it) obtain his release the two are connected like a lame and a blind
persons would and hence the creation.
The suthra refutes this also as being inappropriate. The examples cited do not prove the point. The lame and
the blind persons are both sentient souls, one is able to guide and the other
is able to move.In the case of the magnetic stone and the iron they need to be
brought close by someone in order that attraction will result.Moreover the
pradhana and purusha being always near to each other there will always be
creation which will be eternal and no release.. If the purusha is ever free
there will not be any creation at all.
Suthra-6-angithva anupapathescha-
2-2-6
The relationship of principal and subordinate is not
appropriate.
It is maintained by the opponent that the creation takes place by
the overpowering of one guna of the others resuting in the variegated world.
But in pralaya all the three gunas are in equilibrium and hence cretion cannot
take place.If there is inequality even then there willbe creation always. So
the prdhana cannot create without a sentient principle.
Suthra-7-anyaTHA anumithou cha jna
sakthi viroDHAth-2- 2-7
Any other inference is futile as pradhan is insentient
This suthra dismisses all reasoning to establish the causality of
pradhana by saying that since pradhana can never be the cogniser, that is, not
sentient, it cannot be the cause.
Suthra-8-abhyupagam E api
arTHAbhAvAth- 2-2-8
Even so because of absence of purpose
The purpose of pradhana as being working for the enjoyment
and release of the purusha is inadmissible. Purusha is actionless, pure
intelligence, immutable and pure. Thus it is not possible for him to get
bound or to get released. If it is due to the nearness of pradhana, its
being always near, there will never be release for the purusha.
Suthra-9-viprathish EdhAth
asamanjasam- 2-2-9
sankhyan theory is untenable because of contradictions
The theory of sankhya is summarily dismissed by this suthra as
being full of contradictions.
1. Purusha who is pure
intelligence, free in reality, actionless and changeless is said to get bound
by the gunas of prakrthi which is the cause of both the bondage and release of
purusha.
'sanGHAtha
parArTHathvAth thriguNAdhiviparyay aaDHIshTAnATH
purushoasthi
bhOkthrbhAvAth kaivalyArTHapravrtt hEScha' (SK.17)
The purusha exists because the the aggregates of the gunas are
created for the sake of another,that is purusha,who is free from the gunas and
is the controlling agency of the gunas and their enjoyer and who aspires for
release.
2. The prakrthi alone
is said to be bound and released and not purusha.
’ThasmAnna
baDHyathE asou na muchyathE nApisamsararthi kaschith, samsarathi baDhyathE cha
nAnAsrayA prakrthih' (SK62)
As mentioned earlier
the prakrthi and purusha are connected like the lame and the blind where the
prakrthi creates for the sake of enjoyment of purusha and for his release, while
the purusha who is indifferent becomes the doer due to mutual superimposition
of the gunas of prakrthi and the sentiency of purusha.
Ramanuja now explains the discrepancies in the theory of
sankkhya
1. The doership etc due
to superimposition cannot happen with respect to purusha due to his being
changeless and indifferent because even the illusion of superimposition is a
change Prakrti also cannot be the doer and enjoyer because it is
insentient.
2. Purusha being
changeless, mere proximity of the prakrthi will not result in superimpostion
as, if it happens, it will be permanent on account of the prakrthi being always
proximate.
3. The prakrthi is said
to be benevolent,and acts for the good of the purusha in many ways with her
three gunas while purusha is devoid of attributes and does not confer any
benefits on praskrthi, that is he is indifferent.
'nAnAvdhArupAyaihup
akArNi anupakAriNah pumsah,gunavathagun asyasathah thasyARTHamapArTHak am
charathi.' (SK.60)
Ramanuja asks, if the
prakrthi alone is bound and released (vide kArikA62) then why is the prakrthi
said to be helping purusha who is ever free?
4. The prakrthi .as a
dancer after exhibiting herself on the stage for the sak of purusha withdraws
as the dancer would after she has been seen.
rangasya dharsayithvA nivarthathE narthakee yaTHA nrthyAth,
purushasya thTHAthmAnamprakAsy avinivartthathE prkrthih.' (sk.59)
Ramanuja says this is
inappropriate because purusha being ever free and changeless will never
perceive the prakrthi nor experiences superimposition. prakrthi being inanimate
cannot see itself. If all this is attributed to the mere proximity, which
exists always there, will be eternal perception of each other as both purusha
and prakrthi are eternal.
Therfore concludes
Ramanuja that due to all these discrepancies the theory of causation of the
sankhyas is refuted. This is the end of rachanAnupapathyaDH ikaraNam.
MahddheerGHADhikara Nam-2-2-2
Suthra-10-mahaddhee rGHavathvA hrasva parimandalAbhyAm-
2-2-10
Even so the
theory of big and long produced from short and atomic (of the nyaya
vaiseshaikas) is untenable.
The theory of
causation of sankhya has been disproved on the basis of being fallacious
and now the causality of atoms are taken up for refutation. The
The suthra refutes the theory of atoms
itself and hence the view of Nyayavaiseshika that the world has originated from
atoms. They say that the atoms have no dimension and no parts in which
case they cannot combine and even if they do, since atoms do not have dimension
there would not be any question of short,long etc. Ramanuja explains this as follows:
The things
consisting of parts like threads combine in all their six sides with each other
to produce a piece of cloth. So also the atoms must have parts in order to
combine to become dyads etc. Otherwise the atoms being without dimension even a
thousand atoms combining would not produce any magnitude of long, short etc. If
on the other hand it is admitted that they have parts, then those parts must
have originated from other parts and thus will result in infinite regress.
Vaiseshika may
object that since this would mean the atoms having infinite parts there
would not be any difference between a mustard seed and a mountain to which
Ramanuja replies that the atoms having no dimension the very idea of a mustard
seed or a mountain itself is impossible as nothing bigger than a paramanu can
be produced. Then the vaiseshika asks 'what is the solution,' to which Ramanuja
replies
'vaidhikah
pakshah parigrhyathAm !' meaning, they have no alternative than to accept the
view of the vedanta that Brahman is the cause of the world.
Suthra-11- ubhayathAhapi na karmAthah thadhAbhAvah- 2-2-11
On both assumptions there can be no motion and hence no
creation.
The atoms are
supposed to be set in motion by adhrshta or unseen principle which must abide
either in the atoms or in the individual soul and this suthra says that both
assumptions are untenable.
Adhrshta, the
unseen principle is the effect of karma on the part of the individuals which is
causal for the creation and this cannot abide in the atoms. Adhrshta abiding in
the individual cannot be responsible for the motion in atoms. If it is due to
the contact of the atoms with the individual soul, the adhrshta being
beginningless there will be always creation. But the opponent may say that
since the fruition of karma differs in respect of time there cannot be creation
forever. This presents a difficulty as the pralaya cannot be explained as all
the karma of all the souls cannot fructify at the same time for the creatiion
to stop. The will of the Lord also cannot be cited as the cause of this because
the Isvara of Nyayavaiseshika is inferred, and cannot be proved, as already
shown in the suthra 'sAsthraonithvath' (BS.1-1-3) Therefore the
causality of atoms is disproved.
Suthra-12-samavAyAb hyupagamAccha sAmyAdhanavasTHitjh
Eh-2-2-12
Because of the
concept of samavaya there results an infinite regress.
SamavAya or inherence is one of the seven catagories,
padhArTh as of nyayavaiseshikas. Categories are the classification of
everything in the world which falls into
one of the seven, namely, substance, quality, action, genarality,
peculiarity, inherence and non-existence. Out of these, samavaya, inherence,
is a concept peculiar to the system of Nyayavaiseshika. It is explained thus.
Samavaya, inherence, is the eternal relation between two things inseparable as
the substance and quality, motion and moving object, genus, jati and the
individual belonging to the jati,etc.
The suthra refutes the concept of samavaya on the basis of
infinite regress. As samavaya explains the relation between two things
inseparable the relation of samavaya to the things that are made inseparable by
its presence must be also by samvaya and thus it results in infinite regress,
anavasTHA. If it is said that the inseparable connection is the nature of
samavaya and hence does not need another connection to explain it, Ramanuja
argues that the same naure of connection can be attributed to the two things
which are inseparable by nature.
Suthra-13-nithyamEv a cha bhAvAth-2-2- 13
Because (the world) would be eternal
According to
the nyayavaiseshikas samavaya is eternal and if the connection is eternal the
things connected are also eternal and hence the world will be eternal.
Suthra-14-rupAdhima
thvAccha viparyayO dharsanATH-2- 2-14
Because the atoms possessing colour etc. will prove the
contrary.
The atoms of
four kinds are said to create the world, namely those of air, fire, water and
earth, which possess the peculiar characterstics of the four elements, thaat
is, touch, colour, taste and smell. And the atoms are claimed to be eternal and
partless. If they possess the characterestics of colour etc they cease to be
eternal and partless as all the things that have these qualities are found to
be non-eternal and have parts. This is contradictory to the concept of atoms
professed by the nyayavaiseshakas.
Suthra-15-ubhayaHA cha dhOshAth-2-2- 15
As there is objection in either case
On the other
hand if the atoms do not have colour and other qualities they cannot be the
cause of earth and other elements. So either way the theory of atoms being the
cause of the world is refuted.
Suthra-16-aparigrah Athcha athyantham anapEkshA-2- 2-2-16
Since it is not accepted it is completely rejected
The thoery of
sankhyas advocated by KAPILA, is accepted partly by the followers of the Vedas
because of its sathkaryavAdha, though it has been proved to be contrary to the
vedic concepts. But the theory of atoms, expounded by KaNadha, the founder of
vaiseshika, is totally rejected. Thus
ends the mahaddheerGhADHikar aNam.
SamudhAyADHikaraNam -2-2-3
Suthra-17-samudhAya ubhayahEthukE api thadhaprApthih-
2-2-17
Even with the
aggregate with two causes it is unestablished.
After refuting the atomic theory of the nyayavaiseshika the
Buddhist realist school who also believe that the atoms are the cause of the
world is taken up. There are four schools of Buddhism first two being realists
and the other two being idealists and nihilists. The realists belong to the
hinayana sect of buddhism while the other two belong to the mahayana school.
The realist theory is taken up now and refuted.
Ramanuja himself classifies the four schools of Buddhism by
saying,
'the chathurviDhAh; kechith pArthiva Apya thaijasa
vAyaveeya paramAnusangGHAthar upAn bhoothabouthikAn bAhyAn
chitthachaaittharup Amscha abhyantharAn arTHAn prathyaksha anumAna
siddhAnabhyupayanth i'.
They are of
four kinds.
Some hold the view that all external things, elements and
their products, and all internal like mind and the mental experiences are all
made up of the four atoms of earth,water, fire and air and they are perceptible
and inferrable and real.( vibhAshikas)
'anyE thu bAhyAn arTHAn sarvAnprthivyAdheen vijnAna
anumEyAn vadhanthi.'
Others say that the external things like earth etc. are also
only inferred.(sauthrAnt hikas)
'aparE thu-arTHa sunyam vijnAnamEva paramARTHa sath,
bAhyArTHAsthu svapnArTHa kalpAh ithyAhuh.'
Yet others say that the reality is only ideas with no
corresponding things outward which are all like things seen in a
dream.(vijnAnavAdhi ns or yOgAchAras)
'ThrayOpyEthe svApyupagatham vasthu kshaNikam
AchcchakshathE’
All three of them hold the view that all things experienced
are momentary. That is, they do not accept a permanent soul or any permanent
entity like AkAsa.
The fourth school, says, Ramanuja, consider everything as
non-existent'sarvasunyam. '(mADhyamikas or sunyavAdhins)
The suthra refutes the view of the
first two, sarvAstivAdhins, the realists who consider everything
as the product of the aggregates of atoms and real.
According to
the realist schools, there are four kinds of atoms corresponding to that of
earth possessing the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch, of water
which has all the qualities except smell, of fire which has got only colour and
touch, of air with touch alone. These atoms join in aggregates and produce the
four elements which further forming aggregates to become bodies, sense organs
and sense objects. The self is only the flow of ideas, imagined as the agent of
action and enjoyment. This is how the whole empirical world is created.
