| [Warning: The precedent set down by this case has been overturned by more recent case law.] Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 NE 485 (1909). A 15 year old bicyclist and amputee who was quite adept at cycling while using a prosthetic left leg hit a pothole in the asphalt. He fell, dislocated and permanently injured his left hip. The hole was 1 foot by 2 feet, 10 to 15 inches deep, filled with water, and had been there two to three months. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. From the court's opinion: "The [trial] court instructed the jury, at the request of appellant, that the appellee could not recover unless they believed that it had been proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'the street in question, at the time and place of the alleged accident, was not reasonably safe for ordinary travel thereon by persons using due care and caution for their safety'; and also instructed the jury that: 'A city is not bound, under the law, to keep its streets absolutely safe, nor is it bound, under the law, to keep them in reasonably safe condition. It is only bound to use reasonable care to keep its streets reasonably safe for ordinary travel thereon by persons using due care and caution for their safety.' These instructions state the law with substantial accuracy. ... The appellant further asked the court to instruct the jury that: "Ordinary travel does not include the use of a street by one riding a bicycle thereon. ... A person when riding a bicycle on a street is not using said street for the purpose of ordinary travel thereon.' It also asked the following instruction: 'If you believe, from the evidence, that the street in question, at the time and place of the alleged accident, was reasonably safe for ordinary travel thereon by persons riding in vehicles, such as wagons, carriages, and other similar vehicles, then you are instructed that you should find the defendant, city of Chicago, not guilty, whether you believe that said street at said time and place was or was not reasonably safe for travel by a person riding a bicycle thereon.' "The only ground for reversal urged by appellant is the refusal of these last instructions by the trial court. Does ordinary travel include the use of a street by one riding a bicycle? By the great weight of authority a bicycle is a vehicle of such a nature that it may be properly used upon our highways. ... 'Being a vehicle, its proper place is upon the street or roadway and not upon the sidewalk,' unless otherwiseprovided by statute. 'Bicycles are subject to the "law of the road," and their use upon highways may be regulated by the Legislature.' Elliot on Roads & Streets, p. 635. "When not based upon a special statutory provision ... we are inclined to doubt the soundness of the rule laid down by some courts ... that a cyclist must take the road as he finds it, provided it is safe for an ordinary horse-drawn vehicle, and that in the absence of legislation the courts will not require the public authorities to keep streets and highways safe for bicycles, automobiles, and vehicles of like character. We think the sounder rule is laid down by one of these courts in the recent decision of Doherty v. Town of Ayer ... where that court held that: 'Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles, and cities and towns are bound to keep their ways reasonably safe and convenient for travel generally, including that properly undertaken upon such vehicles. ... But if their ways are reasonably safe and convenient for travel generally, they are not liable for a failure to make special provisions, required only for the safety and convenience of persons using automobiles or bicycles.' ... [Please click here to continue reading.] |
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