Fallacy/Myth 1: "We have examined the allegation that Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague on April 9 [2001]. Based on the evidence available � including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting � we do not believe that such a meeting occurred. The FBI's investigation places him in Virginia as of April 4, as evidenced by this bank surveillance camera shot of Atta withdrawing $8,000 from his account. Atta was back in Florida by April 11, if not before. Indeed, investigation has established that, on April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta's cellular telephone was used numerous times to call Florida phone numbers from cell sites within Florida. We have seen no evidence that Atta ventured overseas again or re-entered the United States before July, when he traveled to Spain under his true name and back under his true name." (Source: 9/11 Comission Staff Statement #16)
According to Edward Jay Epstein: It is the business of the staff to produce evidence for the committee members to appraise, not to make "judgment calls" without presenting any evidentiary basis. The staff omits at least seven facts in "Staff statement #16" that the full Commission deserves to know to render its own judgment.
They are:
1) Atta made 2 prior trips to the Czech Republic in 2000 at a time he was engaged in the 9-11 plot. They were the first two trip Atta made outside of Germany after he obtained his US visa.
2) In applying for his Czech visa (BONN200005260024), Atta identified himself as a" Hamburg student."
3) An eyewitness identified Atta as the person meeting the Iraq official, Al-Ani,on the outskirts of Prague on April 9th.
4) Atta's whereabouts is unknown to the FBI on the day in question. The FBI found no other witness to his whereabouts between April 4, 2001 and April 11th.
5) The FBI has not been able to determine Atta's purpose in withdrawing $8,000 in cash from his bank account on April 4th.
6) There is no chain of evidence showing that Atta himself was in possession of a cell phone on which billing records indicate calls were made from Florida on April 9th. It is possible he left the phone behind (since it did not function in Europe) and it is possible the phone was used by his roommate or others. Without evidence he was exclusiver user, the billing records show the whereabouts of a phone, not of Atta.
7) A surreptitious search of the Iraq Embassy (presumably conducted after the defeat of Iraq) showed, according to a Czech official, that Al-Ani had scheduled a meeting on April 8, 2001 with a"Hamburg student." The staff report makes no mention either of the appointment book or of the "Hamburg student."
Fallacy/Myth 2: On October 21, 2002, the New York Times reported on its front page that "The Czech president, Vaclav Havel, has quietly told the White House he has concluded that there is no evidence to confirm earlier reports that Mohamed Atta, the leader in the Sept. 11 attacks, met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague just months before the attacks on New York and Washington, according to Czech officials."
Havel quickly spurned the Times's creative writing. Within hours, his spokesman, Ladislav Spacek, dubbed the Times story "a fabrication." He added, "Nothing like this has occurred."
That same day, Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross reasserted his government's finding, complete with unique spellings of the names of two key characters:
"In this moment we can confirm that during the next stay of Mr. Muhammad Atta in the Czech Republic, there was the contact with the official of the Iraqi intelligence, Mr. Al Ani, Ahmed Khalin Ibrahim Samir, who was on the 22nd April 2001 expelled from the Czech Republic on the basis of activities which were not compatible with the diplomatic status."
Two days later, America's so-called "Paper of Record" retreated. On October 23, 2002, it quoted Spacek, Havel's spokesman. "The president did not call the White House about this. The president never spoke about Atta, not with Bush, not with anyone else."
Hynek Kmonicek booted Al-Ani from Prague. He was then the Czech Republic's deputy foreign minister, and today is its United Nations ambassador. As Kmonicek tersely insisted in the Prague Post in June 2002: "The meeting took place." (Source: National Review)
Fallacy/Myth 3: "Osama bin Laden is an Islamist zealot who despises secular fascists such as Saddam." (Source: The Guardian U.K.)
According to Richard Miniter: Saddam and bin Laden had common enemies, common purposes and interlocking needs. They shared a powerful hate for America and the Saudi royal family. They both saw the Gulf War as a turning point. Saddam suffered a crushing defeat which he had repeatedly vowed to avenge. Bin Laden regards the U.S. as guilty of war crimes against Iraqis and believes that non-Muslims shouldn't have military bases on the holy sands of Arabia. Al Qaeda's avowed goal for the past ten years has been the removal of American forces from Saudi Arabia, where they stood in harm's way solely to contain Saddam.
According to Yossef Bodansky: Recently Baghdad�s overall attitude toward militant Islamism has changed. As Iraq�s crisis mounted, Baghdad has encouraged the Islamists-a combination of Arab �Afghans� and Muslim Brotherhood offshoots-because of a series of pragmatic considerations. Saddam Hussein needs their anti-Shiite zeal to counterbalance the Shiite revivalism in the south. Their all-Islamic ideology also limits Kurdish nationalism. In the Sunni Arab parts of Iraq the Islamists have developed a comprehensive social services program to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people that has resulted from the U.N. sanctions, distributing food, medicine, clothes, and money to the growing numbers of Iraqis attending religious lessons in their mosques. These activities are financed by Osama bin Laden�s charities. Starting in the mid-1990s with a few mosques at al-Fullujah, about 60 miles west of Baghdad, and Mosul, in Kurdistan, the Islamists-bearded and wearing their special outfits, which are a combination of traditional Arab gowns and camouflage militarylike uniforms-can now be seen all over Iraq, especially in Baghdad but also in such places as al-Azamiyah on the al-Rasafah embankment, al-Fullujah, Mosul, al-Nasiriyah, and al-Ramadi. Because of their proximity to Arabia, some of the Arab �Afghans� consider their presence in Iraq more important than being in Afghanistan.
"Michael Scott Doran, a Near Eastern studies scholar at Princeton, recently wrote that bin Laden has been promoting the idea that, "People of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main infidel" � even if that means that true believers will be forced to fight alongside Muslims of dubious piety." (Source: National Review)
Describing former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's capture as the "blackest day for the Islamic world", the chief cleric of India's largest mosque said he would be remembered as the symbol of Islamic resistance.
"Arab rulers need not be jubilant on Saddam Hussein's arrest because America would now make the whole Arab world their slaves," said Syed Ahmed Bukhari, chief cleric of Delhi's Jama Masjid. (Source: Times of India)
The ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein highly admired Osama Bin Laden.
The leader of the terrorist group al-Qaeda was declared �the man of the year� in 2002 in Iraq on direct orders from Saddam Hussein, the country�s most influential newspaper has revealed.
Azzaman daily said Saddam Hussein wanted �exploit and garner support� of Bin Laden�s loyalists, according to an official document it obtained recently.
The document is a letter Saddam Hussein had sent to his then Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf asking him to declare Bin Laden the man of the year.
In the letter, Saddam orders Sahaf to tell state-run dailies and those owned by his elder son Uday to publish articles extolling Bin Laden and canvass Iraqis opinions about him. (Source: Iraq Press)