Clement v. State of Louisiana through the Dept of Transportation and Development, 528 So2d 176 (1988), writ denied 532 So2d 157 (1988).  A bicyclist riding over a bridge at 3:30 pm lodged her front tire in a gap between sections of bridge gratings.  The original bridge plans called for concrete approaches on each end with a middle span made of steel grate flooring installed in four sections running the length of the span and welded in place with three one-inch gaps between the four lengthwise sections.  The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the cyclist.  The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, affirmed as amended.  From the court's opinion:  "In Farr v. Montgomery Ward and Company ... appears the following:  'The owner, or person having custody, of immovable property has a duty to keep such property in a reasonably safe condition.  He must discover any unreasonably dangerous condition on his premises and either correct the condition or warn potential victims of its existence.  ...  This duty is the same under the strict liability theory of La. C.C. art. 2317 as under the negligent liability theory of La. C.C. art. 2315.  ...  The difference in proof between these theories of liability is that under La. C.C. art. 2315, it must be shown that the owner, or person in custody, either knew or should have known of the risk, whereas under La. C.C. art. 2317, a claimant is relieved of proving the defendant's scienter.  ...  Under either theory of liability, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that:  (1) the property which caused the damage was in the 'custody' of the defendant; (2) the property was defective because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises (breach of duty); and (3) that the defect in the property was a cause in fact of the resulting injury.  In both negligent and strict liability cases, the reasonableness of the risk is determined by balancing the probability and magnitude of the risk against the utility of the thing.  ...  Under either theory of liability, the court must decide if the risk which causes the injury is within the ambit of protection of the duty.

[...]

"A person who negligently builds something is liable in tort under La. C.C. art. 2315 for whatever damages are caused by his negligent construction; the builder has a duty to third persons (as well as to parties with whom he contracts) to perform in a workmanlike manner free from defects attributable to either faulty materials or poor workmanship.  ...

"The Bayou Grosse Tete bridge is intended for local use to accommodate vehicle, pedestrian, bicycle and animal traffic.  [A careful reading of this case fails to reveal what constitutes "intent" for accommodation of bicycle traffic.]  The bridge plans drawn up and followed by DOTD in the construction of the bridge called for a
one inch gap between the grates.  One inch spacers could have been used to assure compliance with this specification.  Plaintiff's expert in civil engineering ... measured the gap in the area where Mrs. Clement fell and found that the gap measured anywhere from an inch and one-half to an inch and three-quarters.  Mrs. Clement's bicycle tire measured an inch and one-half with her on it and an inch and one-quarter when she was off of it.  Mrs. Clement's accident would not have happened had the bridge been built according to plan.

"DOTD failed to follow its own specifications when it constructed the gap in the bridge with a spacing of one and one-half to one and three-quarters inch.  The extra width of the gap made it possible for a bicycle tire to lodge in it.  Because the bridge was intended to accommodate bicycle traffic, this deviation from specifications created an unreasonable risk of injury (and is a defect) because a bicycle tire could lodge in the gap and cause an accident (just as it did in the instant case).  This defect caused Mrs. Clement's accident and injuries.  The duty of DOTD to construct the bridge in accordance with plans and specifications which would ensure that bicycle riders could safely use the bridge includes within the ambit of its protection the requirement that the bridge not have gaps in which a bicycle could fall or become lodged.  (Thus, it is foreseeable that, if gaps in a bridge are not according to plan and are made too wide, bicycles would fall or become lodged in them and cause accidents.)

"DOTD contends the trial court committed error by not finding that Mrs. Clement was comparatively negligent.  DOTD asserts Mrs. Clement was familiar with the bridge because she crossed it many times with her bicycle, and she admitted she had seen the gaps in the gratings.  DOTD argues that Mrs. Clement could have avoided the accident had she been attentive.

"A bicyclist is subject to the same duties applicable to drivers of motor vehicles.  ...  One of those duties is to keep a proper lookout at all times.  ...  Thus, a bicyclist has a duty to maintain a proper lookout for hazards; however, the bicyclist has a right to assume that the highway is reasonably safe for his use until such time as he knows, or should know, of an existing hazard.  ...  A bicyclist is not charged with a duty of guarding against unusual, unexpected or all but invisible hazards which he had no reason to anticipate would be in the roadway.

"The defect which caused Mrs. Clement's accident was a one-half inch to three-quarter inch widening of the gap between the grates on the bridge.  This negligent widening of the gap was just barely enough to allow her bicycle tire to fall into the gap.  ...  When crossing the bridge, Mrs. Clement was required to direct her attention to motor vehicles and pertinent traffic controls, as well as the roadway.  In this factual posture, a distance on the surface of the roadway of one-half to three-quarters of an inch is not apparent or conspicuous.  Failure to observe such a defect while riding a bicycle across a bridge is not comparative negligence."
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