IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA, AT ERNAKULAM

Present:

The Honourable Chief Justice Mrs.K.K.Usha

&

The Honourable Justice Mr.Kurian Joseph

2nd July, 2001

Vypeen Vishamadhya Koottakola Virudha Samithy .......................Vs. State of Kerala
 

W.A.No...1184...of 1993

J U D G M E N T
 

USHA, C.J.


1. Vypeen is an island lying off the main land of Cochin cradled between the Arabian sea and backwaters. It has a unique geography and history. The island, in a sense, is the gift of the sea. The emergence opened up the way of Cochin Port, rightly referred to as the "Queen of Arabian Sea". In AD 1341, when a great flood silted up the harbour at Muziris (the present day 'Kodungalloor'), it expanded the narrow opening of a river at Cochin into the sea and 'converted the landlocked harbour of Cochin into one of the finest and safest ports in India'. It is reported that the same geographic convulsions led to the formation of the island of Vypeen, 13 miles long and 3 miles wide to the north of the harbour. It is in this island of scenic beauty, tragedy struck unexpectedly in September, 1982 when celebration of Onam festival, the gayaous of all festivals in Kerala, was in full swing. 'Onam' is the time when people of Kerala remember a Monarch under whom equality was the prevailing life style. People sing in praising melody of the time when there were no dishonesty, deceit, false measures and absolutely nothing false. The celebrations were suddently marred when large number of people took ill as a result of consuming adulterated arrack. Several persons died and number of them became blind for life.

2. Vypeen Vishamadhya Koottakola Virudha Samithy, an organisation formed to render assistance to the legal heirs of deceased person, and also to those who are disabled approached this Court filing O.P.No.8793/93 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent State of Kerala to pay an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to each of the families of the victims who died and to those who are blinded as compensation. There is also a prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to initiate revenue recovery proceedings against the assets of respondents 2 to 5 who were conducting licensed shops under the Government to recover the amount of damages payable to the victims. the third prayer is to issue a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to impose proper supervision on the process of bottling of arrack and supply, etc. It is not necessary for this Court to go into this issue, since sale of arrack has been banned in State of Kerala from 1-4-1996.

3. Learned Single Judge dismissed the original petition for the reason that there was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to approach this Court and, therefore, not entitled to the discretionary remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Samithy filed the present appeal, W.A.No.1184/1993. Even though the ground of delay was taken as a preliminary objection by the respondent, a Bench of this Court by order dated 30-9-1996 took the view that this is a matter to be considered on merits and not on the basis of the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. Subsequently, by order dated 7-4-2000 a Bench of this Court allowed an impleading petition filed by 50 persons who are representatives of those who died after consuming the adulterated liquor, those who became blind and later died and those who are living without eye sight. They are impleaded as additional appellants 2 to 51.

4. As mentioned earlier the incident happened during the first week of September, 1982. During the relevant period under the provisions of the Abkari Act and the Abkari Shps (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974 the manufature purchase, transport and sale of arrack in the State were controlled by the State Government.

5. It is the case of the petitioners that as a result of consuming adulterated arrack from licensed arrack shops in Njarakkal Range in Vypeen Island, 71 persons died and several others lost their eye sight. Respondents 2 to 5 were partners of the firm styled "Bee Vee Liquors", who were conducting arrack shops in Njarakkal Range and the licence to sell arrack was in the name of the second respondent. It is alleged that the arrack was bottled at a depot at Njarakkal by the employees of respondents 2 to 5 under their directions. The petitioners would further allege that in post-mortem examination on the bodies of those who died after consuming liquor from the above mentioned shops on 1st and 2nd September 1982, it was revealed that they died of Mehyl alcohol poison. Medical evidence was also to the effect that blindness was caused as a result of consumption of methyl alcohol. According to the petitioners, the adulteration became possible only due to the failure on the part of the officers of the first respondent in discharge of their duties as contemplated by the provisions of the Abkari Act and the Rules. The petitioners, therefore, contend that the first respondent is liable along with respondents 2 to 5 to compensate them for the death of their kith and kin and also for the blindness caused to them.

6. The fact that 71 persons died after consumption of adulterated arrack from different arrack shops of Njarakkal Range during the first week of September, 1982 and 19 wer physcially handicapped apart from many who were hospitalised has been admitted in the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent in the writ appeal. Even though the factual averment regarding cause of death has not been disputed by the first respondent, it will be advantageous to refer to other connected proceedings were there had been factual finding on the cause of the tragedy and the responsibility for the incident.

7. Immediately after the liquor tragedy, the Govenrment, as per Notification No.17358/A2/82/TD dated 29-10-1982 appointed Kumar Justice P. Janaki Amma, retired Judge of the High Court, as Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 with the following terms of reference:

1. The reasons and circumstances which led to the death and disablement of a number of persons following the consumption of liquor in and around Njarakkal Range in Vypeen Island during September, 1982.

2. Whether the liquor that was consumed contained noxious and poisonous ingredients, and if so:

(i) how adulteration took place?

(ii) how, from where and by and from whom the noxious and poisonous ingredients were obtained?

(iii) how the liquor came to be distributed?

(iv) the persons responsible for such adulteration and distribution or sale.

3. What steps (Executive or Legislative) are to be taken to prevent such tragic happenings in future.

4. Such other matters incidental and arising out of the matters under enquiry.

On the first point, the Commission came to the conclusion that several persons who died or became blind or suffered ailments, had consumed arrack either on 2-9-1982 or on 3-9-1982 or on both these days and the arrack they consumed was adulterated with methyl alcohol. The cause of death and ailments was poisoning due to consumption of methyl alcohol. On the second point, the Commission came to the following conclusion:

(i) Adulteration took place through the addition of substance which was labelled as Synthetic Polyhydraulic Thinner (Toluene), a noxious and poisonous substance consisting of Methyl Alcohol and other substances.

