Organization of the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Joseph E. Johnston
Hardee's Corps
Bate's Division
Maj. Gen. William B. Bate
Finley's Brigade
1st and 3d Florida Infantry
Maj. Glover A. Ball
1st (dismounted) Florida Cavalry and 4th Florida Infantry
Col. Edward Badger
6th Florida infantry
Col. Angus D. McLean
7th Florida Infantry
Lt. Col. Tillman Ingram
Itinerary of Hardee's Army Corps May 15-June 14
From journal kept by Maj. Henry Hampton, acting assistant adjutant-general
Sunday, May 15.�Skirmishing commenced early and continued along the entire line until near midday, when Bate had a brisk fight,
repulsing the enemy handsomely. In the afternoon Hood, with Stewart�s division and some supports from Cheatham and Loring,
moved out and attacked the enemy�s left with a view of turning it, but finding them massed in heavy force, were compelled to retire
after a short engagement. It was determined in council to retire to Calhoun, six miles below, on the opposite side of the river, to-night,
and the movement was successfully accomplished, so that by daylight next morning the last Confederates crossed the bridges and
destroyed them.
Monday, May 16.�Major-General Walker, whose division had been at Calhoun for some five or six days, reported the enemy
advancing from the ferry west of the place. Hardee�s corps was at once put into position to meet the advance, with Polk and Hood on
the left and center. There being nothing of a threatening character in sight, Hood and Polk withdrew leisurely, leaving Hardee to
protect the rear. About noon the enemy were reported advancing in force from the river west of Calhoun, driving the cavalry in. They
soon struck our skirmishers, and a considerable firing commenced. They were also reported moving directly down from Resaca. About
3 or 4 p. m. Hardee�s line of skirmishers was strengthened and an advance ordered for the purpose of developing the enemy. It was
handsomely executed by Walker and Cleburne, on the front line, who drove the enemy some distance. We held our position until 1
o�clock next morning.
Tuesday, May 17.�Hardee�s corps retired slowly before the enemy about 1 a. m., leaving the cavalry to hold him in check. The rear
of the army reached Adairsville, seven miles below, about noon. The enemy Lllowed closely behind, and by 3 p. m. were skirmishing
with our cavalry. They were hardly looked for so early, but by dint of great activity Hardee�s corps was in position to confront them in
good time, and again the now familiar popping of rifles was heard. The fighting at no time went beyond heavy skirmishing, which, on
our part, was sustained by Cheatham, who occupied the front line. When the firing ended at night we had not receded an inch anywhere.
At a council held at night it was decided to fall back to Cassville, fifteen miles south of Adairsville (in this council it was understood
that General Hardee advocated giving battle to the enemy in the position we then held in front of Adairsville, information having
been received that McPherson�s corps of the enemy were in the neighborhood of Rome and another had been sent to Virginia, which would
give us greatly the advantage of the enemy, as we had our whole army massed at Adairsville), and orders were accordingly issued.
Wednesday, May 18.�At 12 p. m. [17th] our army was again in motion, passing through Kingston about 9 o�clock, and arriving at
camp near Cassville at about noon.
Thursday, May 19.�The troops were placed in position at an early hour, and it was announced that we would go no farther. General
Johnston, in an address to the troops, told them that our communications were safe at last, and that we would now turn upon the
advancing columns of the enemy and give him battle. This was received with enthusiasm by the troops; but alas! �how often is the
word of promise held to the ear, but broken to the hope.� Before 12 m. it was determined to change the line to a stronger one in the
rear, just behind Cassville. This most hazardous movement was accomplished, in the very face of the enemy, with little or no loss.
Here, then, all agreed the stand would be made or an advance projected, but before midnight again went out the order �fall back.�
Friday, May 20.�Etowah River. eight miles south from Cassville, was the next point reached. Our forces and trains crossed without
being molested by the enemy, who might have damaged us severely by pressing us vigorously. The, river crossed, our troops
bivouacked within three miles of it (two miles from Allatoona), holding the fords, or some of them, and burning the
bridges.
