Organization of the Army of Tennessee, General John B. Hood, C.S. Army, commanding,
January 20, 1864
Hardee's Corps
Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, commanding
Bate's Division
Maj. Gen. William B. Bate
Finley's Brigade
Col. Robert Bullock
1st and 3d Florida Infantry
Major Glover A. Ball
1st Florida (dismounted) Cavalry and 4th Florida Infantry
Lt. Col. Edward Badger
6th Florida
Captain Steven a Cawthorn
7th Florida
Major Nathan S. Blount
Report of Maj. Gen. William B. Bate, C. S. Army, commanding division, Hardee's army corps.
Headquarters Bate's Division,
Tupelo, Miss., January 25, 1865.
Major:In obedience to orders from corps headquarters I have the honor most respectfully to forward this
report of the operations of my command in the late Tennessee campaign.
After an absence of two months I rejoined the Army of Tennessee and took command of my division near Cedartown
on the 10th of October 1864. During my absence Lewis� brigade, of my division, had been taken from me and mounted, leaving
Jackson�s, Tyler�s (commanded by Brig. Gen. T. B. Smith), and Finley�s (commanded by Col. Robert Bullock), and Cobb�s battalion
of artillery, composed of Slocomb�s, Beauregard�s, and Phillips' batteries. My comnmuand moved from that time in conjunction
with Cheatham�s corps until the morning of the 13th of October when I was sent in advance upon the flanks of Dalton to Mill Creek
Gap, with instructions to take the block-house in that gap and destroy the railroad. Having approached within three miles and hearing
a locomotive I sent forward my escort, with a man mounted behind each, to cut the road and prevent the escape of the trains
from Dalton. Upon my arrival I found a formidable work so commamiding the gap as to prevent my passing through it. I soon surrounded
it with my infantry and placed my artillery in 200 yards on a commanding point, and sent forward a flag of truce to demand its surrender.
The flag was fired on, killing the horse of my assistant adjutant-general, Captain Cheney, who bore it. Thinking it done through
mistake, I sent another, of which no notice was taken. I then opened my battery, the Fifth [Company] Washington Artillery,
Lieutenant Chalaron commanding, with fine effect, and also had the sharpshooters to keep up a fire at the portholes. The infantry
was put to destroying the railroad, except a part of Tyler�s brigade (Shy�s regiment), which was held as an assaulting party in case
the block-house could not be taken otherwise. The block-house was constructed of timber and earth; the timber was compact and
four feet thick, with the same thickness of earth thrown up for five or six feet on the outside, and covered with the same depth of
timber and earth. It had forty port-holes so arranged, both on the outer and inner sides, as to afford opportunity of firing in almost any
direction. A ditch was dng around the outside filled with water. The assault was to be made at night, and all preparations made for it; but
the artillery had fired with such accuracy and fatality late in the evening that upon demand after dark it unconditionally surrendered. The
garrison consisted of a captain, and lieutenant, and 50 men; 12 or 15 of whom had been killed and wounded. The block-house was burnt next
morning, and the destruction of the railroad, which had been prosecuted during the entire night, was continued. I moved Caswell�s
battalion of sharpshooters to Tunnel Hill early in the morning, together with a regiment of cavalry (which had that night reported to me for
temporary duty), with the view of watching the enemy at that point until the division arrived. They found it had been evacuated
during the night, leaving many stores, both quartermaster�s and commissary, most of which were secured to the troops of my command. Those
which could not be transported were burned. The railroad was destroyed nearly to the tunnel, a distance of three miles, when I received
orders to rejoin and bring up the rear of the army, taking the Villanow and thence the La Fayette road. On arriving at the latter place my
command moved in conjunction with Cheatham�s corps, to which it belonged, to Gadsden, Ala., and thence across Sand Mountain to Decatur,
Ala., where on the morning of the 27th of October I was ordered on the Courtland road, and in the evening of the same day directed by
General Cheatham to press my skirmishers as near as practicable to the fort. I pushed up a detachment from each brigade, under Major Caswell,
during the night, and drove the enemy's outposts and skirmishers into the forts, and built skirmish pits on the same plateau with and within 200
or 300 yards of the fort. My skirmishers were connected on the left by those of Cleburne�s division. The enemy came out early next morning,
turning the extreme left of Cleburne�s skirmish line, and passed to the rear of the left of mine, capturing 25 of my men. As soon as ascertained
General Jackson, with Colonel Mitchell�s regiment (being on the right), retook and held, with much promptness and gallantry, the pits, with a
loss, however, of 8 or 10 men. In obedience to orders I moved my command with the corps that evening on the Courtland road; thence to
Tuscumbia, where we remained for two weeks, and crossed the Tennessee River on November 13.