The suthra refutes this theory saying
that the theory of the aggregates of the atoms forms the elements and the
aggregates of the latter forming the bodies, sense organs etc., both are
untenable. As everything has only momentary existence it is impossible for the
atoms to combine to form an aggregate. Similarly the elements being momentary
cannot form aggregates.Even the ideas being imagined as the knower, is not
possible as the known is lost in a moment and so is the knower,and the one who
perceives is not the one who knows, as both are momentary.Even if it is said
the flow of ideas are continous the idea that exists this moment is not the one
that appears in the next moment. That is, the cognisor and the experincer are
not the same.
Suthra-18-itharEtha ra prathyayathvAth upapannam ithi
chEth na, sanGHAtha bhAva animitthathvAth- 2-2-18
If it is said that this could be explained through
successive causality, no, because they cannot be the cause of aggregation
It is argued by the opponent that though all things are momentary avidhya or nescience is the cause
of everything.
Avidhya consists in the wrong notion of permanence in things that
are momentary. From this avidhya springs the samskaras which are mental
impressions like raga and dvesha.
From these arise vijnAna or
consciousness through provocation of the mind and from this chittha,
mind and chaittha, mental, the name and form like earth and other
elements possessing rupa, rasa, ganda and sparsa, colour, taste, smell and
touch and from these the shadAyathana or sense organs from which the
body called sparsa and from that vEdhana or feelings arise.This
is how Ramanuja explains the theory of the wheel of causation of the buddhists
called pratheethya samuthpAdha. According to Ramanuja from feelings,vEdhana,
the cycle of samsara starts again with avidhya.But the buddhista add five more
to the cycle,thrishNA, desire. upAdhAna, clinging towards the
object of desire, bhAva,beginning of existence,which causes janma,birth,succeeded
by jarAmaraNa,old age and death.All these cannot happen without
the aggregates and hence the theory of aggregates is proved.
The suthra
refutes this saying that the concept of successive causality cannot be the
cause of aggregation. Avidhya causing the sense of permanency in things that are
not, and the subsequent causes of avidhya cannot be responsible for forming of
aggregates, no more that the misconception of the shell as silver can cause the
formation of aggregates of shell.Moreover the perceiver of the momentary things
as permanent, is himself momentary and there is no permanent subject to
whom the avidhya and its effects like samskaras,such as desire etc will belong
. Ramanuja says that those who do not accept a permanent abode of samskaras
have no right to assume the permanency of samskaras, 'samskArAsrayam
sTHiramEkam dhravyam anabhyupagacchathAm samskArAnuvritthira pi na sakyam
kalpayithum. '
Suthra-19-uttharOth pAdhE cha poorvanirOdhAth- 2-2-19
Because of the cessation of the previous one at the
origination of the next
The preceding
existence being momentary ceases to exist when the subsequent existence arises
and hence cannot be the cause of the first.Otherwise if the origination comes
about from non-existence anything may be the cause of anything else, like the
pot having momentary existence can give rise to a cow etc. Even if it is said that
the momentarily existing thing can be the cause of only something belonging to
the same species, then the pot that exists momentarily will be the cause of all
subsequent pots. Moreover the thing perceived being momentary no cognition is
possible in the next moment when the thing no longer exists.
Suthra-20-asathi
prathijnA uparOdhou yougapadhyam anyaTHA-2-2- 20
If the cause
is nonexistent it will be contrary to the proposition. Otherwise there will be
simultaneity.
The
difficulty cannot be surmounted by saying that the effect could be produced
without the cause.According to the sauthranthika school of buddhism perpetual
cognition is said to result from four kinds of causes, Alambanaprathyaya,
aDHipathi prathyaya, sahakAri prathyaya and samananthara prathyaya.
Alambanaprathyaya- In the cognition of the object the
object should be present.
aDHipathi prathyaya- The sense organ should be in
contact with the sense object.
sahakAri prathyaya-
The light which illumines the object
samananthara prathyaya-The impression of earlier
perception to recognise the object.
Ramanuja says
that if there can be effect without a cause everything
may originate from everything else and everywhere and always. Further the
proposition of the four causes will also be contradicted. The principle of aDHipathi
prathyaya requires that the sense organ should perceive the object which
is momentary. If the effect comes into being before the cause is destroyed in
order that it is perceived it would result in simultaneity of the cause and
effect, which does not happen as they are not perceived simultaneously and the
concept of momentariness should be given up. If the momentariness of objects is
retained then the contact of the sense organ and the cognition must be
simultaneous.
Suthra-21-prathisan
khyA aprathisankhyA nirODha aprApthih avicchEdhAth- 2-2-21
Prathiasankhya is not estalished because of the absence of
interruption.
The theory of
origination of the Buddhists has been refuted in the foregoing suthras and now
their theory of destruction is shown to be untenable.
According to Buddhism the destruction is of two kinds, prathisankhyAnirODHa
and aprathisankhyAnirOD Ha.
The former is the destruction which is perceived such as
when the pot is broken by a hammer. The second kind is that which is
not perceived because of the momentariness of things.
That is, an object is destroyed every moment and another
originated in its place but the destruction is not seen and hence appears to be
continous like the flame of a lamp.
The suthra refutes this because of the
impossibility of such destruction. Ramanuja says that the impossible of
complete destruction has been proved in the suthra 'thadhanyathvam'
(BS.2-1-14) it was shown that the origination and destruction is only different
states of one and the same permanent substance which proves the oneness of
cause and effect. When a pot is smashed it exists as potsherds etc. in another
form. Even in the case of flame the light extinguished exists in another form
but being too subtle, is not perceived.
Suthra-22-ubhayaTHA
cha dhOshAth-2-2- 22
In bothcases it is defective.
Neither
origination from nothing nor destruction into nothing can be proved.If the
effect originates from nothing it will also be nothing as the effects
like pots and ornaments are seen to be of the same nature of their causes. If
the dsetruction is absolute, the world when destroyed will pass into
nothingness and the origination of the world again will be impossible and even
if it is possible a world out of nothingness will not be real. So in either
case the theory of the sauthranthika Buddhism is untenable.
Suthra-23-AKasE cha AVISeSHaTH-2- 2-23
In the case of AkAsa also not being different from others
AkAsa is not a
separate element according to Buddhism. This is refuted by the suthra saying
that AkAsa is also proved to be a positive entity as like earth and other
elements the cognition of AkAsa is not sublated and is real.By the expressions
'there flies the eagle, there flies the hawk' etc denotes the difference in
spaces in the AkAsa.
Akasa cannot
be mere non-existence of earth and other things because the non- existence,
abhAva must be either antecedent, prAgabhAva or subsequent,
praDHvamsAbhAva or mutual, anyOnyAbhAva or absolute, athyanthAbhAva.The
first is the non-existence of a thing before its origination and the second is
its non-existence after destruction. The mutual nonexistence is when we
say ’a pot is not a cloth' the last one is the non-existence of a thing in
the past, future and present
AKasa cannot
be the antecedent nonexistrence of things like earth etc. because when they
come into existence there would not be any space at all on the absence of
AkAsa. Neither can it be subsequent non-existence for the same reason as the
whole world will be without space. Mutual nonexistence is also impossible in
which case there should not be any space between two things, but there is.
Absolute non-existence is not AkAsa as the earth and other things are not
non-existing absolutely.Moreover the non-existence of a thing is the counter
correlate of a thing which exists.
Suthra-24-anusmrthE scha-2-2- 24
Because of recognition
The theory of
momentariness is rejected because of recognition. A thing seen
is remembered and it is recognised as such when perceived again. It cannot be
said that as in the case of a flame the recognition is due to similarity.In the
perception of a flame, it is known to be momentary and different through valid
means of cognition but a pot is not cognised as such. Moreover for the
Buddhists even the perceiver is momentary and if so, a thing perceived by one
person cannot be recognised by another. Those who claim that the recognition is
due to similarity must necessarily accept a perceiver who is not momentary.
The opponent
may say that the momentariness is proved by perception and inference in as much
as the thing seen a present moment is different from the one seen in the past
moment as the two have had existence in different times. Moreover, says the
Buddhist, the momentariness can be proved through existence and
purposefulness. What does not exist and not purposeful like the horn of
the hare is not momentary on account of non-existence.
But Ramanuja says that the very arguments
given to support the momentariness serve only to prove the contrary. That which
exists and serves a purpose is permanent while those which are not so like the
horn of a hare are not permenent because they do not exist.Also the perception
does not prove the difference of the present object from the past but only that
of the time.
Further the
purposefulness will only disprove the momentariness as the thing which perishes
in a moment cannot serve any purpose.When it is seen that at the last moment of
existence of an object like pot, the destruction is due to a visible cause such
as hammer, it means that the object continues to exist till that moment. Also
the destruction is not total but only a change of the state of
existence.Therefore the theory of momentariness cannot explain the recognition,
more so because the cogniser is different from the recogniser, both being
momentary. Ramanuja clinches the argument by saying that the opponent cannot
prove his theory at all because the speaker himself is momentary!
Suthra-25-nAsathO adhrshtathvAth- 2-2-25
Not from non entity as this is not seen
The theory of
momentariness is common to both vaibhAShikas and sauthranthikas for whom the
external things are real. But to the latter the reality is not perceived due to
momentariness but inferred. They now come with an argument that even though a
thing perishes it leaves its impression behind, which causes cognition as
in the case of the cognition of blueness continues even after the blue thing
perishes.They argue that the prior state of knowledge is not always necessary
for the subsequent knowledge as otherwise the knowledge of yellowness will not
arise after that of blueness.So the knowledge of external objects are through
inference which can arise evenwhen the object is non-existent at the moment of
cognition.
This view is
refuted by the suthra saying that cognition cannot arise from non-existence
because it is not perceived.Ramanuja explains this as follows: It is not the
common experience that a thing, when it ceases to exist, leaves its attributes
on another. Even a reflection lasts only as long as the image remains in front.
Suthra-26-udhAseenA nAm api chaivam siddhih-2-2- 26
And thus there will be attainment without effort
This suthra
refutes both the realistic schools of buddhism by saying that if everything is
momentary,the result would be attained without effort as the one who
experiences the result would be different from the one who acts.Therefore the
doctrines of these two schools are untenable. Thus ends the samudhAyADHikaraNam.
UpalabDhyaDHikaraNa m-2-2-4
Suthra-27-nAbhAva upalabDHEh-2- 2-27
Non-existence is not true because of experience
The two hinayAna schools of buddhism
have been refuted by the foregoing adhikaranam. Now the
yOgachAras or vijnAnavAdhins, one of the two schools of mahayAna buddhism is refuted
by this suthra.Both the two branches of buddhism are similar as far as the
theory of momentariness is concerned but to the hinaYana buddhists the external
things are real while for the mahAyAna schools they are not. While the
mADHymikas or sunyavadhins follow the middle path the yOgAchAras declare that
no external objects exist in reality and all that exists is consciousness.
Ramanuja calls them vijnAnamAthraasthit hvavAdhins and starts refuting
their view in this suthra which says that the non-existence of external things
is not accepted because they are experienced.
Ramanuja says
that it is not possible to deny the existence of the external objects because
they are experienced. The cognition in the form of "I know the pot"
serves as a means to realise the object in the practical sense. It is
ridiculous,says Ramanuja, to claim that the knowledge alone is real when
the very verb 'jna', to know, is related to a subject and an object.This
fact is also confirmed in the worldly experience. Here Ramanuja equates the
buddhistic view with that of advaitin, whom he calls pracchanna
bauddha, buddhist in disguise, though he appears to support the veda and
says that the claim that only consciousness is real has been refuted already in
the cricicism of advaita.
Further,
Ramanuja declares that the contention of the vijnAnavAdhin that the sahOpalamBHa or the
simultaneous perception of the object and its knowledge implies that they are
one which disproves his own statement.