Saturday, May 21, Sunday, 22 (Trinity).�Our army remained quiet near Allatoona, on Pumpkin Vine Creek. Nothing known of
the enemy.
Monday, May 23.�Hardee�s corps moved to-day eight miles in the direction of Dallas, which is about eighteen miles west of Marietta,
to meet a movement of the enemy reported crossing the Etowah at Milam�s Bridge. Hood remains near Allatoona, and Polk�s corps is
moved near Lost Mountain.
Tuesday, May 24.�Hardee�s corps moved to the Dallas and Atlanta road to a point about ten miles below Dallas, except a brigade
sent to Dallas to support the cavalry in case the enemy pressed them. No intelligence of the enemy until late in the day, when
General Johnston dispatched to General Hardee that he was in force in front of Dallas, and ordered him back in the direction of that
place, in order to concentrate, with the view, it is believed, of moving on Sherman before he can make his dispositions to meet us.
Heavy skirmishing at Dallas, with nO important results. A drenching rain, just before night, greatly refreshed everybody and
everything.
Wednesday, May 25.�Hood, having moved from his position near Allatoona on the 24th instant, had hardly occupied lids ground on
the right, at New Hope Church, about five miles from Dallas, [before he] was attacked (about 4 p. m.) by Hooker�s corps. He easily
repulsed every attempt to dislodge him without assistance, and at night was left by the enemy just where he was found. General
Johnston, believing that Sherman had at last made up his mind to deliver battle, made his dispositions accordingly. Polk got into
position during the night, and Hardee�s people bivouacked on the road a mile or two from the field.
Thursday, May 26.�Contrary to the general expectation, there was no general engagement, but the day was spent in skirmishing
and maneuvering for positions. The enemy is again trying to flank us, this time on the right. During the day the following
dispositions were made of Hardee�s corps: Walker was moved in rear of Hood�s center, Cleburne to the extreme right of our line,
connecting with Hindman, and Cheatham to a position on the left of Polk�s corps, which constitutes our center; Bate remains detached on the
left, one mile and a half from Dallas, guarding the Dallas and Atlanta road.
Friday, May 27.�At an early hour this morning, or a late hour last night, intelligence was received of some advantage, gained by
the enemy to the right of Bate which necessitated new dispositions on our part. By daybreak, therefore, Walker was moved to the
left of Bate, and Clieatham�s line advanced, so as to connect with Bate�s right. Jackson�s cavalry was posted on the extreme left of
the line beyond Walker and had some brisk fighting during the day. In establishing this new line we had some severe skirmishing, the
enemy contesting closely several advantageous positions. We drove them at length, however. No change was made in Polk�s and Hood�s
lines until late in the afternoon, when Cantey�s division was sent to support Cheatham, whose line was very weak and whose loss was
heavy. The skirmishing continued along the entire line all day, but no serious assault was made by the enemy until about 4 p. m., when
he endeavored to turn our right, where Cleburne was posted, pushing forward seven lines of battle against him. The fighting was
very severe and lasted until night, Cleburne driving the enemy back in every attack. A night assault was also made on him, which he
also successfully repulsed. This fighting was marked by great daring on the part of the enemy, some of them getting up as close as
thirty feet to our lines. The slaughter among the Yankees was terrific, and his loss could not have been less than 5,000; 700 dead
bodies were counted before Granbury�s and Lowrey�s brigades. We captured some 200 prisoners and 1,200 or 1,500 stand of arms. Our
loss a fraction over 500.
Saturday, May 28.�It having been determined to mass troops on our right for the purpose of breaking or turning the enemy�s left,
General Hood�s corps, or a portion of it, moved in that direction. Polk�s corps was moved to the right to occupy that portion of the
line vacated by Hood, and Hardee�s corps (Cheatham and Walker) were transferred from the left to flU up the gap left by Polk,
Cleburne still on the right, and Bate on the extreme left. More or less skirmishing along the line all day until about -� p. m., when Bate
moved forward to feel the force in his front. He did not go far before he encountered a strong force behind formidable breast-works,
and was forced to retire after suffering considerably. For some cause our expedition to the right was not consummated. The enemy
either anticipated something of the kind, or else intended trying the same game on us. At any rate, we found them massed on their left,
and Hood returned without doing anything.
