2-28-2001 Denial of application for a post office box at Silver Springs, Florida. Judge determined that an RV park is a "transient development," and therefore not a valid "physical address".
http://www.usps.com/judicial/2001deci/pob00-442id.htm 

In the Matter of the Petition by	)  February 28, 2001
					)
JAMES L. BYRD				)
3601 W. Silver Springs Blvd.,		)
Site 41					)
Ocala, FL 34475-5639			)
					)
					)
Refusal to Provide Post Office		)
Box Service				)  P.S. Docket No. POB 00-442

APPEARANCE FOR PETITIONER:		James L. Byrd
					3601 W. Silver Springs Blvd., 
					Suite 41
					Ocala, FL  34475-5639

APPEARANCE FOR RESPONDENT:		Catherine A. Green, Esq.
					Civil Practice Section
					United States Postal Service
					475 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, Room 6403
					Washington, DC  20260-1127

INITIAL DECISION

This proceeding arises from a Petition filed by Mr. Byrd after receiving a written denial of his application for a post office box from the postmaster at Silver Springs, Florida, dated November 3, 2000.

On December 22, 2000, Respondent, the United States Postal Service, filed an Answer to the Petition, along with a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that there were no material facts in dispute and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Attached to the motion was a sworn declaration from E. Lois Connor, the Silver Springs Postmaster, and other documents. Petitioner was given an opportunity to reply to the motion but did not do so. The following findings of fact are based on all the material submitted by the parties.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner resides in a recreational vehicle (RV). He spends between three to five months in Florida, and travels the country the rest of the year. When in Florida, he leases Site 41 at the Motor Inns RV Park, 3601 W. Silver Springs Blvd., Ocala, Florida. (Petition; Connor Declaration).

2. When Petitioner submitted his post office box application (PS Form 1093) to the Silver Springs Postmaster, he presented proper forms of identification and also presented a document showing that he had leased Site 41 at the Motor Inns RV Park. He also told the postmaster that he planned to stay in Ocala for three months and that he wanted to have his mail forwarded from his post office box while he traveled around the country. (Petition; Connor Declaration).

3. The postmaster told Petitioner that an RV park was not a valid "physical residence" for purposes of renting a post office box, and she denied his application. She also told Petitioner that he could receive mail by general delivery and that she could forward mail from his general delivery address. (Connor Declaration).

4. The following provisions of the Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) are pertinent:1

  • D910.2.3.
  • An applicant for post office box service, . . ., must identify his or her physical address (i.e., an individual’s residence or a business’s location) to the postmaster of the office where service is sought or provided. If the postmaster cannot confirm the physical address, the applicant or box customer must provide proof of the physical address . . ..
    •
  • D910.3.7.
  • A post office box may not be used when the primary purpose is to have the USPS forward or transfer mail to another address free of charge.
    •

    • Section D910.8.1 of the DMM gives a postmaster authority to refuse post office box service if there is substantial reason to believe the box is to be used primarily for mail forwarding.

    DECISION

    A grant of summary judgment is proper when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and when, as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact and, if that burden is met, the opposing party must counter with something more than "mere denials or conclusory statements." Mingus Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The sworn declaration of the postmaster, Ms. Connor, and other documents filed by Respondent set forth facts pertinent to resolution of this case. Petitioner has not disputed those facts. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.

    Respondent relies on Section 631.463 of the Postal Operations Manual (POM) to support the position that an RV park is a "transient development," and therefore not a valid "physical address," within the meaning of DMM §D910.2.3. There is no doubt that the RV park where Petitioner resides is a "transient development," as defined by POM §631.463. The import of this is that mail will be delivered only to a single location or receptacle designated by park management, for further distribution by employees of the park. Whether this means that a resident of such a location cannot qualify for post office box service is less clear, but it is not necessary to resolve that issue.

    The postmaster's second basis for denial of Petitioner's application, i.e., that Petitioner intended to use the box primarily for mail forwarding, is supported by the facts and the quoted DMM provisions. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the postmaster's determination to refuse post office box service to Petitioner, based on DMM Sections D910.3.7 and D910.8.1, is sustained.

     

    					Bruce R. Houston
					Chief Administrative Law Judge

    1  DMM Issue 55 was in effect at all times pertinent to this case. The current version (Issue 56) took effect on January 7, 2001, but none of the pertinent provisions have changed.

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