Organization of Hardee Corps, Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, C. S. Army, commanding, Dec. 31 - Jan. 3, 1863
First Division
Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge
Third Brigade
Brig. Gen. William Preston
1st and 3rd Florida:
Colonel William Miller
4th Florida
Col. William L. L. Brown
60th North Carolina
Col. J. A. McDowell
20th Tennessee
Col. T. B. Smith
Lieut. Col. F. M. Lavender
Maj. F. Claybrooke
Tennessee Battery:
Captain E. E. Wright
Lieut. J. W. Mebane
Report of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, C. S. Army, commanding First Division, with appendix by General Bragg.
Headquarters Bewckinridge's Division.
January -, 1863
I have the honor to report the operations of this division, of Lieutenant-General ilardee�s corps, in the recent battles of Stone�s River, in front of Murfreesborough.
The character and course of Stone�s River, and the nature of the ground in front of the town, are well known, and as the report of the general commanding will, no doubt, be accompanied by a sketch, it is not necessary to describe them here.
On the morning of Sunday, December 28, the brigades moved from their encampments and took up line of battle about 1 1/2 miles from Murfreesborough in the following order: Adams� brigade on the right, with its right resting on the Lebanon road, and its left extending toward the ford over Stone�s River, a short distance below the destroyed bridge on the Nashville turnpike; Preston on the left of Adams; Palmer on the left of Preston, and Hanson forming the left of the line, with his left resting on the right bank of the river near the ford. rfhe right of Major-General Withers, of Lieutenant-General Polk�s corps, rested near the left bank of the river and slightly in advance of Hanson�s left.
Brigadier-General Jackson, having reported to me with his command, was placed, by the direction of the lieutenant-general commanding, upon the east side of the Lebanon road, on commanding ground, a little in advance of the right of Brigadier-General Adams.
My division formed the front line of the right wing of the army; Major-General Cleburne�s division, drawn up some 600 yards in rear, formed the second line of the same wing, while the division of Major-General McCown, nuder the immediate direction of the general commanding, composed the reserve.
My line extended from left to right along the edge of a forest, save an open space of 400 yards, which was occupied by Wright�s battery, of Preston�s brigade, with the Twentieth Tennessee in reserve to support it. An open field 800 yards in width extended along nearly the whole front of the line, and was bounded on the opposite side by a line of forest similar to that occupied by us. In the opinion of the lieutenant-general commanding (who had twice ridden carefully over the ground with me) and the general commanding (who had personally inspected the lines), it was the strongest position the nature of the ground would allow.
About 600 yards in front of Hanson�s center was an eminence which it was deemed important to hold. It commanded the ground sloping toward the river in its front and on its left, and also the plain on the west bank occupied by the right of Withers� line. Colonel [T. H.] Hunt, with the Forty-first Alabama, the Sixth and Ninth Kentucky, and Cobb�s battery, all of Hanson�s brigade, was ordered to take and hold this hill, which he did, repulsing several brisk attacks of the enemy, and losing some excellent officers and men. A few hundred yards to the left and rear of this position a small earthwork, thrown up under the direction of Major [R. E.] Graves, my chief of artillery, was held during a part of the operations by Semple�s battery of Napoleon guns.
In the afternoon of Tuesday, the 30th, 1 received intelligence from Lieutenant-General ilardee that the divisions of Cleburne and McCown were to be transferred to the extreme left, and soon after an order came to me from the general commanding to hold the hill at all hazards. I immediately moved the remainder of Hanson�s brigade to the hill, and strengthened Cobb�s battery with a section from [C. L.] Lumsden�s battery and a section from [C. H.] Slocomb�s Washington Artillery. At the same time Adams� brigade was moved from the right and formed on the ground originally occupied by Hanson�s brigade. Jackson was moved to the west side of the Lebanon road, to connect with the general line of battle.