Major Cobb having been sent to the hospital on account of indisposition, Captain Beauregard, by virtue of rank, took command of the
battalion of artillery.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant.
Wm. B. Bate,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. James D. Porter,
Assistant Adjutant- General.
Report of Maj. Gen. William B. Bate, C. S. Army, commanding division, of operations November 21-December 25, 1864
Headquarters Bate's Division,
Tupelo, Miss., January 25, 1865.
Major: In obedience to orders from corps headquarters, I have the honor most respectfully to forward this report of the operations of my
command in the late Tennessee campaign.
I left Florence, Al a., on the 21st of November with my command, moving with its corps, via Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant, to near
Columbia, Tenn., and went into bivouac on the 26th day of November, on the Shelbyville turnpike. The succeeding day and night was
followed with slight skirmishing on the line around Columbia.
At daylight on the morning of the 29th I moved to Duck River, four miles above Columbia, and crossed on the pontoon bridge at 7.30 o�clock,
which was as soon as I could do so, having to wait for General Cleburne�s division, which had the advance. I moved that day in rear of
that division to the neighborhood of Spring Hill, a distance of twelve miles. After moving rapidly for several miles and wading the creek I
deployed my division in line of battle, in obedience to orders froum General Cheatham to form and move on Cleburne�s left, Jackson on the
right, and Smith in echelon on the left of front line, Col. R. Bullock, commanding the Florida brigade, supporting the left. Not seeing
General Cheatham at the moment of forming my line of battle, General Hood, who was personally present, directed me to move to the turnpike
and sweep toward Columbia. General Cleburne, being in advance, formed and moved forward before it was possible for me to do so, and
changed front without stopping and without my knowing the fact, owing to intervening hills obstructing the view. As soon as asccrtained
I conformed to the movement as well as I could and pushed forward in the direction of the enemny, who held the turnpike. It was now
getting dark, and I had moved more than a mile in line of battle. Cleburne had been engaged; with what success I did not kiiow. Procuring a
guide, learning the exact locality of the enemy and the general direction of the turnpike, I changed direction to the right again, and was
moving so as to strike the turnpike to the right of Maj. Nat. Cheer�s residence, which I believed would bring me near Cleburne�s left;
Caswell�s battalion of sharpshooters, deployed as skirmishers, was within 100 yards of and commanded the tarnpike, checking the enemy�s
movement along it in my front, and my lines were being adjusted for a further forward movement, when I received an order, through Lieutenant
Schell, from General Cheathain to halt and join mny right to General Cleburne�s left. My main line was within 200 yards of the turnpike
when Major Caswell�s battalion lired into the enemy on the pike. He (the enemy) veered to his left, as I subsequently ascertaimied, and took
a road leaving the pike near Doctor McKessick�s. I obeyed the order of General Cheatham, and with delay and difficulty, it being in the
night and near the enemy, I ascertained the left of Cleburne�s line, which had retired some distance to the rear of my right. I made known
to General Cheatham the fact of the enemny threatening my left, and called for force to protect it. My left brigade was retired to confront
any movement from that direction, and during the night (perhaps 10 o�clock) General Johnson's division, of Lee�s corps, was moved to my
left. My command so disposed as to be an extension of Cleburne�s line, with its left retired I bivouacked between 9 and 10 o�clock for the
night. At daylight there was no enemy in mny front.
Early on the morning of the 30th of November 1 was ordered to follow Cleburne and bring up the rear of Cheatham�s corps. In pursuance
thereof I moved down the Franklin turnpike to the rear of Winston�s Hill, three miles from Franklin, where our forces were being deployed
and lines formed. About 3 o�clock in the evening I was ordered by General Cheathamn to move my command by the left flank, pass a gap
in the ridge to the left, circle around a mound which rose in the plain below, and move toward the Carter Creek turnpike, until, in a direct
advance on the town of Franklin, my left would strike the house of Mrs. Rebecca Bostick. I lost no time in starting and moved rapidly. This
gave me the arc, while the divisions on my right moved on the chord of the circle. I was informed that General Chalmers� cavalry was ordered
to form and advance in conjnnction with me on my left. My line was formed with Jackson�s brigade and Tyler�s, commanded by Brig. Gen.
