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1
Andrew Todd
February
1999

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2
Contents
p3
Introduction
p5 The Origin of Sino-tibetan Relations
p12 The British Trade Missions
p22
Tibetan
Independence
p31
Chinese
Invasion
p37
Conclusion
p39
Bibliography

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3
Introduction
Tibet is not a country. According to the Chinese Government Tibet is an
autonomous region of China. As an autonomous region the Tibetans can establish a
number of self-governing bodies, however under Section VI of the Republic's
Constitution, these bodies would possess only a limited delegation of authority from
the Central Government in Beijing. It is apparent from the Constitution that any
suggestion of autonomy would not detract from the unity of the Chinese state. Article
4 states that "All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the Peoples
Republic of China"
Despite Tibet's 'inalienable' status, the Tibetan people have not embraced their
apparent unity with the Central Government. For the past 45 years, Tibet has been
home to a vigorous campaign of armed insurrection, this campaign has seen at least 50
major revolts against the Chinese, while in the past 25 years it has been claimed that at
least one million Tibetans have lost there lives as a result of the Chinese occupation
1
.
International support for this campaign has centred upon the unofficial Government-
in-exile, which formed around the Dalai Lama and his council.
The Central Government has claimed that the revolts in Tibet are of a purely
domestic nature and as such they should not be subject to the scrutiny of international
law
2
. It is the intention of this essay to examine the international law status of Tibet, in
particular this essay will outline the history of Sino-Tibetan relations leading up to
and surrounding the signing of the 1950 "Agreement of the Central People's
Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet".
1
van Walt van Praag, Michael;
The Status of Tibet
(1987) at 157
2
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter (1945)

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4
An examination into the history of Sino-Tibetan relations will cover three
aspects. Firstly, the origin of the Sino-Tibetan relationship will be discussed.
Secondly, the reaction of the international community will be outlined, this will
primarily consist of the response of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, the changes that
have occurred to this relationship in the first half of the Twentieth century will be
examined. This examination will confine itself to questions of sovereignty and
territory, this essay will not deal with any of the issue relating to the Tibetans as a
people e.g. questions of self-determination or human rights. It is hoped that a
investigation into the relationship between China and Tibet will show that at the time
of the Chinese invasion in 1950 Tibet was
de facto
an independent state.
.

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5
The Origin of Sino-Tibetan Relations
1. Background
Tibet is located on the western border of China, and on the northern border of
India. It is surrounded on all sides by some of the world's highest mountains, and with
three of its four borders consisting of mountain ranges it is appropriately referred to
as "the Forbidden Land" . Though Tibet may be isolated, it has developed a
substantial population. The people of Tibet are thought to belong to the Mongoloid
race due to the long and interrelated history they share, however the Tibetans believe
they are the descendants of a union between a monkey, possessed by the Tibetan
Guardian Spirit, the
Bodhisattva Avalokitesevara
or
Buddha,
and a
mountain ogress.
This story illustrates how, from the time they are born, the Tibetans accept the
spiritual as been a part of their life. The importance that religion plays in the lives of
the Tibetan people is the most striking aspect of their history. Tibetan history is
intrinsically tied up with its religion, the spiritual and the terrestrial have become
almost indistinguishable.
Buddhism was originally introduced into Tibet in approximately 700AD by an
Order known as the Red-Capped Sect. Around the Fourteenth century when the Order
adopted aspects that were considered unique to the Tibetan region, the order took on
the name Yellow-Capped Sect so as to distinguish itself from the elder. Their are two
doctrinal aspects to the Sect which play a pivotal role in Tibetan history; firstly, the
Sect's belief in the reincarnation of the
Buddha
, and secondly, the Sect's formation of
regional monasteries.
The Yellow-Capped Sect believed that the guardian spirit of the Buddha was
reincarnated in the form of a male child. This male child, once found, would be raised

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6
to become the head of the Yellow-Capped Sect. The Dalai Lama, as a reincarnation of
the Buddha, would become Tibet's supreme religious authority. This religious
authority also possessed considerable temporal power; as spiritual leader the Dalai
Lama controlled the Tibetan monasteries. The monasteries were more than just bases
for the Yellow-Capped Sect; they also acted as a military, educational and spiritual
centre for the surrounding areas. In effect the monasteries would act as a fort, school,
church, library and granary for the local communities. The monasteries dominance
over these terrestrial areas insured that the Sect, and the Dalai Lama, became a
powerful influence in Tibetan life.
2. The Manchu Empire
The history of Sino-Tibetan relation effectively begins in 1720, when the
Manchu Empire restored the Dalai Lama to power. The Dalai Lama had been driven
form Tibet by Mongol invaders, these invaders were themselves defeated by the
Manchu armies. Tibet was absorbed into the Empire through conquest, becoming the
latest in a latest acquisition in the empire expansion. China had been absorbed by the
Empire in the Sixteenth century. Though the Manchus had consolidated their position
and hold in China, eventually assuming the title of Chinese Emperor, their position in
Tibet was unclear.
It is difficult to define in terms familiar to international law the relationship
that existed between the Tibetans and the Manchus. Their relationship was based on
the phrase
Cho-yon
. This phrase has been described as a contraction of (i)
Cho-ne
which is translated as the "object worthy of religious offering"; and (ii)
Yon-daq

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7
which is translated as the "dispenser of offerings to a religious person or object"
3
.In
this relationship the Dalai Lama assumed the position defined by the
Cho-ne
, he
would be the Priest worthy of a religious offering. The Manchu Emperor would
assume the role of
Yon-daq
, he would be the Patron dispensing offerings to the
religious person. This relationship was purely a personal obligation between the Priest
and the Patron.
A Central feature of the relationship is the duty of protection the Patron
provides. The Patron is obliged to protect his Priest from those who might harm his
teaching i.e. the Empire was obliged to protect the Dalai Lama and his followers. This
protection must be provided when the Priest requests e.g. ostensibly the Dalai Lama
was restored to power by an Emperor acting as Protector of the faith.
Commentators have tried to define this personal relationship in terms
applicable to international law. Alexandrowicz-Alexander believes that the
relationship is based on feudal law
4
. The Dalai Lama acted as vassal while the
Emperor, as superior, was recognised as having control of all military, financial and
political affairs. Alternately Richardson argues that the relationship cannot be defined
in Western terms and as such should be viewed as
sui generis
5
. Without questioning
the validity of Alexandrowicz or Richardson's claims, it would appear hasty to define
an international relationship on its initial premise as a personal obligation. Rather
than attempting to define the
Cho-yon
relationship in international law nomenclature
it is more important to ask whether this personal obligation between successive Dalai
Lamas and Manchu Emperors evolved into a stronger political union.
3
supra,
note 1 at 12-13
4
Alexandrowicz-Alexander, Charles Henry;
The Legal Position Of Tibet
, (1954) AJIL 265 at 267
5
Richardson footnote 28 ICJ