Sunday, May 29.�Cleburne�s division was this morning marched from its position on the right to the left of Walker, so that Hardee�s
corps is again all together, and in the following order from right to left, viz, Cheatham, Walker, Cleburne, and Bate. Learning that
Colonel Lamb, of the Fifth [Tennessee], was mortally wounded on yesterday, I felt it my duty to return at once to my regiment, there
being no field officer with it, and on announcing my intention to General Hardee was relieved at once by him from duty on his staff.
I joined my regiment about 8 a. m. in the breast-works. My journal will henceforth be less comprehensive than formerly, as I shall not
enjoy the same facilities for learning the movements of the army. The Sabbath day passed quietly, disturbed only by an occasional
shot. About midnight, however, while most of the army slept, a furious fire suddenly broke out on the right of Cheatham, supposed
to be on Cantey�s front. Shortly after heavy firing was also heard on the left of our line. That on the right soon ceased, but in the other
direction it was kept up until nearly morning. The troops on Cheatham�s line were put under arms when the firing first began
and remained so until dawn.
Monday, May 30.�It was ascertained this morning that the firing on our left was in front of Bate and Cleburne, the enemy making
several attacks and meeting with a repulse each time. The impression prevails that the noise on onr right was the result of a false alarm,
and it is not believed any serious attack was made by the enemy, and that our men did all the firing. Very little firing to-day; only
an occasional skirmish. The skirmishing grew more brisk after night, but gradually diminished as it grew later.
Tuesday, May 31.�Occasional skirmishing and cannonading today; on the right principally, but occasionally on the left also.
Indications point to a movement of the enemy to our right.
Wednesday, June 1.�Very much such a day as yesterday. Our troops generally engaged in strengthening our works on the center
of the line. Cleburne moved from his position on the front line to the rear of the church and held as a reserve. Indications stronger
than ever that the enemy are massing on our right.
Thursday, June 2.�Walker, Bate, and Cleburne all moved to the right, leaving this division as the extreme left of our line. Our
cavalry went into Dallas last night, which the enemy had evacuated, and were ordered to-day to advance in line perpendicular to our
present position, and press in the direction of the railroad until they developed the enemy. Nothing from them at a late hour. There
can hardly be a doubt now that Sherman is endeavoring to crowd in between us amid the railroad on our right. Distant musketry
heard in the afternoon on the right and some cannon shots. No intelligence from them up to night. Light skirmishing alomig our line
all day.
Friday, June 3.�We remain in statu quo to-day. Skirmishing still continues. In the afternoon the enemy ran a piece close up to
our skirmish lines and opened on a house held by our sharpshooters, enfilading our main line. Nothing known as to what is going on on
the right. The enemy still believed to be massing in that direction.
Saturday, June 4.�Moved still farther to the right, between Lost Mountain and Marietta. Hardee�s corps now on time right, Hood
center, and Polk left.
Sunday, June 5.�Were placed in position.
Monday, June 6, and Tuesday, June 7.�We fortified. Polk moves to the right, leaving Hardee in the center. Little or no
skirmishing anywhere on the front. The enemy still pushing toward the railroad.
Wednesday, June 8, Thursday, June 9, Friday, June 10, and Saturday, June 11.�Very little doing either day. Some
skirmishing on Bate�s and Walker�s front, which grew quite brisk on Saturday afternoon. The enemy evidently are making an effort to take
Pine Mountain, held by Bate, in advance of our main line. Reported that the enemy has been re-enforced by Smith�s corps from the
Mississippi River, and that a heavy column is approaching on the Cassville and Marietta road. Cheatham�s division is taken from the
fortifications and started toward the right. Rain! rain!! rain!!!
Sunday, June 12.�We did not move on account of the incessant rain.
Monday, June 13.�We take Cantey�s position in the trenches, he moving to the right. Rain.
