Brian MJ Visaggio

September 9, 2004

	In the 1880’s, the Sudan fell into crisis as Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Al-Sayid Abdullah - the Mahdi - started a rebellion against the Egyptian authorities. The rebellion grew widespread, and last several years, long enough for the Mahdi to begin constructing a new system; establishing his capitol at Omdurman, erecting courts of law, and building a force large enough to render vast swathes of the Sudan inpassable. General Charles “Chinese” Gordon, former governor of the Sudan, moved in during mid January, 1884, to report on the military situation there, but found his troops attacked and defeated. He was holed up in Khartoum for months, and eventually died there, while waiting for the British government to send him relief in the form of General Kitchener.
	My own interest in this topic springs from a favorite movie, The Four Feathers, which deals heavily with this campaign, although it is historically inaccurate. It is a fascinating campaign, and represents, for instance, the first time a British “military square,” a troop formation, was ever broken. The military square is essentially a fortress with walls made out of men, and is designed with withstand sieges. It is monstrously efficient, and protects the officers and soldiers inside quite well, with generally low causalties even on the outside. At Abu Klea, the military square was broken, but even then, the British suffered only 170 casualties out of 1,500 men, compared to Mahdist casualties of over 1,100.
	I think I’ll need to find out exactly why the Government didn’t send relief in a timely manner. I will need to find out how British command worked in the 1880’s - that is, who had the power to authorize troop movement - and the political climate of the same period. There appears to be much confusion in the House of Lords over this crisis. I must also investigate why Gordon was there to begin with, and why he was so intent on remaining despite what appears to be numerous attempts by Prime Minister Gladstone to recall him.
	What precipitated the crisis in the Sudan? What is Britain’s relationship with Egypt at this time, and why doesn’t Egypt move to put down the rebellion? How did Britain come to be in such a relationship with Egypt, and how does that relate to the rebellion? The Mahdist rebellion was anti-Egyptian and anti-foreign involvment, so it was clearly directed at Britain in particular. How did Britain help provoke the Mahdist rebellion? General Gordon served as governor there for two years. Did any of his actions help ferment the resentment that the Mahdi drew upon for support?
	In a brief span of time, the Mahdi amassed an army and siezed vast portions of the Sudan. What made the Mahdi so successful? How did the Mahdi’s movement grow so large so fast? What was the Mahdi’s ultimate purpose? The Mahdi styled his soldiers “dervishes,” that is, mendicant monks. Was the Mahdi pursuing the establishment of a pure Muslim kingdom instead of a “decadent” Egyptian government, and if so, what led to this belief? 
	The Dervish Empire centered at Omdurman lasted until 1898, thirteen years after the death of the Mahdi. What sustained Omdurman during those years? How was Kitchener eventually able to conquer these millions of square miles, and what finally prompted Gladstone’s Government to move south? Does the fall of Omdurman represent the last success of the Victorian Empire, and does the difficulty Britain had in quashing it foreshadow said empire’s end? How connected is the length of the campaigh - fifteen years - to the initial reluctance of the Government to act, and is that reluctance itself a sign that Britain as entering a new paradigm? The Liberal Government was already well aware how desperately the Egyptians wanted the British to leave. Did British reluctance represent a primitive understanding of the ideas President Wilson would articulate at the end of the First World War as self-determination, that is, the right for a people to determine their own future? If so, how can that be seen to influence Britain’s diplomatic and martial conduct during the campaign? If not so, could it be that Britain was far too occupied with the Dreadnought arms race in which it was engaged with a nascent Germany? If so, however, wouldn’t Britain be eager take any actions that would hinder German expansion in Africa, a category into which preventing the establishment of a native state in the Sudan most surely falls?