All the ground east of Stone�s River was now to be held by one division, which, in a single line, did not extend from the ford to the Lebanon road. I did not change my general line, since a position in advance, besides being less favorable in other respects, would have widened considerably the interval between my right and the Lebanon road. The enemy did not again attack the hill with infantry, but our troops there continued to suffer during all the operations, from heavy shelling. Our artillery at that position ofteif did good service in diverting the enemy�s fire from our attacking lines of infantry, and especially on Wednesday, the 31st, succeeded in breaking several of their formations on the west bank of the river.
On the morning of Wednesday, the 31st, the battle opened on our left. From my front, information came to me from [John] Pegram�s cavalry force in advance that the enemy, having crossed at the fords below, were moving on my position in line of battle, This proved to be incorrect, and it is to be regretted that sufficient care was not taken by the authors of the reports to discriminate rumor from fact.
About 10.30 a. m. I received, through Col. J. Stoddard Johnston, a suggestion from the general commanding to move against the enemy instead of awaiting his attack. I preferred to fight on the ground I then occupied, but supposing that the object of the general was to create a diversion in favor of our left, my line, except Hanson�s brigade, was put in motion in the direction from which the enemy was supposed to be advancing. We had marched about half a mile when I received, through Colonel Johnston, an order from the general commanding to send at least one brigade to the support of Lieutenant-General Polk, who was hard pressed, and, as I recollect, two, if I could spare them. I immediately sent Adams and Jackson, and at the same time suspended my movement, and sent forward Capt. E. M. Blackburn, with several of my escort, and Captain Coleman and Lieut. Thomas B. Darragh, of my staff; with orders to find and report with certainty the position and movements of the enemy. Soon after an order came from the general commanding to continue the movement. The line again advanced, but had not proceeded far when I received an order from the general commanding, through Colonel Johnston; repeated by Colonel Grenfell, to leave Hanson in position on the hill, and with the remainder of my command to report at once to Lieutenant-General Polk. The brigades of Preston and Palmer were immediately moved by the flank toward the ford before referred to, and the order of the general executed with great rapidity.
In the mean time, riding forward to the position occupied by the general commanding and Lieutenant-General Polk, near the west bank of the river, and a little below the ford, I arrived in time to see at a distance the brigades of Jackson and Adams recoiling from a very hot fire of the enemy. I was directed by Lieutenant-General Polk to form my line, with its right resting on the river and its left extending across the open field, crossing the Nashville turnpike almost at a right angle. While my troops were crossing the river, and getting into line, I rode forward with a portion of my staff; assisted by gentlemen of the staffs of Generals Bragg and Polk, to rally and form Adams� brigade, which was falling back chiefly between the turnpike and the river. Jackson, much cut up, had retired farther toward our left. The brigade of Brigadier- General Adams was rallied and placed in line across the field, behind a low and very imperfect breastwork of earth and rails. These brigades did not again enter the action that day, which, indeed, closed soon after with the charge of Preston and Palmer. They had suffered severely in an attack upon superior numbers, very strongly posted and sustained by numerous and powerful batteries, which had repulsed all preceding assaults. The list of casualties shows the courage and determination of these troops.
General Adams having received a wound while gallantly leading his brigade, the command devolved upon Col. H. L. Gibson, who discharged its duties throughout with marked courage and skill.
Preston and Palmer being now in line; Preston on the right, Lieutenant-General Polk directed me to advance across the plain until I encountered the enemy. The right of my line rested on the river (and, from the course of the stream, would in advancing xest on or very near it), while the left touched a skirt of woods from which the enemy had been driven during the day. At the opposite extremity of the plain a cedarbrake extended in front of Palmer�s whole line and two-thirds of Preston�s line, the remaining space to the river being comparatively open, with commanding swells, and through this ran the railroad and turnpike nearly side by side. It was supposed that the enemy�s line was parallel to ours, but the result showed that, in advancing, our right and his left at the point of contact would form an acute angle. These two brigades, passing over the troops lying behind the rails, moved across the plain in very fine order under the fire of the enemy�s artillery. We had advanced but a short distance when Colonel [T.] O�Hara (my acting adjutant-general) called my attention to a new battery in the act of taking position in front of our right, between the turnpike and the river. I immediately sent him back to find some artillery to engage the enemy�s battery. He found and placed in position the Washington Artillery. About the same time Capt. E. P. Byrne reported his battery to me, and received an order to take the best position he could find and engage the enemy. He succeeded in opening on them after our line had passed forward.