The external
objects according to the vijnAnavAdhin appear as real being illuminated by the
light of knowledge because, he says, the knowledge always shines in the
form of object only. That is, the knowledge is objective. But we are always
conscious of the object along with the cognition of it.In other words the idea
of an object and the object are one and the same and hence the idea alone is
real which appears as though it is external. This is what Ramanuja
criticises by saying that by this the buddhist disproves his own
statement since two things being together only means that they are real and
different.So it is meaningless to say that the cognition of a thing is not
different from that thing itself.
The
contention that the cognition of external objects arises from a ceaseless flow
of mental impressions is not acceptable because the continuity of mental
impresssions cannot be established. The theory of momentariness means that the
knowledge is also momentary and hence undergoes continous destruction.
Therefore the knowledge existing at the previous moment cannot produce that of
the subsequent moment. This shows that the variety in knowledge can only be due
to the variety of externally existent objects.
Suthra-28-vaiDHrmyA ccha na svapnAdhivath- 2-2-28
Because of difference in nature, not like dream
Buddhist says that the reality of objects is not proved by
perception. As the object in dream appear to be real to the dreamer so also
the objects in the waking state appear as real but they are not.This view is
refuted by the suthra.
Commenting on this suthra Ramanuja says that the
knowledge of the things in the waking state is different from that in the dream
because the latter is sublated in the waking state. The knowledge is inferred
by the Buddhist to be devoid of objects because it is knowledge, but Ramanuja
points out that even this inference is knowledge and it has an object. So it
cannot be concluded that the knowledge has no object in general.
Suthra-29-na bhAva anupalabDHEh- 2-2-29
The existence is not on account of non-perception
The existence
of mere cognition devoid of objects is never perceived. Moreover such knowledge
will never be cognised as even in the dream the knowledge exists only with a
subject and an object.Thus the view of the yOgachAra or vijnAnavAdhin is
refuted.This is the end
of upalabDhyadhikaraNa m.
SarvaTHA anupapatthyaDHikara Nam2-2-5
Suthra-30-sarvaTHA anupapatthEscha- 2-2-30
Because it is not proved in any way
The nihilist,
mADHyamika comes forward to present his view that everything is a void.He
professes that this is the true meaning of Buddha's teachings and the theory of
momentariness which implies the reality of external things were admitted
in order to suit the limited intellect of his disciples..Since Buddha said that
the world has no beginning and no end, the mADHyamika argues that it has no
middle either.In other words this world is non existent. Causality is only an
illusion because creaqtion is not possible either from existence or from
non-existence.
The
mADHyamaika’s theory of causation is that nothing is created because a
thing cannot be created anywhere out of itself or out of another thing or from
itself as well as another nor can it be causeless. This is explained as
follows:
A pot cannot
be produced from mud unless it is destroyed and also production is not possible
from a non- existent cause.
A thing cannot
be produced from itself since it already exists in the cause and needs no
further action to produce it.
If a thing
cannot be produced from an entirely different cause as in that case
anything may be produced from anything else. So everything is sunya.
Ramanuja
proceeds to examine the arguments of the mADHyamika inorder to refute them in
accordance with the above suthra 'sarvaTHA anupapatthEscha. ‘That is,
the view is unproved in all ways.
Ramanuja does not agree with the view
that sunya is the only reality.Saying everything is sunya, 'sarvam
sunyam'they disprove their own theory because the word sarvam, all,
denotes the existence of things only. In worldly experience, the expressions
like existence, non-existence and the respective knowledge regarding them are
all reated to the different conditions of existent things only.
Sudarsanasuri elucidates
this point further in his commentary to sribhashaya by saying that potness is
existent with respect to pot but non-existent with respect to potsherds and
vice versa.
Ramanuja
concludes by saying that the sunyavada cannot be proved by any pramAna as this
would mean accepting the existence of the pramAna which goes against the theory
that everything is nonexistent, sunya. So, he says, the view of the
mADHyamika is summarily rejected.
Thus ends the sarvaTHAanupapatthy aDHikaraNam and with it the
refutation of Buddhist theories of causation
Ekasmin asambhavADHikaraNam -2-2-6
Suthra-31-naikasmin
asambhavAth- 2-2-31
Jaina theory is refuted because of impossibility of contrary
attributes being in same place.
After the
refutation of the Buddhist theory of causation the Jaina view is taken up
next as they too believe in atoms being the cause of the world.
The Jaina
theory of causation is based on their concept of jiva, individual soul
and pudgala, matter and the interaction between the two. The universe is
made up of jivas and ajivas. Pudgala or matter is the
material cause and the different bhAvakarmas or thought processes are
the efficient cause of the world.As jivas are sentient beings they cause the bhAvakarmas.
As a result of interaction between the souls and matter the creation takes
place.The world consisting of jiva and ajiva, sentient and insentient, is without
Isvara and consists of six components, namely, jiva, ajiva, dharma,
adharma, pudgala, and AkAsa.
The jivas are
classified as baddha, bound, yOgasiddha, perfect through yOga and
muktha, released. Dharma is the all-pervading substance which is
the cause of motion while adhrma is that which causes rest. Pudgala
is the matter consisting of substances with attributes of colour, taste, smell
and touch. It is of two kinds, paramANurupa, in the form of atoms and sanGHAtharupa,
in the form of the four elements and bodies of living creatures etc.
Time, kAla is also atomic and the cause of the concept of past, future and
present.AkAsa is one occupying infinite space.
The substances
other than those that are atomic are called asthikAyas and five in
mumber, namely, jiva, dharma, adharma, pudgala and AKAsa.These
are called astikayas because they have form and occupy several parts of
space.
The unity of
the matter and soul is the cause of bondage.The process of bondage and
liberation is as follows. It is termed as 'jivAjivAsravabandh a
nirjarasamvar mokshAh' to quote Ramanuja. The attitude of the mind
resulting in the four passions of krOdha, anger, lObha, greed, mAna,
pride and mAyA, delusion is the bhAvabhanDha, and the actual
influx of karma into the soul is called dravyabanDha. This state when
the kArmic particles flow to the soul through the passions is known as Asrava,
and when they actually bind the soul it iscalled banDha. By following
right faith and right conducy and acquiring right knowledge it is possible
to stop the fresh karma from flowing in, which stage is called samvAra
and exhausting the already existing karma is nirjara. When the last
particle of karma is exhausted and the soul becomes separated from matter and
shines in its pristine nature of infinite knowledge and bliss.These five stages together with jiva
and ajiva are described as the seven thatthvas of Jainism.
The atoms are
not distinct belonging to the four elements as in vaiseshaika doctrine but all
are of the same nature and the particular characterestics of the elements like
smell, taste etc. are through pariNAma, modification.
The concept of
reality according to jainas is based on anaikAntha vAdha or syAthvAdha
as it is called because they believe in viewing a thing from many of its
aspects. The picture of complete reality, accrding to them, is prsented
only when all the view- points are taken as a whole like so many threads woven
into a cloth.
The syAtvAdha consists of seven propositions which point
out different aspects of an entity.
1. SyAdhasthi - a thing exists.
A thing exists from a particular point of view.For example a
pot exists as a substance at a particular time and place.
2. syannasthi- a thing does not exist.
It is nonexistent from another point of view for example a
pot does not exist as a cloth.
3. syAdhasthi cha
nAsthi cha-a thing exist and does not exists.
Considering the positive and negative aspects of an entity
together (ie. 2and3)
4. SyAdhavakthavyam-a thing is inexpressible.
When the aspects 2and 3 taken together simultaneously.
5. SyAdhasthiacha avakthavyam-a thing
exists and is inexpressible.
Combination of 1 and 4
6. syAnnAsthi cha acakthavyam- a thing does
not exists and is inexpressible. Combination of 2 and 4
7. SyAdhasthi cha nAsthi cha avakthavyam- a thing
exists and does not esist and is inexpressible, a combination of 3 and 4.
This
is also known as the sapthabhanginyAya.
Ramanuja criticises the syAthvAdha saying that
contradictory qualities like existence and nonexistence cannot be found to
co-exist in one place because they are like light and shadow which cannot be
together. A substance which is qualified by one attribute cannot possibly be
associated with an opposite attribute. Ramanuja further says that this point
has been explained already on the refutation of the view of bhEdhAbhEdhavAdhin
when it is said that the difference and non-difference cannot exist
simultaneously. The difference and non-difference claimed to existin one entity
is actually that of the subsatance and its mode which are different and not
identical.But two contradictory attributes cannot co-exist in one substance.
Next
Ramanuja cricticises the jaa concept of kAla, time. It is not an independent
substance, says Ramanuja, just as, the generic quality, jati cannot be an
independent substance.Atomic nature of kAla is also not acceptable.It is
eternal and all -pervading and is only an adjunct of substances.
Jaina comes
with an objection that according to vedantin one Brahman is the self of all in
which case the difference between the jivas and Brahman or between the jivas
cannot be explained. Ramanuja replies that the relationship between Brahman and
the jivas being one of body and soul this can be explained easily as the body
and the soul are of different nature and Brahman who is omniscient etc is
different from the sentient and the insentient which form His body. Ramanuja
concludes by saying that the same objections advanced against the theory of
atoms can also be applicable here.
Suthra-32-Evam cha Athmakarthsnyam- 2-2-32
And non entirety of the soul
The jainas say
that the soul is of the size of the body it occupies. If so, the soul of an
elephant will not have sufficient space when it is born as an ant in next life.
Similarly that of an ant will not be able to fill the body of an elephant in
next birth. If it is said that the soul contracts and expands accordingly it is
refuted in the next suthra.
Suthra-33 - na cha paryAyAdhapi avirODHahvikArAdhib hyah
Nor consistency because of change
If the soul
goes on changing it will be no different than other things like pot and will ot
be superior to them.
Suthra-34-anthyAvas THithEh cha ubhayanithyathvAth
aviseshah-2- 2-34
Thereis no difference in the size because of permanency and
and eternity.
The soul is
said to be eternal and to attain permanency at the time of release and hence
there cannot be any difference in the state of bondage.
Thus ends EkasminnasambhavADH
ikaraNam and the refutation of jaina theory of causation.
PasupathyaDHikaraNa m2-2-7
Suthra-35-pathyuras AmanjasyAth
The views of pAsupathas are discarded owing to
inconsistency.
The Pasupathas accept
Isvara but only as the efficient cause and cite pradhana as the material cause
and hence their theory of causation is refuted in this suthra.
Ramanuja classified
the schools of Sankhya, buddhism, vaiseshika and jaina
as vedabAhyas, being outside the pale of the vedas and refuted their
thoeries of causation, following the suthras of BAdharAyaNa, in accordance with
the tenets of visishtadvaita. Now he says that the system of pAsupatha is also
contrary to the vedas because 'sarvE cha EthE vEdhaviruddhAm
thatthvaprakriyAm aihika Amushmika nissrEyasa sAdhankalpanAscha
kalpayanthi,' because all of them invent various means of attaining happiness
in this life and the next which are against the teachings of the vedas about
reality and hence their views are taken up by this suthra and refuted.
Pasupathas are
fourfold, namely, kApAlas, kAlAmukhas, pAsupathas and saivas. The
practices of the different sects are mutually contradicting. Their theory,
practices of meditation and their forms of devotion which follow theirr own
Agamas are in conflict with the vedas.
The upanishads declare that the supreme reality, Brahman can be
known only through the Vedanta texts and not by any other authority. The
Vedanta texts clearly show that Brahman is both material and the efficient
cause. As it can be seen from the exposition on the suthra 'janmAdhyasaya
yathah,' the terms sath, Brahman and Athman are
synonymous and so are the epithets like Siva or sambhu. Ramanuja quotes
profusely from the upanishads to show that the term Brahman denotes only
Narayana.
