Reference Frames
This paper discusses two reference frames: the mind frame, or mind, (also known as the mind's eye, mindscape, etc.) and an external-to-the-mind, or external, reference frame (also known as the "real world", universe, etc.), which contains all minds. While the existence and separateness of these reference frames is not critical to the main arguments of this paper, they will be assumed to both exist and to be separate from each other in order to highlight the similarities of things traditionally considered as occuring in two separate reference frames: the mind frame (ideas and concepts) and the external frame ("real world" objects). Now, what exactly is a reference frame? Here, a reference frame will be defined as a set, which may or may not contain elements. The mind frame is a set comprising our mindscape, whose elements are ideas, concepts, and so forth. The external frame, or universe, is a larger set containing elements such as objects that we see, sounds, elementary particles, energy, space, and so forth. As mentioned above, the external frame also contains all mind frames.Ideas and Concepts Within the Mind Reference Frame
An idea is defined here as a complete description of something. This definition can be justified because, at the very least, an idea is a complete description of itself (that is, of the contents or meaning of the idea). Ideas are usually thought of as occurring within the mind reference frame, but this is not required by this definition. However, for now, consider an idea within the mind frame. Assuming a materialist view that the mind is composed of biochemical molecules, which themselves are composed of atoms, elementary particles, forces between particles, and so forth, then ideas within the mind frame must also be composed of biochemical molecules, atoms, elementary particles, forces between particles, and so forth. Thus, the definition of an idea within the mind frame is that it is a complete description of something, where this description is composed of atoms, elementary particles, forces between atoms, and so forth. Two types of ideas are: o Simple ideas: These are complete descriptions of things, where the descriptions are fixed at specific times and locations relative to other descriptions of things with their own times and locations. A group, or set, of descriptions of things, each with their own times and locations, is needed in order to define relative times and locations. Therefore, one may say that simple ideas occur within a set or reference frame. One possible reference frame is the mind frame, which contains representations, or descriptions, of the external frame. An example of a simple idea could be the picture inside one's mind frame of an external frame chair at 10:43 A.M. on 11/7/01 in Denver, CO. This chair is fixed in time and location within the external reference frame (the universe), and the simple idea describing it is fixed in time and location in the representation of the universe within the mind frame. o Concepts: These are complete descriptions of things, where the descriptions are not fixed at specific times and locations relative to other descriptions of things with their own times and locations. Two ways for a description to not have a specific time and location stamp relative to other descriptions are as follows. First, the description may be contained within a reference frame, such as the mind frame, which has a mechanism, such as cognition, for removing the relative time and location stamp. Second, if the description is not contained within a larger reference frame containing other descriptions, this would make assignment of a relative time and location stamp impossible. Some examples of concepts are described next. In the mind frame, concepts are often composed of bits and pieces of simple ideas, from which the relative time and location stamps have been removed. For instance, in contrast to the simple idea describing a specific chair with a fixed time and location stamp, the general concept of a chair may take bits and pieces of various other simple chair ideas (legs, arms, backrest, seat, and so forth) in one's mind and combine them into the timeless and locationless description/concept of a generic object for supporting your body (that is, the concept of a chair). Other concepts may show the general, not specific, time and location relationships between different simple ideas. For instance, the concept of "auto transportation" as going from one place to another by car may entail the joining of two simple ideas as well as the replacement of specific location (X0, X1) and time (Y0, Y1) stamps with general location and time stamps. That is, the two simple ideas: - Car in place X0 at time Y0 - Same car in place X1 at time Y1 may be transformed into the concept of auto transportation: - Any car moves from any one place at any time to any other place at a later time. This description/concept just shows general relationships and is not fixed at any specific time or location relative to other descriptions. Of course, one may also have a simple idea of "auto transportation between Denver and Boulder" from 4:00-4:40 on 11/7/01. But, this would be a simple idea and not a concept. In conclusion, an idea is a complete description of something, where this description is composed of atoms, elementary particles, forces between atoms, and so forth. Two types of ideas are simple ideas and concepts. A simple idea is a description with a fixed time and location relative to other descriptions. A concept is a description without a specific time or location relative to other descriptions.Objects Within the External Reference Frame and their Relationship to Ideas and Concepts Within the Mind Reference Frame
What is an object in the external-to-the-mind reference frame (also known as the "real world", universe, existence, and so forth), and what relationship does it have to ideas and concepts within the mind reference frame? Considering the external frame to be a set, an object is an element within that set. The object is composed of atoms, elementary particles, forces between atoms, and so forth. This collection of atoms, forces, and so forth forms a description or picture of that same object within the external frame. That is, the object's atoms, forces, and so forth are, together, a description of itself. Thus, an object in the "real world" external reference frame has the same definition as an idea within the mind reference frame. It is a complete description of something (that is, itself), where this description is composed of atoms, elementary particles, forces between atoms, and so forth. This indicates that an idea in the mind frame and an external frame object are really exactly the same thing except in different reference frames. This then leads to the following, additional conclusions: o Ideas do not just occur in the mind reference frame. A "real world" object can be thought of as an idea within the "real world" external reference frame. That chair you're sitting in right now is an idea in the external frame because it's a collection of atoms and forces completely describing itself; it's just that this idea is an element within the external reference frame instead of the mind frame. This external frame idea does not need a human mind to "think" it because it exists outside the human mind. It is an idea on its own just as an idea can exist within the mind frame. It