A number of officers and men were killed along the whole line, but in this charge the chief loss fell uvon Preston�s right and center. His casualties amounted to 155.
The Twentieth Tennessee, after driving the enemy on the right of the turnpike, and taking 25 prisoners, was compelled to fall back before a very heavy artillery and musketry fire, Colonel Smith, commanding, being severely wounded, but it kept the prisoners and soon rejoined the command. The Fonrth Florida and Sixtieth North Carolina encountered serious difficulty at a burnt house (Cowan�s) on the left of the turnpike from fences and other obstacles, and were, for a little while, thrown into some confusion. Here for several minutes they were exposed to a destructive and partially enfilading fire at short range of artillery and infantry; but they were soon rallied by their gallant brigade commander, and, rushing with cheers across the intervening space, entered the cedar glade. The enemy had retired from the cedars, and was in position in a field to the front and right. By changing the front of the command slightly forward to the right, my line was brought parallel to that of the enemy, and was formed near the edge of the cedars.
About this time meeting Lieutenant-General Hardee, we went together to the edge of the field to examine the position of the enemy, and found him strongly posted in two lines of battle, supported by numerous batteries. One of his lines had the protection of the railroad cut, forming an excellent breastwork. We had no artillery, the nature of the ground forbidding its use. It was deemed reckless to attack with the force present.
Night was now approaching. Presently the remainder of Lieutenant-General Hardee�s corps came up on the left, and, with McCown�s command and a part of Cheatham�s, prolonged the line of battle in that direction. Adams� brigade also appeared and formed on the right of Preston. The troops bivouacked in position.
The commanding general, expecting an attack upon his right the next morning, ordered me during the night to recross the river with Palmer�s brigade. Before daylight Thursday morning, Palmer was in position on the right of Hanson. No general engagement occurred on this day, the troops generally being employed in replenishing the ammunition, cooking rations, and obtaining some repose.
On Friday, January 2, being desirous to ascertain if the enemy was establishing himself on the east bank of the river, Lieutenant-Colonel [John A.] Buckner and Major Graves, with Captain [Edward P.] Byrne�s battery, and a portion of the Washington Artillery, under Lieutenant [W.] C. D. Vaught, went forward to our line of skirmishers toward the right and engaged those of the enemy, who had advanced, perhaps, 1,000 yards from the east bank of the river. They soon revealed a strong line of skirmishers, which was driven back a considerable distance by our sharpshooters and artillery, the latter firing several houses in the fields in which the enemy had taken shelter. At the same time, accompanied by Major [W. D.] Pickett, of Lieutenant-General Hardee�s staff, and by Maj. James Wilson, Colonel [T.] 0� Hara, and Lieutenant [J. Cabell] Breckinridge, of my own, I proceeded toward the left of our line of skirmishers, which passed through a thick Wood about 500 yards in front of Hanson�s position and extended to the river. Directing Captain [Chris] Bosche, of the Ninth, and Captain [Thomas] Steele, [jr.,] of the Fourth Kentucky, to drive back the enemy�s skirmishers, we were enabled to see that he was occul)ying with infantry and artillery the crest of a gentle slope on the east bank of the river. The course of the crest formed a little less than a right angle with Hanson�s line, from which the center of the position I was afterward ordered to attack was distant about 1,600 yards. It extended along ground part open and part woodland. While we were endeavoring to ascertain the force of the enemy and the relation of the ground on the east bank to that on the west bank of the river, I received an order from the commanding general to report to him in person. I found him on the west bank, near the ford below the bridge, and received from him an order to form my division in two lines and take the crest I have just described with the infantry. After doing this I was to bring up the artillery and establish it on the crest, so as at once to hold it and enfilade the enemy�s lines on the other side of the river. Pegram and Wharton, who, with some cavalry and a battery, were beyond the point where my right would rest when the new line of battle should be formed, were directed, as the general informed me, to protect my right and co-operate in the attack. Captain Robertson was directed to report to me with his own and Semple�s batteries of Napoleon guns. Captain Wright, who with his battery had been detached some days before, was ordered to join his brigade (Preston�s). The brigades of Adams and Preston, which were left on the west side of the river Wednesday night, had been ordered to rejoin me. At the moment of my advance, our artillery in the center and on the left was to open on the enemy. One gun from our center was the signal for the attack. The commanding general desired that the movement should be made with the least possible delay.
