"The record reveals, the parties stipulated, the defendants have insisted throughout, and the trial judge agreed, that Tenpenny traveled on the shoulder of the road, and only on the shoulder of the road, during his entire sojourn, right up until the accident. At no time did he enter Johnston Street proper. The shoulder of the street, then, was his chosen pathway of travel and was not utilized as a mere convenience to pass or overtake other vehicles.
"La. R.S. 32:1(92) defines a bicycle as a vehicle. Generally, bicyclists have the same rights and duties under law as drivers of other vehicles, subject to exceptions. ... One of these exceptions is, '[w]henever a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use such path and shall not use the roadway.' ... This proposition is fully supported in the case law. In Robertson v. Penn ... the court said '[w]here there is no bicycle path or shoulder as here, the bicyclist has no choice but to ride on the highway,' thus not only holding that a bicyclist did not have to ride on the road, but explicitly recognizing a preference in favor of a non-highway bicycle path, and implicitly holding that the preferred bicycle path does not have to be one expressly created or designated solely for bicycle travel. That is, the shoulder of a road or a sidewalk can serve as the preferred bicycle path. ...
"Upon reflection, one can see the sense in this. A bicyclist riding on Johnston Street itself, an extremely busy thoroughfare the record reflects, would be an impediment to the 'regular' motor vehicular traffic and would be engaged in an enterprise creating hazard to himself and to others. Therefore, we can appreciate a public policy determination that it would be safer for all concerned for bicycles to utilize alternative pathways, away from motor vehicular traffic, if they are available.
"Additionally, the trial judge found that Ringuet also violated a safety statute, La. R.S. 32:104, in that she failed, in entering a private driveway [to a shopping center], to turn her vehicle with reasonable safety. The record, viewed in its entirety, supports this finding. Although she testified she gave a turn signal, there is evidence that she was late in giving it. There was also evidence that she did not see Tenpenny, either because she was in a hurry, or because of inattention, or because he was in her 'blind spot.' Whatever the particulars, the trial judge could have reasonably inferred negligence on her part, finding that if she had allowed herself to be less harried, or if she had been more attentive, she could have taken appropriate and proper precautions, and she then would probably have seen Tenpenny, thus averting the collision."
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