(ii) the noxious and poisonous substances were obtained by those in charge of the sale of arrack from Rama Varma Thirumulpad who in turn purchased from Rekha Chemicals, Bangalore stating that he required for his business in paints and polishes.

(iii) The adulteration took place at the depot of Bee Vee Liquors at Njarakkal. the distribution of the adulterated liquor was through the shops and sub-shops which were vending arrack on behalf of the licensed contractors.

(iv) the persons responsible for the adulteration are the contractors for 1982-83 K.K. vijayan and M.P. Augustine, thampan who was actively looking after the business along with them and Rama Varma Thirumulpad who supplied the noxious and poisonous adulterant.

The Government, after examining the report of the Commission, decided to acept generally the conclusions/recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. We may have to refer to certain other portions of the report of the Commission in s different at a later stage of this judgment.

8. Yet another proceedings, which is relevant, is the suit filed by several persons, including the petitioners herein, before the Principal Sub Court, Cochin seeking compensation for the death and disablement caused to those who consumed adulterated arrack supplied in the shops of respondents 2 to 5. On the basis of the evidence in the case, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the death and disablement were caused due to consumption of adulterated liquor, that defendants 2, 3 and 5 viz. respondents 3, 5 and 2 respectively in the original petition, were responsible for supply of the poisonous adulterated liquor and, therefore, liable for damages for the death and disablement of persons who consumed the adulterated liquor. Even though decree was granted to the plaintiffs for different amounts, they could not get it executed against those defendants for the reason that they had no assets. As far as the first defendant (Assistant Excise Commissioner) and the additional 12th defendant (Government of Kerala) were concerned, the lower court took the view that the suits were not maintainable against them as they were filed before the expiry of the period prescribed under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeals filed by the defendants were dismissed by this Court as well as the Supreme Court.

9. Yet another proceedings is the criminal prosecution initiated against the accused contractors which culminated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in E.K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala (AIR 1995 SC 1066). The police had charge-sheeted ten persons in connection with this incident for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 302, 272 and 328 read with Section 107 and 109 IPC and under the provisions of the Abkari Act. The Sessions Court acquitted accused 5 to 8 and 10 of all charges. The convicted accused filed appeals before this court and the State challenged the acquittal of all accused of offences under Sec.302 and the acquittal of accused 5 to 8 and 10 of all offences. The State appeal was partly allowed by convicting accused 1 to 3, 9 and 10 under Section 326 read with Sections 120B, 107 and 109 and each of them were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. Accused 1 to 3 and 10 filed appeals before the Supreme Court. After hearing them at great length, the Supreme Court issued notice for enhancement of punishment. These accused are respondents 3, 2, 5 and 4 respectively in the present original petition.

10. It is relevant to note the observations made by the apex Court while deciding to enhance the punishment of the accused. It reads:

"46. Let it now be seen whether the sentences on the appellants merit to be enhanced. On this aspect, according to us, there cannot be two opinions, as the appellants by their neferious activity, prompted only by lust for money, sold such a brew the enormity of consequence, 70 deaths and 24 losing their eye sights permanently. What can be more shocking to the conscience? If greed (sic.) for money makes people so unconscionable, so unconcerned with human happiness and make them behave like devils and to destroy human lives, they have to be dealt with appropriately, sternly and with a steel heart not yielding to any plea of softness on any ground, not relenting to discharge the onerous duty which falls on a court in such cases. The need to rise to the occasion becomes great and imperative when it is noted that liquor barons have long been playing with destinies of many with impugnity for one reason or the other, which has encouraged them to indulge in such an activity without fear of law haunting them. This is abundantly clear from deaths due to consumption of spurious liquor in different parts of the country, tragedy has been taking heavy toll of human lives almost every year in one part or the other of this vast country. To mention about such recent tragedies, it was Gujarat which saw this disaster in 1991 in a big way; it fell on Cuttack in 1992 to see loss of more than 100 lives; and very recently this tragic drama was enacted in Patna, where too about 100 persons became victim.

47. So, retribution itself demands enhancement. Deterrence lends further support to the demand. Let us all strive to check such atrocious acts. We would be indeed failing in our duty if we were not to do so. And the least we can do in the cases at hand is to see that the maximum sentence visualised by our law makers is awarded to all the appellants before us. There can hardly be more appropriate occasion than the one at hand to award the maximum sentence".

Ultimately, the Supreme court dismissed the appeals filed by the accused and enhanced the sentence of all the appellants and 9th accused for offence under Sec.326 to imprisonment for life.

11. In this background, we will now consider the contentions raised by the petitioners that the manufacture, possession, purchase, transport and vending of liquor in the State are controlled by the State under statutory provisions, that there are sufficient safeguards in such provisions for supply of unadulterated liquor for human consumption and that the liquor tragedy at Vypeen happened only due to the callous attitude on the part of the officers who had failed to perform their statutory duties. It is the case of the petitioners that since the entire responsibility regarding manufacture and trade of liquor in the State has been taken on by the State, it has to be made liable to compensate those who had suffered due to the wrongful action of its licensees in vending adulterated liquor.