T. B. Smith, in the front, the former on the right, and Finley�s brigade, commanded by Col. Robert Bullock, supporting. Major Caswell had
charge of the skirmish line in front. With these dispositions I moved forward through the open plain in good order. My skirmish line drove
back that of the enemy, which was located on a line with Mrs. Bostick�s house. The center of my line swept by this house, my left, Which I
had extended, reaching near the Carter Creek turnpike. The line moved steadily on, not waiting for the cavalry, driving the enemy from
his outer works, which covered the right but not the left of my line. The cavalry (dismounted) not touching my left, nor being on a line with
it, exposed that flank to a furious tire. T moved the Florida brigade to the left and advanced it, two regiments extending beyond the left
of the turnpike. My line, now a single one, without support, charged the works of the enemy. My right got to the works (the second line)
and remained there until morning the left was driven back. The enemy's [works] were strong and defiant, constructed on a slight
elevation, with few obstructions in front for several hundred yards. The works to the left of Carter Creek turnpike were not strong, and with
a vigorous assault should have been carried; a fact, however, not known until next day. A battery was located just to the right of
this turnpike, which kept up the fire until late at night. The left of my line was reformed on the brauch between the works of the
enemy and Mrs. Bostick�s house, but not in sufficient numbers to justify another effort to carry the works, as the command on my left
had not come up. A battery, under the conduct of Colonel Presstman, participated most gallantly in the fight, first occupying a position near
the house of Mrs. Bostick, and then was run up the turnpike close to the enemy�s works and engaged that battery of the enemy on our
immediate front. Many of our men who had gone into the interior works held their positions until morning, when the enemy had evacuated
the town. General Ed. Johnson�s division came in my rear just after dark, passing over that part of my line which had been reformed
near the branch fronting Mrs. Bostick�s.
My loss in this engagement was 47 killed, 253 wounded, and 19 missing. Among the killed was Colonel Smith, of the First [Georgia]
Confederate Regiment, Jackson�s brigade, who fell most gallantly while putting his regiment into the interior works of the enemy.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton was badly wounded while pressing forward in handsome style. Lieutenaimt-Colonel Badger, commanding
First [Florida (dismounted) Cavalry] and Fourth Florida Regiments was woumided three times before he left the field. Captain Carter, on
staff duty with Tyler�s brigade, fell mortally wounded near time works of the enemy and almost at the door of his father�s house. His
gallantry I witnessed with much pride, as I had done on other fields, and here take pleasure in mentioning it especially.
On the morning of the 2d of December, as my command was moving from Franklin, Tenn., in the direction of Nashville, I received the
following order, made official and inclosed to me by Major-General Cheatham, commanding corps:
Headquarters,
Near Franklin, December 2, 1804�7 a. m.
General Hood directs that you will send Bate�s division, with one battery of artillery, over to Murfreesborongh, and direct them to destroy the railroad from
Murfreesborough to Nashville, burning all the bridges and taking the block-houses and then burning them.
A. P. Mason,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
Col. B. J. Hill was ordered to co-operate with me, who had about 150 cavalry. My command consisted of Jackson�s, Tyler�s (commanded by
Brig. Gen. T. B. Smith) and Finley�s brigades (commanded by Col. Robert Bullock), and Slocomb�s battery (commanded by Lieutenant
Chalaron), all not exceeding in number 1,600 men. I moved my command on the direct road from Franklin to Triune, thence on the
Kolensville tnrnpike to the most practicable road leading across the country to the terminus of the Wilkinson turnpike, some seven miles from
Murfreesborough. I learned here that Murfreesborough, instead of being evacuated, as was supposed and as the nature of my order led me to
believe, was occupied by a strong force, estimated from 6,000 to 10,000, commanded by Major-General Rousseau, which fact I reported to army
headquarters on the morning of the 4th. I received that night the following communication from General Hood:
Headquarters,
Overton�s House, Six Miles from Nashville, December 2, 1864.
Major-General Bate:
General: General Hood directs me to say that citizens report some 5,000 Yankees at Murfreesborough. General Forrest will send some of his cavalry to assist you.
