Junkers Vs. Adolf Hitler and Nazism

 

The Values of the Prussian Officers in Germany in the Second World War:

Were They Reactionary or Conservative During the Changing Society?

 

 

Preface Note:

            In this paper all politics are omitted and the discussions only foci on the traits and virtue that the Junkers believed. Junkers meant the old Prussian nobles with a prefix "von" on the surnames, and they formed the main structure of the Imperial Germany Army and the Weimar Republic Army.

 

 

Introduction

 

There are no bad regiments but only bed colonels. (Napoleon Bonaparte)

 

            Over a half of century after the end of the Second World War, there is still a question about the Germany generals, who were either Junkers or influenced by the Junker values: Why were many of generals contemptuous of Hitler and the Nazi Party and loyal to the Reich at the same time? Many of Hitler's famous generals were phobic of National Socialism, even anti-Nazist[1]. This contradiction confuses many people who have studied modern European history. The keynote answer is that the Junkers' reactionary attitudes towards the changing world made these phenomena[2].

 

 

Part I          The Junkers' Traditions: The Legacy of the Teutonic Knights

 

            Prussian officers, mostly the Junkers, placed the military monastic order of the Teutonic Knights as their core value, and they felt themselves the direct descendants of the Teutonic Knights[3]. This constructed the Junkers' core value and they made their efforts to pursue the virtues of the knight codes. From the memories of Gero von Manstein, the son of Generalfeldmarschall[4] von Manstein, we can see the following traits:

 

The officer's calling was his mission in life, and he fulfilled it with a maturity rare in one so young. If one can speak of a young aristocrat in this sense, then he was one indeed. Not merely in outward appearance - he was tall, slim and fine-limed, with long, noble features - but most of all in character and outlook. There was not a single flaw in the boy's make-up. Modest, kind, ever eager to help others, at once serious minded and cheerful, he had no thought for himself, but knew only comradeship and charity. His mind and spirit were perpetually open to all that is fine and good. It was his heritage to come of a long line of soldiers; but by the very fact of being an ardent German soldier, he was at once a gentleman in the truest sense of the world -- a gentleman and a Christian.[5]

 

            From this passage we can see an image of a knight in the Middle Age. However, in the early and middle twentieth century, is this life style too old-fashioned? The answer is: "No." Prussian officers, or German officers, strongly believed that they were the descendants of Teutonic Knights, the German military colonialists in Poland[6]. Patriotism and the passion towards their people were considered the highest virtue as knights. Therefore, the Prussian officers thought that they chose a military career by nature and by their historical obligations.

 

            Generaloberst[7] von Arnim, one of the last knights of the Old School[8], showed some of these virtues as a knight. When von Arnim was involved in an air attack on an Italian ship at the beginning of May 1943[9], there were over 700 British POWs on board, but the RAF[10] did not know this. He saved those captives by sending Alexander, the commander in chief of the Allies Troops in North Africa, a clear message, 'Stop the air attack on Tunis harbour. The ship has 700 POWs on board.' This concern for humanity with both friend and enemy shows another aspect of knight codes[11].

 

            The biography of General der Panzer von Senger shows some other virtues that the virtues in which the knights believed:

From earliest times when troubadours sang chivalrous ballads in Provence, to the time when Prussia perfected the ideal of the 'perfect professional officer', and our enemy today that of the 'perfect gentlemen office', the guiding principle was that the feudal lord or the officer, the man set in authority, should devote himself to the protection of the weak. Your subordinates are placed there by the authority that the state has entrusted in you. They are placed there in your protection and they are totally dependent on your judgement, your care and your decisions. They are the weak - just as are they who inhabit the lands on which you now stand as conqueror[12].

 

            These virtues were eliminated and replaced by "Nazist propaganda". In spite of the guardianship of some "old-fashioned, reactionary" senior officers[13], this "fight with Nazism into Wehrmacht[14]" was lost. Since 1933, the Wehrmacht have started to conflict with the political issues into the military internal operations. This was severly against the Weimar military principles established by General von Seeckt[15].

 

Perhaps, at the funeral of Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt in 1953, that "the offering clergyman spoke of the deceased's 'simple demeanour and noble character' and told the mourners they were witnessing 'the burial of the last great Prussian'[16]" can be the end note of this has-been ideology in the changing Germany.

