Summary and Reflection on Samantha Power's Article, “Bystanders in Genocide”, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2001

A few years after the Rwandan Genocide occurred in 1994, Philip Gourevitch wrote a series of article in The New Yorker about the genocide that caught President Clinton’s attention. The president acted with outraged surprise that such horrible events could occur. The problem was that the genocide in Rwanda took place while he held the chief position to stop them in the world as the President of the United States. How could he not have known what was happening when the government and their militia killed over eight hundred thousand people in one hundred days?

While many American government officials claim that either the U. S. did not know what was occurring in Africa or they knew that nothing could be done to stop it, many facts support the idea that not only did the U. S. predict and understand what was happening in Rwanda, but that they passed up many opportunities to intervene in the slaughter. When Clinton later gave a speech in Kigali basically admitting his wrongs in not acting enough, the problem remained that, not only did the U. S. do nothing, but it actually fought to remove peacekeepers from Rwanda when the genocide broke out.

Even as individuals and the entire country promised never to let such large scale immoral events happen after the Holocaust and Vietnam, the administration still sat by and did nothing. After the Holocaust, the United States, like many other countries at the time, pledged to never allow genocide to happen again. However, even while the genocide was occurring in Rwanda, the United States never gave the situation any serious attention as other events around the world seemed more important. In 1971, Anthony Lake, a foreign-service officer, wrote a critique of how such sensible policy makers could wage such an immoral war in Vietnam. Twenty-three years later, as Clinton’s national security advisor, Lake had the opportunity to alert everyone to the same situation in Rwanda. However, like many in the Clinton administration, he did nothing but attempt to remove more troops from Rwanda. In their inability to emphasize the responsibility of the United States to intervene, the members of the Clinton administration did more damage to the effort than any group of courageous individuals could counteract.

On the other side of the issue as one of those brave tragic individuals, Romeo Dallaire consistently and passionately fought for any intervention to stop the Rwandan slaughter against strong opposition from the world community. Throughout his life, Romeo sought the values of soldiering, service, and sacrifice which he felt were personified in the UN Peacekeeping forces. As a result, he jumped at the chance to lead a peacekeeping effort in Rwanda where rebel Tutsis and government Hutus had just sign an Armistice after a bloody civil war in a still tense region where ethnic wars had occurred for decades. His duty consisted of overseeing a peaceful transition under the new Arusha Accords between the two sides.

However, when he arrived, he found a very tense situation hinting at preparation for genocide. Even before he arrived, two organizations, the UN and a collection of human right groups, had filed reports warning of possible genocide. He also found that the mission was underfunded and under supported by the UN because of strong U. S. opposition to the plan. His vehicles did not work and many of the international troops he ruled over had few supplies. At one point, he even sent in a report which was ignored that stated that the government was preparing for genocide by registering all the Tutsis. Throughout his courageous tour of duty, Dallaire never gained any outside support for his attempts to stop the genocide before it started.

On April 6, 1994, reformist president Habyarimana’s jet was shot down outside the capital while carrying the president and the president of neighboring Burundi. Immediately, the Hutus set up road blocks and instigated a curfew throughout the country. At the time, America realized the possibility of mass violence and even genocide in reports released directly after the incident; however, the administration still refused to act even after the telling signs of genocide. Within hours, the Hutu militiamen began their slaughter by specifically attacking reformers including the prime minister. Not only did they plan to kill the moderates, but also attack the peacekeepers who they knew would crumble. On April 7, they killed and mutilated ten Belgian soldiers in an effort to make the country withdraw. The plan worked as Belgium immediately pulled out of the country. They also showed the advance planning that Dallaire noted by announcing the names and addresses of Tutsis. In response to these killings, the Rebel Tutsi Patriotic Front resumed its civil war with the government, further confusing the situation.