12. We may now refer to some of the relevant statutory provisions as it stood in September 1982. Section 5 of the Abkari Act provides that the Government may make rules prescribing the powers and duties under the Act to be exercised and performed by abkari officers of several classes and regulating the delegation by the Government or by the Commissioner of Excise of any powers conferred by the Act or exercised in respect of abkari revenue under any law for the time being in force. Chapter III contains provisions regulating import, export and transport of liquor into, from and within the State. Section 9 authorises the Government to prohibit transport of liquor from any local area into any other local area. Sections 10 and 11 take in provisions empowering the Government to limit the quantity permitted to be transported from time to time and to issue permit for the transport of liquor. Chapter IV contains provisions controlling manufacture, possession and sale of liquor in the State. Section 12 deals with the prohibition of manufacture of liquor except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. No liquor shall be manufactured, no distillery, brewery, etc where liquor is manufactured, shall be constructed or worked; no liquor shall be bottled for sale; and no person shall use, keep or have in his possession any materials whatsoever for the purpose of manufacturing any liquor other than toddy except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the Commissioner in that behalf or under the provisions of Section 21. Licence granted under this section shall extend to and cover servants and other persons exployed by the licensees and acting on their behalf. Section 14 deals with establishment and control of distilleries, breweries, warehouse, etc. Section 15 provides that no liquor or intoxicating drugs shall be sold without a licence from the Commissioner.

13. Chapter VIII deals with powers and duties of the officers. Section 31 empowers the Commissioner of Excise or any abkari officer not below the rank of Preventive Officer or any police officer duly empowered in that behalf to enter and inspect at any time by day or by night any place in which any licensed manufacturer carries on the manufacture of any liquor or intoxicating drug, or draws toddy; or stores any liquor, he may also enter and inspect any place in which any liquor is kept for sale by any licensed person and may examine, test, measure or weigh any materials, including liquor found in such place. Section 33 empowers the officer even to break open any outer or inner door or window and to remove any other obstacle to his entry into any such place. Section 34 authorises the officer to arrest any person found committing the offence punishable under Sec.15C or Sec.55 or Section 57 or Section 58. He may also seize and detain any liquor, material, etc which he has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under the Act. Section 38 provides that every officer of the Government other than an abkari officer shall be bound to give immediate information to an abkari officer and every abkari officer shall be bound to give immediate information either to his immediate official superior or to an abkari inspector of all breaches of any of the provisions of the Act which may come to his knowledge; and all such officers shall be bound to take all reasonable measures in their power to prevent the commission of any such breaches which they may know or have reason to believe are about or likely to be committed.

14. Chapter IX deals with penalties. Section 55 covers penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act of any of the licence or permit obtained under the Act in the matter of import, export, transport, manufacture, etc. Section 57 deals with penalty for adulteration, etc. by licensed vendor or manufacturer.

15. The Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1974 contains provisions relating to grant of privilege of vending toddy, arrack and foreign liquors. Chapter VII of the said Rules deals with special provisions applicable to licensees for the privilege of vending arrack in independent shops. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 provides that the monthly quota or arrack which shall be allowed for the shop that is put up to auction shall be announced by the auctioning officer. The Assistant Excise Commissioner may, however, permit issue of arrack in excess of the announced monthly quota under certain circumstances. Sub-rule (2) mandates that all arrack kept or offered for sale shall be unadulterated and undiluted and it shall be of the same quality and strength as issued from the distillery or warehouse by the supply contractor. Nothing shall be added to it to increase its intoxicating power or for any other purpose. Sub-rule (6) provides for special licences to be issued to the contractors of arrack shops who have taken arrack shops even for a group in a range for opening godowns where necessary to store duty paid arrack. The licensee shall purchase arrack only from distillery or warehouse or vending unit established by the contract suppliers. The price is also controlled by notification issued from time to time.

16. The provisions quoted above would support the contention of the petitioners that the manufacture, possession, transport and sale of arrack in the State are strictly controlled by statutory provisions and the officers of the State have been given very wide powers to effect strict implementation of the provisions.

17. The specific contention taken by the petitioners in the original petition as well as in the Writ Appeal is to the effect that there was total lack of departmental supervision at the stage of bottling the arrack in the depot at Njarakkal. The petitioners allege that on the crucial day, only two or three officials of Njarakkal Excise Range were present in the office. The rest were either absent or had left the place without obtaining prior permission. Had there been prompt and adequate supervision and control on the part of the first respondent at the place of bottling of the arrack as well as supply of the same, according to the petitioners, the adulteration would not have been possible and the tragedy could have been averted.

18. In the counter affidavit filed by the State, there is no denial of these allegations. In this connection, it will be advantageous to refer to certain portions of the report submitted by Justice Janaki Amma Commission. It is as follows:

"69. Before concluding this part of the report, it is only proper that I refer to the role tragic drama. The Excise Department is in the charge of a member of the board of Revenue who is also the Commissioner of Excise. There is a Joint Excise Commissioner who is in charge of the supervision of enforcement work, training of Excise personnel, purchase and maintenance of vehicles, supply of uniforms and maintenance of discipline in the force. This post is filled by an officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General from the Police Department.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

"71. Sri. Balakrishnan Nair, the Assistant Commissioner in his detailed statement admitted that he was in overall supervision of the District, but would say that he had multifarious functions to attend such as collection of revenue, disposal of complaints, matters relating to administration and establishment etc. He would say that the Range Inspector, Njarakkal was in full and independent charge of the Njarakkal Range, to inspect the shops, check the quality of the liquor sold in the shops, issue licences to the shops and see that there were no malpractices. Consignments of liquor delivered were to be checked by him and he was to see that arrack conforming to standard prescribed by Government alone was sole in the shop. The Circle Inspector, Parur was in charge of three Ranges and was equipped with a vehicle. He is to detect crime and suppress malpractices. Besides there is a special equipped with vehicles and men, who was also to detect infringement of rules. It appears that Sri. Balakrishna Nair availed of the Onam Holidays. He went to Mookambi and returned only after the liquor tragedy. He has been examined as W.211."