 

 

Part II The Third Reich from the Junker Viewpoints

 

At a parade at Saarbrücken on 1 March 1935, to mark the return of Saar to Germany,Fritsch stood on the reviewing platform where, according to American journalist William Shier standing next to him, 'he poured out a running fire of sarcastic remarks about the SS, the Party, and various Nazi leaders from Hitler on down. He did not disguise his contempt for them all.'[17]

 

It is hard to believe that General der Artillerie von Fritsch was the commander in chief of OKH[18]^{, [19]} at that time. However, this sort of abhorrence or contempt of Nazism was not rare among most of the traditional Prussian officers, which believed in the virtues of the Wehrmacht. Another example shows an even  more emotional attitude. Baron von Müllenheim-Rechberg narrated this sort of mind by taking a political term translation. In his book Schlachtschiff Bismarck, he showed his contempt upon Nazism unreservedly. He once said that  "gleichalten" was to be translated into English as "to boil down to the same level"[20]. Yet this term meant to force the unionisation of culture, politics, economy, etc.

 

            Although many of the Junkers did not like Hitler, especially some of the senior officers from the Imperial German Army, they still had to make compromises. Due to their fond memories of their old lifestyle, they wanted to turn to the society of their previously illustrious life. At the burial of Empress Augusta Victoria in April 1921, people could not realise that the event happened three years after the end of Imperial Germany because everything looked the same as the old time[21]. An old Imperial-styled  burial was held, and many generals and nobles put on their Imperial costume t attend this event. Many patriot student groups also joined the march in the farewell ceremony. When Hitler offered to rebuild the Wehrmacht[22], the officers were of course glad to see this due to the insults of the Treaty of Versailles[23]. This was their chance to have their old Imperial Army back.

 

          Why did the generals make no attempt to get rid of Hitler or just resign when the god of fortune turned from Germany? Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein gave us a very good explanation:

"The first point is that a senior commander is not more able to pack and go. …… The soldier in the field is not in the pleasant position of a politician, who is always at liberty to climb off the band-wagon when things go wrong or the line taken by the Government does not suit him. A Soldier has to fight where and when he is ordered. There are admittedly cases where a senior commander cannot reconcile it with his responsibilities to carry out an order he had been given. …… No general can vindicate the loss of a battle by claiming that he was compelled - against his better judgement - to execute an order that led to defeat. In this case the only course open to him is disobedience, for which he is answerable with he head. Success will usually decide whether he was right or not.[24]" "As one responsible for an army group in the field I did not feel that I had the right to contemplate a coup d' état in wartime because in my view it would have led to an immediate collapse of the front and probably to chaos inside Germany. Apart from this, there was always the question of the military oath and the admissibility of murder for politifcal motives. As I said at my trail,: 'No senior military commander can for years on end expect his soldiers to lay down their lives for victory and then precipitate defeat by his own hand.'"[25]

 

            Regarding the attitude towards the coup d' état of 1944, many traditional Junkers did not participate in the conspiracy because they did not think this would not solve the problem. Although the Allies also made contribution[26] for keep German generals staying on the sinking ship, the attitude of the generals still served as the main reason. General der Panzer von Senger gave an answer in a letter to a friend about why not to support any scheme against the Third Reich[27].

 

 

Conclusion

 

            Actually there is not a clear idea how the Allies directed the political part of the Second World War, and they tried to varnish the facts after the war[28]. Someone in the British government at the wartime described his work: "My tasks was simply to find out who was killing the most Germans and suggest means by which we could help them to kill more. Politics must be a secondary consideration."[29] Through this sort of psudoreasoning lenses we cannot see the genuine values of the Junkers. In addition, from Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein's views, doing one's duty is a very important virtue of a soldier or a commander[30]. Moreover, from his son's memories, the best description of the Junker values was stated[31]. We must understand them although this has been history. They deserved their positions in history, and we must know they were not merely Hitler's war tools.

 

Bibliography

 

1.        Barneett, Correlli, Hitler's Generals, 1989, Grove Weidenfeld, New York

2.        Fuller, J. F. C., The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Volume 3, 1956, Eyre And Sopottiswood, London

3.        Lorant, Stefan, Sieg Heil, 1974, Murray Printing Company, Forge Villege, MA

4.        von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Burkard Freiherr, Schachtschiff Bismarck, 1979, Verlag Ullstein GmbH, Germany (Chinese version printed in 1995 by Sing Kuang Book Company, Taipei)

 

Other Bibliography

The books listed below also contain the materials related to this paper but was not taken due to the limitation of the length of this paper.

 

1.          Guderian, Heiinz, Panzer Leader, (Chinese version printed in 1994 by Sing Kuang Book Company, Taipei)

2.          Liddel Hart, B. H., The Other Side of the Hill, 1948, Cassell And Company Ltd., London

3.          von Manstein, Erich, Lost Victories, 1953 (Chinese version printed in 1994 by Sing Kuang Book Company, Taipei)