It was now 2.30 p. m. Two of the brigades had to march about 2 miles, the other two about 1 mile. Brigadier-General Pillow, having reported for duty, was assigned by the commanding general to Palmer�s brigade, and that fine officer resn med command of his regiment, and was three times wounded in the ensuing engagement. The Ninth Kentucky and Cobb�s battery, under the command of Colonel Hunt, were left to hold the hill so often referred to. The division, after deducting the losses of Wednesday, the troops left on the hill, and companies on special service, consisted of some 4,500 men. It was drawn up in two lines�the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the second 200 yards in rear. Pillow and Hanson formed the first line, Pillow on the right. Preston supported pillow, and Adams� brigade (commanded by Colonel Gibson) supported Hanson. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, under orders to move with it and occupy the summit of the slope as soon as the infantry shduld rout the enemy. Feeling anxious about my right, I sent two staff officers in succession to communicate with Pegram and Wharton, but received no intelligence up to the moment of assault. The interval between my left and the troops on the hill was already too great, but I had a battery to watch it and a small infantry support. There was nothing to prevent the enemy from observing nearly all of our movements and preparations. To reach him it was necessary to cross an open space 600 or 700 yards in width, with a gentle ascent. The river was several hundred yards in rear of his position, but departed from it considerably as it flowed toward his left.
I had informed the commanding general that we would be ready to advance at 4 o'clock, and precisely at that hour the signal gun was heard from our center. Instantly the troops moved forward at a quick step and in admirable order. The front line had bayonets fixed, with orders to deliver one volley, and then use the bayonet. The fire of the enemy�s artillery on both sides of the river commenced as soon as the troops entered the open ground. When less than half the distance across the field, the quick eye of Colonel O�llara discovered a force extending considerably beyond our right. I immediately ordered Major Graves to move a battery to our right and open on them. He at once advanced Wright�s battery and effectually checked their movements. Before our line reached the enemy�s position his artillery fire had become heavy, accurate, and destructive. Many officers and men fell before we closed with their infantry, yet our brave fellows rushed forward with the utmost determination, and, after a brief but bloody conflict, routed both the opposing lines, took 400 prisoners and sevei~al flags, and drove their artillery and the great body of their iiifantry across the river. Many were killed at the water�s edge. Their artillery took time by the forelock in crossing the stream. A few of our men in their ardor actually crossed over before they could be prevented, most of whom subsequently, moving up under the west bank, recrossed at a f6rd three-quarters of a mile above. The second line had halted when the first engaged the enemy�s infantry, and laid down under orders; but very soon the casualties in the first line, the fact that the artillery on the opposite bank was more fatal to the second line than the first, and the eagerness of the troops, impelled them forward, and at the decisive moment, when the opposing infantry was routed, the two lines had mingled into one, the only practical inconvenience of which was that at several points the ranks were deeper than is allowed by a proper military formation. A strong force of the enemy beyond our extreme right yet remained on the east side of the river. Presently a new line of battle appeared on the west bank directly opposite our troops and opened fire, while at the same time large masses crossed in front of our right and advanced to the attack. We were compelled to fall back. As soon as our infantry had won the ridge, Major Graves advanced the artillery of the division and opened fire. At the same time Captain Eobertson threw forward Semple�s battery toward our right, which did excellent service. He did not advance his own battery (which was to have taken position on the left), supposing that that part of the field had not been cleared of the enemy�s infantry. Although mistaken in this, since the enemy had been driven across the river, yet I regard it as fortunate that the battery was not brought forward. It would have been a vain contest. It now appeared that the ground we had won was commanded by the enemy�s batteries, within easy range, on better ground, upon the other side of the river. I know not how many guns he had. He had enough to sweep the whole position from the front, the left, and the right, and to render it wholly untenable by our force present of artillery and infantry. The infantry, after passing the crest and descending the slope toward the river, were in some measure protected, and suffered less at this period of the action than the artillery.