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8
The
Cho
-
yon
relationship has being central to the arguments of both the Tibetans and
the Chinese, it would appear therefore to possesses political qualities. by examining
the Sino-Tibetan relationship from 1720, onwards it is hoped that this union, if found
to exist, will be readily defined.
3. Manchu Influence in Tibet
The Mongol reign over Tibet had been known for its persecution and killing,
the Tibetan people were therefore ready to accept the Manchus as the restorers of
peace and order. By Decree of the Emperor the Dalai Lama was re-installed as
spiritual leader, and given a limited temporal power. The Dalai Lama's temporal
powers were restricted in that certain concessions were to be granted to the Emperor.
while a Council of Ministers, consisting of three Tibetan members and one
representative of the Yellow-Capped Sect, were installed to assist with Tibet's internal
administration, the decisions of these members were to be supervised by
representatives of the Emperor. These representatives consisted of two Residents, or
Ambans
, stationed in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. The
Amban
's position was supported
by a permanent garrison consisting of initially 3 000 soldiers. This initial concession
provided a base from which the Manchus could strengthen their influence.
In 1728 15 000 Manchu troops were brought in to subdue a short civil war.
After the fighting had been suppressed the Manchus reduced the influence of the Dalai
Lama by exiling him from Lhasa. In his absence a pro-Chinese replacement
governed, with the aid of the
Ambans
and their garrison, until 1750. The Manchu
actions did not go unopposed. In 1751 the two
Amban
s were killed by Tibetan rebels,
however his act of rebellion only led to a further increase in Manchu power. After the

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9
rebels had been suppressed, the Council of Ministers was restructured so that half of
its members would be appointed by the Manchus.
As the Manchu's increased their influence over Tibet's internal autonomy they
also sought to control Tibet's external relations. The power of the Council was
reduced, so that the responsibility for the countries defence and the maintenance of
law and order was delegated to four generals who, though nominated by the Council,
would hold their commissions from the Emperor. In tandem to these reforms the
Amban
s were reserved the right of drafting and forwarding all official correspondence
to Peking, and the control of all post from Tibet into China. The
Amban
s in effect
provided the only route for communication to leave Tibet.
The strengthening process culminated in a series of Decrees issued in 1791,
the aftermath of a failed Gurkha invasion allowed the Manchus to use the rebuilding
period to consolidate their influence. Manchu authority was increased through a
number of measures. Firstly, the
Amban
s were no longer to be seen as merely advisors
to the Council, from 1791 onwards they were to be considered the equal of the Dalai
Lama. In some areas the
Amban
s were to act as the embodiment of the Emperor, e.g.
the Dalai Lama was denied all access with the Manchu court and had to refer to the
Amban
s for all instructions. Secondly, the
Amban
s were to be consulted over all
appointments to the Tibetan Administration. This power covered the appointment of
all officials, regardless of the position to be filled. The only exceptions were
appointments to the Council, in this area all appointment had to be approved by the
Emperor. The reorganisation of the internal administration went hand in hand with the
introduction of a new currency that would bear the Emperor's title.
Thirdly, the external authority of the
Amban
s was increased. Along with their
existing power to have all external mail directed through them, they were to receive

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10
all mail from outwith Tibet addressed to the Dalai Lama or the Council of Ministers.
Frequently, this correspondence would be answered without the letters actually been
delivered. The defence of the border became the sole responsibility of the
Amban
s. To
support this duty the
Amban
s were empowered to raise and maintain a native force
with to act along with the Manchu troops ordinarily stationed in Lhasa. This control
of the Tibetan border extended to cover all aspects of foreign trade. Approved trade
routes were open only to accredited traders during designated times.
Finally, the Emperor as the designated Patron for the Yellow-Capped Sect
initiated a new procedure for appointments to the higher positions of the Order. Due
to the propensity for reincarnations to appear in those factions that opposed the
Emperor, all subsequent investitures would be subject to the Emperor's formal
approval.
As the 1791 Decrees deal with Manchu influence on both Tibet's internal and
external authority, they provide the perfect opportunity to review the questions over
the
Cho-yon
bond. Alexandrowicz-Alexander has argued that the Sino-Tibetan
relationship was based on a feudal law, in particular, he has argued that the
relationship was one of suzerain-vassal. The Manchu Decrees throughout the
nineteenth century would offer weight to this argument
6
. Under the terms of a
suzerain relationship, the external affairs of the vassal state, Tibet, are administered by
the suzerain state, China. Internally the vassal state would have a limited decree of
self-governing authority but would hold certain obligations to the suzerain, e.g. a
common obligation would be the payment of a tribute. The Decrees of 1751 and 1791
would appear to follow the terms of the suzerain relationship, therefore if the Decrees
6
supra,
note 4

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11
were implemented it is assumed that the Sino-Tibetan relationship was based on
feudal law.
Ahmad believes that while these Decrees, on paper, were the high water-mark
of Chinese influence inside Tibet there is serious question marks over there
de facto
implementation, Even when the Decrees were implemented their influence swiftly
declined, e.g. upon the Dalai Lama death in 1808 his successor was chosen by the
traditional manner rather than by approval of the Emperor
7
. This decline in Manchu
influence continued throughout the Nineteenth Century with the reduction of the
Amban
s role in Tibetan politics to becoming little more than an ambassador. The only
area where Manchu influence was left seemingly unchallenged was in their external
control of Tibet's relations, nevertheless the extent of this control was undefined.
This ambiguity surrounding Tibet external relations is evident throughout the various
negotiations dealing with the British Trade Missions of the Nineteenth Century.
7
Ahmad, Zahiruddin,
China and Tibet 1708-1959: A Resume Of Facts
at 12

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12
The British Trade Missions
1. The Cheefo Convention
In 1873, Britain, who sought to establish trade between India and Tibet, had to
decide whether their negotiations should take place with Tibet or with China. Britain
was aware that the relationship between the Tibetans and the Manchus were unclear,
though it had been the Manchu's policy to control Tibet's external affairs there had
been signs that this control was fading.
In 1841-2 and 1855-56 Tibet had been the recipient of a number of failed
invasions attempts by its neighbours. In 1841-42, the Dogras of Khasmir invaded
Western Tibet, in the aftermath of the conflict the "Agreement Between Tibet and
Kashmir"
8
was signed, a treaty in which Tibet appeared as a signatory. In 1856, after
conflict with the Gorkhas of Nepal, Tibet again appeared as a signatory on the "Treaty
Between Tibet and Nepal" and the "Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet". On both
occasions Tibet had driven back the invading force without the aid of the Manchus,
nevertheless the independence of the Tibet signature was questioned. The Agreement
with Kashmir had also been signed by the Manchus despite playing no part in the
conflict, while the bi-partite 1856 treaty was thought to have been heavily influenced
by the perceived power of the
Amban
s in Lhasa.
The
Amban
s presence, with their appearance of control over Tibetan affairs,
proved the critical factor in Britain decision to begin negotiations with the Manchus.
On September 13th 1876 Britain and China signed an agreement commonly referred
to as the Cheefo Convention, whereby the Manchus would arrange for a British party
to be issued with passports to visit Tibet and conduct a trade mission. Richardson
8
The full text of this and all other treaties is available from the International Committee of Lawyers for
Tibet website at
http//www.tibeticlt.org/materials/treaties

