WHAT IS PRAGMATISM?
Pragmatism as a philosophical doctrine was
first formulated by the American philosopher, physicist and mathematician
Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced "purse") in the 1870s. Taking off
from a use of the term "pragmatic belief" by the 18th
century philosopher Immanual Kant (who will reappear briefly below), Peirce
propounded what he called the pragmatic theory of meaning. His original
statement of the theory follows: "Consider what effects, which might
conceivably have practical bearing, we conceive the object of our conception to
have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of
the object." *1
Now this may, at first, sound similar to
Marxism. Isn't he saying that practice is primary, that there can be no
knowledge apart from practice, that theory and practice are intimately related,
ect? Well, he is making a close link between theory and practice, but it
takes more than this to arrive at the Marxist theory of knowledge and truth.
What Peirce is saying is that the whole
concept of a thing can be identified with the total effects which that thing
has. In other words, the thing = its effects. He goes on to give an example of
what he means. What, he asks, does it mean to call something hard? He
answers:
"Evidently that its will not be
scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of this quality, as of
every other, lies in its conceived effects. There is absolutely no difference
between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to test.
Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of
soft cotton, and would remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be
false to say that the diamond was soft?… Reflection will show that the reply
is this: there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They would
involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words
hard and soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be
different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts, which would
be exceedingly maladroit [awkward]. This leads us to the remark that the
question of what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is
not a question of fact, but only the most perspicuous [clear fitting]
arrangement of them." *2
There is no difference between something hard
and something soft unless they are "brought to the test." A thing is
reduced to its effects; a quality is reduced to its manifestations. What this
amounts to is what is called in philosophy phenomenalism - the doctrine
that human thought can only grasp the appearances of things (the phenomena),
whereas the reality, the essence, remains beyond our reach.
If a thing does not manifest a quality through
actual effects, then you can either say that the thing has the quality or that
it doesn’t - both will be equally true. The only criterion involved is the
"arrangement of facts." What Peirce means is that with regard to this
particular diamond, which had never come into contact with anything (other than
cotton) and hence never manifested the quality of hardness, if you were to say
that its was soft, while other diamonds (which had actually scratched
something)*3 were hard, then this would be a "maladroit," or awkward,
arrangement of facts. So, in order to have a graceful arrangement, you might as
well say that this cotton-swathed diamond too is hard.
Such were the beginnings of pragmatism. But it
did not become a powerful force in the world of ideas for another twenty years
after this essay, and the person who became its most well known exponent was not
Peirce himself but his friend, the Harvard philosopher and psychologist William
James. After James began to use the term, it was taken up in a widespread way
both within academic philosophy and among intellectuals in general. As James
noted at the end of 1906,
"The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at
its present it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals. On all hands
we find the 'pragmatic movement' spoken of… It is evident that the term
applies itself conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked
a collective name, and that it has 'come to stay.'" *4
This last statement is certainly true (except
in the broadest historical sense). Although pragmatism found expression as a
whole explicit philosophy through the writings of academics, their writings
simply crystallized a widespread tendency of thought. Like all theory, in fact,
pragmatism had a basis in social practice. And the practice that it summed up
(though of course not scientifically), as we shall see, was that of the U.S.
bourgeoisie as it consolidated its rule and moved into the monopoly stage of
capitalism in the period between the Civil War and World War 1.
James insisted that pragmatism was not a set
of doctrines, but a method, which he explained as follows:
"The pragmatic method is primarily a
method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.
Is the world one or many? -fated or free?- material or spiritual? - Here are
notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over
such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to
interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What
difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that
notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the
alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle."
According to James, then, pragmatism is
primarily a method for dealing with philosophical disputes. As we shall see
later, it is more than this, but let us look at it first in terms which James
lays down. What results does pragmatism have when applied to philosophical
questions?