We lost three guns, nearly all the horses being killed, and not having the time or men to draw them off by hand. One was lost becanse there was but one boy left (Private Wright, of Wright�s battery) to limber the piece, and his strength was unequal to it.
The command fell back in some disorder, but without the slightest appearance of panic, and reformed behind Robertson�s battery in the narrow skirt of timber from which we emerged to the assault. The enemy did not advance beyond the position in which he received our attack. My skirmishers continued to occupy a part of the field over which we advanced until the army retired from Murfreesborough. The action lasted about one hour and twenty minutes. As our lines advanced to the attack, several rounds of artillery were heard from our center, apparently directed against the enemy on the west bank of the river.
About twilight Brigadier-General Anderson reported to me with his brigade, and remained in position with me until the army retired. I took up the line of battle for the night a little in rear of the field over which we advanced to the assault, and Captain Robertson, at my request, disposed the artillery in the positions indicated for it. Many of the reports do not discriminate between the losses of Wednesday and Friday. The total loss in my division, exclusive of Jackson�s command, is 2,140, of which I think 1,700 occurred on Friday. The loss of the enemy on this day was, I think, greater than our own, since he suffered immense slaughter between the ridge and the river.
I cannot forbear to express my admiration for the courage and constancy of the troops, exhibited even after it became apparent that the main object could not be accomplished. Beyond the general good conduct, a number of enlisted men displayed at different periods of the action the most heroic bravery. I respectfully suggest that authority be given to select a certain number of the most distinguished in each brigade, to be recommended to the President for promotion.
I cannot enumerate all the brave officers who fell, nor the living, who nobly did their duty; yet I may be permitted to lament, in common with the army, the premature death of Brigadier-General Hanson, who received a mortal wound at the moment the enemy began to give way. Endeared to his friends by his private virtues, and to his command by the vigilance with which he guarded its interest and honor, he was, by the universal testimony of his military associates, one of the finest officers that adorned the service of the Confederate States. Upon his fall the command devolved on Colonel [H. P.] Trabue, who in another organization had long and ably commanded most of the regiments composing the brigade.
I cannot close without expressing my obligations to the gentlemen of my staff. This is no formal acknowledgment. I can never forget that during all the operations they were ever prompt and cheerful by night and day in conveying orders, conducting to their positions regiments and brigades, rallying troops on the field, and, indeed, in the discharge of every duty.
It gives me pleasure to name Lieutenant-Colonel Buckner, assistant adjutant-general, who was absent on leave, but returned upon the first rumor of battle; Colonel O�Hara, acting adjutant-general; Lieutenant [J. Cabell] Breckinridge, aide-de-camp; Major Graves, chief of artillery (twice wounded and his horse shot under him); Major [James] Wilson, assistant inspector-general (horse shot); Captain [Charles] Semple, ordnance officer; Lieutenant Darragh (severely wounded). Captains Martin and Coleman, of my volunteer staff, were active and efficient. The former had his horse killed under him.
Drs. J. F. Henstis and [John E.] Pendleton [Ninth Kentucky Infantry], chief surgeon and medical inspector, were unremitting in attention to the wounded. Dr. Stanhope Breckinridge, assistant surgeon, accompanied my headquarters and pnrsned his duties through the fire of Wednesday. Mr. Buckner and Mr. Zantzinger, of Kentucky, attached themselves to me for, the occasion, and were active and zealous.
Capt. E. M. Blackburn, commanding my escort, ever cool and vigilant, rendered essential service and made several bold reconnaissances. Charles Chotard, of the escort, acting as my orderly on Wednesday, displayed much gallantry and intelligence.
The army retired before daybreak on the morning of January 4. My division, moving on the Manchester road, was the rear of Hardee�s corps. The Ninth Kentucky, Forty-first Alabama, and Cobb�s battery, all under the command of Colonel Hunt, formed a special rear guard. The enemy did not follow us.