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13
considers that this provision indicates the Manchus did not consider Tibet to be part of
China
9
. In 1858 the Manchus and the British had concluded the "Treaty of Tien-Tsin"
whereby British citizens had the right to enter the Empire with papers issued by a
British Consul. Clearly if Tibet was part of the Manchu Empire the need for separate
passports would be superfluous.
In its practical application the Convention failed to support any of the
concessions it purported to grant. The Tibetan Authorities refusal to recognise the
Passports led to the British Mission been forcibly prevented from entering the
country. The relationship between the three states can be defined by the actions they
took in response to the Convention practical failure. China was afraid that the
continued Tibetan opposition to the Mission would expose the Empire's failure to
control the Tibetan authorities. The Manchus therefore offered Britain an immediate
settlement over the disputed Burma in exchange for the abandonment of the mission.
The 1886 "Convention Relating To Burmah and Tibet" altered China's obligation
under the Cheefo Convention. Article 4 stated that the Manchus would only:
"adopt measures... with a view to the promotion and development of trade... but
if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not
press the matter unduly"
For the Tibetans the events surrounding the Cheefo Convention illustrated the
control they possessed over Tibet's internal affairs. Nevertheless this internal control
was not converted into a control of external relations. While it may be thought that
the Tibetan resistance would have led the British to rethink their approach, the
concessions granted by the Manchus in the 1886 Convention led them to continue
negotiating with the Manchus.
9
Richardson, H. E.;
Red Star over Tibet
, Delhi (1959) 71

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14
The Tibetan resistance had also brought back to British attention the dispute
surrounding the border between Tibet and the British controlled Sikkim. In retaliation
for the Mission being blocked the British had attacked the town of Lingtu situated in
the disputed area, Lingtu was suspected of providing a base for Tibetan resistance.
The British also secured the Chinese agreement to the 1890 "Convention Relating To
Sikkim and Tibet" too finally settle the disputed boundary. In an unrelated Article the
Convention attempted to secure for Britain a trade mart within Southern Tibet. This
Article must also be read in tandem with the "Regulations Regarding Trade,
Communication and Pasturage" which were appended to the main Convention in
1893.
Van Walt van Praag argues that the 1886 and 1890 Conventions help to define
the nature of the relationship between the Manchus and Tibet. He argues that both the
1886 and 1890 Convention refer to Tibet as a separate political entity. He bases this
argument on the fact that the treaties are headed "Relating to Burmah and Tibet" and
"Relating to Sikkim and Tibet"
10
. This separation of Tibet, Sikkim and Burmah as
distinct from the Chinese or British Empires leads him to conclude that Tibet could
not be covered by Chinese sovereignty. This argument appears too simplistic, on van
Walt van Praag basis the separation of "Sikkim" in the 1890 Convention would
indicate that it was not an integral part of the British Empire, yet Article 2 states
clearly that Sikkim is to be considered a protectorate of the British Empire, and that
Britain would have "direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and
foreign relations of that state". The separation of Sikkim in the title does not appear to
affect the complete control the British Empire possessed over that territory. The
10
supra,
note 1 at 129-130

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15
separation of Tibet should likewise be seen having no effect on the relationship
between the Manchus and the Tibetan.
The 1890 Convention though did continue to illustrate the lack of control
China possessed over Tibetan affairs. In attempting to implement the 1890
Regulations the British were subject again to Tibetan resistance; boundary markers
were destroyed almost as soon as they were erected while the proposed mart was
rendered unsuitable for trade. Britain now suspected that the Chinese would be unable
to meet any of the concessions they had granted.
2. The Lhasa Convention
Britain now thought that their objective would be better met through
negotiation with the Tibetan themselves. Britain therefore attempted to communicate
directly with the Tibetan Council of Ministers. These attempts were dismissed when,
surprisingly, the Council said that the
Amban
s had not given them permission to speak
to foreign Governments. This sudden desire to follow the 1791 Decrees was a
diplomatic decision, the Decree provided the Council with an excuse to refuse
negotiations while they attempted to allay themselves with Russia
11
. Tibet's attempt to
avoid negotiations led to Britain becoming increasing frustrated. This frustration led
the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, to declare both the Tibetans and the Manchus unfit
for diplomatic negotiations. He believed that communication could only begin through
direct contact with the Tibetan council, contact that could only take place after a
11
Command Papers (Cd. 1920) No. 13
While this decision may have been successful in the short term, it has more recently provided China
with apparent evidence of Tibet's acquiescence to Manchu rule. The diplomatic decision to play one
state of another has only served to reduce Tibet's claim of independence in the future.

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16
military mission had been launched against Lhasa. This Mission, under the command
of Colonel Younghusband, reached Lhasa in 1904.
The "Convention Between Great Britain and Thibet", commonly referred to as
the Lhasa Convention, was concluded between the British and Tibetan Governments
only; there is no reference either directly or indirectly to the Manchus alleged right to
negotiate on Tibet's behalf, nor is the Manchu seal attached to the document. The lack
of reference would suggest that the Convention was signed independently of their
control, however the absence of a signature does not suggest that the Manchus were
not involved in the negotiations surrounding the Convention conclusion. Li states that
the
Amban
s assisted the British mission in their negotiations
12
. To be involved though
is not the same as having authority. The International Commission of Jurists argue
that as the stated purpose of the British Mission was to negotiate with the Tibetans,
the assistance of the
Amban
s does not detract from this purpose
13
. Additionally, the
involvement of the
Amban
s was dependant on the negotiations taking place in Lhasa.
A month prior to the arrival of the mission the
Amban
s had been prevented from
leaving the city, if the negotiations had taken place outside of Lhasa it is likely the
Amban
s would not have been involved.
The Lhasa Convention bound Tibet to observe the terms of the 1890
Convention and the 1893 Trade Regulations. Accordingly the majority of the Articles
of the Lhasa Convention concern the setting up of trade, however Article 9 is the
exception as it deals with Tibet's relationship with other states. Article 9 required
Tibet to secure the consent of the British Government before it concluded a number of
12
Li, Tieh-Tseng ;
The Legal Position of Tibet
, 1956 AJIL 394 at 396
13
International Commission of Jurists;
The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law
, (1959)