Tuesday, June 14.�The weather cleared up and we went to work strengthening our position. The skirmishing, which had almost
ceased while it rained, again commenced. Lieutenant-General Polk was killed to-day by the enemy�s artillery while on the outpost of
Bate�s position, on Pine Mountain. At night regiment was ordered to retire from the hill, it being regarded as a dangerous position,
and being threatened by the enemy in the rear.
Reports of Lt. Gen. Hardee, commanding Hardee's Corp.
Headquarters Hardee's Corps.
Camp near Smithfield, N. C., April 5, 1865.
General: The want of subordinate reports has hitherto prevented me from making an official report of the operations of my
corps, of the Army of Tennessee, from the opening of the campaign at Dalton to the time of my transfer from that army on the 28th of
September, 1864. Many of the general officers in that corps were killed, wounded, or captured in the recent Tennessee campaign
without having made up their reports, and this obstacle, therefore, still exists; but the publication of General Hood�s official report makes
it a duty to place at once upon record a correction of the misrepresentations which he has made in that report with respect to myself
and the corps which I commanded. It is well known that I felt unwilling to serve under General Hood upon his succession to the
command of the Army of Tennessee, because I believed him, though a �tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in both experience amid
natural ability to so important a command, and soon afterward, with the knowledge and approval of General Hood, I applied to his
Excellency the President to be relieved from duty with that army. The President replied that it was my duty to remain where I was. I
accepted the decision and gave to the commanding general an honest and cordial support. That in the operations about Atlanta I failed
to accomplish all that General Hood thinks might have been accomplished, is a matter of regret. That I committed errors is very
possible, but that I failed in any instance to carry out in good faith his orders I utterly deny; nor during our official connection did General
Hood ever evince a belief that I had in any respect failed in the execution of such parts of his military plans as were intrusted to me.
On the contrary, by frequent and exclusive consultation of my opinions, by the selection of my corps for important operations, an by
assigning me on several occasions to the command of two-thirds of his army, he gave every proof of implicit confidence in me. The
publication of his official report with its astonishing statements and insinuations was the first intimation of his dissatisfaction with my
official conduct. Referring to the attack of the 20th of July at Peach Tree Creek, he says:
Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart
were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General
Hardee�s attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that his left did not take more than half a division front. This, unfortunately, was not
attended to and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until
nearly 4 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart�s corps carrying the temporary works on its front. Hardee failed to push the attack as
ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart�s right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried.
I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my orders been executed.
I was ordered, as above stated, to move half a division length to the right, but was directed at the same time to connect with the left
of Cheatham�s corps. The delay referred to by General Hood was not caused by my failure to post a staff officer to prevent my
command from moving more than half a division length to the right, for Major Black, of my staff, was sent to the proper point for that
purpose; but it arose from the fact that Cheathamn�s corps, with which I was to connect, was nearly two miles to my right instead of a
division length. Had General Hood been on the field the alternative of delaying the attack or leaving an interval between Cheatham�s
command and my own could have been submitted to him for decision. He was in Atlanta, and in his absence the hazard of leaving an
interval of one mile and a half in a line intended to be continuous, and at a point in front of which the enemy was in force and might
at any time attack, seemed to me too great to be assumed. The attack thus delayed was, therefore, made at 4 instead of 1 p. m.
My troops were formed as follows: Bate�s division on the right, Walker�s in the center, Cheatham�s (commanded by Brigadier-
General Maney) on the lefty and Cleburne�s in reserve. The command moved to the attack in echelon of division from the right.
Walker�s division, in consequence of the circular formation of the enemy�s fortifications, encountered them first, and was repulsed and
driven back. Bate, finding no enemy in his immediate front, Was directed to find, and, if practicable, to turn, their flank, but his
advance through an almost impenetrable thicket was necessarily slow. Expecting but not hearing Bate�s guns I ordered Maney
and Cleburne, whose divisions had been substituted for Walker�s beaten troops, to attack. At the moment when the troops were
advancing to the assault I received information from General Hood that the enemy were passing and overlapping the extreme right of
the army, accompanied by an imperative order to send him a division at once. In obedience, to this order I immediately
withdrew and sent to him Cleburne�s division. The withdrawal of a division at the moment when but two were available compelled me
to countermand the assault, and the lateness of the hour, which made it impossible to get Bate in position to attack before dark,
left no alternative but to give up the attack altogether.
