Michelle Maru
Whistle-blowing is an issue that is of concern to all Human Resource professionals. It is both controversial and complex. Various theories have been presented in recent literature that attempt to explain: 1) what whistle-blowing is, 2) who whistle-blowers are, and 3) the results of whistle-blowing. This paper will present an overview of each of these areas of research as well as look at the legal issues surrounding whistle-blowing. This is a relatively new area of study, thus conflicting ideas will be presented and in many cases consensus will not be reached.
Although variations can be found, whistle-blowing is defined as �organization members� disclosure of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to parties who may be able to effect action� (Miceli and Near, 1985, p. 525). Whistle-blowing can be as simple as one individual employee reporting a wrong-doing or it can been seen as a complex process beginning with the reporting of such an act. When viewed as a process, whistle-blowing involves, not only the complaint, but also the complaint recipient, the immediate supervisor, top management and, probably most importantly, the interactions of all these key players. (Miceli, Rehg and Near and Ryan, 1999). According to Boyle (1990), four elements encompass whistle-blowing: 1) the disclosure of information, be it internal or external, must be made in good faith, 2) this disclosure must be made by a current, former or prospective employee, 3) the information must be linked with misconduct on the part of the employer and 4) evidence of the misconduct should exist as well as information regarding the identify of the wrongdoer.
Internal whistle-blowing refers to the reporting of the wrongdoing to a current member of the organization. Positive results can arise, for both the organization and the whistle-blower, from internal whistle-blowing. As discussed by Paul and Townsend (1996), internal whistle-blowing not only gives the employer a opportunity to correct the wrongdoing and avoid its consequences but it also provides the organization with an opportunity to increase employee morale and overall well-being. Alternatively, external whistle-blowing involves the reporting of the wrongdoing to an individual or organization outside of the company in which it occurred. This method of whistle-blowing, when used, can have more extreme effects on the organization as well as the whistle-blower. Frequently, external whistle-blowing occurs only after internal attempts have failed or when it is viewed that management will not correct the wrongdoing (Paul and Townsend 1996). In these instances, Paul and Townsend (1996) cite citizens� rights, increases in taxes coupled with decreases in services and greater regulations as potential outcomes of external whistle-blowing.
Having explained the nature of whistle-blowing, the literature then directs its focus toward describing the characteristics of the whistle-blower. Identifying a potential whistle-blower can be of great benefit to an organization. Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to the exact composition of a whistle-blower; however, there are several theories presented in the literature. The first is the idea of categories of characteristics (Murphy, 1993). From this perspective, there are four categories of characteristics which comprise a whistle-blower,: individual, job, work-group and organizational. Individual characteristics such as high status, high education level, professional orientation and high tolerance for rejection tend to empower the potential whistle-blower. Alternatively, high executive ambitions, high organizational identity and low job confidence tend to discourage an individual from blowing the whistle. �Individuals who are highly interested in furthering their careers might either identify with the organization and thus regard the wrongdoing as not really wrong, or they may fear jeopardizing their careers by exposing the faults of the organization to others� (Murphy, 1993, p 53). The characteristics of an individual job also seem to impact an employee�s propensity for whistle-blowing. As an example, internal auditors are often encouraged and/or required to report wrongdoing (Paul and Townsend, 1996). �These jobs also give individuals unusually high levels of exposure to information, events, and the like that might trigger whistle-blowing� (Murphy, 1993, p.53).
The presence of work groups, either formal or informal, may also effect whether an employee chooses to blow the whistle. Group norms establish standards of acceptable behavior. The tendency to blow the whistle seems to increase if the group views whistle-blowing as acceptable behavior (Paul and Townsend, 1996). �There is usually a strong norm in favor of conformity and against �tattling�, but if the work group supports the notion that wrongdoing should be exposed, whistle-blowing might occur, especially in response to acts or practices that are defined as unacceptable by the work group� (Murphy, 1993, p.53-54).