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17
specified agreements
14
. This prior consent obligation has important implications for
the Sino-Tibetan relationship. The International Commission of Jurists argue that
China should be included under the term "foreign power". Due to the ambiguity
surrounding the Manchus position in relation to Tibet the Commission believe that
from Article 9 absolute and unambiguous nature it is clear that China was not to be
excluded from it's provisions. This argument appears dependant on the Manchus lack
of involvement in the negotiating process. While there are questionmarks over the
extent of their involvement, it is clear that the Ambans were consulted by members of
the British Mission, it would seem absurd that they would co-operate in any way with
an Agreement that was intended to rob them of any claim they may have had to Tibet.
Nevertheless from the nature of Article 9 it is apparent that the Sino-Tibetan
relationship must have been altered.
Alexandrowicz-Alexander, who argues that the Sino-Tibetan relationship is
based on suzerainty, believes Article 9 reduces this suzerain link to little more than a
nominal right
15
. However for this reduction to occur the suzerain relationship would
have to exist. Alexandrowicz-Alexander refers to the 1907 "Convention Between
Great Britain and Russia Relating To Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet" as confirmation
14
Article 9 states:
"The Government of Tibet engages that without the previous consent of the British Government-
(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given to any
foreign power;
(b) no such power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;
(c) no representative or agents of any foreign power shall be admitted to Tibet;
(d) no concession for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights shall be granted, similar or
equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;
(e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign power,
or to the subject of any foreign power."
15
supra,
note 4 at 256

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18
of the suzerain relationship existence. The first sentence of the Convention states "The
Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in
Thibet..." However, as discussed, the relationship between Tibet and China was based
on the
Cho-yon
bond. If the relationship was based on the suzerain relationship it
should be evident from examining the events surrounding the nineteenth century trade
missions. As suzerain any treaties concluded by China would be applicable in Tibet,
yet this was shown not to be the case during the negotiation surrounding the Cheefo
Convention. The "Treaty of Tien-Tsin" had already dealt with issue of British travel
in China's territory. As suzerain the "Treaty of Tien-Tsin" should have applied to
Tibet, on this basis the Cheefo Convention provisions concerning the issuing of
passports to British subjects should have been superfluous. The Cheefo Convention
therefore shows that China did not view itself as suzerain. Li, who supports Chinese
sovereignty, denies that China was ever suzerain. He argues that suzerainty is
essentially a Western concept
16
. The phrase was used was inserted into the 1907
Anglo-Russian Convention without the Manchus being consulted. With Tibet and
China absent from the Convention, neither Britain nor Russia had the authority to
affect China or Tibets' sovereign rights
17
.
While an examination of the facts would conclude that the relationship had not
evolved into a suzerainty it is possible to misconstrue it as such, China's proclaimed
control of Tibet's external relations would appear to support Alexandrowicz-
Alexander argument. For this reason his argument should not be dismissed, regardless
of the existence of the suzerain relationship prior to 1904, Alexandrowicz-Alexander
16
supra,
note 12 at 394
17
supra,
note 1 at 39

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19
argument supports the proposal that Article 9 excluded suzerainty as the basis for any
future Sino-Tibetan relations.
3. The Adhesion Agreement and The Anglo-Russian Treaty
The Lhasa Convention left China adrift from Tibet. Britain's negotiations had
made a mockery of the Manchus declared right to control Tibet's external relations.
China was looking for an opportunity to reassert herself, luckily the Manchus did not
have long to wait before Tibet's status was discussed again. Britain had received
adverse international criticism of its mission to Lhasa, it sought to remedy this
situation by seeking Chinas acceptance of the 1904 Convention.
The 1906 "Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Thibet",
more commonly referred to as the Adhesion Agreement, failed to resolve the
questions surrounding Tibet's status. The Adhesion Agreement transferred the
responsibilities of Article 9 so that China, rather than Britain, would be responsible
for Tibet's integrity. The Agreement effectively removed any of the gains Tibet had
achieved through the Lhasa Convention, any claim Tibet may have made to control its
external affairs were seriously weakened. The extent of control China would possess
is left unstated. However while there is no direct mention of a suzerain relationship
the agreement implies that one could exist. Britain's acquiescence in the transfer of
Article 9 was effectively recognising China's authority to conduct Tibet's external
relations.
China's position was further strengthened by the 1907 "Convention Between
Great Britain and Russia Relating to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet". Though China
This view is supported by the statements of the Russian Foreign Minister who states that "the two
contracting parties have no sovereign right to use at their will over [this] region."

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20
was not a signatory the effect of the Convention had important ramifications; firstly,
as discussed, it recognised Chinese so-called suzerainty, while secondly the
signatories pledged from interfering in Tibet's internal administration. With Britain
and Russias' withdrawal, China was left with unrivalled authority over Tibet. China
was now free to pursue its objectives in Tibet without the threat of third-party
interference. Accordingly China began by seeking to remove or take over the
obligations Tibet had undertaken in the Lhasa Convention.
4. The Trade Regulations
Article 6 of the Lhasa Convention had pledged the Tibetans to compensate
Britain for the cost of the Mission. China's new-found freedom resulted in this
compensation being paid by the Manchus. Britain though was reluctant to accept this
payment, they thought that this gesture would undermine the Tibetan authorities. A
compromise was reached whereby the compensations would be paid by the Manchus
however it would be delivered by the Tibetans. However, after the first payment had
been made through the Tibetan Council, all subsequent payments were delivered
directly. Significantly the Tibetan authorities offered no objection to this arrangement.
Article 3 of the Lhasa Convention had promised discussions on updating the
1890 Trade Regulations. Article 3 implied that this discussion would take place
exclusively between Tibet and Britain
18
. Despite this suggestion Britain accepted
China's offer to re-negotiate on condition that a representative of the Tibetan
authorities was in attendance. However to attend and to participate are entirely
18
Article 3 of the Lhasa Convention states:

                                                                                  Page 21

21
separate concepts, by the time the Treaty was signed the Tibetan representative
appears as a mere subordinate of the Manchus.
The 1908 "Agreement Between Great Britain China and Thibet Amending
Trade Regulations of 1893" outlines a large degree of Manchu authority over Tibet.
Internally, Britain recognised China right to control the administration and
maintenance of the Trade Marts throughout the country. Externally Britain recognised
that China rather than Tibet would be responsible for fulfilling the terms of the Lhasa
Convention and the trade regulations attached. Yet even though a large measure of
Manchu control is outlined, the extent of the control is left unclear e.g. it has been
argued that the 1908 Convention supports the claims of Tibet rather than China. The
International Commission of Jurist believe that the Agreement illustrates that the
Manchus did not view Tibet as a province of China. The Agreement contains several
references to the Tibetan people as distinct from the Manchu subjects, this separation
indicates that Tibet was not a province of China
19
, for if Tibet were a province of
China the Tibetan people would be Manchu subjects. China's action in the aftermath
of this Agreement appear to support the Commission's argument, as the Manchus
spent the next 3 years attempting to forcibly assimilate Tibet.
"The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 are reserved for separate discussion, and
the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorised delegates to negotiate with the British
Government as to the details of the amendments required"
19
supra,
note 13 at 82-83

