Kissinger on Detente, 1974

There can be no peacable international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus, we must be clear at the outset on what the term 'detente' entails. It is the search for more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a continuing process, not a final condition. And it has been pursued by sucessive American leaders though the means have varied as have world conditions.

Some fundamental principles guide this policy:
The United States does not base its policy solely on Moscow's good intentions. We seek , regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and concilliatory responses to moderate behavior.

We must oppose aggressive actions, but we must not seek confrontations lightly.
We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is the most complex in in all history.

Where the age-old antagonisim between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is a recognition of the neccessity of peace--not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values, too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties percieve an element of gain.

To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of the series of documents is the Statement of Principles signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation, (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; ad (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build firm long-term relationship.

An Agreement of the Prevention of Nuclear War based on these Principles was signed in 1973. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of any war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In other words, the principles restraint is not confined to relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is explicitly extended to include all countries.

These statements of principles are not an American concession; indeed, we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Not are they a legal contract; rather they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to rely on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if over the longterm the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it defintion, structure, and hope.
One of the features of the current phase of United States-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders either face to face or through diplomatic channels.

It was difficult in the past to speak of the United States-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. Today, by joining our efforts even in such seemingly apolitical fields as medical research or environmental protection, we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples, but all mankind.
Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean’s resources, on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject to earthquakes, and on devising new transportation methods…

We have approached the question of economic relations with the deliberation and circumspection and as an act of policy not primarily of commercial opportunity. As political relations have improved on a broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the U.S.S.R. has been negotiated, side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extention of the most-favored-nation treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business; our Government credit facilitites were made available for trade with the U.S.S.R.; and a maritime agreement regulating the carriage of goods has been signed…

Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political relationship.

We cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable international system should the two strongest nuclear powers conduct an unrestrained strategic arms race Thus, perhaps the single most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition.
The competition in which we now find ourselves is historically unique:
Each side has the capacity to destroy civilization, as we know it

Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our very survival…
The prospect of decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. Therefore, the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher and more complex levels of forces.

The arms race is driven by political as well as military factors. While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the appearance of inferiority-whatever its actual significance-can have serious political consequences. Thus each side has a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of equality. In a very real sense each side shapes the military establishment of the other.

If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race. But the political or military benefit, which would flow from such a situation, would remain elusive. Indeed, after such an evolution it might well be that both sides would be worse off than before the race began.

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship with the United States will be less stable if strategic balance is sought through unrestrained competitive programs. Sustaining the buildup requires exhortations by both sides that in time may prove incompatible with restrained international conduct. The very fact of a strategic arms race has a high potential for feeding attitudes of hostility and suspicion on both sides, transforming the fears of those who demand more weapons into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The American people can be asked to bear the cost and political instability of a race, which is doomed to stalemate only if it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it. That is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

SALT has become one means by which the Soviet Union and we could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding of the doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. SALT in the American conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by methods other than the arms race.

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