;.cTIME 12/13/93
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MEDIA BIAS
TO:    David bar-Ilan, Eye on Media, Jlem Post
FROM:  Steve Amdur, Kibbutz Haon, Jordan Valley, 15170 Israel.
       Telephone:  972-6-757572; FAX:  972-6-757554
DATE:       
RE:    TIME 12/13/93 pp30-31
REF:
CC:   David Bedein, Israel Resource, Bet Agron; 02-247803; 257303 
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TIME 12/13/93 pp30-31, "From Rebels to Rulers", by Bruce Nolan;Reported by Aikman (Washington), Dean Fisher (Cairo); Jamil Hamad(Jerusalem)

GENERAL REMARK:  Note that articles in TIME have a theme and atone, and usually a cliche.  The theme is `moral equivalence'biased toward the Palestinians -- ie, the fiction that Palestinianviolence is not a calculated move in factional competition nor anattempt to exert pressure on the Israeli government, but simply apopular, spontaenous reaction to morally equivalent violence byIsraelis (with the IDF and settler vigilantes lumped together,most obviously in the 'body counts'.)
	The cliche is 'an eye for an eye', with anti-Jewishundertones reflecting the Xian theologic assumption that Judaismis a primitive precursor of Xiainity, and should have enoughmanners to at least acknowlege its own obsolecence.
	The tone is civilized and world-weary (Cf. Polanski's film"Chinatown"):  Arabs and Jews will always kill each other in theMiddle East; what can one do but note it.  Goes well with thestill-fashionable '30's pose of the decent but cynicalnewspaperman.

	As I've suggested previously, what newsmagazines (and to alesser extent TV news, esp. via the anchorperson) are reallyselling is not information, nor even ruling-class propaganda, but"right thought" (as the Maoists said, with naive innocence):  thesocio-politically correct attitudes of the moment for anyoneaspiring to weasel their way into the ruling class.  So factsserve, and are bent as necessary, to serve as a prop for style andtone.  That may explain why TIME gives both editorial control andpride of place, not to the reporters on the scene, but to the rewriters in the cultural capital of the USA.

Another point:  Media analysis should pay much more attention towhat is not said.  

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SPECIFIC CRITICISMS, THIS ARTICLE:

Generally inoffensive.
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(1):	"undercover agents in the Gaza Strip spring a trap on threemembers of the Fatah Hawks"

COMMENT:  This revives the old charge of undercover "deathsquads".  The impression one gets from Post coverage isthat the unit just happened to come across armedterrorists, who were shot and killed in self-defense. Maybe it's time for a bit more candor.
	Also, the Post should summarize the brief but busy careersof those killed by such units.
	It might in general be appropriate for the Post to publishobituary notices of persons killed by terrorism.
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(2)	"Palestinian gunmen open fire on Israelis parked on aroadside near Ramallah, killing a 24-year-old kindergartenteacher and a 19-year-old Yeshiva student."

COMMENT:  This is not false, but it is inaccurate; the vehicle hadstopped to change a flat tire.  (One might have asked whyit got a flat tire at that point.)

SUGGESTION:  Send the appropriate editors of TIME in New York airmail or electronic subscriptions to the daily JerusalemPost, and call them to account for misrepresenting factsreported in same.

(3)	"Next week Palestinians are to begin an experiment in selfgovernment"

COMMENT:  Like dropping a cat and a dog into a tub ofnitroglycerine and standing by with a clipboard

	"PLO leaders in Tunis are scrambling to police theirvolatile countrymen"

COMMENT:  When they're not too busy dispatching hit-men 

	"Last week the mood at headquarters was subdued..."

COMMENT:  Note that none of the reporters were in Tunis.
	Note that this rhetoric conveys the impression of the PLOas a calm, professional organization; it also puffs upTunis while denigrating local Palestinian leadership.

(4)	"Part of this uncertainty is traceable to Arafat'sautocratic leadership and his inability to share authoritywith subordinates.  He has always conducted hisorganization's business literally on the fly..."

COMMENT:  Note too that media opinion (what Newsweek, withrefreshing insight, terms 'Conventional Wisdom') isstarting to turn against Arafat.  
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As Newsweek and The New Republic have noted, 'mediaopinion' does not simplistically follow ruling-classlines; it may be strongly influenced (as in mediaopinion of Clinton) by the personal piques, vanities andself-delusions of reporters.
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	The press can prop up incompetent and aberrant rulersalmost indefinitely (as with Reagan and Bush), but with afew good pushes it might start to reveal Arafat's Hitlerlike and Stalin-like character traits.  
        
(5)	"Initial priority will be given to establishing aninfrastructure in the Gaza Strip, which now lacks even themost basic services."

COMMENT:  The implication is that this is due to Israel's quaisicolonialist policies, and reflects an occupation attitude.
	It would help to clarify (a) the socio-economicimprovements made under Israeli administration from 1967-1987, in contrast to the neglect under Egyptian occupation(b) the economic self-destructive impact of the intifada 

(6)	"Many West Bank Arabs fear that the endemic corruption ofthe PLO will eat up large amounts of investment money.  Toreassure them, Arafat has agreed to call in an independentauditing firm to monitor spending."

COMMENT:  To paraphrase Brecht, if it weren't for capitalistpenny-pinching [Brecht: 'corruption'] an honest manwouldn't have a chance.

	Note, however, that the writer takes Arafat's reassurancesat face value where a realist would discount them asbombast.  As Vonnegut notes, there are times when goodmanners can be suicidal.
	
(7)	"PLO officials say it is important to have at least some ofthe new secuirty forces on duty by Dec. 13 to showPalestinians they have gained something tangible."

COMMENT:  Note how PLO officials advance their own agenda byspeaking in the name of the Palestinian people.  Matters ofPLO military strategy -- eg control of border crossingpoints -- are put in terms of a need to coddle the selfimage of Palestinians as a free people (incredibly, Rabinseems influenced by this point, offering to share bordercontrol).  Threats to re-ignite Palestinian terrorism areput in terms of the sense of frustration of the Palestinianmasses.  
		This fiction that the PLO (viz. the Tunis fatcats)is the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinianpeople' has its drawbacks.

(8)	"The Palestinian police might also exert a calminginfluence on some of the violence that is shaking thisextraoridnary venture toward peace."

COMMENT:  Or then again, they might serve as the spearhead of anarmy of liberation that will advance to the Mediterranean;it's an experiment.

	Here we have the two basic myths of the 'piece process': (1) that it is a move toward peaceful coexistence betweenPalestinian and Jewish peoples in this land (with theimplied assumption that the Palestinian people will be morefree under Palestinian rule)
	(2)  That a PLO police force will keep the peace (ratherthan serving as an internal organ of repression, and aspearhead for attacks on the Jewish people and governingauthorities)
	(There is an understated assumption that (a) Islamicfundamentalists are the bad guys (b) that the PLO policeforce will neutralize the Islamic fundamentalists.)