The composition of the organization as a whole also plays a part in bringing the whistle-blower to the forefront. Whistle-blowing tends to decrease as the size of the organization increases, thus whistle-blowers are more common in relatively small organizations (Paul and Townsend, 1996). �This phenomenon has several potential explanations, including diffusion of responsibility, or the difficulty of psychologically identifying with large organizations� (Murphy, 1993, p.54). Organizational climate also appears to be useful in predicting who will blow the whistle. In an attempt to learn more about this relationship, Miceli and Near (1985) analyzed questionnaires that they sent to a random sample of federal employees as well as archival information from federal agencies. As a result of their work, Miceli and Near saw that a predictive pattern of whistle-blowing emerged: �when wrongdoing was serious and the organization signaled that it was dependent on the wrongdoing (i.e. it had high levels of other wrongdoing and threatened retaliation against whistle-blowers), observers went �outside�� (1985, p. 538). In an earlier discussion of the types of whistle-blowing, it was pointed out that external whistle-blowing is more likely to occur when the potential whistle-blower feels that management will do nothing. This finding was consistent with that of Miceli and Near. Further, Miceli and Near�s data �strongly suggest that certain conditions lead to employees� sensing that they can be manipulated and that this may discourage whistle-blowing� (p.539). Again we see that an individual�s perception of the organization will have an impact on their decision whether or no to act upon knowledge of wrongdoing. While the climate of the organization helps us to identify who will blow the whistle, the nature of the wrongdoing will help us to predict whether the whistle-blowing will be internal or external: �The more extreme or recurring the wrongdoing, the more likely that the whistle-blower will inform authorities outside the organization� (Miceli and Near, 1985, p.540). Alternatively, they found that there was a propensity to report the wrongdoing internally when the activity wasn�t consistent with operations (1985). These findings of Miceli and Near (1985) have had very important implications for organizations that wish to curtain whistle-blowing activities. Given these findings, organizations will be able to develop and implement programs to alter organizational climates in ways that will decrease the likelihood of whistle-blowing.
In 1994, Somers and Casal examined how levels of organizational commitment define the whistle-blower. Similar to the work of Miceli and Near in 1985, Somers and Casal analyzed the results of questionnaires sent to a random sample of national management accountants. Their work looked at the effects of commitment on both internal and external whistle-blowers. Initial findings showed that commitment level effects internal reporting but not external. This effect appeared to be curvilinear indicating that �relatively high and relatively low levels of commitment inhibit whistle-blowing, whereas moderate levels lead to an increased propensity to report wrongdoing� (Somers and Casal, 1994, p.281). This finding suggests that whistle-blowers tend to identify with the organization; however, consistent with prior discussion, they do not have high executive ambitions. Whistle-blowing research has allowed us to gain a better understanding of who is likely to report a wrongdoing and whether they will report it to an internal or external source. However, it is important to note that a comprehensive theory of whistle-blowing has yet to be uncovered. Various theories, such as Vroom�s expectancy-valence theory, cognitive dissonance theory and moral reasoning theory, have been used to explain specific whistle-blowing activities but none are able to span all situations (Paul and Townsend, 1996). Miceli and Near (1988) examined �prosocial behavior, defined as positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons, even though prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves� (p.268). They analyzed archival data from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board and found that their results supported the prosocial behavioral perspective. Specifically, they found that �observers of wrongdoing that worked in organizations where inactive observers believed problems could and would be corrected would be more likely than other observers to blow the whistle� (p.274). The whistle-blower is accomplishing two things in this instance: ridding society of the wrongdoing and seeing immediate, positive results of their whistle-blowing effort. Both the individual and society as a whole benefit from whistle-blowing.
Another important facet of whistle-blowing research involves the potential for retaliation by management. Certain factors have been identified as being central to predicting retaliation. Lack of support from management and supervisors, external whistle-blowing and minority racial group membership have been shown to be consistently related to retaliation (Miceli et al., 1999). Rothschild and Miethe (1999) examined survey data from specific professions, telephone interviews with whistle-blowers and silent observers across the country, and 1993 survey data from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board. Their studied revealed that �about two-thirds of the whistle-blowers . . . experienced each of the following forms of retaliation:
-lost their job or were forced to retire (69%)
-received negative job performance evaluations (64%)
-had work more closely monitored by supervisors (68%)
-were criticized or avoided by coworkers (69%)
-were blacklisted from getting another job in their field (64%)� ( p.120).
Consistent with the findings of Miceli et al. (1999), internal whistle-blowing produced less retaliation than external whistle-blowing. Along with management retaliation, the majority of the whistle-blowers studied by Rothschild and Miethe (1999) also experienced severe emotional effects of their whistle-blowing activity:
�-severe depression or anxiety (84%)
-feelings of isolation or powerlessness (84%)
-distrust of others (78%)
-declining physical health (69%)
-severe financial decline (66%)
-problems with family relations (53%)� (p.121).
