Jones
Important contributions to fertility studies: -Spatial diffusion theory
-Appreciation of regional cultural identities
-Territorially disaggregated data
-Crude Birth Rate (CBR) B/P x1000
-General Fertility Rate (CFR) B/P f 15-44 x1000
-Child:woman ratio P 0-4/P f 15-49 x1000
-Age-specific Birth Rate Bfa/Pfa x1000
-Standardized Birth Rate Births by female age group, number of females in the age groups, and with this data: expected births in standard population can be calculated
-Total Fertility Rate S age-specific birth rates multiplied interval of the age groups (e.g. 5)
Cohort measures are cases in which a group of females are followed during a long period
Two fertility determinants [1] : -a serie of cultural, socio-economic and environmental ‘background’
influences
-a set of proximate or intermediate determinants comprising those biological and behavioural factors through which the background variables must operate to affect fertility
Fertility decline theory
Any theory must deal with two major problems:
-It has to provide a single framework for 2 declines; In the West and Third World.
-It has to accomodate verydiffrent threshold levels at which fertility decline is initiated.
Theory of inter-generational wealth flows (Caldwell): fertility behaviour is rational. Fertility is either
Economically advantageous or it’s not. Lifetime wealth flows from parent to child or in opposit direction (KàO,
or OàK). A fundamental factor is transition from a familial mode of production to a capitalist mode of
production.
-Third World Children benefits in: 1, working at young age 2, adult children often help or donate 3,
children care for aged parents 4, children do ceremonies for their (dead) parents 5, power and prestige.
All of this undermined by westernization (capitalism and other factors). Caldwell: spread of Western nuclear family caused big part of fertility decline. How much it’s adopted depends on the recieving culture.
-Western fertility and wealth flows. Decline starts at late 19th century, well after capitaslism and industrialization. The explanation: the familial mode of production remained under capitalism. High fertility becomes unadvantageous when schooling is initiated: in the last quarter of the 19th century. Thereby withdrawing children from labour force. The working class changed from a unit of reproduction and production to reproduction and consumption. And finally the Christian traditional family was undermined.
Seccombe and Levine argue about Britain: change in wealth flows was a second phase of industrialization in which the factory achieved dominance over the cottage and workshop. So child labout decline was much the cause as the result of the 1872 primary education Acts.
Fertility in pre-industrial
Europe
CBR; 35-40 per 1000. This is lower than most Thord World countries. This can be attributed to later marriages and widespread celibacy. Female first marriage age=25-27 years which brings the reproductive span to only 15 years. All of this becaus of the marriage-inheritance theory and brides had to make a capital contribution. Both marriage and fertility responded positively to improvements in living conditions. High-status groups did, somehow, succeed in birth control. High infant mortality was more a result of high fertility than it’s cause.
Malthus population growth can be brought back by: 1)positive checks of famine/war/disease etc. 2)preventive checks; later marriage, prevention etc..[2] In some countries marriage was connected to land avaiablility.
When proto-industrialization starts, children become more a econmical benefit.
The modern fertility
transition in Europe
Decline through eco/socio transformation; demise of familial mode of production. No exact year known. In several parts ov Eu. fertility increased at the start of the indus. revolutution (bv coalmine areas; lack of female jobs). 1900: significant fertility decline. France had low fertility since 1800, to avoid fragmentation of holdings. Generallization is diffucult[3].
Old argument: fertility adjusts to socio-economic change
New argument: replacement of familial mode of production and cultural contexts which
made family limitation acceptable instead of unthinkable(take what God sends us..).
Strategies of family formation:
(Matras: 1965) A-Early marriage/ natural fertility
B-Early marriage/ controlled fertility
C-Late marriage/ natural fertility
D-Late marriage/ controlled fertility
A: todays Third World, Europe untill 1500
C: from 1500 Europe à B in modern transition (can go via D, sometimes A)
Transition outside Europe
North Amerika: high fertility 1800(CBR;55); availability of frontier land. Than decline untill 1940
(1850; CBR;43, 1900 CBR;30, 1940; 18) early 19th century decline: land became scarse farmers concerned for good land for their children. late 19th century decline; because of industrilization, urbanization, modernization.
Australia: decline in 1880s; mass education, and lesser extent secularism.
Japan: fertility was socially and individually controlled to combat population pressure (still av.=3 children).
(1880; CBR;38, 1900 CBR;30, 1940; 33) maintenance of family-centred social organization.
Post-transition trends
Since 1940 flucuations in fertility; Real decline since 1960. How many children depends on; ‘the intensity of desire for children relative to goods and services’.
There’s a short-term positive relationship between national income/head and fertility. (possible; fertility decline in 60/70’s because of stagnating economy)
Influence to recent fluctuations has been the loss of income when the woman involved leaves the labour force. Since 1960 female participition rates increased.
3 influences above: -recources, tastes and costs.
Contraceptive technology is not yet spoken about, it does not effect the demand side of fertility.
Attitudes and values towards child-bearing were always th critical factor, more important than contraceptives.
In e.g. USSR fertility did not decline untill 1960., East-European countries had the lowest fertility during the 1960s, connected to housing problems and early abortion possebilities.
Differential fertility
Explain differences within national societies. Decline is often seen as tyhe start of regional diffusion. It varies much from mortality because mortality is not determined by choice.
-Social class; 1880-1930 negative relation between social class and fertility. Birth control was first adopted by high classes. Also indicated by ‘culture of poverty’ ( fatalism, apathy, no long-range planning) Essentially for social differentials are 1)educational attainment 2) family income. 1)à later marriage by education, female career. These females are more likely to have interests outside family life and better family planners. 2)à positive relation is expected but it gives the oppertunity to achieve desired fertility, some say that low fertility is due to education/lifestyle despite income. The ‘relative income hypothesis’ suggests fertility has a positive relation with relative income.
-Female employment; labour leaves little time for children. But much depends on work-conditions.
-Urbanization; inverse relation with fertility from early demo-transition. Seems to maintain
-Religion; R.K. fertility is higher, hate towards contraception. Big values are also high valued. Some say: many differences between religious groups depend on eductaion, composition, occupation. Jews have got the lowest fertility. Some argue: Catholic fertility is highest in communities where they are minorities. In French Canada, high fertily ensured them for political survival.
-Ethnicity; only possible through fecundity, and there’s no evidence for.
Spatial analyses
Done to throw light upon the relations between fertility and socio-economic change. There’s a interpretation problem: ‘ecological fallacy’ (unintended side effects wich cause a wrong interpretation). Wilson : 1) narrowing of traditional fertility in response to the norms around the two-child family 2) spatial differentials, have little more than a surrogate status, being a horizontal reflection of structural differentiation of society. Coward thinks differentials are still significant enough, tough differences where narrowed by class narrowing. Still 25% of the regions differences 10% from national average (in England).