Suthra-36-aDHishTAn a
anupapatthEscha- 2-2-36
Because of the impossibility of rulership
The concept of Isvara as only the efficient cause is supported by
arguments based on inference, which according to Ramanuja, is ficctitious. If
it is contended that Pasupathi is the efficient cause like a potter then he
must have a body and creates the world from pradhAna as the potter creates the
pot from mud. But to them Pasupathi is asarira as embodiment cannot be
attributed to Isvara in which case He will be finite.
Suthra-37-karaNavac cheth na
bhOgadhibhyah- 2-2-37
It is not as jiva rules the body and senses from within,
because of the enjoyment etc.
If it is said that the Lord rules over pradhAna as the soul rules
over the body and the senses, it is not so, because the soul gets embodiment
due to adhrshta as a result of karma and the same cannot apply to
Isvara.
Suthra-38-anthavath vam
asarvajnathAva- 2-2-38
Isvara will be subject to diisolution and will not be
omniscient.
The pAsupatha theory
of causation is dicarded being inconsistent. Thus ends the pasupthyaDHikaraNam.
PAncharAthrADhikara Nam-2-2-8
Suthra-39-uthpattha sambhavath-
2-2-39
Origination being impossible
Since PAsupatha system was refuted on account of being contrary to
the vedas because it is based on their own Agama the opponent may argue that
even the pAncharAthra agama, held to be auhtoritative by the
visishtadvaitin cannot be authoritative. This aDhikarana is started to remove
such doubts and to establish the authority of pAncharathra system.the first two
suthras are of the nature of poorvapaksha while the other two refutes the poorvapaksha
view and proves that the pAnchrAthra system is authoritative.
This suthra points
out that even though the pAnchrAthra system accepts the Vedic concept of
Brahman being both material and efficient cause there are other aspects in it
which are objectionable.
The theory of bhagavathas claim that
'paramakAraNAth
prabrahmabhoothavas udEath sankarshaNah nAma jivO jAyathe sankarshaNAth
pradhyumnasajnam manO jAyathE thasmAth aniruddhasajnO ahamkArO jAyathe,'
From the supreme
cause, the Brahman who is vasudEva, sankarshaNa the jiva is born; from him
pradhyumna the mind and from him aniruddha the ego.
Now the opponent says that the jiva is said to be unborn by the
sruthi 'najAyathE mriyathE vA vipaschith, (Kato.II-18) the sentint being
is never born nor dies.' so this statement that sankarshana, the jiva is born
from Vasudeva, Brahman is contrary to the vedas.
Suthra-40-na cha karthuh karaNam-2-2-
40
No origination of the intrument from the doer.
Pradhyumna, the mind is said to be born from sankarshaNa, the
jiva, but the mind being the instrument of cognition cannot originate from the
jiva, the doer.
Suthra-41-vijnAnAdh ibhAvE va
thadhaprathishEdhah -2-2-41
There is no contradiction if they all are the nature of
intelligence, that is, Brahman.
Ramanuja says that the cricism of bhagavatha doctrine is made
by those who do not understand it properly. Brahman Himself who is vAsudeva, out of kindness, comes to
reside in four forms as vasudeva, sankarshaNa, pradhyumna and aniruddha, which
are called His vyuhas. It is said in Poushkarasamhitha
'KarthavyathvEna
vai yathra chAthurAthmyam upAsyathE; kramAgath aih sva sajnAbhih
brAhmaNairAgamam thu thath,'
This is the
authoritative doctrine which brahmanas are enjoined to worship of that which is
the four fold nature of the self. The worship of the four forms of vAsudeva etc
is the worship of that Brahman who is called vAsudeva, says sAthvatha samhitha
also.
The Brahman who is complete with the six qualities that go to
signify the meaning of BhagavAn, namely, aisvarya,rulership, tejas,
brilliance,veerya,prowess, shakthi, power, bala, might and
jnAna knowledge, is worshippd by the devotees according to their
capacity as subtle, sukshma, vibhava, incarnations and vyuha,
the fourfold manifestation.
It is said that by worshipping the Lord in His vibhava form,
the devotee reaches the vyuha form, worshipping which he reaches the subtle
form of vAsudeva. Of these, vibhavas are the incarnations like Rama and
Therefore the vyuha forms like sankarshaNa are also the
manifestations of Brahman by His own will and hence there is no contradiction
with sruthi texts which declare clearly 'ajAyamAno bahuDhA vijayathE.'
These manifestations are ssumed through boundless love towards devotees.
The sankarshaNa and the others are termed as jiva, mind and
ahamkAra in the same way Brahman is denoted by the words AkAsa and prANa.
Suthra-42-viprathis hEDHAccha- 2-2-42
And because of denial of the origination of Jiva
Ramanuja says that in pAncharAthara as well as in all other Agamas
the origination of the individual soul, jiva is denied. Therefore the objection
on account of the origination of the soul is dismissed.
Another objection is put forth that the pAncharAthra Agama was
said to have been taught to sAndilya, who did not get the knowledge from the
vedas. This is opposed to the vedas and hence the agama cannot be held authoritative.
But Ramanuja replies that it is like the utterance of Narada that he has learnt
all the vedas with their angas, ithihasas and puraNas but yet came to
grief and was taught bhumAvidhya. That was not to undermine the vedas but to
extoll bhumAvidhya. Similarly here also it is to praise the system of
pAncharAthra through which one can understsand the meaning of reality as
declared in the vedas easily. It is for this purpose the Lord Narayana out of
compassion taught the essence of vedas in the form of pAncharAthra Agama. Hence
it is not vedaviruddha, opposed to vedas.
Ramanuja claims the authority of PanchrAthra in his own
style thus:
'athah sa bhagavAnvedhaaikave dhyahparabrahmAb hiDhanah vasudevo
nikhilahEya prathyaneeka kalyANa gunaika thana ananthajnanAnandhAd hyaparimitha
udhAra gunasAgarah sathyasankalpah chAthurvarnya chAthurAsramayavyav asThayA
vyavasTHithAn dharmArThakAma mOkshAkhya purushArThAbhimukhA n bhakthAn avalokya
apAra kAruNya souseelya vathsalya oudhArya mahOdhaDHih svasvarupa svavibhoothi
thadhArAdhana thathphalayAtTHAthm ya avaboDHinah vedhAn rkyajussAmATharva
bhedhabinnAnaparimi tha shAkhan viDhyarTHavAdhamant hrarupAn svEthar sakala
suranara duravagAhAn cha avaDHArya thadharTHa yATHAthmyAvaboDHi
panchrAthrasasthram svayamEva niramimeetha ithi niravadhyam. '
The meaning of the long passage is as follows:
The Lord
Vasudeva, who is Brahman, known only through the vedas,who is free from
evil,possessor of auspicious qualities, the ocean of limitless generous
attributes,of infinite knowledge and bliss,of infallible will, seeing his
devotees engaged in the duties of varanasrama and pursuing the four
purusharthas , out of compassion, being the ocean of love,and other qualities ,
taught the pancharathra, the essence of the vedas, to those who were bent on
worshipping his glorious forms and who were incapable of comprehending the
teaching of the vedas.
Ramanuja says that
Vyasa, the author of brahmasuthras, the codifier of vedas explains
the pAnchrAthra system in mahabharatha and ends with
'idham mahOpanishadham
chathurvedasamanvit ham;sAnkhyayOgak rthAnthEna pancharAthrAnusabdh itham.' ,
Meaning, this great Upanishad comprising of the four vedas, Sankhya
and yOga is called PAncharAthra. Further he extolls the Agama as
'idhamsrEyam idham brahma idham
hithamanutthamam; rgyajussAmabhirjush tam aTharvAngirasaistha THA.'
It means that this agama is the best, this is Brahman and this is
the most beneficial and is in accordance with the four vedas. Here he terms
Sankhya and yOga do not mean the respective systems but they refer to jnanayOga
and karmayOga as mentioned in the Gita, jnAnayOgEna sAnkhyAnAm karmayOgEna
yOginAm.
Ramanuja concludes the chapter on the refutation of the
non-vedantaic schools of philosophy by saying that the other systems being
expounded by humans are liable to be contradictory and with limitations. But
the pAncharAthra is taught by Narayana Himself, who is professed as Brahman by
all the scriptural texts and hence it is indisputable.
Finally Ramanuja says that the sAriraka sAsthra does not deny the
systems of Sankhya, yoga, vaiseshika and pasupatha in toto, as it does with
repect to Buddhism and Jainism but refutes only their theories of
causation and concept of reality. Sankhyan principles like the 24 thathvas and
the techniques of yoga are accepted as well as the argumetative techniques and
the means of cognition etc of the viseshikas and the concept of pasupati
is not rejected. These systems do not accept Brahman as the sole cause of the
universe and the inner self of all and only these points are criticised. Thus ends the pAncharAthrADhikara
This is the end of the second padha
of the second aDhyAya
PADHA- 3
ViyadhaDHikaraNam-
2-3-1
Suthra-1-na viyadhasruthEh- 2-3-1
AkAsa is notcreated because it is not so stated in the sruthi.
In the first adhyaya it was shown that all scriptural texts denote Brahman as the only cause
of the world and
In the first padha of the second adhyaya all the objections raised against this view are refuted. In
the second padha of the second adhyaya the theories of causation forwarded
by the nonvedantic schools are refuted.
Now the
next two padhas the possible discrepencies that may be cited from the
scriptures regarding the theory of creation are examined and the objections
based on them are refuted.
A doubt is raised in the above suthra by the poorvapakshin
as to whether the AkAsa is created or not.The opponent says that it is not -na
viyadh- because it is not stated so in the scriptures-asruthEh. They
quote the Chandhogya text which says 'thadhaikshatha bahusyAm prajAyEya
thatthEjO asrjatha'(Chan.6-2-3) it willed to become many and created fire
and goes on to mention the creation of other elements but the AjkAsa was not
mentioned. AkAsa being all-pervading and without parts like the individual
self could not have been created. But there is discrepency when it is said
in the taiitiriya text ’thasmAth VA EthasmAth Athmanah AkAsah
sambhoothah, '(Taitt.2-1) from that self AkAsa was created and it
goes on to say that from AkAsa vAyu was produced etc. To this the next
suthra replies.
Suthra-2-asthi thu-2-3-2
But there is.
There is scriptural
reference to the creation of AkAsa. Sruthi which deals with matters beyond the
perception through the senses are capable of validating the creation of AkAsa
which cannot be proved by any pramANa. The fact that AkAsa is without parts is
not sufficient to contradict the decalation of its xcreation by the sruthi
because even in the case of the individual self its unorigination is not
based on its being without parts, which point will be made clear later, says
Ramanuja.
Suthra-3-gounyasamb havAth
sabdhAccha-2- 3-3
The creation of AkAsa is to be taken in secondary sense
because of the impossibility and also from the texts.
The poorvapakshin now says that the texts referring to the
creation of AkAsa must be taken in the secondary sense because there are texts
declaring that AkAsa is eternal such as 'vAyuschAnthriksham chaithadhamrtham'
(Brhd.2-3-3) vayu and AkAsa both are eternal.'
Suthra-4-syAth chaikasya
brahmasabdhavath- 2-3-4
There may be primaray and secondary meaning for a word as in
the case of Brahman.
The opponent anticipaties the objection that in the statement
'from the self AkAsa originated and from Akasa, vayu etc. the origination of
AkAsa alone cannot be taken in the secondary sense while that of vayu etc is in
the primary sense.
It is possible, he says, as in the sentence 'thasmAth Ethadh
brahma nAmarupam annam cha jAyathE,(Mund.1-1-9) from Him is born
brahma,name form and matter ,'where the word brahma is used to denote the
creator Hiranyagarbha while in the previous text 'thapasAcheeyathE brahma,
meaning the Brahman swells by knowledge,' the word brahma is used in the
primary sense.
Suthra-5- pratijnAhAnih
avyathirEkAth- 2-3-5
Non-abandonment of the promissory statement only from
non-difference
This suthra refutes the objection expressed in the previous two
suthras. Secondary meaning cannot be assumed for the Chandhogya text because
the promissory statement that by knowing one everything else becomes known will
be true only if the AkAsa is the effect of Brahman.