You must act according to your judgment under the circumstances, keeping in view the object of your expedition, viz, to destroy the railroad. This report is sent you
for what it is worth.
Yours, respectfully,
A. P. Mason,
Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
At 7 a. m. I moved my commaud by the left flank diagonally across the country from the Wilkinson to the Nashville and Murfreesborough
turnpike, striking the latter on the Nashville side of Overall�s Creek, five miles and a half from Murfreesborough. The object of going to
Overall�s Creek was to get between the enemy and Nashville, that I might not be cut off by his superior force, and if pressed, could fall back
to the main army. It also put me in position to execute the order which I was cautioned by General Hood to keep in view, viz �to destroy the
railroad.� This position also made my force a protection to the right wing of the army. Colonel Hill�s command was ordered to close in as
near as possible and demonstrate on the Salem and Wilkinson turnpikes, and to keep nine posted by scouting on my flanks and front. I
here drove in the enemy�s scouts and placed three regiments of the Florida brigade, commanded by Col. Robert Bullock (the Sixth Florida
being detached, under Colonel Kenan, guarding the wagon train), near the bank of the creek in observation, and to protect Chalaron�s
battery should occasion require, which was ordered to open on the block-house just across the creek, guarding the railroad bridge.
Tyler�s brigade (General T. B. Smith commanding) was held in reserve; Jackson�s was immediately put to destroying the railroad.
About noon the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the creek but was dispersed two or three times by a few well-directed shots from
the artillery. He retnrned in the evening, re-enforced by infantry and artillery. He moved a skirmish line down near the creek, as if to
prevent our crossing, and about sundown turned my left flank with his cavalry and charged my battery. It was anticipated, however, and
Tyler�s brigade brought to its support in time to repulse it, in conjunction with the battery, which fired double charges into his lines, not fifty
yards distant, scattering them in all directions and securing fifteen or twenty of their horses. Meanwhile the infantry attacked the three
regiments of the Florida brigade with vastly superior numbers, wounding Colonel Bullock and driving his command back from the creek.
Jackson�s brigade was promptly thrown forward to meet this advance, and with one volley repulsed and drove his infantry across the creek. I
threw out skirmishers to the bank of the creek and held the field.
Slocomb�s battery, under command of Lieutenant Chalaron, acted with conspicuous and most effective gallantry.
Col. Ed. Dillon reported with the squadron of cavalry just before night�too late to take part in the fight. I certainly did not suppose
this was all the support I was to get from General Forrest, mentioned in the before-quoted order. I ordered him to relieve the infantry
pickets at 10 o�clock, at which hour I withdrew my infantry and artillery across Stewart�s Creek, fearing the enemy might get on my flank
or rear with his superior numbers during the night, and also to begin operations on the road early next morning.
In the fight my losses were 15 killed, 59 wounded (Colonel Bullock, commanding the Florida brigade, among the latter), and 13 missing.
I have every reason to believe that the losses of the enemy were much greater. We buried some of his dead which he left when driven from
the field.
Early on the morning of the 5th dispositions were made to take the block-houses at Stewart�s Creek, Read�s Branch, and Smyrna, which, as
we moved upon them, the enemy precipitately evacuated. Each of these were burned after removing the stores; also the bridges they
were intended to guard, and several miles of the railroad destroyed. While these operations were going on General Forrest arrived with
two divisions of cavalry, followed by two infantry brigades (Sears�, of French�s, and Palmer�s, of Stevenson�s division), with artillery, and, by
virtue of rank, assumed command of the forces near Murfreesborough. The order to keep in view the object of my mission, viz, �to destroy the
railroad,� seemed to be revoked, and offensive operations against Murfreesborough assumed, which (lid not accord with my judgment, as I
was satisfied there were 8,000 or 10,000 Federals within, strongly fortified and with a large amount of artillery in position. Not deeming it
prudent to attack such works manned with twice our numbers, I, however, readily gave cheerful co-operation. By command of General
Forrest I ceased operations on the railroad and moved back toward Murfreesborough. On the 6th I closed in my lines and pressed forward
skirmishers as near to the works around Murficesborough as practicable. in doing which I lost sixteen men from Caswell�s battalion of
sharpshooters. I dug pits for skirmishers and built defenses for my main line.