is just in a different reference frame. o Even though it cannot consciously manipulate ideas as a human mind can, the external frame can be thought of as a type of "mind" in that it is a set that contains descriptions of things (that is, objects/ideas). Thus, one could almost think of the external frame as a "universal mind". o Objects/ideas in the external reference frame are simple ideas and not concepts. This is because all objects/ideas contained in a reference frame also containing other objects/ideas, such as the external frame, have a specific time and location stamp given by their relationships with the other objects/ideas in the frame and with the overall frame and are, thus, simple ideas (simple ideas have relative time and location stamps, concepts do not). Furthermore, as far as we're aware, the external frame, unlike the mind frame, has no mechanism for removing these time and location stamps in order to turn the objects/ideas into concepts. Thus, only simple ideas exist within the external reference frame. This view is in contrast to the Platonist school of thought, which holds that concepts exist independently of the mind, that is in the external frame. Assuming that there is no cognition-like mechanism for removing time and location stamps in the external frame, then the only way an external frame object/idea can have no time and location stamp, and thus be a concept, is if it is not contained in a larger set of other objects/ideas, which means that it cannot be assigned a time and location stamp relative to these other ideas. This can only happen in one situation, which is where the object/idea is itself the largest set of all objects/ideas. This set-of-all-sets would not be contained in a larger set containing other objects/ideas, would therefore have no time and location stamp, and would thus be a concept. This leads to the conclusion that the entirety of the external reference frame (that is, all that exists or "existence") can itself be considered to be a concept independent of the mind. This will be discussed more fully in an accompanying paper.Conclusions
Humans have always made a dichotomy between mind and matter. These have always been considered as two totally different things. In concluding this paper, however, it is suggested that this distinction is not totally valid. Support for this suggestion comes from the the main conclusions of this paper: (1) that ideas within the mind frame and objects within the external frame are identical in definition except for the reference frame; and (2) that the external frame is a set containing descriptions/objects/ideas similar to the mind frame, and can, thus, be thought of as a "universal mind". These external frame ideas do not need the presence of a human mind to "think" them. One application of this reasoning is in cosmology. Stephen Hawking, in `!A Brief History of Time`!\(u)1\(d), has asked: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?". In a similar vein, John Wheeler and Kenneth Ford, in `!Geons, Black Holes, and`! `!Quantum Foam`!\(u)2\(d), writes: "The universe and all that it contains ('it') may arise from the myriad yes-no choices of measurement (the 'bits')". These authors appear to be searching for a mechanism that changes ideas and concepts (that is, equations and bits of information) into "real world" objects. The results presented here on the equivalence of mind and matter suggest that perhaps no mechanism is needed. The ideas, concepts, equations and bits may THEMSELVES be the constituents of the "real" universe. That is, it doesn't come from bit. It is bit. Bit is it. After all, it ("real world" object) and bit (idea, concept, equation, or bit of information) are identical in definition except for reference frame. Furthermore, relative to one another, two ideas, concepts, equations or bits of information would appear to be as real to each other as two "real world" particles appear to each other. Therefore, given a set of equations or bits of information, who's to say that these aren't equivalent to a set of "real world" particles? Ideas, concepts, equations, bits and "real world" particles are all just arbitrary names for complete descriptions of things, or ideas, existing within a set or reference frame. Further applying this reasoning to cosmology, consider the following example. In the mind frame, given an initial description, such as that of a ball, one can then instantaneously visualize a larger, even infinite, number of other balls radiating out from that first ball. Assume that the initial ball is a timeless and locationless description of a generic ball, that is a concept. The succeeding balls radiating out from that first ball concept, however, are simple ideas because all ball descriptions after the first one exist in a set of more than one ball description and, thus, have time and location stamps given by their relationships with these other ball descriptions. One could say that the fact that the initial ball concept is not tied to any specific time or location (that is, it has perfect timelessness and locationlessness) give it a type of symmetry. Additionally, one could say that the fact that the succeeding simple ball ideas have specific time and location stamps (that is, they lack perfect timelessness and locationlessness) give them a type of asymmetry. Therefore, the process of going from a single concept to set of simple ideas is associated with a breaking of a symmetry. This overall process of forming a larger set of simple ideas from a single initial concept, with its associated symmetry breaking, is strikingly similar in form to the big bang process in cosmology in which a larger space-time (that is, a set of time and location stamps, or simple ideas) is formed from an initial timeless, locationless singularity (that is, a concept) and in which an initial, still unknown, symmetry is thought to be broken during the formation of the universe. Considering the equivalent definitions, as descriptions, of ideas and "real world" obects, perhaps one of Hawking's equations or Wheeler's bits is the initial singularity from which our universe sprang? In addition to being similar in form to the big bang, the formation, in the mind frame, of an infinite number of balls from an initial ball concept is analogous to the relationship between the observer and the observed in quantum physics. Quantum physics implies that objects do not exist until they are observed, but once observed, properties of distant objects can be tied together, or entangled, instantaneously. Likewise, in the mind frame, the infinite number of balls radiating out from the initial ball concept cannot exist until that initial concept of a ball (that is, the "observer") is present somewhere in the mind frame. Once present, the mindframe can instantaneously, or non-locally, visualize an infinite number of succeeding balls (that is, the "observed") radiating out from it. Given these similarities, one fruitful avenue for physics and cosmology research may be in considering ideas and "real world" object to be identical, as proposed in this paper. References 1. Stephen W. Hawking, `!A Brief History of Time`! (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), 190. 2. John A. Wheeler with Kenneth Ford `!Geons, Black Holes, and Quantum Foam`! (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 340.
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Copyright, 2001