Suthra-6-sabdhEbhyah-2-3-6
From texts
Chandhogya declaration that the sath alone was in the beginning
and that it is the self of everything denotes that AkAsa, as everything else,
is the effect of and non-different from Brahman. Moreover the statement 'it
created fire ' is not sufficient to disprove the origination of AkAsa mentioned
in other texts.
Suthra-7-yAvathvikA ramthuvibhAgO
lokavath-2-3- 7
The origination extends to all as in the world.
All being said to be the effect of Brahman; it includes the
origination of Aksa also as in the world when we say all these men are the sons
of Devadattha, similar to 'EthadhAthmyam idham sarvam, all these have
Brahman as their self. The statement that AkAsa is immortal or vAyu is immortal
is used in the same sense as devas are immortal whereas they are also created
by Brahman, meaning only that they exist for longer duration as compared to the
mortals.
Suthra-8-EthEna mAthrisvA
vyAkhyathah- 2-3-8
By this the air is also explained.
The origination of the air is also explained in the similar
manner.
Suthra-9-asambhavas thu sathah
anupapattheh- 2-3-9
Unorigination pertains to Brahman only.
All the rest are the effects of Brahman. The origination of AkAsa
and air are to illustrate the general truth.
This is the end of viyadhDHikaraNam.
ThEjoDHikaraNam
Suthra-10-thEjO athah thaTHA
Aha-2-3-10
Sruthi declares that fire is produced.
It is said that everything riginated from Brahman. But from the
statement such as 'vAyoragnih,'etc. a doubt arises whether the susequent
effects are produced from the precedent ones or from Brahman directly. The
poorvapakshin claims that in the above statement 'from air fire' (originated)
it shows that fire is the effect of air.
Suthra-11-Apah- 2-3-11
Water from fire
From the text 'agnEh Apah, water from fire, the fire is the
cause of water.
Suthra-12-prthivee- 2-3-12
Earth from water
From the texts 'adhbhyah prthivee,' 'thA
Suthra13-aDHikAraru pasabdhAnthrEbhy
ah-2-3-13
By food, earth is meant from subject matter, form and other
sruthi texts.
The word food means earth for the following reasons:
1.'adhaneeyasya
sarvasya prthiveevikArathvAt h kAraNE kAryasabdhah’ -As all that is
eaten is a modification of earth, the term denoting the effect is applied to
the cause.
2. The subsequent
passage to that referring to the creation of prthivee from water mentioning the
colours respective to fire, water and earth, refers to earth as annam.
'yadhagnErOhitham
rupam,thEjasasthdhr upam,yacchuklam thadhapAm, yadhkrshnam thadhannasya, (
In fire, what appears red belongs to fire
the white colour belongs to water and what is black belongs to earth and earth
is referred to as
The poorvapakshin says that as the evolution from mahath etc
happens from the preceding principle only the elements are described as each
being originated from the preceding one.
Suthra-14-thadhabhi DHyAnAdhEva thu
thallingAth sah-2-3-14
He is known (to be the cause of everything) from the
indicatory mark, that is, reflection.
In all the effects Brahman is the inherent cause and this is known
through the indicatory mark supplied by reflection. The word reflection means
the phrase 'bahu syam' repeated in the passage on creation.From 'thadhaikshatha
bahusyAm prajAyEya,(Chan.6-2-3) it willed to become many,meaning
Brahman,in describing the creation of each element proceeding from the
preceding one such as 'thatthEja aikshatha bahusyAm prajAyeya, fire
willed to become many,' and 'thA Apa aikshantha bahusyAma prajAyEmahi the
waters willed to become many' etc. the phrase is repeated. So the act of
willing denotes it is Brahman only, which is the cause of everything. Moreover
Brahman is mentioned as the inner self of all in BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad, 'yah
prthivyAm thishTan,yasthEjasi thishTan, yO vayou thishTan,ya AkAsE thishTan
and so on(Brhd.3-7- 3) which also shows that everything is the effect of
Brahman only.
Suthra-15-viparyayE Na thu kramO atha
upapadhyathEcha- 2-3-15
The reverse order of creation is possible only if the
effects proceed from Brahman.
In Mundaka Upanishad the order of creation is quite the reverse of
that found in the Taiitiriya text quoted by the poorvapakshin. (Taitt.2- 1) the
Mundaka text 'EthasmAth jAyathe prANO manssarvEndhriyANi cha, kham
vAyurjyothirApahprt hvee sarvasya DHAriNee,from Him are born prANa
,mind,senses, AkAsa,air, fire, waterand earth which bears all.So unless Brahman
is the direct cause both the texts would be conflicting each other.
Suthra16-antharA vijnAnamanasee kramENa thallingAth ithi
chEth Na, aviseshAth
If it is said it is the same order only with indhriyas and
mind in between, it is not so because of non-difference.
It is argued by
the opponent that the vijnAna ,knowledge which is denoted by the term
indhriyas, being the instruments of knowledge, and the mind found in between
prANa and the elements are in the same order of creation presented
elsewhere , only prAna and other things are added and hence there is no reverse
order.
The suthra refutes this view saying that the words 'EthasmaAth
jAyathE prAnah manas sarvEndhriyANi etc only denotes that everything
originated from Brahman and not the order of creation.
But the opponent objects that to say that everything is denoted by
Brahman only is contrary to their separate connotations to which the next
suthra gives the reply.
Suthra17-charAchara vyapAsrayasthu syath thadhvyapadhesah
bhAkthasthadhbhAvab hAvithvAth- 2-3-17
The words denoting the moving and immobile things are not
secondary because they depend on Brahman for their denotating power.
The view of the opponent is that the words fire etc can
denote Brahman only in the secondary sense since their primary meaning is to
denote their individual entity.This is refuted by this suthra, saying that
their denotation is based on Brahman only as shown in the text 'anEna rupENa
AthmanA anupravisya nAmrupe vyAkaravANi. '(Chan.6-3-2) thus ends the thEjODhikaraNam.
AthmADHikaraNam- 2-3-3
Suthra-18-nAtmA
struthEh nithyathvAccha thAbhyah-2-3- 18
Not self because of scriptural texts and the eternity from
them.
After
confirming the creation of AkAsa and others from Brahman now the question is
about the individual self. The poorvapakshin says that it is originated, as
known from the texts such as 'sanmoolAh soumya imAh sarvAh prajAh
sadhAyathanAh sathprathishTAh,(Chan.VI-8- 6)all these beings, have their
root in'sath', abide in it and rest in it, and 'yathO vA imAni bhoothAni
jAyanthe,(Tait.3-1-1) from whom all these beings originate,' etc. they say
that the texts such as 'that thou art' professing the
unity of the Atman with Brahman cannot be taken to mean that the Atman is
eternal since Brahman is so, because from the texts such as 'EthadhAtmyam
idham sarvam, all this is ensouled by Brahman' and 'sarvam khalu idham
brahma, all this is Brahman,' it would mean that everything is eternal and
hence unoriginated. Therefore the individual self is created.
The suthra
refutes this saying that the individual self is not originated as could
be shown from the sruthi. The texts such as 'na jAyathE mriyathE vA
vipaschith,(KatO.1-2-18) the intelligent self is neither born nor
dies.' and ' ajO nithyam sAsvathO ayam purANah na hanyathE
hanyamAnE sarirE, this self is unborn,eternal, ever existent and ancient
who is not killed when the body is destroyed.'(KatO.1-2- 18)
The opponent
asks that if the soul is not originated how the promissory statement
EkavijAnEna sarvavijnAnam can be true. Ramanuja replies that the soul also
being the effect, the non-difference between the cause and effect is
indicated by the promissory statement. But being an effect does not mean that
the soul is originated because the effect is only avasTHAnthara or
another state of the causal substance. This avasTHAnthara of the
individual self is different from that of AkAsa etc. Because the state of
being the effect consists in the inteligence becoming expanded with respect to
the individual self whereas it is a change of essential nature in the case of
AkAsa etc.
In the causal
state Brahman has the sentient and the insentient in their subtle form as its
sarira while in the state of effect the insentient changes in its essential
nature attaining name and form and becomes the object of enjoyment and
the sentient soul attains an expansion of itntelligence enabling it to
experience the fruit of actions.The texts that speak of origination of soul
only mean its embodiment and not origination while those which deny the
origination declare that there is no change in the essential nature of the
soul. Thus the soul is also the effect of Brahman and it is not contraditory to
the promissory statement.Thus ends
AtMADHikaraNam.
JnADHikaraNam- 2-3-4
Therefore the knower
Now the nature
of the soul is examined. Buddhists and sankhyans hold the view that the soul is
pure consciousness while for the vaiseshikas it is inert having knowledge as
its adventitous quality.The opponent who holds the former view quotes from
sruthi texts such as ’vijnAnam yajnam thanuthE, karmANi
thanuthEpi cha,(Taitt.2-5-1) the knowledge performs sacrifice and the
actions.
Others say
that knowledge is only an adventitious quality as there is no intelligence
present in the state of deep sleep etc. The knowledge, they say, is
present only when the soul is connected with the body, as the sruthi also
declares that 'na prEthya sajnA asthi, there is no consciousness when he
soul leaves the body.'
The suthra
refutes this by saying that the self is of the nature of knower and not mere
knowledge nor inert. This is proved from the sruthi itself. In ChAndhOgya
text in the section where prajApathi describes the released and unreleased
souls by saying 'aTHa yo vedha jiGHrANeethi sa AthmA, one who knows
"I smell" he is the self.Similarly in BrhadhAraNyaka it is
said as a reply to the question 'kathama AthmA,who is the self,' that 'yO
ayam vijnAnamayah prANEshu hrdhyanthrjyothirpu rushah,(Brhd.4-3-7)
he who is consisting of knowledge is the light within the heart in the prAnas.'
and 'Esha hi dhrashtA srothA GHrAtha rasayithA manthA bOdDHA karthA
vijnAnAthmA purushah,(Pras.IV-9)this person is the seer,hearer
smeller,taster thinker knower doer and the knowing self.
To the
objection that if the self is a knower, it being infinite and all pervading,
there will always be cognition everywhere the next suthra replies.
Suthra-20-uthkrAnth igathyAgatheenAm -2-3-20
Because of
passingout, going and returning, the self is atomic.
The sruthi mentions the soul going out, and coming in etc.
which is not possible if it is all pervading. In BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad '
'Esha AthmanishkrAmathi chakshushO VA murDHnO vAanyEbhyO VA
sariradhEsebhyah,(Brhad.4- 4-2)
This self departs through the eyes or the skull or any other
part of the body,' and the return likewise 'thasmAth lokAth punarEthi asmai
lOkaya karmaNE, from those worlds, returns to this world for karma.'
Suthra-21-svAthmanA cha uttharayOh-2- 3-21
And as the going and coming being effected directly by the
self it is atomic.
Passing out of
the body, meaning separation from the body, is applicable even if the soul is
infinite but going and coming indicates that it is atomic.
Suthra-22-na aNuh athathsruthEh ithi cheth na
itharADHikArAth- 2-3-22
If it is said
that it is not atomic because of scriptural statement as otherwise, it is not
so, as the subject matter of those texts is Brahman.
The opponent
quotes the text 'sa vA Esha mahAn aja AthmA, (Brhd.4-4-22) that self is
infinite and unborn,' to prove that it is not atomic but this suthra refutes
the view saying that it is Brahman who is referred to in those texts as can be
understood from the text 'yasya anuvitthah prathbuddha Athma, he who
knows the sentient self,' meaning Brahman, which was the topic introduced in
the section.
Suthra-23-svasabdhO nmAnAbhyAm cha-2-3-23
Because the
very word anu is used
'EshO aNurAthmA chEthsAvedhithavyah, (Mund.
This atomic
self should be known,'and
'ArAgramAthrOhyvarO pi dhrshtah,
(Svet.5-8)
The lower one, (meaning the individual self) is seen to be
of the measure of the tip of the goad, show that the self is atomic.