I was ordered by General Forrest to move my entire command at daylight on the 7th to the Wilkinson and my wagon train to the Salem
turnpike, which was done. My command was ordered to be an extension of the right of Colonel Palmer�s brigade, which occupied a hill fronting
the fort and works of the enemy located on the west bank of Stone�s River. While the order was being executej the enemy was observed to
be moving a force across Stone�s River above the town of Murfreesborough and down the Salem turnpike. At this juncture I was ordered
by General Forrest to make dispositions to move, in conjunction with Colonel Palmer, on the works of the enemy, which, however, was
revoked by ordering me to take charge of infantry and put it into position near where the Wilkinson turnpike crosses Overall�s Creek, which
I proceeded to do, nn der the personal direction of General Forrest. The main line was established on the southwest side of the turnpike,
diagonally to but not crossing it any point, with the right towards the creek, in the following order by brigades, beginning on the right: Sears�,
Palmer�s, Finley�s. Jackson�s and Tyler�s brigades were placed by me in reserve across the turnpike from main line. Temporary works were
constructed of rails and logs. The artillery was placed at the most eligible and advantageous points. While temporary works were being
built of rails and logs the enemy presented himself in our front, but was speedily driven out of view by our artillery. I was ordered by
General Forrest to put my entire command in the main line. Jackson was then ordered to the left of Finley�s brigade, Sears brought from
the right to the left in prolongation of and retiring main line toward the turnpike. He soon presented himself again, turning our left flank and
advancing diagonally to it. General Forrest ordered the whole line by the left flank. The extent of the enemy�s line was not visible. Sears
leading and Jackson following, under my order, moved too far to the left the Florida and Palmer�s brigades were halted in the temporary
works just vacated by these two. Smith was immediately brought in between them at right angles with the turnpike and in full front of the
enemy, who was within 200 yards, driving in our skirmishers, the cavalry on the left having fallen back with but slight resistance. The time
of the reappearance of the enemy emerging from the woods, when he was thought to have retired to Murfreesborough (no information being
received by me from the cavalry in my front), did not admit of sufficient time to adjust the line before he was upon us, hence there was a
space of perhaps 75 or 100 yards between Smith�s right and Finley�s left. Jackson and Sears were immediately ordered to move, under
the conduct of a staff officer, Major Shaaff, by the right flank and align on Smith�s left, who was now engaged with the main line of the
enemy. The enemy�s line caine diagonally from the left and struck Finley�s and Palmer�s brigades, crumbling and driving them from the
temporary works. Meanwhile Smith�s (Tyler�s) and the right of Jackson�s brigade, which was getting in position, drove back in gallant
style the right of the enemy�s line which confronted them. I did not again see the Florida and Palmer�s nor Sears� brigade until night, they
being under the immediate conduct of General Forrest. I remained in person with Smith�s and Jackson�s brigades. The enemy occupied the
line vacated by Finley�s and Palmer�s brigades on Smith�s flank, but did not push up vigorously. I changed front to rear on my left
battalion and formed line in the woods parallel to and near the turnpike, where I remained without molestation until ordered by General
Forrest to move across the creek and join him (who was themi with cavalry, artillery, and Sears�, Palmer�s, and Finley�s brigades), which I did
leisurely, moving off the two remaining brigades by the flank. If the cavalry on either flank was seriously engaged, I was not aware of it.
In this day�s fight there were 19 killed, 73 wounded, and 122 missing. Among the former was Lieutenant-Colonel Billopp [Twenty-ninth
Georgia Regiment, who fell gallantly at his post.
I have to regret the loss of two of the guns of that gallant battery, Slocomb�s, commanded by Lieutenant Chalaron. The horses being
killed, they could not be brought off.
After crossing the creek, about sundown, Smith�s brigade was placed in position to resist in case of pursuit, and brought up the rear in good
order to the bivouac on the Nashville turnpike.
Next day we engaged again in the destruction of the railroad; but little progress was made, in consequence of the extreme bad weather;
the snow fell rapidly and the ground was freezing. In conseqnence of the recent marches many of the men were barefooted; all were shod,
however, when we left Florence. I pressed every pair of shoes which could be found for them, and in many instances the citizens gave them
second-hand shoes, which but partially supplied the demand. The country afforded us superabundance of rations. While in this
neighborhood I put in operation several mills for the use of the army.