The report would further show that many of the officers, who were in charge of Njarakkal Range, had taken leave due to one or other reasons during the fateful days. Paragraphs 74, 75, 76 and 77 of the report read as follows:

"74. It is admitted by Sri. Basheer, the Range Inspector that over and above the 1200 litres allowed as the normal quota, the contractor in the Njarakkal Range had been allowed 2000 litres on commission basis and a special quota of 5000 litres for the Onam. It was the duty of the Range Inspector to check and verify the arrack whenever a consignment reaches the contractor. The Range Inspector in the instant case has not done so. It is a well known fact, so far as the officers of the Excise Department were concerned, that during festival days there would be excess demand for arrack. Therefore the omission on the part of the contractor to avail to the special quota of 5000 litres should have normally raised suspicion in the Range Inspector and he should have made enquiries. Failure to do so only shows that he was aware of the malpractices that were going on and wanted to close his eye over it. It has come out (see W.102 Paul Thomas Mampilly) that die to the raid at Gothuruthu and nearby places just on the eve of the Onam there was non-availability of illicit arrack and people throunged in the shops in the Njarakkal Range. The heavy rush of people has been given expression to by Valsan (W.201) whose evidence has been referred to already. It was this heavy rush that prompted the workers to hurriedly mix up the quota arrack, water and S.P. without much adherence to the formula supplied by Thirumulpad. It is this arrack which proved fate in the case of many consumers. There are however materials to suggest that S.P. and water were being added to the arrack even earlier to 2-9-1982 the earlier supply being on 21-8-1982.

75. Under the provisions of the Abkari Rules, special licence is required for the contractors to have a depot for storing liquor for bottling. In the absence of a licensed depot they are to carry quota arrack from the warehouse or the distillery direct to the licensed shops. It is an admitted fact that the depot at Njarakkal was in existence over since 1980-81. this is spoken to by W.233 Maryamma who owned the land. Two sheds were put up by the lessees. The rent was originally Rs.150. It was raised to Rs.250 later on. Under Chapter XII of the Kerala Excise Manual arrack depot will be sanctioned only to arrack shop contractors who have taken all the arrack shops in a range or more ranges enbloc. All transport of arrack from the depot to the shops should be accompanied by transport permit issued by the Depot keeper and copies thereof should be sent to the Range Inspector simultaneously. The Excise Inspector should inspect the depot once in every week. The depot keeper should keep a sample of the arrack received from the warehouse in a sealed bottle. The seals of the warehouse keeper (of the warehouse from which arrack is drawn) and the Excise Inspector in charge of the warehouse should be affixed to the bottle. this bottle can only be emptied after the whole quantity of arrack, the sample of which is kept in the bottle, is distributed to the shops. This provision is meant to ensure that the quality of the arrack is not tampered with after it is issued from the warehouse and before it reaches the shops for sale. The above provisions are not adhered to. It is not made out that any licence was issued for the depot at any time after 1980-81. W.212 Basheer would say that in practice a person would be allowed to use a building as depot once it is found that an application had been filed for licence even though the licence had not been issued. No application had been filed for licence in this case, admittedly before June, 1982 and no licence had been issued till the date of the tragedy.

76. As per the rules vending of arrack is to be allowed only in licenced shops. Sub-shops not exceeding two in number in plains and four in number in hilly areas may be sanctioned, for an arrack shop, buy the Assistant Excise Commissioner. The actual location of the sub-shops should be decided by the Assistant Excise Commissioner and should not be changed during the currency of the contract. A licence fee Rs.2,000 for a year or part thereof is fixed for each sub-shop. Sub-shops shouod commence functioning only after receipt of licence from the Assistant Excise Commissioner. The violation of the conditions prescribed by the Commissioner would entail cancellation of the licence of the sub-shop. The licence for the sub-shop should be kept in the sub-shop itself.

77. In the instant case it has been made out that 15 sub-shops were functioning. None of them had taken a licence. It is not made out that a licensee was even applied for any sub-shop. Many of the so-called sub-shops had no connection with any other main shop."

The above findings in the report of the Commission would indicate that there was grave failure on the part of the officers of the department in discharging the statutory duties which ultimately resulted in the disaster.

19. At this juncture, we may note the contention raised by the learned Government Pleader that the report of the Commission constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 cannot be used as an evidence in judicial proceedings. In support of the above contention, he relied on Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and other (AIR 1958 SC 538), Karam Singh v. Hardayal Singh and others (1979 Crl.L.J. 1211) and Kehar Singh and others v. State (Delhi Administration) (1988 SCC (Cri) 711). In P.V. Jagannath Rao and others v. State of Orissa and others (AIR 1969 SC 215), it has been held quoting Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (Supra) that such an inquiry cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry and the order ultimately passed cannot be enforced proprio vigore. The scope of the trial by the courts of law and the commission of Inquiry is altogether different. We are not for a moment taking the view that the findings entered by the Commission can as such be taken as evidence against the individual officers on their alleged failure to exercise duty. The Commission conducted a fact finding inquiry and entered certain findings. As mentioned earlier, the Government had, in general, accepted the inquiry report and some remedial measures were also taken including amendments to the statute. In the present case, the circumstances under which the tragedy occurred would, prima facie, indicate lack of vigil, supervision and proper exercise of statutory duty by the officers. Reference is made to certain portions of the inquiry report only as a background material. It is to be noted that reliance was placed by the petitioners in the original petition as well as in the writ appeal on certain specific findings entered in the report of the commission. But, in the counter affidavit filed by the State, there is not even a whisper that the Government is not accepting the finding on the laches of the officers of the department which paved way for the occurrence of the tragedy.