One of the most basic and important
philosophical disputes is that between materialism and idealism. What result
does pragmatism give in this case? For James, this question posed itself as a
choice between materialism on the one hand and 'spiritualism' on the other. And
on the question of whether matter is primary, or whether God or some spiritual
force is the ultimate thing in the universe, the pragmatic method, says James
offers a clear result; it shows that the difference between materialism and
'spiritualism' comes down to the following:
'[Materialism is] not a permanent warrant
for our more ideal interest, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes. The notion
of God, on the other hand,… has at least this practical superiority…, that
it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved… Materialism
means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of
ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and
the letting loose of hope." *6
This same theme is developed by James in one
of his most famous essays, "The Will To Believe," in which he argues
that, from the point of view of philosophy and general intellectual rigor, we
have the "right to believe" in religion. *7 For Peirce also, one of
the important things about pragmatism was that it allowed for the possibility of
religious belief. As one scholar writing about Peirce notes, "Although he
opposed dogmatic theology vigorously, he was equally opposed to any philosophy
which closed the door on religion."*8 And Peirce himself, defending the
pragmatic theory of meaning, makes a revealing remark: "It has been said to
be a skeptical and materialistic principle. But it is only an application of the
sole principle of logic which was recommended by Jesus; 'ye may know them by
their fruits', and it is very intimately allied with the ideas of the
gospel."*9
Indeed, this religious-justification theme,
this fideism (belief in faith as prior and superior to reason), was so
pronounced in the beginnings of pragmatism that the French writer Anatole France
was led to say "Just lately pragmatism has been invented for the express
purpose of gaining credit for religion in the minds of rationalist." *10
John Dewy (1859-1952), the next major
continuator of pragmatism in philosophy, smoothed over the crudeness of many of
James' formulations, while at the same time not basically altering the essence
of the philosophical position. This was no less true in the case of religion
than in other areas. What he wanted, Dewey said, was a "religious
attitude" which
"…would surrender once for all
commitment to beliefs about matters of fact, whether physical, social or
metaphysical. It would leave such matters to inquirers in other fields. Nor
would it substitute in their place fixed beliefs about values…" *11
What would be left would be "the
religious attitude as a sense of the possibilities of existence and as devotion
to the cause of these possibilities…" *12
So pragmatism shows a constant inclination for
religion, and this may well lead us to think that it must be a form of idealism
rather than materialism. And indeed this will prove to be correct. But before
going on to show just how it constitutes idealism, and how it relates to other
trends in bourgeois philosophy, let us look more closely at how it presents
itself.
We have seen that Peirce introduced pragmatism
as a theory of the meaning of concepts. James developed it into a general method
for settling "metaphysical," or philosophical disputes. Further, James
introduced a pragmatic theory of truth, which takes us to the most basic
level of the meaning of pragmatism. This is how James explains it in some famous
passages from his 1907 lectures on pragmatism:
"True ideas are those that we can
assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we
cannot. That is the practical difference it makes for us to have true
ideas…Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true
by events."*13
So if only verifiable ideas are true, and
truth "happens" to an idea, then the process of verification must be
the process whereby an idea actually becomes true (and in fact James draws this
conclusion in the next sentence of this passage). In other words, there is no
such thing as something's being true before it is found out to be true. In fact
James is saying that there is no such thing as "finding out" that
something is true. For the process of verifying an idea is actually the process
whereby the idea becomes true- whereby truth 'happens to' the idea.
But what, then, does it mean to verify an
idea? For James, it simply means that the consequences of believing the idea are
generally useful and advantageous. Thus he says:
"You can say of it then either that
'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'.
Both these phrases mean exactly the sane thing, namely that there is an idea
that gets fulfilled and can be verified… When a moment in our experience, of
any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that
sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of
experience again and make advantageous connexion with them… 'the true', to
put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as
'the right' is only expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in
almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole
course…"*14
Ideas are true when the consequences of
believing them are in the long run and on a whole useful. Truth =
expediency.
These rather bald statements provoked a storm
of controversy following the publication of James' book, and other pragmatist
hastened to dissociate themselves from the obvious crudity of his position, As
one writer put it:
"Peirce dubbed James' doctrine
'suicidal' and rebaptized his own philosophy as 'pragmaticism'… Dewy also
dissociated himself from James on this matter. He disclaimed the notion that
truth gives satisfaction…"*15
Peirce preferred to say "the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we
mean by the truth…" and that belief "were to tend indefinitely
toward absolute fixity," we would have truth. *16 But, it might well be
objected to this, as one scholar did object,
"What pragmatic meaning can be
attributed to notions such as 'absolute fixity' or 'the opinion which is fated
to be ultimately agreed to'? One would imagine that these concepts, too, would
be unacceptable…"*17