Major-General Forrest gave me an intimation of a probable attack on the main army in front of Nashville and directed that I be ready to move
at short notice. I soon thereafter received an order to move to the right flank of the Army of Tennessee, held by General Cheatham, to take part
in the anticipated operations there. The sleet and severe freezes had made the surface of the earth a sheet of ice. Nearly one-fourth of the
men were still barefooted, yet plodded �their weary way under these adverse circumstance (many with bleeding feet), and arrived in good
time to the position assigned in Cheatham�s corps. I was contiguous to and on the left of the Nolensville turnpike, at a point known as
Rains� Hill. I remained here in the intrenched line, with the men uncomfortable from the extreme cold and the scarcity of wood, until
the evening of the 15th, when I was ordered by General Cheatham to move to the left, where the fighting was going on, and should he not be
there to report to General Hood. When 1 passed the Franklin turnpike streams of stragglers, and ar tillerists, and horses, without guns or
caissons, the sure indicia of defeat, came hurriedly from the left. I formed my division for battle at once, its right resting near the
turnpike, and communicated the situation to General Cheatham, who meantime had come up. It was nearly dark. I received an order from
General Hood to move straight forward and take a skirt of woods beyond the field, in the rear of which I had formed my line, and near
which the firm was going on. I did so, and made known that fact to my corps commander, and awaited orders. The firing had now slackened.
About 8 o�clock Major-General Cheatham came to me and took me with him to find the line I was to occupy. He informed me that he
was directed by the general commanding to extend a line of battle from the apex of the hill (now known as Shy�s Hill) occupied by Ector�s
brigade in direction of Mrs. Bradford�s house, on the Granny White turnpike, so that a prolongation of the same would strike the line then
occupied by General Stewart. We went together and found General Sharp�s brigade on left of that corps, in the rear of Mrs. Bradford�s
house, somewhat parallel to the turnpike, its right resting near the woods, in which we were informed the balance of that corps was. A
fire was kindled, by General Cheatham�s order, to indicate the direction of my line from the given point on the left. I moved my command in
the position indicated, but with much delay, attributable to the darkness of the right and marshy fields through which I had to pass. The
artillary I was unable to get up. The field intervening the turnpike and my position was impassable to artillery; the earth had thawed, and the
cultivated low ground was an obstruction through which even the ambulances could not pass with success; hence the artillery was left in the rear for the
right. Having a personal interview with Colonel Coleman, commanding Ector�s brigade, and agreeing upon the point where the right of his line
rested, I adjusted mine, as ordered, between that and the point designated on General Sharp�s line, taking such advantage of the ground in its
exact locality as I could in the night. My left then rested near the crown on that slope of the hill, facing the turnpike, and my right in the
corn-field, advanced toward Nashville, hence not quite at right angles with the turnpike. Seeing that my line at its junction with Coleman�s
made a right angle, and the enemy already immediately under the brow of the hill annoying me with sharpshooters, within 100 yards, and my
right unconnected with any one, I went in person to my corps commander and remonstrated as to the positioim of umy line. He informed
me he was not authorized to change it, and that General Stewart was to connect with my right. I at once put the men to making defenses
with such tools as I had. They worked with alacrity the balance of the bight (nearly all time while under my immediate supervision),
and constructed works along my entire front impervious to ordinary shots.