My acknowledgments are due to Col. J. Stoddard Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel Brent, and Lieutenant-Colonel Garner, of General Bragg's staff and to Major Pickett, of Lieutenant-General Hardee�s staff for services on Friday, January 2.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
John C. Breckinridge,
Major-General, Commanding.
Maj. T. B. Roy,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Report of Brig. Gen. William Preston, C. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade.
Headquarters Preston's Brigade, Breckinridge's Division, Army of Tennessee,
January 12, 1863
Colonel: In obedience to the orders of Major-General Breckinridge, I have the honor to transmit a report of the operations of the brigade under my command in the recent battles near Murfreesborough.
The Twentieth Tennessee. the Sixtieth North Carolina, the Fourth Florida, and the First and Third Florida Regiments, with Wright�s battery of four pieces, constituted my command, numbering 1,640 effective men.
The enemy having advanced in force against Murfreesborough, dispositions for battle were made, and Breckinridge�s division was posted on the extreme right in our front line, with its right near Spence�s house, on the Lebanon turnpike, extending toward the ford, where the Nashville turnpike crosses Stone�s River. Adams� brigade was on the right, mine next, and Palmer�s and Hanson�s extended westwardly toward the ford. This position was occupied from Sunday morning, December 28, with some few unimportant changes in our line of battle, until the succeeding Wednesday. On that day, not long afternoon, we were ordered to cross the river at the ford, and, under the ~upervision of Major-General Breckinridge, my brigade, on the right, and that of Palmer on my left, were formed in line of battle on the ground originally occupied by Lieutenant- General Polk�s command. The right of my brigade rested near the intersection of the Nashville Railroad and turnpike, and extended nearly at right angles westwardly, about half a mile south of Cowan�s, or the burnt house.
These dispositions made, the order was given to advance in the direction of the burnt house toward a cedar forest beyond. Wide and open fields intervened, through which the command passed with great animation, in fine order. As we came near the farm-house, heavy batteries of the enemy, supported by strong lines of infantry near a railroad embankment, forming a strong defense, were visible obliquely to the right, on the northeast of the Nashville turnpike. The brigade advanced rapidly and steadily under a destructive fire from the artillery. The Twentieth Tennessee, passing to the right of the house, engaged the enemy with vigor on the right in some woods near the river, capturing some 25 prisoners and clearing the wood. The First and Third Florida, on the extreme left, pressed forward to the cedar forest with but little loss. The two central regiments (the Sixtieth North Carolina and Fourth Florida) found great difficulty in pressing through the ruins and strong inclosures of the farm-house, and, retarded by these obstacles and by a fire from the enemy's sharpshooters in front, and a very fierce cannonade, partially enfilading their lines, were for a moment thrown into confusion at the verge of the wood. They halted and commenced firing, but, being urged forward, they responded with loud shouts and gained the cedars. The enemy turned upon the wood a heavy fire from many pieces of artillery, across a field 400 or 500 yards distant, and, though we lost some valuable lives, the brigade maintained its position with firmness in the edge of the wood.
Having met Lieutenant-General ilardee, he ordered me, with Adams� brigade (under Colonel Gibson) added to my command, to hold the wood. We bivouacked for the night, establishing our pickets far in the field and very near the enemy. The Twentieth Tennessee, which had been directed by Captain [H. W.] Wooley, assistant adjutant-general, near the river, finding their force insufficient to advance, after losing many men, halted in good order and rejoined the brigade at nightfall in the cedars. Wright�s battery, having been detached by General Hardee, took no part in the action.
At roll-call, about dark, it was ascertained that the loss suffered by my command was 155 killed and wounded. The companies of the Sixtieth North Carolina, under the immediate command of Colonel [Joseph A.] McDowell, were with me but those separated from his regiment in passing the burnt house, to which I have alluded, fell back without orders to the encampment, with the exception of some of the men and officers who joined the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment, and who did not rejoin their regiment until after night. Some few prisoners were taken and 400 or 500 stand of arms were secured.