20. The fact that the licensees had distributed much larger quantity of arrack than what was allotted to them has been made mention of in the judgment in E.K. Chandrasenan's case (supra). In para 15, it is observed as follows:

"......The firm had lifted only 3200 litres of arrack from 1-8-1992 up to 2-9-1982 as against the period it distributed 19,492.05 litres through various shops and sub-shops. The additional quantity of more than 16,000 litres constituted either of water or of methyl alcohol. If the firm was only keen to supply more arrack during the festival season for which permission was sought, it would have at least lifted the full quantity of arrack sanctioned to it but it did not; instead, it went for adulteration, and that too with such a poisonous material which ultimately resulted in 70 consumers dying, 24 losing eyesights permanently and many others suffering minor injuries".

Such large scale adulteration could not have been possible if the officers of the first respondent were vigilant and had honestly discharged their statutory duties. The fact that after making a requisition for additional quota for the Onam season, the licensee did not lift the whole quantity additionally sanctioned, should have alerted the officers. But, unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, many of them had conveniently left the place and those who were actually present opted to shut their eyes. It is relevant to note that the State has no case that the officers had taken all care and caution expected of them under the statute. But the contention raised is that the Government has no liability since the Government was no directly negligent and the conduct of the employees had not violated any non delegative duty of the master. Since the negligence shown by the officers is outside their duty, State is not liable is the argument. It was also contended that if people have consumed adulterated liquor from sub-shops, which are not licensed, Govenment cannot be made liable.

21. We do not find any merit in these contentions. The sub-shops are liable to be licensed. If sub-shops happened to function without licence, it is also due to the failure of the State's officers to exercise their statutory duty. When the officers show such callous indifference and fail to exercise their duty in the matter of verifying the quantity and quality of arrack supplied through licensees, it cannot be contended by the State that as master, it has no responsibility for the consequences arising out of the laches and the lapses of its servants.

22. The State, in its counter affidavit, has referred to certain compensatory measures undertaken immediately after the tragedy in 1982. It is stated that an amount of Rs.5,000/- each was paid to the dependents of the deceased totally incapacitated persons - 15 in number - wee given an amount of Rs.2,000/- each and for partially incapacitated persons - 19 in number, Rs.1,000/- each. Besides, the Govenment sanctioned four days free ration to 88 families of the victims of the liquor tragedy. The total amount paid by way of immediate reliefs, including medical reimbursement, would come to more than Rs.4,00,000/- as per records. The State also put forward a contention that no writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution would lie seeking compensation.

23. It is the case of the petitioners that since the Government has control on the manufacture, transport, sale and distribution of arrack in the State, the consumers naturally expect supply of unadulterated arrack. As a result of the wrongful action or failure to exercise the statutory duty by the officers of the State, many happened to consume the bitter brew which resulted in loss of life or permanent disablement in violation of their fundamental right under Art.21 of the Constitution. Therefore, according to the petitioners, they are entitled to claim compensation in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

24. In support of the above contention, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1983 SC 1086), the petitioner, who was detained illegally in prison for over 14 years after his acquittal filed a habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court for his realease from illegal detention. He contended that he was entitled to be compensated by the State. The apex Court took the view that one of the ways in which the failure of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution can reasonably be prevented is to mulot its violators in the payment compensation. 'Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be correct by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield', the Government was directed to pay him compensation. This decision was later followed in Bhim Singh v. State of J & K and others (AIR 1986 SC 494) and compensation was granted to a Member of the Legislative Assembly, who was arrested enroute to the seat of Assembly with malicious intent, in a petition filed by him under Art.32 of the Constitution of India.

25. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera v. State of Orissa and others (1993) 2 SCC 746), there was an elaborate discussion on this issue. After referring to its own earlier decisions and the decision of the Privy Council in Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) (1978)2 All ER 670) and quoting Loard Diplock and Lord Hailsham in Jaundoo v. Attorney General of guyana (1971) AC 972), J.S. Verma, J. (as he then was) held as follows:

"It follows that 'a claim in public law for compensation' for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principal which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Arts.32 and 226 of the Constitution......"

In his concurring judgment Dr.A.S. Anand, J. (as he then was) observed as follows:

"The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proc4eedings under Art.32 by this Court or under Art.226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in proceedings under Art.32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law".

These authoritative decisions were followed by a Bench of this court in W.a.No.766 of 1990 while granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution to the legal heirs of a young member of this Bar, who died in a scooter accident. Even though a contention was raised by the Corporation of Cochin that it was the Kerala Water Authority which was responsible for digging the road which resulted in the pothole in which the scooter fell, this Court took the view that the Corporation, which was duty bound to maintain the roads vested in it, was liable to pay compensation. this judgment was affirmed by the apex court in S.L.P. (Civil) No.11890 of 1998 and C.a. No.2380 of 1999 filed by the petitioner, the apex court granted higher rate of interest also.