Daylight [16th] revealed the fact that Stewart�s corps had been moved back several hundred yards from the point toward which I was directed
to extend my right. His two left divisions were retired in echelon from my right, Walthall�s on the same side of the turnpike with me, and
Loring�s behind the rock wall on the opposite side of the turnpike, in echelon to him. Ector�s brigade was on my left, occupying that side of
the angle. It was prolonged in same direction by Lowrey�s (Cheatham�s) division. My line was formed with Jackson�s brigade on time
right, then Finley's and Tyler�s in succession, with no support. The hill on which my left rested was confronted by a similar one within 400
yards and an open field in the intervening valley. On this hill the enemy had planted several rifle pieces during the night. There was a
deflection on the left of this, and then a series of hills occupied by the enemy extending to its left and culminating opposite Lowrey�s left in
an irregular range and greater altitude than those held by us, surmounted here and there by a commanding peak. This range of hills, from
time point where Lowrey�s left rested, extended at right angles across the Granny White turnpike, almost parallel to and in rear of may line of
battle, a distance of not more than 600 yards, with open fields between. At daylight I found a road skirting the inner border of the hills on
my left over which artillery could pass, but not without difficulty. I ordered Captain Beauregard to send a section of howitzers and place
them upon a small plateau making out from the declivity of the hill just in rear of Finley�s brigade, from which they could sweep the from it
of my right and the entire line of General Waltlmall. A desultory fire by sharpshooters was kept up during the night and morning until about
8 o�clock, when the enemy began to deploy additional masses, advanced his lines into the woods held by Stewart�s corps the night previous, where
he soon planted batteries. He made a feeble charge along my front and was quickly repulsed. About this time Ector�s brigade was taken out
of the line and put imm reserve, and 1 was ordered to extend to the left. This not only gave me an additional ground to occupy, but necessarily
thinned my lines, as I had no reserves. The line established by Ector�s brigade had been located in the darkness of the night, and was,
unfortunately, placed back from the brow of the hill, not giving a view and range on the front of more than from five to twenty yards, and the
curvature of the hill, as well as the gradual recession of the lines from the angle, forbid any flank fire giving protection to the front of the
angle. The works were flimsy, only intended to protect against smallarms, and had no abatis or other obstruction to impede the movements
of an assaulting party. Froum the hour this became a part of my line it was impossible to remedy it. The constant fire of sharpshooters from
the neighboring hills made it fatal to attempt a work in front. To advance my line and attack the enemy was the only way to relieve the
situation, and to do that was to attack a re-enterimmg angle of breastworks, which, of course, could not be done unless the whole line moved.
Time enemy opened a most terrific fire of artillery, and kept it up during the day. In time afternoon he planted a battery in the woods in the
rear of Mrs. Bradford�s house and fired directly across both lines composing the angle; threw shells directly in the back of my left
brigade; also placed a battery on a hill diagonally to my left, which took my first brigade in reverse. The batteries on the hill in its
from it, not more than 300 yards distant, that had borne the concentrated fire of my Whitworth rifles all day, must have suffered heavily,
but were not silenced. These rifled guns of the enemy being so close razeed the works on the left of the angle for fifty or sixty yards.
Ector�s brigade was withdrawn from its supporting position in rear of the angle, and left mne without any support whatever, at which
transfer I remonstrated. The enemy was in two lines in my front, and in the afternoon moved by his right flank from direction of the Granny
White turnpike, and mu assed by advancing a skirmish line at a time under the brow of the hill near the angle. I made this known to General
Cheatham by a staff officer (Lieutenant Rogan), and asked for re-enforcemnent. The general informed me that he had nothing that could
possibly be spared, and desired me to extend still farther to the left, as he had to withdraw strength from his front his front to protect his left, which had
been turned. About this time the brigade on the extreme left of our infantry line of battle was driven back, down the hill into the field in
my rear, and the balls of the enemy were fired into the backs of (killing and wounding) my men. The lines on the left (as you go into
Nashville) of the Granny White pike at this juncture were the three sides of a square, the enemy shooting across the two parallel lines. My men were
falling fast. I saw and fully appreciated the emergency, and passed in person along the trenches in the angle built by Ector�s brigade, where
I had placed troops who I knew to be unsurpassed for gallantry and endurance, and encouraged them to maintain their places. The men
saw the brigade on the left of our line of battle give way and the enemy take its place on the hills in my rear, yet they stood firm and
received the fire from three directions with coolness and courage. Anticipating a disaster I ordered Captain Beauregard, who commanded
my artillery, to move his battalion back to the Franklin turnpike, as the enemy already had the Granny White pike in our rear, which
was my channel for escape, as per order in the forenoon. About 4 p. m. the enemy with heavy force assaulted the line near the
angle, and carried it at that point where Ector�s brigade had built the light works, which were back front the brow of the hill and without
obstructions; not, however, until the gallant and obstinate Colonel Shy and nearly half of his brave men had fallen, together with the
largest part of the three right companies of the Thirty-seventh Georgia, which regiment constituted my extreme left. When the breach was
made, this command�the consolidated fragments of the Second, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twentieth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-seventh Tennessee
Regiments�still contested the ground, under Major Lucas, and, finally, when overwhelming numbers pressed them back, only sixty-five of the
command escaped, and they not as a command, but individuals. The command was nearly annihilated, as the official reports of casualties show.