On Friday, about 2 o�clock, the two brigades under my command were withdrawn from the cedars and ordered to take position in line of battle across the river, near the original post of Hanson�s brigade. This being done, preparations for attack were made, and Major-General Breckinridge formed his division in two lines, Pillow�s and Hanson�s brigades being in the front line, with mine 200 yards in the rear of Pillow�s, to support his command, and Gibson�s on my left, to support Hanson�s.
About 4 o�clock, the order to advance being given, the division moved forward rapidly through a wood and an open field beyond to drive the enemy beyond the river and seize a hill that would enable our artillery to enfilade in reverse their batteries. As soon as the field was entered the engagement commenced, and our men, pressing forward with great ardor, drove the enemy over the crest of the hill and beyond the river. Wright�s battery was advanced to the crest of the hill, and was soon hotly engaged. On our right the enemy far outflanked us, and the Twentieth Tennessee suffered severely, but dashed forward into the woods with its accustomed gallantry and drove the enemy down the hill, capturing some 200 prisoners. A division of the enemy, said to be that of [H. P.] Van Cleve, was driven down the hill-side in utter rout by our division. The enemy then rapidly concentrated large numbers of fresh troops on the other side of the river, and poured upon our dense ranks a withering fire of musketry and artillery. Our lines, originally very close in the order of advance, were commingled near the river, and this new fire from an overwhelming force from the opposite banks of the stream threw them into disorder. The division recoiled over the field in the direction of the wood through which we first passed. When withdrawing from the field, I met Brigadier-General Wharton with his battery and the cavalry, with which he was covering our right. He was about opening fire with the battery, when I advised him not to do so, as he might fire on some of our men. He detached Colonel Harrison, of the Texas Rangers, who, with my brigade, formed and supported Robertson�s battery in the verge of the wood until General Breckinridge ordered me to resume my original lines. One of oar batteries opened from its verge, and I succeeded in forming my brigade for its support, and was in that position when Major-General Breckinridge arrived and ordered me to resume our original lines, about a mile in the rear, as night had come on.
The loss sustained by my command in this action was 295 killed and wounded, and 90 missing, most of whom were doubtless killed or wounded. The total loss of my command in both actions was 537.
Wright�s battery was bravely fought, but lost its gallant commander, who was killed at his guns. Lieutenant [J. W.] Mebane, though wounded, succeeded in withdrawing all of the battery except two of the pieces, which were lost, and which could not be got off, as many of the horses were killed.
For other details I refer to the reports of the commanding officers of the regiments and of the battery, which I inclose.
During the battle both men and officers displayed great intrepidity, and I attribute the repulse on Friday to the manifest hopelessness of the attempt to hurl a single division, without support, against the cardinal position of the whole hostile army. This was apparent to the least intelligent soldier. The line fell back, rallied, and in half an hour was ready to re-engage.
In rallying the troops, I feel it my duty to notice and report the conspicuous zeal and gallantry displayed by yourself, and to testify my appreciation of the valuable assistance you rendered on the field.
Colonel Smith, of the Twentieth Tennessee, a brave and skillful officer, was severely wonuded on Wednesday, and the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel [Frank M.] Lavender, who has not been heard of since the action on Friday. It is believed that he is wounded or a prisoner.
Colonel Miller, of the First and Third Florida, was wounded on Friday while bravely leading his regiment, which he withdrew, retaining the command, notwithstanding his wound.
The Fonrth Florida in both actions bore itself gallantly, and was ably commanded by Colonel Bowen.
In the action of the 31st, Lieut. Edwin Whitfield, of my staff, was severely, if not fatally, wounded by my side while gallantly rendering me the most efficient aid, and Mr. Orville Ewing, a young gentleman of great promise, distinguished in the battle of Mill Springs, was killed nearly at the same moment.
Maj. J. C. Thompson, volunteer aide, and Captain Wooley, assistant adjutant-general, assisted rue efficiently on Wednesday.
Mr. [W. R.] Chambliss, acting assistant adj~itant-general; Captain [H. P.] Wallace, and Lient. [J. C.] Wheeler assisted me on Friday on my staff.