Suthra-24-avirODHas
chandhanavath- 2-3-24
Like the sandalpaste, no contradiction.
The self
though atomic is able to prevade the whole body like the sandalpaste that
creates coolness for the whole body though applied in one place.
Suthra-25-avasTHith i vaiseshyAth ithi cheth
na,abhyupagamATH hrdhi hi-2-3-25
If it is due
to particular position the analogy is said to be inappropriate, not so because
the heart is accepted as the seat of the soul.
The sruthi
text 'yO ayam vijnAnamayah prANEshu hrdhanthrjyothih, '(Brhd.4-3-7) shows that the self is found in the
heart.
Suthra-26-gunAthvA AlOkavath-2- 3-26
Or due to its quality like light.
As the light
placed in one corner lights up the whole room so does the AtmA in the heart
spreads consciousness all over.
Suthra-27-vyathirEk O gandhavath thaTHA cha dharsayathi-
2-3-27
There is distinction as in the case of smell as shown by the
sruthi.
To the
objection that if the essence of self is knowledge how can it be the quality of
the self.
The reply is
given that, as the smell is the quality of the earth yet inseparable from it,
so too knowledge is the quality of the self.
Suthra -28-prthagupadhEsAt h-2-3-28
By separate mention
The text 'na thu
vijnAthuh vijnAthEh viparilOpO vidhyathE,
(Brhd.
Suthra-29-thadguNas ArathvAth thu hadvyapadhEsah
prAjnavath-2- 3-29
The
declaration is due to knowledge being the essential quality as Brahman is said
to be knowledge.
As the text 'sathyam
jnAnam anantham Brahma,' denotes Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinity
on account of the fact that these are HIs essential qualities.
Suthra-30-yAvath
AthmabhAvithvAth cha na dhOshah thaddharsanAth- 2-3-30
There is no defect so long as the soul exists because it is
so seen.
As knowledge
is the quality that persists through out life there is nothing wrong in
denoting the soul by it. Ramanuja says that a cow with broken horns is still called
a cow because the cowness persists even if the parts of the body are lost.Moreover the
self also like knowledge is self illumined and hence it is depicted as self.The
objection that knowledge is not an inseparable quality of the soul as it is not
seen to exist in deep sleep etc. is replied by the next suthra.
Suthra-31-pumsvAdhi vathvasya sathah aBhivyakthiyOgAth-
2-3-31
Because manifestation is possible only if it exists in deep
sleep like virility etc
As virility
which is potential in a male child manifests only on youth, similarly knowledge
existing in the deep sleep only manifests in the waking state.Otherwise it
cannot manifest on waking up. Therefore the self is knower and is of atomic
size.The text "na prEthyasya samjnA asthi'(Brhd.2-4-12) only means
that in release, the self does not experience birth,death and pain as in the
bound state and does not mean that the self has no knowledge.
Suthra32-nithyaupal
abDhi anupalabDHimprasang ahanyatharaniyam ah vA anyaTHA-2-3- 32
Otherwise
there will be perpetual perception or nonperception or limitations of either of
the two.
The self being
omnipresent and all knowledge as some assume there will be permanent perception
or nonperception. but experience proves otherwise as there is perception at
times and nonperception at other times.If the self is omnipresent there will be
'I" consciousness always everywhere. Hence to avoid these difficulties the
self iis taken as atomic and has knowledge for its quality. Thus ends jnADHikaraNam.
KarthraDHikaraNam- 2-3-5
Suthra-33-kartha sAsthrArTHathvAth-
2-3-33
The individual self is an agent according to sasthra
The self has been
shown as the knower and now the question is whether it is the doer also. The
opponent says it is not, as the self has been shown to be action less and the
actions are said to be only pertaining to the gunas. In Katopanishad while
describing the self as having no birth and death 'na jAyathE mriyathE vA
vipaschith,' the acts of killing and get killed etc. are denied of the self
.
'hanthA cheth
manyathE hanthum hathaschEth manyathE hatham, ubou thou na vijAneethou nAyam
hanthi na hanyathE.'(Kata.I-2-19),
meaning, one who thinks that the self kills or get killed do not
know the truth because the self neither kills nor gets killed Even in the Gita
it is said
'prakrthEh kriyamANAni
guNairkarmANi sarvasah, ahamkAravimooDAthmA karthAham ithi manyathE, (BG.3-27)
All actions are done
by the gunas and the one who is deluded by ego thinks that he is the
doer.'
This suthra refutes the above view. Only the self is the kartha
and not gunas. This is in accordance with the sasthras. It is found in the
sruthi texts like 'yajEtha svargakAmah, one desirous of heaven should
perform sacrifice ' and 'mumukshurbrahma upAseetha, one aspiring for
release should meditate on Brahman,' that the agency of action is ascribed only
to the individual self. The word sasthra means scriptural injunction originated
from the word sAsana, command. Sasthras induce action by giving certain
instructions and it is possible only in the case of a sentient soul and not
insentient pradhana that is the gunas. That is why the purvamimamsa declares 'sAsthraphalam
prayokthari, the fruit of the injunctions is only to the agent.'
(III-7-18)
Ramanuja clarifies the point by saying that the text about
the self not killing or getting killed etc. is to show that it is eternal and
not to deny the agency. Similarly the sloka
quoted from Gita only means that the activity during the state of bondage is
induced by the gunas and not natural to the self as it is mentioned there itself
'kAraNam gunasangOasya sadhasath yOnijanmasu, the cause of the
embodiment in good and evil wombs is the association of the self with the
gunas.' (BG.18-21)
Suthra-34-upAdhAnAt h
vihArOpadhEsAccha- 2-3-34
Because of the teaching of the self taking the senses
and wandering about.
In BrhadhAraNyaka
upanishad there is a passage
'yaTHA maharAjah
jAnapadhAn grheethva sve janapadhe yaTHAkAmam parivarthEtha , EvamEva
EthathprANAn grheethvA svE sarirE yaTHA kAmamaparivarthathE ,(Brhd.2-1-18)
This means, as a king will take his subjects and wander around in his
kingdom, so too, the self taking the pranas (sense organs) wander around in the
body.
Suthra-35-vyapadhes ATh cha kriyAyAm
na cheth nirdhEsaviparyayah- 2-3-35
The self mentioned as the agent in scriptures and if not so
it would have been different.
The self has been
definitely mentioned as the agent in texts such as
'vijnAnam yajnam
thanuthE karmANi thanuthEpicha.' (Tait.2-5) .
Meaning that the self denoted as vijnAnam is the performer of sacrifice
and actions If it is said that the word vijnAna means the intellect, it being
the instrument of action and not the agent, the text would have been 'vijAnEna
' by the intellect and not 'vijnAnam,' the intellect.
Suthra-36-
upalabDHivath aniyamah-2-3- 36
There will be no definite rule as in the case of
consciousness
If the self is not the doer then the same difficulty as mentioned
in the case of consciousness (vide.suthra- 2-3-32) will result. That is, if the
agency of action is ascribed to pradhana, all souls being equally associated
with it, all actions will result in the enjoyment of all. If the souls are
omnipresent no internal organ will be exclusive to one soul and hence
distribution of different results to difference souls will not be possible.
Suthra-37-shakthivi paryayAth- 2-3-37
On account of inversion of power
If the intellect is the agent it must also be the enjoyer as both
the doer and enjoyer of an action must be the same, in which case there will
not be any proof for the existence of the individual self, contrary to the
statement 'purusho asthi bhOkthrbhAvAth,(SK.17) the soul exists because
there must be some experience.
Suthra-38-samAdhyab hAvAcccha- 2-3-38
Because of impossibility of samADHi
If intellect is the agent of action it will be so even in samADHi
which is the state prior to release, in which, the knowledge of the difference
of the soul from the prakrthi dawns. As the intellect is itself is a product of
prakrthi, this will not happen.
Suthra-39-yaTHA cha thakshObhayathA-
2-3-39
And even as a carpenter are both.
This suthra is in reply to the objection that if the soul is the
doer, the instruments of action being always present there will be perpetual
action. It is replied that like a carpenter who has the will to use his
instruments or not, the soul also, being sentient, has the power to act or not
to act.On the other hand only if the intellect is the doer, there will be
action always as it lacks the power of discrimination being insentient. Thus ends the karthraDHikaraNam.
parAyatthADHikaraNA m-2-3-6
Suthra-40-parAtthu thacchruthEh- 2-3-40
From the highest only as declared in the scriptures.
The question raised is that whether the agency of action on the
part of the individual self is independent or dependent on the supreme self.
The opponent says that it is independent as otherwise the injunctions and
prohibitions by the scriptures will be meaningless if the individual self is
not free to act by itself.
The suthra refutes this by saying that only the supreme self is
the cause of all actions as declared by the sruthi 'anthah pravishtah sAsthA
janAnAm sarvAthmA, He is the ruler of all entering inside as their inner self.' and the
passage in BrhadhAranyaka which mentions Brahman as the inner ruler and self of
all etc by enumerating each category ending with 'yah Atmani thishTan
atmanah antharah yam AthmA na vedha yasya AthmA sariram ya AthmAnam antharO
yamayathi sa tha AthmA antharyAmyamrthah,'who dwelling in the Self is
different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is,
who rules the Self from within, He is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal
one.'
Even in Bhagavatgita the Lord declares, 'sarvasya chAham hrdhi
sannivishtO, I am in the heart of all,' and says that He is whirling them
with action by His MAya, as though mounted on a machine,'bhrAmayan
sarvabhoothAni yanthrArooDAni mAyayA.'
Suthra-41-krthapray atnApEkshasthu
vihithaprathishiddh a avaiyarTHyAdhibhyah -2-3-41
Since the effort is taken by the individual soul the injunctions
and prohibitions are relevant.
The objection that if the soul is not independent the injunctions
and prohibitions will have no value it is replied in this suthra that the
effort is taken only by the individual self but it cannot act without the sanction
of the supreme self, who is the anumantha, one who gives permission to
act. If the soul does good karma the Lord bestows His grace and if indulges in
evil deeds He gives punishment. That this does not indicate that He is
merciless has been already proved, says Ramanuja , while explaining the
doctrine of sankhya.
The opponent comes
with an objection that the text in Kouseetaki upanishad which says
'Esha hyEva
sAdhukarma kArayathi tham yamEbhyO lOkEshu unnineeshathi, Esha Eva asAdhu karma
kArayathi tham yam aDHo nineeshathi,
He makes those whom He wishes to raise to the
higher worlds to do good deeds and whom He wishes to send down from these
worlds He makes them do bad deeds,' means that only the Lord Himself makes one
to do good and bad deeds and this goes contrary to the independent effort of
the individual self. Ramanuja replies that this does not apply to all beings
but only means that when one chooses to proceed along the path approved by the
Lord, He helps the soul to rise further and when one pursues the path that
leads away from the Lord, He makes the soul descend further so that the
propensity for evil will be exhausted. In the Gita the Lord says
'thEshAm sathatha
yukthAnAm bajathAm preethipoorvakam dhadhAmi buddhiyOgam tham yEna mAmupayAnthi
thE.'
It means that the
Lord gives the wisdom to those who worship Him with love so that they can
attain Him. And He hurls those who are evil, He says, into demonical wombs in
perpetual transmigration,
'thAn aham
dvishadhah kroorAn samsArEshu narAdhamAn, kshipAmi ajasram ashubAnAm
aAsureeshvEva yOnishu.'
Thus ends the parAyatthADHikaraNam.
amsAdhikaraNam- 2-3-7
Suthra42-amsO
nAnA vyapadhEsAth anyaTHA chApi dAsa kithavAdhithvamaDHe eyatha EkE-2-3-42
The individual self is a part of Brahman as the difference being
declared and otherwise the mention of fisherman, slave etc.
The foregoing
SÃstras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such
dependent on the supreme self. Now the question is, whether the
individual self is absolutely different from Brahman or Brahman itself under
the influence of avidhya or Brahman determined by a limiting adjunct (upÃdhi)
or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman.