26. In Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das (Mrs) and others (2000) 2 SCC 465), there is a detailed discussion on this issue. It was a case where compensation was sought from Railway authorities for a victim, a Bangaladesh national, who was gang raped by many, including employees of the Railways, in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station of the Eastern Railway. The contention that the victim should have approached the civil court for damages and the matter should not have been considered in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution was rejected by the apex Court. It was observed that where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to violation of fundamental rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the public law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under private law. Apex court noted that causing of injuries which mandated to tortious act was compensated by the apex court in many of its decisions beginning from Rubul Sah's case (supra). In the light of the above discussion, we have only to hold that the original petition under Article.226 of the Constitution seeking compensation for the death and disablement caused due to consumption of adulterated arrack is maintainable.

27. The further question to be considered is regarding the liability of the State for failure to discharge the statutory duty by the officers under the State. As mentioned earlier, there is ample proof in this case in support of the contention of the petitioner that if the officers of the State had taken proper care and had discharged their duties in accordance with the statutory provisions, the licensees could not have adulterated the arrack, consumption of which led to the tragedy. It is the contention of the learned Government Pleader that for the wrongful action of the officials, the State cannot be made liable. He also submitted that in the present case, there was no positive action on the part of the excise officials. On the other hand, the complaint is that there was positive inaction on their part. Under such circumstances, according to the learned Government Pleader, the State is not liable to apy compensation.

28. It is not necessary that always there should be any positive wrongful action on the part of the officials to make the State liable. Even when the violation of the fundamental right of a person is due to the inaction on the part of the officers, the State can be made liable. This position is well settled tby authoritive decisions. In Smt. Kumari v. State of tamil Nadu and others (AIR 1992 SC 2069), the mother of a six year old child filed a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Madras High court seeking compensation for his death due to failling into an uncovered sewerage tank. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. While allowing the appeal, the apex Court directed the State of Tamil nadu to pay the appellant an amount of Rs.50,000/- with interest. The State of Tamil Nadu was permitted to take appropriate proceedings to claim the amount or any part thereof from any of the respondents or other authority which might be responsible for keeping the sewerage tank open. This was a case of failure to exercise due care and caution in keeping the sewage tank closed which was the duty of the officials. In Charanjit Kaur (Smt) v. Union of India and others (1994) 2 SCC 1), a petition filed under Art.32 of the Constitution by the widow of an Army Officer claiming compensation for the death of her husband under suspicious circumstances, the apex Court took the view that the responsibility for his death was prima facie traceable to the act of criminal omissions and commissions on the part of the authorities concerned and, therefore, she was entitled to compensation.

29. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and others v. State of West Bengal and another (AIR 1996 SC 2426), the petition considered by the apex Court was one filed under Art.32 of the Constitution for compensation for breach of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was contended that the second petitioner suferred serious head injuries and brain haemorrhage when he fell off a train. Even though he was taken from hospital to hospitals, no timely emergency medical treatment was given to him. The apex Court took the view that Government hospitals run by the State and the medical officers employed therein are duty bound to extend medical assistance for preserving human life. Failure on the part of the Government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to the second petitioner, who was in need of such treatment, had the effect of violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution. Since the said denial of the right of the second petitioner guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution was by the officers of the State in hospitals run by the State, it was held that the State cannot avoid its responsibility. The second petitioner was found entitled to be suitably compensated and compensation was granted to him.

30. In P.A. Narayanan v. Union of India and others (AIR 1998 SC 1659), a writ petition was filed by a husband in the Bombay High Court claiming compensation for the death of his wife who was travelling in a local train of Western Railway. His wife was a senior Lecturer in English. She was travelling on a first class Railway pass in the first class ladies compartment. Before she could reach at destination at Andheri, she was criminally assaulted and also robbed of her gold ornaments between Bandra and Andheri Railway Station while the train was in motion. She pulled the alarm chain but despite the ringing of the alarm bell, neither the guard nor the motorman stopped the train. She succumbed to the injuries in the compartment. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. In appeal while rejecting the objection raised on behalf of the Railway Administration that the Railway had no statutory liability since the Railway Act, 1989 was not applicable at the time of the incident, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

"10. ...... We do not wish to go into that question in this case and leave that issue open. We are resting our case on the breach of common law duty of reasonable care, which lies upon all carriers including the railways. The standard of care is high and strict. It is not a case where the omission on the part of the railway officials can be said to be wholly unfore seen or beyond their control. here there has been a complete dereliction of duty which resulted in a precious life been taken away, rendering the guarntee under Art.21 of the Constitution illusory. Had the deceased not pulled the alarm chain with a view to stop the train, the position might have been different. Liability in this case in fault based......."

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. (1970) 2 All ER 294), the House of Lords had occasion to consider the liability of the Home Office for damages suffered by a third party due to the negligence on the part of its officers. Ten borstal trainees were working on an island in a harbour in the custody and under the control of three officers under the Home Office. During the nigh, seven of them escaped. It was claimed that at the time of escape, the officers had retired to bed, leaving the trainees to their own devices. The seven got on board a yacht moored off the island and set in motion. They collided with another yacht, the property of the Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. and damaged it. The company sued the Home Office for realising damages. A preliminary issue was ordered to be tried whether on the facts pleaded in the statement of claim, the Home Office, its servants or agents owed any duty of care to the respondents capable of giving rise to a liability in damages with respect to the detention of persons undergoing sentences of borstal training, or with respect to the manner in which such persons were treated, employed, disciplined, controlled or supervised whilst undergoing such sentences. It was held that if the borstal officers had taken precautions to prevent the trainees from escaping and were acting not in breach of instructions and that it was reasonably foreseeable by the officers that if these particular trainees did escape they would be likely to appropriate a boat moored in the vicinity of the island for the purpose of eluding immediate pursuit and to cause damage to it, the borstal officers would be in breach of a duty of care owed to the company and the company would have a cause of action against the Home Office as being vicariously liable for the negligence of the borstal officers.

