"The Highway 275-92 bridge is not part of the interstate system. This bridge is a two-lane bridge and has a thirty-five mile per hour speed limit with no minimum speed limit. There is a significantly lower traffic volume on this bridge. Adjacent to the roadway is a narrow walkway which is used as an escape area for pedestrians but would not be suitable for bicycle riders. There is no shoulder on this bridge.
"The drainage grates along the shoulders of the interstate bridges pose a particular threat to bicycle riders. The bars of the grates run parallel to the direction a bicycle will travel, creating a serious danger for bicycle riders. However, that design for the drainage grates has maximum hydraulic efficiency. [John Forester previously commented on the hydraulic efficiency of drainage grates in response to DeWaters v. City of Atlanta.]
"A threshold question is whether there exists a constitutional right to travel by a particular means to travel. There is no question that there is a constitutionally protected right to travel. As stated in Shapiro v. Thompson ...:
"'This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.'
"However, it is a different matter entirely to say that traveling by bicycle is similarly protected. A three-judge district court in Massachusetts considered a similar question regarding the automatic suspension of a driver's license when a person failed to satisfy property judgments as a result of a car accident. The appellant argued that the operation of statute significantly impeded the right to travel and served to punish the exercise of that right. The court stated:
"'Section 22A's sanction limits only one means of transportation--a car operated by a particular individual. The right to travel does not require the state to avoid any regulation of methods of transportation if it would have some minimal effect on interstate travel. We, therefore, conclude that the statute does not violate the right to travel itself and does not affect the fundamental interest requiring close judicial scrutiny.'
Assuming arguendo that the fundamental right to travel encompasses the right to travel by a particular means, 'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest is unconstitutional.' ... In light of these premises, this court must consider whether the restrictions for use of the bridge are legitimately defensible in that they further a compelling state interest and do not unnecessarily impinge on constitutionally protected interests. ...
"To meet the burden of the compelling state interest test, the defendants must first establish what interest they seek to promote and secondly, that the regulations serve that interest without being arbitrary and capricious. The states are seeking to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens by regulating the use of the highways.
"'The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves. ... In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles, --those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. ... This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety and comfort of their citizens. ...' Hendcrick v. Maryland, ...
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