The texts that
speak of absolute difference are 'jna ajnou dvou eesa aneesou, (Svet.1-9)
the two, one knowing the other not knowing, both unborn one the master the
other servile.' Those who hold this view say that the knower and ignorant are
entirely different and to ascribe any unity between them involves contradiction
like saying 'sprinkle with fire. So the texts that speak of unity should be
interpreted as conveying secondary meaning. This is the contention of the
dualist,dvaitha school. Nondualist view is that the jiva is Brahman deluded by
avidhya and imagines difference. They quote the texts like 'ayam AthmA
brahma,this self is Brahman,' and 'thathvamasi' etc.
The third view
is that the jiva is Brahman limited by adjuncts
The suthra refutes all these views
and says that jiva is a part of Brahman since there is declaration of both
difference and unity. Some texts speak of Brahman and the individual self as
having the relationship of the creator and created, ruler and the ruled,
omniscient and ignorant, independent and dependent, pure and impure, possessing
auspicious qualities and the opposite of it, master and the servant etc. Other
texts like thathvamasi etc declare unity. There is yet another text
'Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these fishermen,' and so on, implying the
all pervading quality of Brahman. To consider the both types of texts to
be true the jiva must be accepted as an amsa, part of Brahman.
Neither the
texts that describe the individual soul being the creation of, under the
control of, belonging to, being the sarira of, supported, protected and
annihilate by, Brahman nor being a devotee through which the jiva obtains,, by
the grace of Brahman, the purushArTHas and moksha ultimately, all of which
declare the difference between the jiva and Brahman can be denied. In the same
manner the texts that describe the 'willing' of Brahman to become many and
after creating the world entering into everything as the indwelling soul cannot
be dismissed as illusion. From the above it also becomes clear that the jiva
cannot be Brahman conditioned by adjuncts. Therefore to reconcile the
both kinds of texts the jiva is the amsa of Brahman.
Suthra-43-manthrava rNAth-2-3- 43
Also from the words of manthra
In chandhOgya upanishad it is declared
'pAdhOasyavisvAbhoo
thAni thripAdhasyAmrtham dhivi,(Chan.3-12-
6)
All beings and the world constitute one part (quarter) of
the supreme self and the rest of the three quarters are immortal in
heaven.' The word pAdha denotes amsa. The plural term bhoothani,
is used as souls are many.
Suthra-44-api smaryathE-2- 3-44
It is also stated in the smrithi.
In Bhagavatgita the Lord declares
'mamaivAmsO jivalOkE
jivabhoothah sanathanah,(BG.15-7)
an eternal part of Myself has become the individual soul.'
An objection
is raised that if the soul is part of Brahman all imperfections of the soul
will be of Brahman too. The next sutra answers
that
Suthra-45-prakAsAdh ivatthu naivam parah-2-3-45
As in the case of light it is not so
As the light
of a luminous body, the generic character(jati) of an entity and the colour of
an object, though being part of the object they qualify are different from it
so also Brahman is different from the individual self which forms its mode. A
visEshaNa, attribute and the visEshya the object having the attribute are
inseparable yet different. The declarations of identity and difference denote
the two aspects, the inseparability of the substance and its attribute and the
distinctness of the substance and the attribute, respectively.
Suthra-46-smaranthi cha-2-3-46
The smrthis also state this.
In VishnupurANa ParAsara states
'EkadhEsasTHithasyA gnEh jyothsnA visthAriNee
yaTHA,parsyabrahmaN ah sakthih thTHEdham akhilam jagath,(VP.1-22-56)
Just as the light of a luminous body that exists in
one place spreads around, the power of Brahman pervades the whole world. Also
the individual self is declared to be the body of the Lord.'thasyasrjyasya
sambhoothou thath sarvE vai harEsthanuh, ' all these created are the body
of Hari.
To the objection that if all souls are the amsa of the
Lord why should there be inequality such as some are qualified to study the
vedas and some are not etc. The next suthra
answers.
Suthra-47-anujnApar ihAraoudhehasamb ahDHAth
jyothirAdhivath- 2-3-47
Permission and exclusion is due to the connection with the
body.
Like the fire
which is from the household of a brahmana is accepted while that from cremation
ground is not, though the fire is the same everywhere, the difference in qualification
is due to the purity or otherwise of the body the soul occupies.
suthra-48-asanthath Eh cha avyathikarah- 2-3-48
Because of non-connection there is no confusion.
Even though
all souls are part of Brahman they being atomic and different from each other
the result of the karma is different for each. This would not have been
possible, says Ramanuja if the individual soul is identical with Brahman
but under the influence of ignorance or conditioned by upADhis.
Suthra-49-AbhAsa Eva cha-2-3-49
The arguments (of others) are fallacious.
Since Brahman is self illumined if it does not shine because
of avidhya it will result in the destruction of the svarupa of Brahman as
already shown in the arguments against the advaita view. And it is against
sruthi also, as indicated by the' cha 'kAra in the suthra,as the texts 'prthagAthmAnam
prErithAram cha mathvA,’ (Svet.1-6)
thinking himself to be different from the ruler, and
'thayOranyah pippalam svAdhu atthi anasnan anyah
parichAkaseethi,(Svet.4-6)
Of the two, one eats the fruits sweet and sour and
the other looks on without eating,' clearly show that the individual self is
different from Brahman.
Suthra-50-adhrshta aniyamAth-2- 3-50
Because of non-determination of adhrshtas
The opponent,
bhEdhAbhedhavAdhin says that this difficulty can be surmounted if the upAdhis
are real and the differences are taken to be the cause of beginning less
adhrshta, unseen principle, which cause upAdhis.
But this suthra refutes it by saying
that since the upadhis have their substratum as Brahman, who
appears as though different from the jiva due to upADHis, there can be no rule
that a particular adhrshta acts for the particular soul and hence there will be
confusion.
Suthra-51-abhisanDh yAdhishvapi chaivam-2-3- 51
Similarly there can be no restriction in the case of purpose
etc.
Neither can
there be any definite rule regarding the purpose of adhrshtas.
Suthra-52-pradhEsab hEdhAth ithi cheth na, antharbhAvAth-
2-3-52
If it is
claimed that plurality of upADHi is due to difference of place it is not so,
because they are all within.
Brahman being limited by upADHis which occupy different
places the difference of experience is possible, says the opponent who is
refuted by the suthra saying that the upADHis move here and there and also
Brahman being one, the suffering in one place will affect the whole.
The last three
suthras refute the view of those who profess the absolute unity of the soul
with Brahman. Thus ends
amsADHikaraNam.
The end of the third pAdha of the second aDHyAya of
sribhAshya
pAdha4
prAnOthpatthyaDHika raNam-2-4- 1
Suthra-1-thaTHA prANAh-2-4-1
Likewise
the organs
Here the word
prAna refers to the vital airs and the senses.After discussuing the origination
of the insentient world and the individual self now the the creation of vital
breath and the sense organs are taken up in this pAdha.
The opponent
quotes the text,
'asadhvA idhamagra Aseeth; thadhAhuh kim thadhAseeth
ith;rshayO vAva thE agrE Aseeth; thadhAhuh ke thE rshayah ithi;prANA vAva
rshayah,'(sathapatha brAhmaNa
VI-i-1-1-)
Meaning, non-being
was at the beginning; rshis are the non-being said to be present in the beginning;
the rshis are the prANas, and says that it shows that the sesnses existed
before creation. The word prAnAs used in plural denotes all the sense organs as
well. This cannot be construed to mean the long duration of existence as in the
case of air and AkAsa as explained in the previous section because the sentence
asadhvA idhamagra Aseeth clearly denotes the time before
creation.
This suthra
refutes the above view saying that like the AkAsa etc. the prANas are also created
as declared by the texts such as 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth EkamEva
adhvitEEyam, ' (Chan.6-2-1) which declare that the Self, Brahman only was
at the beginning, one only without a second, and 'EthasmAth jAyathE prAnah
manah sarvendhriyANi cha,(Mund.2-3-1) from this vital airs, mind and
senses are created,' which specifically mention the origination of
these.Moreover there is no mention of eternity for the senses as in the case of
the individual soul.In the the passage quoted at the outset, only Brahman is
denoted by the word prANa because it has been used in the same sense elsewhere
also as in 'sarvANi ha imAni bhoothAni prANamEva abhisamvisanthi
prANamabhyujjihvath E, (Chan.1-11-5) all these beings merge in prANa and
emerge from that, which could be only Brahman, and also the word rshi
used in the passage quoted denotes only Brahman because of the meaning
'all-knowing' attributed to the rshis.
Suthra-2-gounyasamb havAth thathprAkrtsruthesc ha-2-4-2
The plural is
to be taken in the secondary sense because of the impossibility and the earlier
declaration.
Since it has
been mentioned that sath alone existed, the plural form of the word prANa is to
be taken in the secondary sense.
Suthra-3-thathpoorv akathvAth vAchah-2-4-3
Because of speech having for its antecedent the creation of
the senses
There is an
additional reason to know that the senses were created, says this suthra. The
text 'thddhedham tharhi avyAkrtham Aseeth thannAmarupAbhyam vyAkriyatha, this
world was then unmanifested and then was differentiated by names and forms. So,
as there was no function to perform before differentiation into name and form,
they were created later.
Thus ends the prANOthpathyaDHikar
aNam.
SapthagathyaDHikara Nam-2-4-2
Suthra-1-sapthagath
Eh cvisEshithathvAccha
The organs are
seen in number as known from their going with the soul at death and from being
specified so.
The senses are usually counted as eleven, five
jnAnendhriyas, five karmEndhriyas and the mind. But the opponent comes with an
argument that they are only seven as given in the sruthi.He quotes the text 'saptha
imE lOkA Eshu haranthi prAnA guhAsayA nihithAh saptha saptha, (Mund.2-1-8)
(fromHim) these seven worlds (Seats of sense life) are born seven and seven
where placed lying in the cave (of heart) the prAnas move.' The word seven
and seven does not mean fourteen but the repetition is to indicate the
plurality of souls. the prANas are also mentioned as moving in the text
'yadhA
panchAvathishTanthE jnAnAni mansA saha, buddhischa na vichEshtitha thAmAhuh
paramAmgathim,
When the five instruments of knowledge along with mind rest
and the buddhi also does not act that they call the highest state.'
The highest
state means the state of release. This shows that the jnAnendhriyas, eye, ear,
nose, tongue and skin, (that is the power behind them and not the gross
organs,) mind and intellect moving with the soul when it departs from the body.
The next suthra answers this.
Suthra-5-hasthAdhay asthu sThithE athah naivam-2-4-5
It is not so on account of hands and feet etc assist the
soul residing in the body.
Indhriyas are
eleven only which are the five jnAnEndhriyas and five karmEndhriyas and manas,
the mind, because the karmendhriyas, hands, feet, organ of speech and the
organs of reproduction and excretion are also assisting the soul residing in
the body.The text 'dasEmE purushE prANAh Athma EkAdhasa,(Brhd.2-4-2)
these are the ten organs in man and the self is the eleventh,' confirm this.
The view that the karmEndhriyas are referred to as prAnas only in the secondary
sense is not correct and on the other hand the inclusion of buddhi,chittha and
ahamkAra are all different states of mind only, says Ramanuja, 'adhyavasAyAbhimAna
chinthabuddhibhEdhA th mana EvebuddhyahankArach ittha sabdhaihvtapadhisya tha,'
according to the functions of the mind,namely, deciding, egoistic and
thinking. Even in the smrthi it is said 'indhriyANi dhasaikancha (BG.XIII-5)
the ten indhriyas and the one. Where more number is mentioned it is to denote
the functions of the mind wnd where less number is given it refers to the
particular aspects such as accompanying the soul etc.
Thus ends the sapthagathyaDHikara Nam
PrANANuthvADHikaraN am-2-4-3
Suthra-6-aNavascha-
2-4-6
And they are atomic.