These movements ani their causes were fully explained to General Hood at the time, and seemingly to his entire satisfaction. No mention
is made in General Hood�s report of the fight made by Cleburne on the 21st, which he described as the �bitterest of his
life;� but it was the well-known and often-expressed opinion of that noble and lamented officer that but for the withdrawal of his
division, which prevented, the assault on the 20th, and its timely arrival on the right, the enemy would on the morning of the 21st have
succeeded in gaining the inner works of Atlanta.
On the 21st of July General Hood decided to attempt on the following day to turn the enemy�s left flank. The original plan was to send
my corps by a detour to Decatur to turn the enemy�s position, but my troops had been marching, fighting, and working the night and
day previous, had had little rest for thirty-six hours, and it was deemed impracticable to make so long a march in time to attack on
the following day. This plan was therefore abandoned, and General Hood says:
Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's flank, as directed; took position and attacked his flank.
In proof that General Hood's instructions were obeyed I have only to mention that when my dispatch informing him of the
position I had taken and the dispositions I had made for the attack was received he exclaimed to Brigadier-General Mackall, his chief of
staff, with his finger on the map, "Hardee is just where I wanted him."
I will not in this report enter into the details of the engagement of the 22d of July, one of the most desperate and bloody of the war, and
which won the only decided success achieved by the army at Atlanta.
In the afternoon of the 28th of July, when the corps of Stewart and Lee, on the left, had been badly repulsed in an attack upon the enemy�s
right, and were attacked in turn, a serious disaster was apprehended. General Hood sent several couriers in quick succession and great
haste to summon me to his headquarters, which were between my own and the then battle-field, and a mile and a half nearer to it.
He there directed me to proceed to the field, and, if necessary, to assume command of the troops engaged.
If I failed of my duty in any respect on the 20th and 22d of July, it is a little singular that on the 28th General Hood, remainiug at his
headquarters in Atlanta, should have sent me to take command on a field where there was no portion of my own corps, and where nearly
two-thirds of his army were engaged. Upon my arrival on the field the fighting had nearly ceased, and I found it unnecessary to take
command. This fight of the 28th is mentioned by General Hood in terms to leave an impression of its success, but it was well known
throughout the army that so great was the loss in men, organization, and morale in that engagement that no action of the campaign
probably did so much to demoralize and dishearten the troops engaged in it. It was necessary, in order to cast upon me the onus of the
general failure at Atlanta, to cover up any want of success on the part of others. But if strange that General Hood should have placed me
in command of two-thirds of his army on the 28th, after my failures of the 20th and 22d, it is not less remarkable that in the following
month, remaining himself at Atlanta, nearly thirty miles from the scene of action with one corps of his army, he should have sent me in
command of the other two corps to make an attack at Jonesborough, upon which he says so much depended.
On the 26th of August the enemy drew in his left on the north front of Atlanta, in pursuance of a plan to turn our position and move upon
our railroad communications. Wheeler had cut the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and General Hood believed the
enemy to be retreating for want of supplies. He even ordered General W. H. Jackson, then commanding the cavalry of the army, to
harass the rear of the retreating enemy. General Jackson endeavored to convince him of his error, but to no purpose. The
opportunity to strike the flank of the enemy exposed during the five days occupied in the movement from Atlanta to Jonesborough was
neglected and lost. It was not until the 30th of August in the evening of which day the enemy actually reached the vicinity of
Jonesborough, that General Hood was convinced, by information sent him by myself from Rough and Ready, that the enemy were moving upon
that place. He then determined to attack what he believed to be only two corps of the enemy at Jonesborough. The enemy had reached
Jonesborough before the order was given to move against him. I was telegraphed at Rough and Ready in the evening of August 30
to come to Atlanta, and an engine was sent for me. I arrived in the night. General Hood ordered me to move with Lee�s corps and
my own, commanded by Major-General Cleburne, to Jonesborough, attack the enemy, and drive him, if possible, across Flint River.