                                                                                  Page 22

22
Tibetan Independence
1. The Fall of The Manchu Empire
The 1906 Trade Agreement and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention gave
China unopposed control over Tibet. With this freedom China sought to actively
incorporate Tibet as a Chinese province. Between 1908 and 1911 the Manchus
increased their military presence within Tibet, a succession of campaigns were
launched against the Monasteries and Clans that were thought to oppose China's plan.
This clampdown resulted in the establishment of an exclusively Manchu
administration, with the Commander of the Manchu Army assuming control of the
Government. These measures were not opposed by the Tibetan council as they hoped
to secure peace through negotiation.
China's expansion was curtailed in the Autumn of 1911, after the fall of the
Manchu Dynasty. The resulting struggle for power consumed China's attention, with
attention focused on Beijing the troops stationed in Tibet failed to receive pay or
supplies. This lack of support, with the desertion and low morale that followed,
allowed the Tibetans to easily expel all Chinese personnel from the country. In spite
of their now complete lack of control the new Chinese Republic declared, on 21st
April 1912, that Tibet would thereafter be viewed as a province of China. To restore
Chinese rule an armed expedition was launched to re-subjugate it. Accordingly 1913
saw not only the start of the China invasion, but also the concurrent declaration of
independence by the Tibetan authorities.

                                                                                  Page 23

23
2. An Independent Tibet?
A number of commentators have referred to Tibet's declaration of
independence in 1913, while they agree on the year, they differ over the basis for this
declaration. The International Commission of Jurists mentions the Declaration
without reference to a specific document or incident
20
. This reference without
evidence is echoed by a number of authors
21
. This situation led Rubin to argue that no
Declaration had ever been issued
22
. Such a direct statement could not go
unchallenged for long, McCabe argues that there is clear evidence that Tibet had
Declared its independence
23
. In 1913 Tibet and Mongolia concluded The "Treaty of
Friendship and Alliance". In the preamble both Tibet and Mongolia declare
themselves to be independent states free from Manchu authority, while in Articles 1
and 2 each country recognised the others independence. This declaration and
recognition would be a persuasive response to Rubin's argument were it not for
doubts surrounding the Treaties validity
24
. The Treaty was concluded by a Russian
national, on behalf of the Tibetan Government, after he had received an ambiguous
document purporting to delegate authority from the Dalai Lama. After the existence of
the Treaty was brought to the Tibetan Government's attention, the Dalai Lama denied
delegating any authority to the Russian. Accordingly neither Government considered
the treaty to be in force.
20
supra,
note 13 at 84
Later in the Report at p89 the ICJ state that "It does not appear before 1942 that Tibet actively and
formally asserted herself to be independent of... the China polity". It would appear that the ICJ doubt
there own assertion.
21
Ahmad,
supra
note 7 at 18, Sharma Suya P.,
The India-China Border Dispute: An Indian
Perspective
, AJIL (1965) 16 at 21
22
Rubin, Alfred P.,
A Matter of Fact
, AJIL (1996) 586
23
McCabe David A.,
Tibet's Declaration of Independence
, AJIL (1966) 369 at 370.

                                                                                  Page 24

24
McCabe also refers to several Foreign Office files which mention that a
Declaration has been given. This rebuttal of Rubin's argument shares a similar
characteristic to the International Commission of Jurists: a complete failure to produce
a declaration of independence. The evidence of a secondary sources should not
presume the existence of a primary document.
This ambiguity over the existence of a physical document was resolved when
Shakbapa produced evidence of a physical document
25
. The document Shakbapa
refers to was a Proclamation issued by the Dalai Lama in February 1913. The
Proclamation began by stating that the military actions of China between 1908 and
1911 had ended the Priest-Patron relationship, as that relationship "...had not been
based on the subordination of one by the other." This reference to the
Cho-yon
relationship must also be seen in light of an earlier Declaration by the Dalai Lama.
Shortly after his exile to India in 1910 the Dalai Lama had stated that the
Cho-
yon
relationship had come to an end.
If the revocation of the
Cho-yon
relationship by the Dalai Lama is not
sufficient proof of the bonds extinction, the events after the fall of the Manchu
Empire also signified the end of this relationship. As the relationship had been based
on a personal obligation by the Manchu Emperor and the Dalai Lama the fall of the
Empire was the end of the obligation. It is clear that the new Republic succeeded to
the treaties and Agreements concluded by the Manchu Emperor. A purely personal
obligation is not covered by the law covering State succession
26
. Either through
revocation by the Dalai Lama, or through the extinguishing of the obligation it is
24
supra,
note 13 at 87
25
Shakabpa, Tsepon W. D.,
Tibet: A Political History
, Yale University Press (1967) p246-248

                                                                                  Page 25

25
evident that the beginning of the Chinese Republic, and the attempted subjugation of
Tibet that followed, signified the end of the
Cho-yon
relationship, for how was the
Patron protecting his Priest by attacking his land and monasteries?
After discussing the
Cho-yon
bond, the 1913 Declaration refers to Tibet
independence in a roundabout manner. The Dalai Lama talks of Tibet as a "small
religious and independent nation". He concludes by stating that "To safeguard and
maintain the independence of our country, one and all should voluntarily work hard"
Rubin, in a later article, argued that the mention of an "independent nation" the
Declaration dealt with the revocation of the
Cho-yon
bond exclusively, it had no effect
on China's sovereign rights over Tibet
27
. Rubin argument presumes that the Sino-
Tibetan relationship was based on a stronger union than that provided by the
Cho-yon
bond. In the absence of a stronger tie the end of the
Cho-yon
relationship signified the
end of Sino-Tibetan relations. The existence of a stronger union was the subject of
international discussions at the 1914 Simla Conference.
3. The Simla Conference
Britain, in the hope of securing peace and stability on the border of India,
sought to settle the status of Tibet through negotiation. The Tibetan and Chinese
authorities were invited to send representatives to a tri-partite conference which met at
Simla from October 13th 1913. After considerable discussion a draft Convention was
initialled by the representatives of all three Governments, however the Chinese
representative declined to formally sign the completed Convention. In the Chinese
26
Lauterpacht (editor),
Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise (vol. 1) Peace
, 8th Ed., Longmans
(1955) at 159.