To Major [F.] Claybrooke, who volunteered on my staff on Friday, I am greatly indebted for his services.
I recommend for promotion Sergeant Battle for conspicuous gallantry. After four color-bearers of the Twentieth Tennessee had been shot down and the regiment was in confusion, he seized the colors and bravely rallied the men nnder my eye.
I remain, colonel, with great respect, your obedient servant,
W. Preston,
Brigadier-General.
Col. T. O�Hara, Acting Assistant Adjutant- General.
[Addenda.]
Abstract from Semi-weekly report of Preston�s brigade (Total force available), Brig. Gen. William Preston commanding, for January 12, 1863.
1st and 3rd Florida.............34 Officers and 461 Men and a total 595
4th Florida.............................16 Officers and 268 Men and a total 385
60th North Carolina.................26 Officers and 250 Men and a total 354
20th Tennessee......................29 Officers and 254 Men and a total 338
Wright's battery......................4 Officers and 71 Men and a total 86
Report of Col. William Miller, First Florida Infantry, commanding First and Third Regiments.
Camp near Tullahoma, Tenn.,
January 12, 1863.
Captain: In obedience to instructions received from brigade headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part borne by my command in the actions of December 31, 1862, and January 2, 1863, near Murfreesborough:
About 3 p. m., on December 31, we were ordered into line, marched across the river, and formed on a hill in an open field in line of battle, occupying the left of the brigade. The command �forward� was soon given, and on advancing, our front being masked by a regiment, our left was thrown back out of line. This defect in our alignment caused the regiment to diverge to the left, and to enter a cedar forest to the left of the burnt house, the balance of the brigade passing to the right. In charging over this field we lost several men killed and wounded by the enemy�s batteries, which swept the field by an almost enfilading fire. Passing through the cedar, we arrived before the enemy�s batteries, and took position on the right of Stewart�s brigade, where we were joined by the balance of the brigade. This position of the enemy, supported by heavy batteries, was judged to be too strong to storm; we, therefore, retained our position, skirmishing occasionally with the enemy during that afternoon and the next two following days, up to 2 or 3 p. m. of the 2d instant.
On this occasion the command numbered 36 officers and 495 men, making the aggregate 531.
About 3 p. m. of January 2, we were ordered from the cedars back to the right, recrossing the river, and about 4 p. m. we were formed in line of battle with the balance of the brigade, occupying again the left of the brigade, which was in the second line of battle. At the command �forward,� the regiment advanced in excellent order, soon getting in range of a raking fire from the enemy�s batteries, until we reached the crest of a ridge in an open field, where the first line of the division was engaged, and here we were ordered to lie down, which we did for a few minutes, and then arose and charged at the command �forward.� Upon advancing, on account of the formation of the ground, we were compelled to move by the right flank, passing into the wood that skirted the field through which we had just passed. This combination of movements caused an intermingling of regiments, which led to no little confusion, separating commands, and, again, the men from their commanders. Nevertheless, the troops behaved bravely, driving the enemy before them. As we moved on through the woods, the ground gradually descended, and our left rested on the river, whose high banks were covered by the enemy, who poured a galling fire upon us from the opposite side. Further forward the river, by a sudden .bend, appeared in our front, and we found ourselves exposed to a deadly fire from the hills that overlooked us on our left and front. Crossing this hastily, a large portion of the regiment passed the river, under the opposite bank of which it was partially sheltered. I think it is owing to this fact that the First and Third Florida Regiments lost fewer men than other corps which were not so far advanced in the fight. The hopelessness of carrying the opposite heights being now apparent, we were ordered to fall back, and, owing to the commingling of regiments, as before stated, this was done in some confusion and disorder.
Into this fight the regiments carried 32 officers and 424 men making the aggregate 456.
I respectfully refer you to the report of casualties already forwarded for an account of the losses sustained by the regiment.
I am happy to have it in my power to state that both officers and men behaved gallantly.
I have the honor to be, sir, yours, very respectfully,
Wm. Miller,
Colonel, Commanding First and Third Florida Regiments.
Captain [R. W.] Wooley,
Assistant Adjutant-General.