The troops were in vicinity of East Point and were put in motion at once. I left Atlanta by rail and reached Jonesborough before
daylight, expecting to find Lee and Clebiirne there. To my disappointment I learned that Cleburne, who was in advance, had
encountered the enemy in force on the road he had been instructed to take, and had been conipelled to open another road. This
occasioned great delay. Cleburne got into position about 9 o�clock on the morning of the 31st, and Lee, who was in rear, at about
11 o�clock. Three brigades of Lee�s corps, which had been left on picket, did not get up until 1.30 p. m. Foreseeing that the
attack could not be made before the afternoon, and that the enemy would have time by intrenchin5 himself to add strength of
position to superiority of numbers, I telegraphed these facts to General Hood early in the day and urged him to come to
Jonesborough and take command. Communication with Atlanta by rail was then still open, but he did not come. As soon as the
lines could be adjusted I ordered the attack. Lee�s corps was on the right, Cleburne�s on the left. Cleburne had orders to turn the
enemy�s right flank, and Lee to begin the attack on our right when he heard Cleburne�s guns. Lee, mistaking the guns of Cleburne�s
skirmishers for the main attack, began the movement before Cleburne became seriously engaged. He encountered formidable
breast-works, which he was unable to carry, and after considerable loss was driven back in confusion. Cleburne had carried the
temporary works of the enemy, and a portion of his command had crossed Flint River and captured 2 pieces of artillery, which he
was unable, however, to bring over the river. He was now moving upon the enemy�s main works. I sent my chief of staff (Colonel
Roy) to Lieutenant-General Lee to ascertain whether his troops were in condition to renew the attack. General Lee expressed the
decided opinion that they were not. Immediately after this I was informed by another staff officer (Colonel Pickett) that the enemy
were preparing to attack Lee. In view of the demoralized condition of Lee�s troops, as reported by the same officer, I withdrew a
division from Cleburne to support Lee. It now became necessary for me to act on the defensive, and I ordered Cleburne to make
no further attempt upon the enemy�s works. It is proper to state that the enemy were strongly intrenched and had one flank
resting on Flint River and both well protected. Their fortifications were erected during the day and night preceding
the attack, and were formidable. Two corps were in position, with a third corps in reserve. Three other corps were in supporting
distance, between Jonesborough and Rough and Ready. The Twentieth Corps alone, of Sherman�s army, had been left in front
of Atlanta. These facts were obtained from Captain Buel, a captured officer of Major-General Howard�s staff. On the night of the 31st
the following dispatch was received in duplicate from General Hood:
Headquarters Army of Tennessee,
Office Chief of Staff,
August 31, 1864�6 p. m.
Lieutenant-General Hardee,
Commanding, &c.:
General Hood directs that you return Lee�s corps to this place. Let it march by 2 o�clock to-morrow morning. Remain with your corps and the cavalry, and so
dispose your force as best to protect Macon and communications in rear. Retain provision and ordnance trains. Please return Reynolds� brigade, and, if you think
you can do so and still accomplish your object, send back a brigade or so of your corps also. There are some indications that the enemy may make an attempt upon
Atlanta to-morrow.
Very respectfully, &c.,
F. A. Shoup,
Chief of Staff.
Lee�s corps proceeded to Atlanta, in obedience to this order, and I remained at Jonesborough with my own corps and a body of cavalry
under Brigadier-General Jackson.
It will be seen from the above order that Lee�s corps was not recalled, as General Hood states, with a view of attacking the enemy in
flank, but to protect Atlanta from an apprehended attack by Sherman�s army, which General Hood, with a marvelous want
of information, evidently still believed to be in front of Atlanta.