                                                                                  Page 26

26
Governments absence the Convention was signed on July 3rd 1914 by the
representatives of Tibet and Britain. Both Governments declared that China would be
barred from claiming any privileges arising from the document for as long as their
signature was withheld.
The document was a compromise between the opposing positions advocated
by the Chinese and Tibetan representatives. The Tibetans had declared, in their
opening speech to the Conference, that "It is decided that Thibet is an independent
state and that the precious Protector, the Dalai Lama, is the ruler of Thibet, in all
temporal as well as spiritual affairs."
28
China responded by stating that Tibet was to
form "an integral part of the territory of the republic of China" and if this was agreed
"China would engage not to convert Tibet into a province"
29
As a compromise Britain
proposed the division of Tibet into two zones. "Inner Tibet", which covered the
eastern and north-eastern regions of Tibet, would be subject to China's right to
"Establish such a measure of control... as will safeguard their historic position there".
Article 2 of the Convention would also explicitly recognise that "Tibet is under the
suzerainty of China". "Outer Tibet" which covered the Central and Western Regions
would be subject to the full autonomy of the Tibetan Government. China would
promise to respect this autonomy by abstaining "from interference in its
administration (including the selection and the installation of the Dalai Lama)"
The lack of a Chinese signature does not exclude conclusions been drawn from
the conference. The formal recognition of the Tibetan delegation into the conference,
where they would participate in the negotiation and conclusion of an international
27
Rubin Alfred P.,
The Position of Tibet In International Law
, 35 The China Quarterly (1968) 110 at
121-122, footnote 64
28
Quoted in
Tibet s Declaration Of independance
,
supra
note 23 at 371

                                                                                  Page 27

27
agreement, could imply that Britain and China recognised Tibet's independent treaty
making power
30
. This recognition is dependent though on the intention of both Britain
and China as recognition is not implied where the non-recognised state is admitted to
an international conference when there is no intent to recognise that state. From the
Chinese negotiators opening words to the conference it is clear that China had no
intention of recognising Tibet. Nevertheless the conclusion of a bi-lateral treaty with
the non-recognised state does imply recognition by the other party to that treaty,
therefore when Britain concluded a bi-lateral treaty with Tibet in China's absence
they were impliedly recognising Tibet.
It should be evident that the status of Tibet would have changed if the
Convention had been signed and ratified by the Chinese as Tibet would have
recognised China's suzerainty and control. China's refusal to sign the agreement
effectively granted Tibet it's independence, as their refusal led to a recognition of
Tibetan independence and an end to Sino-Tibetan relations. By refusing to agree to a
suzerainty over Tibet China had no fall back position. The Sino-Tibetan relationship
had been built on the original
Cho-yon
bond which, as discussed, had been revoked by
the Dalai Lama. If China possessed a claim based upon a stronger connection, this
connection should be apparent from the history of the relationship throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth century. Yet, as shown, China's control over Tibet had not
been reflected in their
de facto
relations.
4. Tibetan survival
Until 1950 Tibet successfully maintained its independence from China. During
the First World War Tibet reoccupied all the land it had lost during the Chinese
29
Quoted in
The Status of Tibet
,
supra
note 1 at 55
30
Oppenheim,
supra
note 26 at p146-147

                                                                                  Page 28

28
offences in 1910. This action led to a truce whereby a border between China and
Tibet was fixed at the Yangtze river. Though the Agreement was never ratified by the
Chinese it terms were observed.
At the end of the First World War, Tibet began to show all the requirements
for statehood; fixed population and territory, and effective Government with the
capacity to enter into relations with other states
31
. Due to Tibet's geographic
condition, it is hard to dispute the requirements attached to showing a permanent
population or a fixed territory. The Tibetan Government exercised all of the powers
and duties expected of it, they ran an extensive civil service with control over
taxation, currency and communications, they also maintained a small army. The
Government was founded on the traditional Tibetan rules of law, rather than one
imported from China. Finally the Tibetan Government controlled its borders through
the creation of an Office for Foreign Affairs which dealt with passport and trade.
Despite it new-found independence, Tibet was careful in how it dealt with
China. Regardless of the control the Government exerted, the Council and the Dalai
Lama were always mindful of the power the Chinese possessed. In 1930, two missions
were sent by the Chinese to discuss the re-establishment of Sino-Tibetan relations,
the Dalai Lama replied that China would have to respect Tibet's autonomy. A mission
remained at Lhasa throughout the 1930 and 40s. Their presence, like the presence of
the
Amban
s before them, insured that doubts would remain over the independence of
the Tibetan authorities e.g. In 1940 the Chinese claimed that they had played a large
part in the selection and appointment of the Dalai Lama, upon his predecessors death.
31
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1934) Art(1)

                                                                                  Page 29

29
However this story was allegedly a fabrication as they had been present only as
observers
32
.
This continued suspicion was partially laid to rest during the Second World
War. In 1942-43 the Allies sought to use Tibet as a alternate military supply route to
China. At first the Tibetan Council refused as they wished to maintain their neutrality.
Britain believed that the Tibetans reluctance stemmed from their distrust of China's
motives in supporting the proposed route, they suggested that China should issue a
declaration respecting Tibet's autonomy so that Tibetans fears would be alleviated.
The Chinese refused to issue the declaration on the basis that Britain appeared to use
the words 'autonomy' and 'independence' almost interchangeably
33
. Nonetheless a
compromise was reached whereby the supply route would be open for all non-military
supplies provided they were escorted by only a token escort, no large Chinese or
British force would be allowed to travel through Tibet. Additionally the proposed
route would be altered so as to bypass Lhasa.
The negotiations surrounding the proposed supply route illustrate the strength
possessed by the Tibetan authorities in its relations with other states. This strength is
shown in a number of ways; firstly, the fact that China was at war with Japan was of
no consequence to the Tibetan Council. Tibetan maintained its neutrality throughout
the war contrary to any suggestion of Chinese suzerainty. Secondly, Tibet successfully
maintained its independence despite the pressure exerted upon it by China and Britain.
32
supra,
note 13 at 88
33
American Official Quoted in
TheQuestion Of Tibet and The Ruel Of Law supra
note 14 at 91

                                                                                  Page 30

30
Chinese Invasion
1. The Seventeen Point Agreement
On the 7th October 1950 40,000 Chinese troops entered Tibet in breach of the
customary rules of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Within a fortnight they
had overrun the Eastern territory and captured the provincial capital of Chamdo. The
Chinese justified their movement of troops as a strengthening of China's western
border, China's western border being the Western Border of Tibet. The fighting
between the Tibetan soldiers and Chinese troops was justified as a removal of
rebellious elements. The Tibetans realised they were heavily outnumbered and that to
continue resisting would be futile. On the 11th November the Dalai Lama appealed to
the United Nations for aid. El Salvador, with the backing of India and the United
States, asked the General Assembly to consider this appeal. despite this support the
Steering Committee of the Assembly decided that discussion should postponed, they
thought that Tibet autonomy could be safeguarded through peaceful negotiations with
the Chinese Government.
The United Nations decision left the Tibetans with no choice but to begin
discussions with the Chinese. On the 23rd May 1951 the "Agreement of the Central
People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the
Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was signed. The agreement contained 17 articles
governing the future course of Sino-Tibetan relations, taken together these articles
effectively absorbed Tibet into Chinese territory.
The validity of the Seventeen Point Agreement has been questioned by
commentators, their criticism has taken three forms. The first argument deals with the
authority of the Tibetan representatives to conclude the Agreement. The Tibetan seal,