In response to the situation, the United States used their experience in Somalia to discount any effort to become involved in the conflict. In Somalia, U. S. involvement led to a great loss of American life and “nothing gained”. When faced with Rwanda, the United States believed the same thing would happen so they refused to participate in “self-interest”. To back their opinion of staying away from the conflict, the Administration created Presidential Directive 25, which made it almost impossible for Americans to ever get involved in outside conflicts without direct interests.

The diplomatic process suffered from three main failures both before and during the event. First, the Rwandan government’s many previous failures to follow the Accords before the genocide caused many countries to threaten to pull out peacekeeping forces. As a result, the members of the government planning the genocide gained confidence in their ability to crumble the international effort once the killings began. Second, a strong bias existed to see only the bright signs of success in the future and not the overwhelming signs of failure that now seem so obvious. Third, the world had grown use to ethnic violence in the region, so little seemed out of the ordinary when scattered reports of the genocide began to trickle in to different agencies. All these failures combined to allow the situation to continually worsen even as the killing spread unchecked.

The only interest any countries seemed to have in Rwanda was the evacuation of their citizens. Immediately after the fighting began, knowing the amount of killings taking place, many foreign governments including the United States sent troops to remove their citizens from the conflict. When the troops arrived, they refused to help any native Rwandans; instead, they rushed to protect only their own citizens. As the thousand troops rolled out behind the evacuees, Dallaire sat helplessly knowing he could do nothing to stop the genocide.

Through many different sources, the U. S. Government knew what was going on over in Rwanda; however, they continued to do nothing but lobby for the removal of troops. From Dallaire’s consistent speech about the “ethnic cleansing” occurring in Rwanda, the United States should have understood the situation as genocide. Even within the government, African experts began to warn the administration about the genocide, but the administration refused to listen. The newspapers also gave glimpses into the mass slaughter in Rwanda but the government did not heed any of these signs. Intent on avoiding involvement, the U. S. Government especially avoided the word “genocide” because they believed that the word would require them to “do something”. Instead, the government used terms like “acts of genocide” even though the administration candidly admitted to overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

When the genocide began, General Dallaire fully expected to receive an increase in troops to fight the perpetrators. The problem remained the Americans who feared their eventual involvement if UN troops continued their presence. When the Belgians approached the U.S. to support a complete withdrawal of troops from Rwanda after the ten Belgian soldiers died, the United States more than willingly backed their withdrawal and began to avidly fight for the removal of all troops, sighting “insufficient justification” for continued presence. Many international officials believed that the small force of twenty-one hundred left in the country could do nothing. On the contrary, the small UN force successfully protected twenty-five thousand Tutsis from eminent destruction because of the killers’ hesitance around any foreign forces. Never the less, the Security Council eventually passed an initiative to leave only two hundred and fifty troops in Rwanda. Then, Dallaire could only attempt to hold the positions he had held before the mass withdrawal.

The world community’s ignorance continued as no efforts occurred to help the situation. During the genocide, Rwanda held a Security Council seat but no one attempted to expel them. When a plane holding Rwandan refugees arrived in Kenya, the officials sent the people back to Rwanda. All the while, the U. S. still maintain almost no accusatory statement toward the perpetrators of the mass killings.

With direct intervention by troops out of the question, the U. S. refused even the slightest intervention because of strong voices from the Pentagon against such actions. When approached with the possibility of jamming the Hutus’ hate radio used to coordinate the genocide, the State Department and Pentagon balked by claiming that jamming was too expensive and complicated and not worth the effort. Instead, the situation needed military intervention which they were not willing to offer. With no strong voices in favor of intervention, the Pentagon officials denied any attempt to help in the horrible situation.

In late April, a group of Security Council nations began an attempt to increase the UN force’s mandate to include the forceful protection of civilians to create safe zones. This plan, supported by Dallaire would start by securing the capital and then moving throughout the country to create safe havens. The U. S., unwilling to put their air transporters in direct danger, instead backed a plan to create safe zones at the border. After months of debate, the Security Council did accept Dallaire’s plan, however, the U. S. held back on providing equipment such as armored vehicles. By the time real help arrived, the genocide had ended, leaving eight hundred thousand Rwandans dead.