From the text
' tha EthE sarva cha Eva samAh sarvE ananthAh,' (Brhd.1-5-13) which says
all these (speech, mind and prAna) are equal and infinite,' it looks as though
they are all pervading but this suthra confirms that they are atomic. This is
known from 'prANam anoothkrAmantham sarvE prANA anoothkrAmanthi, when
the vital breath passes out of the body all the organs depart with it,' the
first prana meaning the vital air and the latter meaning the organs. The
mention of infinite character is for the sake of meditation as shown by 'aTHa
yO hyEthAnananthAn upAsthE, he who meditates on them as infinite.
Suthra-7-srEshtascha
And the best
The oppoent holds the view that the chief
vital air, prANa is not created as stated in the sruthi,'AneedhavAtham
svaDHaya thadhEkam, by its own law it was alone breathing
without wind.' (Rk.V.X-129- 2) Since the word breathing refers to the
mukhyaprANa, as indicated by 'prANO vai jyEshTascha srEshTascha, ' (Brhd.6-1) the
passage quoted shows that the prANA existed before creation.
This suthra refutes the view citing
the evidence of sruthi that the prANA was created.In MundakOpanishad it is
specifically mentioned that the prANA was created from Brahman. 'EthasmATH
jAyathE prANah, from this the prANA was born.' Hence the reference to the
one breathing without wind is to Brahman, who only existed in the beginning.
Thus ends the prANANuthvADHikaraNam.
VAyukriyADHikaraNam
Suthra-8-na vAyukriyE prthagupadhEsAth- 2-4-8
Neither air nor function.
A doubt
is raised regarding prANa as to whether it is only air, the element or the
motion of air or is it some specific condition of air. The poorvapakshin states
that it is air as known from the text 'yah prANah sa vAyuh, prANa is
air.' Or as the word breath is adopted to indicate prANa and it is the motion
of inhalation and exhalation it could be the motion of air.
Both
these views are refuted by the suthra on the basis of separate statement of the
scriptures that the breath and air are two different things.'EthasmAth
jAyathE prANah mansasarvEndhriyANi cha, kham vAyuh, (Mund.2-1-3)
from HIm prAna originated, mind and the sense organs and AkAsa and VAyu,' The
text prANa is air does not mean that breath is identical with air but only that
it has assumed a special form and not altogether different from air like any
ther substance like fire. Also the breath is not only motion but a substance
having motion.
Suthra-9-chakshurAd hivatthu
thathsahasishtyAdhu bhyah-2-4- 9
But like
the eye and the rest, being taught with them and other reasons.
Breath is
not a boothavisesha, a special element but like other senses like the
eye it is also an instrument of the soul. This is shown by the text which
mentions it along with the other organs, 'EthasmAth jAyathE prAnah
manssarvEndhriyANi cha,' the phrase 'for other reasons ' refer to
the mention of sense organs as prANas and the vital breath as mukhyaprANa.
To the
objection that if the prANa is also helpful to the soul like the sense organs
then there must be some function ascribred to it but it is not so, the next suthra
gives a reply.
Suthra-10-akaraNath vAth cha na
dhOshah thaTHA hi dharsayathi- 2-4-10
It is no defect as shown in the scripture.
The word akaraNathva
denotes akriyathva, absence of action.The objection that the prANa has
no function is not correct as the scripture mentions the action of prANa as
supporting the soul. In Chandogya upanishad there is an account of a dispute
among the senses, mind and prANa as to who is the superior among them and when
each one departed from the body the body remained active though without that
particular faculty but when the vital air started to leave it pulled all the
others with it and they had to accept that prANa is the best among them.
Therefore prANa, like the other organs is subservient to the soul and
hence instrumental like eye and other organs.
Suthra-11-panchvrtt hirmanOvath
vyapadhisyathE- 2-4-11
It is said to have five functions like the mind
The desire etc though different
in their functions is not different from mind,
'kAmasankalpO
vichikithsA sraddha asraddha dhrthiradhrthih hreerdheerbheeerith yEvam sarvam
mana Eva, (Brhd.1-7-3)
desire, will,doubt, faith,
faithlessness, courage and the lack of it,shyness, wisdom and fear all are of
mind only.' Similarly the five prANas, namely, pprANa,apAna, udana,vyana and
samana are only five functions of the same breath. Thus ends the
vAyukriyADHikaraNam
SrEshTANuthvADHikar aNam-2-4- 5
Suthra-12-aNuscha- 2-4-12
PrANa is
also atomic like the sense organs as shown from the text ' thamuthkrAmantham
prANO anukrAmathi, (Brhd.4-4-2) the prANa follows the soul when it goes
out.' The view that it is all pervading according to the texts like 'sarvamheedham
prANENa Avrtham, all these are covered with prANa,' are only to indicate
that all life depends on it.Thus ends the srEshTANuthvADGikar aNam.
JyOthrAdhyaDHishTAn ADHikaraNam2- 4-6
Suthra-13-jyOthiraD HishTAnam thu thadhAmananAth prANAvathA
sabdhATH-2-4- 13
Ruling over the senses by fire and others and of the soul is due to the
will of the supreme self.
In a
previous suthra 'abhimANivyapadhEsa sthu visEshAnugathibhyAm,' (BS.II-1-5) it has been shown that the
fire and oher deities rule over the sense organs and the rule of the soul over
the senses is known from the text
'EvamEva
Esha EthAn prANAn grheethvA svE sarirE yaTHA kAmam parivarthathe,(Brhd.2-1-18) taking these prANas he moves within the body as he wishes.'
The doubt
is that whether the ruling by the presiding deities and by the soul is by their
own independent power or depends on some other higher authority. The opponent
says that they are independent which the suthra refutes on the basis of the
scriptural declaration that it depends on the will of the supremeself.'yO
vAyou thishTAn', 'ya AdhithyE thishTan', 'ya Athmani thishTAn' etc. (Brhd.II-
1-18) which declare the supreme self to be the inner ruler and the self of all.
Also the text, 'BheeshA asmAth vAthah pavathe, bheeshAdhEt hi suryah,
bheeshASmAth agnischendhrascha mrthyurdhAvathi panchamah,' (Taitt.II-8- 1)
which means that out of fear from Him the air the Sun, fire, Moon and the
Lord of death discharge their duties. In BrhadhAraNyaka upanishad also we
have the following text, 'Ethasya vA aksharasya prasAsanE gArgi
suryAchandhramasou viDHrthou thishTathah, (Brhd.III-8- 9) by the command of
this, the imperishable, the sun and the moon stand, held apart.'
Suthra-14-thasya cha nithyathvAth- 2-4-14
The ruling of all by the supreme self is permanent.
The
sruthi texts like 'thathsrshtvA thadhEva anuprAvisath, (Tait.2-6) after
creating the world He entered into it,’. and of smrithi also 'vishtabhyAham
idham krtsnam EkAmsEna sThithO jagath,(BG.10-42) where the Lord declares
that He pervades the whole world by a part of Himself, all show that
the ruling by the supreme self is permanent and His essential nature.
IndhriyADhikaraNam- 2-4-7
Suthra-15-tha indhriyANi
thadhvyapadhEsAth anyathra sreshTAth-2- 4-15
With the exception of the sreshTa, (the mukhyaprANa) all the
others denoted by the word prANa are the organs because they are so mentioned.
As declared in the BrhadhAraNyaka text 'thasmAth Etha EthEna
AkhyAyanthE prANA ithi (Brhd.1-5-21) therefore they are all called by its
name as prANA,' the senses are denoted by the name prANAh. This suthra
differentiates the mukhyaprANa from the others saying that except the srEshTa,
as prANa is so called in the passage; all the others are organs, that is,
instruments of cognition. This is confirmed by the smrthi also as 'indhriyANi
dhasaikam cha pancha chEndhriyagOcharAh, the indhriyas are ten with the
mind as the eleventh.'
Suthra-16-bhEdhsrut hEh
vailakshaNyAccha- 2-4-16
Because of statement of difference and the difference in
characterestics
The text 'EthasmAth jAyathE prANO manssarvENdhriyAni cha,
from this (Brahman) prANa, mind and all indhriyas are born,' (Mund.2-1-3)
mentions prANa separately from indhriyas and the mind. But the mind has been
included among the indhriyas elsewhere. 'manas shashTAneendhriyANi,'
says the Gita.(BG.15- 7) The function of the indhriyas and manas is to act as
instruments of cognition while that of prANa is to support the body and senses,
which is why the indhriyas are denoted by the term prANAh. Hence by
specific mention and funcion the prANa is different from others.Thus ends the indhriyADHikaraNam.
SajnAmurthyklrpthya DHikaraNam- 2-4-8
Suthra-17-sajnAmurt hyklrpthisthu
thrivrthkurvatha upadhEsAth-2- 4-17
The creation of names and forms are by the one who effects
the tripartite because scripture says so.
To the question that whether the names and forms were created
by the supreme self or by HiraNyagarbha who stands for the collective aggregate
of individual selves, the suthra answers that it is only the supreme self.The
One only without a second who willed to become many and created fire etc. is
said to enter into all beings and gave them names and forms says the sruthi. 'anEna
jivENa AthmanA anupravisya nAmarupE vyAkaravANi,(Chan.6-3-2) I will enter
along with the soul as the inner self and give names and forms.'
The opponent claims that the designation of names and forms is by the HiraNyagarbha only
because anEna jeevEna indicates the agency of the jiva which means that the
supreme self did not do the differentiation of name and form by itself but
through the jiva only.But on account of this the first person singular used
in the passage, namely vyAkaravANi (let me differentiate) is not to be
taken in the secondary sense as in the case of a king functioning through his
spies who represent him because, the two are distinct whereas in this case the
jiva is a part of Brahman and the first person singular can be taken literally.
But this view is
refuted by the suthra saying that the differentiation of names and form can be
ascribed only to the one who effected the tripartite as shown in the text
'sEyam
dhEvathaikshatha hanthAham imASthisrah dhEvathA anEna jivEna AthmanA
anupravisya nAmarupe vyAkaravANi; thAsAm thrivrtham thivrthamEkaikAm
karavANi, (Chan.6-3-2)
that divinity
thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this lself,
differentiate names and forms ;let me make each of these three tripartite.'
The tripartition of each means this. Of the three elements mentioned as being created, in each,
the one which is the primary constituent dominates while the other two remain
as secondary. For instance the gross element fire consists of half fire
and rest being made up of water and earths each forming a quarter.
Similarly in the other two the primary element forming one half of it and other
two a quarter each.This can be the action of the supremeself only and not the
Hiranyagarbha because he himself resides inside the cosmic egg made up of the
three elements.Hence the word Athma in the passage means only Brahman
having the individual self as His body.
Sythra-18-mAmsAdhi boumam yaTHAsabdam
itharayOscha- 2-4-18
Flesh etc are of earthly nature and so are the other two
according to the texts.
The opponent comes up with an objection that though the differentiation into names and forms and
the tripartition may be the act of one agent it need not necessarily be the
supreme self but could be Hiranyagarbha as there is evidence from sruthi that
the nama rupa were evolved first and then the tripartite creation came
about.In the text quoted in the previous suthra it clearly shows that this was
the order of creation because the nAmarupa vyAkarNam is mentioned before
the thrivrthkaraNam. Since the texts refer to a tripartete process with
respect to the food taken by an individual whcih cannot be prior to the
differentiation into name and form.The text quoted by the opponent is from
ChAndhOgya passage '
The suthra refutes this saying that the tripartite process described in the passage is
only a description of the transformation of the three elements into different
parts of human body and has nothing to do with the tripartition explained
earlier regarding the creation.
Suthra-19-vaisEshyA sthu thadhvAdhasthadhvAd hah-2-4-19
The designation of the elements as such is due to the
preponderance of that particular element.
Though all the three elements mentioned are presemt on each of the
three they are called by the name of that element which is predominant. This is the end of sajnAmurthyklrpthya DHikaraNam.
End of the second chapter of
Sribhashya of Ramanuja.