[...]
"Of the soundness of these decisions and their applicability to our statute we need not inquire, for they fall far short of deciding that a bicycle rider injured by reason of a defect in the highway rendering it unsuitable for ordinary travel is without remedy merely because when injured he was in the saddle of a bicycle instead of on a wagon seat, or a horse's back, or on his feet pushing a bicycle. ... Common sense rejects the distinction. The statute furnishes no warrant for it, either in letter or spirit. It says, 'Towns are liable for damages happening to any person ... traveling,' etc., without any expressed limitation as to the mode of conveyance. 'A traveler is one who travels in any way.' 'To travel is to pass or make a journey from place to place, whether on foot, on horseback, or in any conveyance.' Traveling is 'the act of making a journy; change of place; passage.' The word 'traveling,' as used in some penal statutes, may have a narrow meaning; but, in order to maintain an action against a city or town for a defect in a highway, one need be a traveler only in the general sense above indicated. ... It should also be observed that the bicycle is recognized by the public policy of New Hampshire as a legitimate method of traveling upon the highway, and that it is in common use for that purpose, with general consent. Laws 1897, p. 51, c. 61, sec. 1; Id. p. 89, c. 93. Being a traveler upon the highway, both according to the literal meaning of that term and by the public policy of the state as clearly manifested by the legislation and general custom referred to, the plaintiff, notwithstanding she was riding on a bicycle, was entitled at least to a highway in condition suitable for ordinary travel, and to damages happening to her by reason of any unsuitableness of the highway for such travel. It follows that the instructions given upon this point were correct, and that those requested were properly denied.
"The question discussed as to whether a bicycle is a carriage within the meaning of the statute seems quite immaterial to the present case, because the plaintiff claims nothing on account of damage to her wheel, and her right to recover for damage to her person is in no way dependent upon the means by which she was moving, so long as she was a traveler and in the exercise of due care. But, if the question were material, and the instruction that a bicycle is not a carriage erroneous, the error was entirely in the defendants' favor, and prejudicial to the plaintiff alone."
Disclaimer