| Kaehny v. Lynn, 659 NYS 2d 388, 172 Misc 2d 295 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1997). John Kaehny was suing in his capacity as ED of Transportation Alternatives, and Lynn was the Commissioner of the NYC DOT. June 3, 1979, the South Outer Roadway on the lower level of the Queensboro Bridge was first officially designated as a bike/ped lane. From 1979 to 1996 exclusive bike/ped use was restricted at various times due to construction on other parts of the bridge. On September 6, 1996, the North Outer roadway of the lower level was closed for repairs. The DOT implemented different traffic patterns on the remaining nine lanes to minimize traffic problems. On November 11, 1996, the DOT designated the South Outer Roadway exclusively for Queens-bound motor traffic weekdays from 3:30 pm to 8:00 pm. This restriction on the use of the lane by peds and cyclists was accomplished by posting signs, an October 30 press release, and dissemination of 20,000 leaflets and other press advisories after November 4. This case was an Article 78 proceeding to annul these actions. From the court's opinion: "The Alleged Rule-Making Violation. Petitioners cite the City Administrative Procedure Act [Charter of the City of New York, sec. 1041 et seq.] which sets forth specific procedures that must be followed whenever an agency, such as the DOT, adopts a rule. The lane restriction, petitioners contend, constitutes a 'rule' within the meaning of the APA because it involves 'substantial policy considerations' [Charter sec. 1041(5)(b)(iv)]. They argue that regulating the conduct of over 500 cyclists and pedestrians involved substantial policy considerations. Therefore, petitioners say, under the City APA, respondents were required to publish a written draft of the proposed rule, set a date for a public hearing, publish a draft statement of the basis and purpose of the proposed rule, and invite written comments; no final rule may be adopted until 'after consideration of the relevant comments presented' [Charter sec. 1043 (d)]. "Petitioners draw an analogy between the restrictions at issue here and a 90 day ban imposed on cyclists in 1987. That ban, which affected Park, Madison, and Fifth Avenues between 31st and 59th Streets, was also accomplished by posting signs, and was enjoined by the court, which found adoption of the ban as a regulation was required [Association of Messenger Services v. City of New York ...]. "That analogy, and the other authority cited by petitioners, are inapplicable. An existing Rule of the City of New York--Title 11, sec. 4-12--prohibits bicyclists and pedestrians from using certain bridges within the City of New York 'unless signs permit such use.' The Queensboro Bridge is one of the bridges enumerated in the Rules [Title 11, sec. 4-07]. The City Charter gives the DOT the authority to post traffic signs regulating pedestrian and vehicle traffic on city bridges [Charter sec. 2903(a)]. Based on these existing rules--which were inapplicable to the situation presented in Messenger Services, supra--the DOT has the authority to regulate pedestrian and cyclist access to city bridges by the posting of signs. The rule-making process urged by petitioners, therefore, is irrelevant. "The Alleged Violation of the Constitutional Right to Travel. Petitioners contend that the daily restriction imposed by respondents violated their constitutional right to travel. They concede the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed an intrastate right to travel, but they argue that such an intrastate right can be inferred from decisions issued by the 2d and 3d Circuits. "This attempt to couch the DOT's actions in terms of a constitutional right cannot save petitioners' application. Even if the court were to presume the existence of a constitutional right of intrastate travel, that right would not extend to a particular mode of travel [Wherrett v. Doyle ...]. Highway safety regulations, such as the restriction at issue here, enjoy a strong presumption of validity [Ruiz v. Commissioner ...]. "Mandamus. Mandamus is a remedy used to compel an agency to perform a duty required by law ... It is available where there is a clear right to the relief sought against the agency, and the agency has refused to perform its duty ... "Mandamus, however, is not available here. Petitioners have not established a clear right to the relief they seek. Furthermore, the lane restriction imposed by respondents involves 'questions of judgment, discretion, [and the] allocation of resources and priorities [which are] inappropriate for resolution in the judicial arena' [Jones v. Beame ...]. "On this record, the application is denied in its entirety, and the petition is dismissed." |
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