31. The above is the same principle that was applied by a Bench of this Court in W.a.No.766 of 1990. This court found that Sec.211 enjoins upon the Cochin Corporation to maintain the public streets and carry out all works necessary or expedient for the public safety. The fact that it was the Kerala Water Authority who was responsible for digging on the road and hich left the pot-hole where the incident happened due to disrepair, would not help the Corporation to escape from its responsibility to maintain and repair the roads and to ensure public safety. This Court took the view that it is a case of absolute liability for the Corporation even though it may be possible for the Corporation to bring an action against the Water Authority for their negligent action. As mentioned earlier, the special leave petition filed by the Corporation against the above judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

32. In Saheli, a Women's Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police (1990 (1) SCC 422), the Supreme Court granted damages to the mother of a nine year old boy who died on account of beating and assault by the police acting in violation and excess of power vested in them. It was held that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. While directing the Delhi Administration to pay an amount of Rs.75,000/- to the mother of the deceased the apex Court observed that the Delhi Administration would take appropriate steps for recovery of the amount paid as compensation or part thereof from the officers who would be found responsible if they were so advised. In D.K.Basu v. State of west Bengal (1997 (1) SCC 416), while laying down the requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest and detention, certain legal provisions to be made in that behalf as preventive measures, the Supreme Court considered the question of claim for damages in case of violation of rights guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution. It was held thus:

"44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose then the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Art.226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under art.21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the state which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental right of the citizen".

After referring to the development of law in this field in England, Ireland and New Zealand, the apex Court summed up as follows:

"Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must receive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrongdoer. In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory any not on punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State in law, is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong done, may in a given case be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claiment by way of damages in a civil suit."


33. There is a recent decision of the House of lords reported in Lister and others v. Hesley Hall Ltd. (2001 (2) All ER 769), where vicarious liability of the employer for the torts of their employee was considered in detail after surveying the decisions of English, American and Canadian Courts. Between 1979 and 1982m the claimants were residents at a school for boys with emotional and behavioral difficulties, owned by the defendants. The latter employed a warden to take care of the boys in the school's boarding annex. Unbeknown to his employers, the warden systematically abused sexually the claimants while they were residents at the school. He was eventually convicted of multiple offences involving sexual abuse. Subsequently, the claimants brought actions for personal injury against the defendants, alleging, inter alia, that they were vicariously liable for the torts committed by their employee. Even though their claim was rejected by the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords allowed their appeal. It was held that while determining whether an employer was vicariously liable for an employee's wrongful act, it was necessary to concentrate on the relative closeness of the connection between the nature of the employment and the particular tort. It was further held that the warden's torts were so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the defendants vicariously liable.

34. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in E.K.Chandrasenan's case (Sura) and the judgment and decree of the Principal Sub-court, Kochi in O.S.No.39 of 1985 and connected cases, which was ultimately affirmed by this Court and the Supreme Court, it cannot now be disputed that respondents 2 to 5 were responsible for supplying the adulterated arrack at Njarakkal Range, which resulted in the loss of life and p4ermanent disablement to number of persons at Vypeen. An attempt was sought to be made by learned counsel for the fourth respondent to contend that so long as he is not a licensee or partner in the firm at the relevant time, there is no public duty to be performed by him. That be so, no petition under Art.226 would lie claiming damages against him for violation of any public duty. A reading of the judgment of the apex court in E.K. Chandrasenan's case (supra) would show how closely connected the fourth respondent was with the activities of the licensee. It was in these circumstances, the fourth respondent, who was the 10th accused therein was held guilty and the sentence was enhanced to life imprisonment. Therefore, for the mere techynical reason that he ceased to be a partner just before the period of the incident cannot absolve him from liability. Nor is it fair to relegate the petitioners to the Civil Court only for the sake of the fourth respondent. We, therefore, hold that the fourth respondent is also liable as in the case of other respondents.

35. There are sufficient materials in this case to support the uncontroverted allegation in the original petition that there was failure on the part of the excise authorities to take necessary precaution which could have averted the tragedy. It they had complied with the statutory provisions which provide safeguards against adulteration at every stage, it would not have been possible for respondents 2 to 5 distribute the poisonous brew. The State having taken on itself the entire responsibility of monitoring the trade in arrack from the stage of manufacture till its supply to the consumers, it is its duty to see that the public is offered arrack of the right quality as provided under the statute and unadulterated. The consumers of arrack were justified to be under the bonafide belief that since the liquor trade is controlled by the State, the arrack supplied through its licensees are potable. It is to this unsuspecting public the adulterated poisonous arrack was supplied on 1st and 2nd September, 1982 resulting in loss of life or severe permanent disability to many. According to use, these facts would certainly justify grant of the prayer made in the original petition.

36. The catena of decisions referred above, according to us, is enough authority to support our view that the State can be held responsible for the wrongful action on the part of the licensee and contractors and failure to exercise statutory duty on the part of the officers of the department which resulted in the liquor tragedy in September, 1982. We do not find any merit in the contention that there was inordinate delay in the petitioners approaching this Court and, therefore, they are to be denied the relief sought in the original petition. If we examine many of the cases decided by the apex Court granting similar claims, it can be seen that delay in approaching the court has not been taken as an impediment at all. In Union Carbide Corporation and others v. Union of India and others (1991 (4) SCC 584), it has been held that great issues of human suffering cannot be made subordinate to legal technicalities. In the decision of the House of Lords referred above it is seen that the claim for compensation regarding sexual abuse happened during 1979-1982 was put forward against the employers only in the year 1997. Apart from the above, as mentioned earlier, a Bench of this Court, by order dated 30-9-1996 had already taken the view that the issue raised in the original petition was not one which has to be rejected on the ground of delay, but one which has to be considered on merits.