                                                                                  Page 31

31
attached to the document, was alleged to be a Chinese forgery and therefore incapable
of having any binding legal effect, however this argument would be moot if there was
Tibetan collusion in the process. The original seal was reported to be diplomatically
"lost" by the Tibetan negotiators so as to avoid the appearance of genuine
acquiescence to the Agreements terms
34
. If this account is true it shows that the
negotiators knew the seals were not genuine, and the principle of
estoppel
should
apply to hinder any subsequent claim.
The second criticism has centred on whether the Tibetan signature on the
Agreement was obtained voluntarily. The Dalai Lama in 1959 stated that "The
Agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was... thrust upon its people and
Government by threat of arms... consent of the Government was secured under duress
and at the point of bayonet"
35
The lack of voluntary consent could raise question
marks over the validity of the treaty. Oppenheim states that a valid agreement can only
be created through the free and mutual consent of the contracting parties
36
.
Accordingly coercion to sign could invalidate the Treaty.
The nature of the coercion is important when determining the validity of the
Agreement . The International Commission of Jurists argue that physical or mental
coercion would invalidate the treaty only if it was directed against the states
representatives not the state itself
37
. Though it was clear that China was prepared to
continue to use force against Tibet, it is questionable whether any physical coercion
was directed against the negotiators. Van Walt van Praag alleges that the negotiators
34
supra
, note 27 at 123
35
Dalai Lama Statement at Moosoirie June 20th 1959 quoted in The Question of Tibet and the rule of
Law
supra
note 13 at 95-96
36
supra,
note 26 at 891
37
supra,
note 13 at p96

                                                                                  Page 32

32
were threatened with physical violence and were treated as prisoners throughout the
discussions, however Rubin believes that these allegations are without foundation and
difficult to believe. It is difficult to find any evidence to back up these allegation; it
may be significant that van Walt van Praag offers no supporting evidence, or, it may
be significant that Rubin phrases his opinion in the form of a personal remark, again
without the support of any evidence. This lack of corroborating evidence hinders any
argument based on physical coercion.
Coercion does not have to be physical, it can also take the form of mental
pressure. The Dalai Lama stated "My representatives were compelled to sign the
agreement under the threat of further military operations against Tibet by invading
armies leading to the utter ravage and ruin of the country"
38
Clearly the Tibetan
negotiators were subject to mental pressure due to the continued presence of the
Chinese troops in Tibet. This mental coercion would render the treaty invalid or the
treaty could be repudiated on this ground.
The third criticism is concerned with the obligations imposed by the 17 Point
Agreement. This criticism has focused on the interpretation of Point 4, which states
"The Central Government was not to alter the existing political system in Tibet. The
Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of
the Dalai Lama" The Dalai Lama was thought of as the spiritual and temporal ruler of
Tibet. This position had been reinforced as recently as 17th November 1950 when the
Foreign Minister stated "Tibet is united as one man behind the Dalai Lama"
39
. It
should be apparent that the position occupied by the Dalai Lama would not be a part
38
Dalai Lama statement at Moosorie June 20th 1959 quoted in The Question of Tibet and the rule of
Law
supra
note 13 at 95-96

                                                                                  Page 33

33
of China's future plans; the Chinese believed that Tibetan autonomy in cultural,
educational and religious areas would satisfy Point 4, the Tibetans thought of
autonomy as nothing less than a complete control over local Government.
March 1955 saw the formation of the "Preparatory Committee" to further the
integration of Tibet into China. The Committee's stated task was to assist in the
observance of Tibetan autonomy in accordance with the Chinese Constitution and the
1951 Agreement. The Chinese have claimed that the criticisms of the 1951
Agreement are superfluous, as the Dalai Lama had acquiesced to the changes during
his time on the Preparatory Committee. The Dalai Lama hoped that the Committee
would have acted as a conduit for compromise between the Chinese and the Tibetans,
however in practical terms the Committee had little influence on Chinese policy.
Subordinate agencies, dominated by Chinese personal, controlled the majority of
Governmental power; e.g. the agencies controlled appointments to the legislative and
judicial administrations, in addition they governed all aspects of trade and the
economy, cultural affairs and education. Even in the areas not covered by the
Agencies the Committee was subject to Chinese interference as all of their decisions
had to be approved by the Central Government.
The Dalai Lama's co-operation has to be viewed in light of the Chinese
presence within Tibet. With 150'000 Chinese troops stationed in the country the
threat of violence, both at a personal and a general level, was always present. In these
circumstances the Dalai Lama's conduct throughout the 1950s cannot be viewed as
voluntary. After the Dalai Lama fled Tibet in 1959 he was able to speak freely without
39
Quote from Tibet Government-in-Exile Paper Proving Truth From Facts at
http://tibet.com/whitepaper/white2.html

                                                                                  Page 34

34
a threat of violence, he immediately repudiated the 1951 Agreement as the Chinese
had not fulfilled their obligations
40
.
2. Use of Force
The repudiation of the Seventeen point Agreement leaves one final question:
what effect did the Chinese use of force in 1950 have on the Sino-Tibetan
relationship? China was party to the 1928 "General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War", more commonly known as the Kellog-Briand pact. Article 1 of the Pact pledged
states not to use war as a solution to international controversies or as an instrument of
national policy in their international relations. However the Pact did not ban warfare
outright, the act only applied to relations between states who wee party to it,
accordingly as Tibet was not a party to the treaty China invasion would not be
contrary to Article 1.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that "All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state". Although China did not become a member of the
Untied Nations until 1972 Article 2(4) was generally considered to from part of the
customary international law. Van Walt van Praag argues that China adhesion to the
Kellog-Briand pact and to other international obligations with a similar nature
illustrates China adhesion to the customary restriction on the use of a force
41
. In 1949
the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case stated that the use of
force between states had no place in international law and that "Between independent
40
supra,
note 13 at 99
41
supra,
note 1 at 150

                                                                                  Page 35

35
states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations"
42
It is therefore arguable that the actions of China in 1950 were a breach of the
international customary law prohibiting the use of force between states.
42
The Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Report 1949 at 35