In retrospect, the United States could have done so much to effect the genocide in Rwanda, but it did nothing. Before the genocide occurred, the government could have increased the amount of troops presence. They could have employed troops with the UN, with the UN’s approval, or unilaterally to intervene in the massacre. Instead of avoiding the word, the U.S. could have immediately called the situation genocide, denouncing the slaughter. They could have jammed the communicating radio of the Hutus which would have prevented countless deaths. When Belgium came to them to withdraw, the U.S. could have urged them to stay and avenge those deaths by stopping the genocide. Instead of doing any of these preventive actions, the U.S. avoided the situation out of lack of interest.

By making the situation an all or nothing option, appealing to the future of humanitarian efforts, and finding small victories among mass killings, the Clinton Administration and the government as a whole sought to find consolation from their inaction in Rwanda. Throughout the ordeal, the Pentagon presented the options of either doing nothing or sending troops, while discounting anything between, even though much could be done without sending troops. The policymakers also argued that for the future of the U.S.’s relationship with the UN and future humanitarian efforts, the eminent failure of the Rwandan campaign had to be avoided by removing the peacekeeping forces. Thirdly, the few members of the government who fought for invention found satisfying victories in the safety of a few hundred while hundreds of thousand other Rwandans died. By applying these tactics in a system to avoid involvement, the U.S. escaped the situation without any public outcry.

In avoiding engagement, appeasing Congress, and avoiding social criticism, the government’s system worked to skirt criticism of its position. First and most important to the U.S. was the avoidance of any troop involvement in the conflict. Second, the Clinton administration convinced Congress that it had restraint in peacekeeping missions after the disaster in Somalia. Third, by avoiding the word “genocide”, the U.S. skirted any humanitarian responsibility for the situation. Through completing these objectives, the Administration completed its goals concerning Rwanda by avoiding it.

For many top officials in charge at the time of the genocide, their present feelings tend to include grief or a lack of grief during the event and a solemn promise to never allow such inaction to ever happen again.

Personal Reflection

After doing research on Rwanda for my genocide project, viewing the touching Hotel Rwanda, and reading this Samantha Power article; I am left with two overwhelming feelings. First, I feel horrible for the people who inexplicably lost their lives during the genocide. Second, and perhaps most prevalent, I feel strong hatred toward the entire world community and especially the United States for not acting to stop such an imense and obvious crime against humanity. In the U.S.’s case, not only did they refuse to help many times but they fought against others who wanted to help. The entire situation moves me to intense anger and grief.

This article especially vastly changed my view of the Clinton Administration from present-day saviors to accessories in one of the greatest crimes committed in the twentieth century. After reading that the Administration still claims ignorance as an excuse in such an enormous situation, I am left to question the truthfulness in other decisions. Their total lack of concern for the true “good” of the world and its people worries me deeply. How could they act in Kosovo against the UN’s wishes a few years later after they claim they avoided intervention in Rwanda to save that relationship between them and the international community? Self-interest is the only answer. Since no economic or direct political gains could bee made by saving lives in Rwanda, the Administration skirted the entire issue until after no lives were risked.

The fact that the entire African community has been so utterly ignored raises darker questions about the state of race relations around the world. Even while the African genocide occurred, the State Department had much more interest in European Bosnia. One reason why the Pentagon did not want to commit troops was a risk of American life loss. However, is not one American life sacrificed worth saving thousands of Rwandans. If all men are created equally, then we a fellow humans have the responsibility to act when such crimes occur.

Again, as Sudan suffers more death in a drawn-out genocide, the world stands idly by, claiming that it is an African issue. After so many horrible tragedies, we must all act to stop this from continuing, whatever the consequences.