37. Now that we have come to the conclusion that the respondents are liable to pay compensation or the damages to the petitioners, what remains is to fix the quantum. In the original petition, compensation claimed is at the rate of Rs.2,00,000/- to each of the families of the victims dead or blinded as a result of the liquor poisoning. A list of 40 persons who died is appended in the original petition as Exhibit P9 and a list of 9 persons who became blind as Ext.P10. Subsequently, they got impleaded as additional appellants. In the affidavit filed in support of the impleading petition C.M.P.No.2282 of 2000, it is stated that petitioners 1 to 40 represented the families of persons who died by taking the adulterated arrack and petitioners 41 to 50 are either victims who became blind or their legal representatives. They are impleaded as additional appeallants 2 to 51.

38. No objection is raised before us by the respondents regarding the fact that additional petitioners 2 to 51 are either legal representatives of those who died or became blind. Therefore, we proceed on the basis that petitioners 2 to 51 are either entitled to represent the families of those who died or the victims who became blind in the liquor tragedy which happened in September 1982 at Vypeen.

39. It was contended on bahalf of the respondents that since there is no evidence adduced in this case regarding the actual loss sustained by each of the additional petitioners, there will be no basis for this Court to compute the quantum of compensation. We are afraid that this contention is totally unacceptable. the nature of such compensation payable to those who suffered injuries at the hands of public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions has been considered elaborately in two decisions of the apex Court viz. Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243) and Common Cause, a registered socieity v. Union India and others (1999) 6 SCC 667). Such compensation being in the nature of exemplary damages need not be calculated with reference to the actual monetary loss suffered by the claimants. It is said in legal sense that the term 'compensation' may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. A public functionary, if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony this is not an exercise of power but its abuse. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome (1972) 1 All ER 801). Lord Hailsham observed that an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of law. By applying the test laid down by Loard Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard (1964) 1 All ER 367), exemplary damages could be awarded in this case in view of the unconstitutional action of the licensees and omission of the officials under the state resulting in violation of the fundamental right, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, of several persons, who died and who suffered permanent disability.

40. As mentioned earlier, the claim is at the rate of Rs.2 lakhs per family of those affected by the tragedy and represented by additional petitioners 2 to 51. While examining this claim, we are bound to take note of the fact that immediately on the occurrence in 1982, Government had sanctioned some relief measures to the dependents of the deceased and those who were disabled. An amount of Rs.5,000/- was paid to dependents of each person who met with death. those who suffered permanent or partial disablement were granted relief at the rate of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.1,000/- respectively. Free ration was provided for a period of four weeks to 88 affected families. It is alleged that an amount of Rs.4 lakhs had been spent by the Government towards the relief measures, including medical reimbursement. There is legislative recognition of the liability and quantum of compensation payable in similar situations vide Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 where proof regarding negligence and actual loss is dispensed with. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, including the passage of time, we are inclined to grant appellants 2 to 51 an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- each. It is made clear that in the case of victims, who are not alive, each additional petitioner represents the family of the victim. There will be a further direction to the first respondent to pay the above amount to additional appellants 2 to 51 as expeditiously as possible at any rate within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment by first respondent.

41. The first respondent is made liable in view of its vicarious liability of the action of its licensees and for the wrongful omission by its officers to act in accordance with the statutory provisions. As observed by the apex Court in Lucknow Development Authority's case (supra), 'when the court directs payment of damages or compensation against the State, the ultimate sufferer is the common man. It is the tax payers' money which is paid for inaction of those who are entrusted under the Act to discharge their duties in accordance with law'. therefore, we make it clear that it will be open to the government to recover the amount, which is directed to be paid immediately by the first respondent, from respondents 2 to 5 and also from the officers who were in charge of Njarakkal Range during the relevant period and whose omission to take appropriate action in accordance with the statutory provisions led to the liquor tragedy in September 1982. Since these officers are not parties in this proceedings, the State will have to give them appropriate opportunity before taking steps to recover the amount from them and any observations made in this judgment in this regard would be subject to such opportunity. There will be a direction to the first respondent to report to this Court after four months about the progress of the steps taken to recover the compensation amount from respondents 2 to 5 and the officers of the department referred to above.

42. The writ appeal stands allowed, as above.
 

43. Before we leave the judgment, we are constrained to observe that inspite of the mandatory statutory provisions added after the Vypeen liquor tragedy making the law more stringent, State has not been able to contain similar occurrences. Apart from the statutory provisions, what is more required is revamping of the department. the erring officers must be dealt with strictly. Responsibility for similar incidents should be fixed without delay and the officers are to be made personally liable. It is only by strict vigil by the officers of the relevant departments, such tragedies can be averted. But what we find is, after shedding tears for some time over the tragedy and issuing certain statements thereon, the authorities tend to push the incident into oblivion. The sufferings of the victime and the families of those who died continue unabated and unnoticed. We hope that there would be concerted effort on the part of the State machinery, social scientists and non-governmental organisations to find out a remedy for averting such tragedies in future.


Sd/- [K.K.USHA, CHIEF JUSTICE]

Sd/- [KURIAN JOSEPH, JUDGE.]