On the morning of September 1 the situation was as follows: General Hood was at Atlanta with Stewart�s corps and the Georgia
militia; my corps was at Jonesborough, thirty miles distant, and Lee�s corps on the road from Jonesborough to Atlanta, fifteen miles
from each place, and in supporting distance of neither. The Federal commander, on the other hand, had concentrated his whole army
upon my corps at Jonesborough, except the one corps left in front of Atlanta, and was now in position to crush in detail the scattered
corps of his unwary antagonist. My position at Jonesborough had been taken up on the failure of the attack on the day previous. It
was not strong naturally, and there had been little time to strengthen it by art; but it was absolutely necessary to hold the position
through the day to secure the evacuation of Atlanta, which had now become a necessity. To add to my embarrassment, I was encumbered
by the immense subsistence and ordnance trains of the army, which had been sent for safety from Atlanta to Joimesborough, and could
not now be sent farther to the rear, because the superiority of the enemy in cavalry made it indispensable to their safety that they
should remain under the protection of the infantry. It is difficult to imagine a more perplexing or perilous situation; yet it is this
engagement, fought under such circumstances, which General Hood disposes of in two contemptuous sentences; an engagement in which
my corps was attacked by six corps, commanded by General Sherman in person, and where upon my ability to hold the position
through the day depended the very existence of the remainder of the army, for it is not too much to say that if the enemy had crushed
my corps, or even driven it from its position at Jonesborough on the 1st of September, no organized body of the other two corps could
have escaped destruction. Through the splendid gallantry of the troops the position was held against fierce and repeated assaults of the
enemy. At night the object of the stand (which was to secure the successful retreat of the two corps in Atlanta) having been gained, I
retired about four miles and took up a position in front of Lovejoy�s Station, which was maintained against a renewal of the attack on the
following day, and until the remainder of the army formed a junction with my corps and Sherman withdrew to Atlanta.
General Hood sums up the total losses of his entire army from the date of his assuming command, on the 18th of July, to the
Jonesborough fight, inclusive, at 5,247. The casualties in my corps alone during that time considerably exceeded 7,000 in killed,
wounded, and captured.
General Hood says:
The vigor of the attack (on the 31st of August) may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded
out of the two corps engaged.
This attack was made principally by Lee�s corps, and the loss was chiefly in that corps. It is true that the attack could scarcely have
been called a vigorous one, nor is it surprising that troops who had for two months been hurled against breast-works only to be repulsed
or to gain dear-bought and fruitless victories, should now have moved against the enemy�s works with reluctance and distrust.
But dispositions were made to renew the attack with both corps, which would probably have resulted bloodily enough to have
satisfied even the sanguinary expectations of the commanding general but for developments of the enemy�s movements amid forces, which
made it necessary for me to assume the defensive. I now consider this a fortunate circumstance, for success against such odds could at
best only have been partial and bloody, while defeat would have been almost inevitable destruction to the army.
The fall of Atlanta does not date from the result of the battle of Jonesborough, but from General Hood�s misconception of his
adversary�s plans.
After the 30th of August General Hood�s whole plan of operations was based upon the hypothesis that Sherman was moving only a
detachment to Jonesborough, whereas in reality he was moving his army. He divided his forces to attack a concentrated enemy. He
in effect sent a detachment of his army to attack an enemy who was superior in numbers to his whole army.
Had it been possible with two corps to dislodge three corps of the enemy from a chosen position on the 31st, I should still have had to
meet three fresh corps on the following morning with my own corps alone, for be it remembered that Lee�s corps was withdrawn
by General Hood before he knew the result of the fight on the 31st.
The fate of Atlanta was sealed from the moment when General Hood allowed an enemy superior in nnmbers to pass unmolested
around his flank and plant himself firmly upon his only line of railroad. If, after the enemy reached Jonesborough, General Hood had
attacked him with his whole army instead of with a part of it, he could not reasonably have expected to drive from that position an
army before which his own had been for four months retiring in the open field.
I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. J. Hardee,
Lieutenant-General.
General S. Cooper, Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va.
ADDENDA.
September 11, 1864.
Colonel Roy, Assistant Adjutant-General:
Colonel: I wish you would furnish me the loss of Hardee�s corps on 27th of June on the Kenesaw line; also at same time General
Hardee�s estimate of the loss of the enemy on that day. I infer from what you told me that you had these facts already in your possession.
I wish it for a particular purpose. Send to me, care of Colonel Harvie. It will be several days yet before we get through with the
witnesses in the court of inquiry.
Very truly, and in haste,
W. D. Pickett.
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