Given these deep effects of whistle-blowing, it is important to note that Rothschild and Miethe (1999) found that �90% of the whistle-blowers in our sample said they would still report misconduct if they had a chance to do things all over again� (p.121).
As with any controversial issue, whistle-blowing must be examined within its legal parameters. The purpose of many federal and state laws is to regulate certain activities. Naturally, attempts have been made to control the act of whistle-blowing and to protect those who engage in it. As with many issues, protection for whistle-blowers is not always guaranteed and current legislation is not exhaustive. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) protects federal employees �who disclose government waste, fraud or abuse� (Miceli et al., 1999, p.130) from retaliation by management. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) was established as the enforcing body under the CSRA. It should also be noted that the Whistle-Blowers� Protection Act of 1989 was passed in an effort to strengthen all whistle-blowers� rights under the CSRA. The First and Fourteenth Amendments discuss citizens� rights to free speech. These Amendments have been extended to �protect against federal, state and local retaliation against whistle-blowers (Paul and Townsend, 1996, p.155). Similarly, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the concerted efforts of employees for the purposes of mutual aid and protection. Thus the activity of whistle-blowing is protected; however, its application under the Act applies only to a limited scope of activity (Paul and Townsend, 1996).
Miceli et al. (1999) were interested in examining the effects that the above legislation had on the act of whistle-blowing. In order to accomplish this, they analyzed survey data collected by the MSPB assessing federal employees� perceptions of wrongdoing, whistle-blowing, and retaliation. Miceli et al. examined data collected throughout three years: 1980 (this year was used as a baseline of comparison), 1983 and 1992. Two notable results indicate that this legislation had a positive effect on the process of whistle-blowing: �First, over time the rate of perceived wrongdoing declined significantly and, second, the proportion of those who believed they had observed wrongdoing-who then reported it to authorities-increased� (Miceli et al., 1999, p.144). However, further findings indicate that whistle-blowing legislation created effects other than simply reducing wrong-doing and increasing reporting: �the proportion of whistle-blowers who remained anonymous increased over time, and proportion of identified whistle-blowers who perceived they were retaliated against� (Miceli et al., 1999, p.145). As one may expect, the overall effect of current legislation has various results on the act of whistle-blowing. It is impossible to say that legislation had a completely positive or completely negative impact, for it appears to have had both.
About one third of U.S. employees have witnessed activity that they perceive as unethical or illegal (Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). The question then becomes, will these wrongdoings be reported and if so, will they be reported internally or externally. The ramifications of whistle-blowing on both the individual and the organization are diverse in nature, thus there are numerous factors that must be taken into account when attempting to explain whistle-blowing activity. Some of these elements have been presented in this paper while many more are still being researched. Throughout the literature, one common theme does seem to emerge and that is that �workers� themselves have enormous potential to detect and control waste, fraud, and crime in the American workplace� (Rothschild and Miethe, 1999, p.112). With this in mind, both workers and managers need to be aware of organizational wrongdoing and work together to try to prevent and/or correct it.
REFERENCES
Boyle, R. (1990). A Review of Whistle-Blower Protections and Suggestions for Change. Labor Law Journal, 41, 821-830.
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1985). Characteristics of Organizational Climate and Perceived Wrongdoing Associated with Whistle-Blowing Decisions. Personnel Psychology: 38(3), 525-544.
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1988). Individual and Situational Correlates of Whistle-Blowing. Personnel Psychology, 41, 267-281.
Miceli, M. P., Rehg, M., Near, J. P., & Ryan, K. C. (1999). Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a Naturally Occurring Field Experiment. Work and Occupations, 26(1), 129-151.
Murphy, R. (1993). Honesty in the Workplace. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.
Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1995). Effective Whistle-Blowing. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 679-708.
Paul, R. J., & Townsend, J. B. (1996). Don�t Kill the Messenger! Whistle-Blowing in America-A Review with Recommendations. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 9(2), 149-161.
Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T. D. (1999). Whistle-Blowing Disclosures and Management Retaliation. Work and Occupations, 26(1), 107-128.
Somers, M. J., & Casal, J. C. (1994). Organizational Commitment and Whistle-Blowing. A Test of the Reformer and the Organization Man Hypotheses. Group and Organization Management, 19(3), 270-284.