                                                                                  Page 36

36
Conclusion
In 1791 the Manchus issued a series of Decrees covering Tibet's internal and
external structure. One effect of the Decrees was to transfer control of Tibet's foreign
relations, trade and defence into Manchu administration. This transfer in control led
Tibet to become isolated from the rest of the world. Due to it's geographic position
Tibet had always been a difficult country to enter, yet the Manchus increased the
bureaucratic difficulties in gaining admission. The Manchus thought that by
hindering foreign visitors, especially those from Britain and Russia, their influence
over Tibet would be easier to maintain. By removing contact with possible allies the
Manchus hoped the Tibetans would increasingly turn towards China for guidance. The
success of the 1791 Decrees were questionable, as discussed earlier, the nineteenth
century saw a decline in China's influence over Tibet, nevertheless the "Forbidden
Land" policy played a decisive role in forming the opinions of Tibetan citizens.
Throughout the nineteenth century the few visitors who managed to enter Tibet were
met with suspicion if not hostility. It was even thought that by eating sweets or using
soap imported from India the Tibetans would be putting their faith at risk
43
.
The end of the twentieth century sees an unparalleled increase in global travel
and communication. Modern technology has rendered Tibet almost as accessible as
any Package Destination. Yet, in this climate, China has attempted to reinvent it's
"Forbidden Land" policy. China claims that Tibet's problems are of domestic nature,
that the Tibetan resistance does not justify international scrutiny. In effect the Chinese
are hoping that without international assistance Tibet will be left with no choice but to
acquiesce to Chinese rule. As this essay has attempted to show the Sino-Tibetan
43
supra,
note 25 at 173-174

                                                                                  Page 37

37
relationship is an international problem requiring solutions. However, while this essay
has highlighted the Tibetan claims for independence, it may appear paradoxical to say
that the solution is not necessarily based on Tibetan independence. The history of
Sino-Tibetan relations is ambiguous. The Tibetans have exhibited signs of
independence, especially after the First World War, however there also been
conflicting evidence of Chinese authority. Firstly, Tibetan authorities were not averse
to relying on China to resolve problems e.g. the Tibetans refusal to negotiate with
Britain in 1904 out of an alleged respect for the 1791 Decrees
44
. Secondly, the
influence of the
Amban
s has always effected the Tibetan claims, e.g. it was the
presence of the
Amban
s in Lhasa that led Britain to open negotiations with China in
1876. Thirdly, the alleged acceptance or acquiescence of the 17 Point Agreement by
the Tibetan Government.
The Simla conference illustrates that Tibet has been prepared to accept
solutions short of full independence. Under the terms of the proposed Agreement
Tibet was ready to accept Chinese suzerainty in return for local autonomy. This type
of solution is also the approach favoured by the Dalai Lama, he stated as recently as
January of 1999 that "I'm fully committed tot he middle way approach [of seeking
autonomy for Tibet]... as an antidote to separation"
45
Nevertheless China refusal to
enter discussions only serves to polarise the issue. While China hides behind Art 2(7)
the suspicion will remain that while Tibet may not be a country, perhaps it should
become one.
44
Discussed above at p15
45
Interview with the Dalai Lama in
Time Magazine
, 25 January 1999

                                                                                  Page 38

38
Bibliography
Treaties:
Agreement Between Tibet And Kashmir (1852)
Treaty Between Tibet and Nepal (1856)
Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet (1856)
Cheefo Convention (1876)
Convention Relating To Burmah and Thibet (1886)
Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating To Sikkim and Tibet (1890)
Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet (1904)
Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet (1906)
Convention Between Great Britain and Russia (1907)
Agreement Between Great Britain, China and Tibet Amending Trade Regulations of
1893 (1908)
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between The Government of Mongolia and Tibet
(1913)
Convention Between Great Britain, China and Tibet (1914)
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (1928)*
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1934)*
United Nations Charter (1945)*
Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1951)
The full text of all but the *treaties can be obtained at the International Committee for
Lawyers for Tibet Website at
http://tibeticlt.org/materials/treaties/

                                                                                  Page 39

39
Books & Articles:
Ahmad, Zahirudddin,
China and Tibet 1708-1959
:
A Resume Of Facts
, Oxford
University Press (1960)
Alexandrowicz-Alexander, Charles Henry;
The Legal Position Of Tibet
, (1954)
American Journal of International Law 265
Farrington Anthony (ed.),
British Policy in Asia: India Office Memoranda vol. 2
Tibet, Burma and Indo-China 1862-1940
, Mansell (1980)
The Government of Tibet in Exile, Proving Truth from Facts, available from their
Website at
http://www.tibet.com/whitepaper/index.html
Hughes A. D,
Tibet
in Bernhardt R. (Editor) Encyclopaedia of Public International
Law Vol. 12 (1981) 375
International Commission of Jurists;
The Question Of Tibet and The Rule of Law
,
(1959)
International Committee of Lawyers For Tibet;
The Case Concerning Tibet: Tibetan
Sovereignty and the Tibetan Peoples Right To Self-Determination
, available from
their Website
International Committee of Lawyers For Tibet,
Occupied Tibet
: The Case In
International Law, available from there Website
Li, Tieh-Tseng;
The Legal Position Of Tibet
, 1956 American Journal of International
Law 394
McCorquadale, Robert (editor);
Tibet: The Position Of International Law
,
Weatherhill (1995)
McCabe David A.;
Tibet's Declaration of Independence
, American Journal of
International Law (1966) 369

                                                                                  Page 40

40
Lauterpacht (editor);
Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise (vol 1) Peace
, 8th
Ed., Longmans (1955)
Richardson, Hugh E.;
Red Star Over Tibet
, Delhi (1959)
Richardson, Hugh E.;
A Short History Of Tibet
, New York (1962)
Rubin, Alfred P.;
A Matter Of Fact
, American Journal of International Law (1966)
586
Rubin, Alfred P.;
The Position Of Tibet
In International Law, 35 The China
Quaterly (1968) 110
Rubin, Alfred P.,
The Sino Indian Border Dispute
, International and Comparative
Law Quaterly Vol. 9 (1960) 96
Shakabpa, Tsepon W. D.,
Tibet: A Political History
, Yale University Press (1967)
Sharma, Suya P.,
The India-China Border Dispute
:
An Indian Perspective
, American
Journal of International Law (1965) 16
Yu Fan,
Speaking about the Relationship Between China and the Tibetan Region from
the Viewpoint of Sovereignty and Suzerainty
in Cohen Jerome Alan, Peoples China
and International Law: A Documentary Study Volume I; Princeton University Press,
(1974) at 395
van Walt van Praag, Michael;
The Status of Tibet
(1987)
Parliamentary Papers:
Papers Relating To Tibet, 1904, Cd. 1920
Further Papers Relating To Tibet, 1904, Cd. 2054
Further Papers Relating To Tibet, 1905, Cd. 2370
Further Papers Relating To Tibet 1910, Cd. 5240

                                                                                  Page 41

41
Websites:
International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet at
http://www.tibeticlt.org/
The Government of Tibet in Exile at
http://www.tibet.com/