Whether the yielding of gallant and well-tried troops to such pressure is reprehensible or not is for a brave and generous country to
decide. The breach once made, the lines lifted from either side as far as I could see almuost instantly and fled in confusion. Two regiments, the
Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Georgia, then my extrenme right, commanded by Colonel Mitchell (Jackson�s brigade), and adjoining
Walthall�s division, did not break, but remained fighting until surrounded. The section of artillery under Lieutenant Alston was turned on the
enemy and fired after being completely flanked and our lines vanishing. I mention it in compliment to this gallant lieutenant. I first sought to
rally the men and form line in the wooded bottom in rear of Strahl�s brigade, Lowrey�s right, but found it yielding to the example on its
right (there being no pressure of consequence either on its front or that of my extreme left), and imence it was impossible to do so. I was then
directed by General Cheatlmaum to forum a line at Lea�s house, on opposite side of Granny White turnpike, but found on getting there that our
lines on that flank had also given way, and the enemy already commanding it with his small-arms. The men then, one by one, climbed
over the rugged hills in our rear and passed down a short valley which debouched into time Franklin turnpike. The whole army on this
thoroughfare seemed to be one heterogeneous mass, and moving back without organization or government. Strenuous efforts were made by
officers of all grades to rally and form line of battle, but in vain. The disorganized masses swept in confusion down the Franklin turnpike,
and the approaching darkness and drenching rain, until beyond Brentwood, when the fragments of commands were, in some measure, united,
and bivouacked in groups for the night.
At daylight [17th] I moved my command across Harpeth River, through Franklin, to Spring Hill, and next day crossed Rutherford�s
Creek, formed line of battle, and bivouacked for the night.
The enemy�s advance appearing on the umorning of tlme 19th slight skirmishing ensued. I retired with my command, in conjunction with
Cheatham�s corps, across Duck River, at Columubia, that evening. My division moved without separation from its corps and crossed the
Tennessee River, at Bainbridge, on the evening of time 25th of Deceumber.
To my senior brigade commander, General H. H. Jackson, I am especially indebted, not only for the prompt and willing
execution of orders, but for many practical suggestions based upon his large experience, for his conspicuous gallantry and resistless energy.
General T. B. Smith, commanding Tyler�s brigade, and Col. Robert Bullock (Finley�s), bore themselves with heroic courage both through
good and evil fortune, always executing orders with zeal and alacrity, and bearing themselves in the face of the enemy as became
reputations which each had heretofore bravely won. The latter was severely wounded on the 4th of Decemuber, near Murfreesborough, and was
succeeded by Major Lash, whose coolness and gallantry was marked. He, together with Brigadier-Generals Jackson and Smith, was captured at
Nashville, and are yet in prison. Major Ball having arrived, and being ranking officer present in Finley�s brigade, assumed command and
conducted it at Nashville.
Captain Beauregard, commanding my artillery, showed merit beyond his years, [and] managed the battalion not only to my satisfaction, but
to the good of the service and to his own credit.
I take pleasure in making my acknowledgments for their promptness and gallantry to Maj. Arthur Shaaff, my inspector; Capt. H. J. Cheney,
my assistant adjutant-general; Lients. R. B. McClure, John B. Pirtle, and Charles B. Rogan, of my personal staff; and Capt. W. H. Rhea,
paymaster of my division, who participated with us in the fight without obligation to do so; also to Lieutenant Magruder, my ordnance officer.
I am also much indebted to my chief surgeon, Doctor McDowell, for his skill and unwearying application to his delicate trust; to Maj. John L.
Brown, commissary, for his success in getting up and distributing supplies under most embarrassing circumstances; and Maj. E. P. Tyree,
quartermaster, for his promptness, vigilance, and success in managing his department without loss during the long march and hazardous
retreat of either wagons or supplies.
My escort company, under Capt. J. H. Buck and Lieut. J. W. Henderson, merits my special commendation for gallantry upon the field and
the faithful and cheerful performance of all duty devolving upon them. My excellent pioneer company, under Lieut. H. W. Reddick, labored
day and night without murmur, for which they will receive my thanks. My provost-guard was most efficiently managed by Capt. Matthew
Dwyer, for which I am under obligations. My squad of sharpshooters (with Whitworth rifles), under Lieut. A. B. Schell, behaved with
marked gallantry on every occasion when brought into requisition.
In this report I have dealt more in particulars for the reason there are no reports from brigade commanders, all three of whom having been
captured, I reserve to myself the privilege of making such corrections as would appear right and proper when I subsequently have the
opportunity to examine their reports.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Wm. B. Bate,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. James D. Porter,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
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