First Chapter
1. Introduction	3
2. Objectives	4
3. Methodology	5

SECOND CHAPTER

4. The protracted social conflict theory	9
4.1. Communal content	11
4.2. Human Needs	12
4.3. Governance and the state’s role	14
4.4. The role of domestic elites: interaction between structures and human agency	16
4.5. Underlying conditions versus proximate causes	18
4.6. International linkages	20

THIRD CHAPTER

Sri Lanka: the merging of theory and praxis	22
5. Belief and intolerance	22
5.1. The Ethnic geography	22
5.2. The creation of religious and ethnic identities	23
5.3. Buddhist revival	24
5.4. The Tamil Response	25
5.5. Conflict dynamics	26
6. Political and structural patterns of conflict: 1948-1988	27
6.1. A lack of a constitutional framework	27
6.2. Majoritarian dictatorship	28
6.3. Constitutional reforms	30
6.4. The Thimpu Talks and Principles	31
6.5. Conflict dynamics	33
7. Political and structural patterns of conflict: 1988-2002	34
7.1. Premadasa-LTTE talks	36
7.2. The Premadasa-LTTE talks from a LTTE perspective	40
7.3. The Kumaratunge-LTTE talks 1994-95	42
7.4. A war for peace	45
7.5. Political culture in Sri Lanka	47
7.6. Good governance	49
7.7. The latest peace making efforts	52
7.8. Lack of a “Sinhala consensus”	53
7.9. The relationship between the Sinhalese parties and the LTTE	54
7.10. A Tamil consensus?	57
7.11. Conflict dynamics	59
8. Conclusion	60
9. Bibliography	63

1. Introduction

In September 2002 the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) will be entering their fourth peace talks that will hopefully bring an end to a war, which for decades have scattered and divided the population and crippled economic and political life. A complex pattern of conflict dynamics characterises this conflict that ranges from a lack of power sharing to unmet needs. From being a non-violent protest against the Sinhalese-led government’s inability to meet the needs of the Tamil population, the conflict escalated in the 1970s and culminated in war in the 80s, resulting in a culture of violence that permeates all levels of society. In recent years the conflict has seen one of its most intense phases illustrating that the conflict, if not managed properly, is unlikely to peter out in the near future. 

As in all countries where a violent conflict occurs over a long period of time, some conflict dynamics have changed in Sri Lanka, bringing new life to the conflict and aggravating the suffering of the population. However, some conflict dynamics have also remained the same, illustrating a pattern of continuity since independence in 1948. For the international society and for people who work in, on and around conflict, tracking these dynamics and identifying the problems are of utmost importance. Especially in the post-Cold War period the field of conflict resolution has contributed a great deal to this task. By acknowledging that every conflict has its own dynamics and features and thus requires different responses, a huge step has been taken towards a more profound conflict management. 

Edward Azar’s theory on protracted social conflict (PSC) appears to be one of the most important contributions to the field and to the understanding of highly complex conflicts. In the mid-80s he held in collaboration with the International Center for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, a series of workshops and seminars that addressed the issues of conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority and the Tamil minority. According to Azar the Sri Lankan conflict was an unfortunate instance of a protracted social conflict where the issues of security, identity and recognition constituted the basic platform for conflict. However, a new dimension has been added to the field in the 90s, namely an increased focus on the role of leadership and domestic elites in instigating conflict, which is crucial for an understanding the Sri Lankan conflict. Since independence, the behavior, decisions and actions of Sinhalese and later on Tamil political leaders have, in interaction with structures had a decisive impact on the outcome of the conflict. Therefore, in order to understand the conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka one has to elaborate on underlying conditions such as security, identity and recognition, as well as the interplay between structures and human agency. 

2. Objectives

In the light of Azar’s protracted social conflict theory (Azar, 1990), the main objective of the dissertation is to critically explore the role of political and structural factors in the Sri Lankan conflict and examine the concept of political culture in a Sri Lankan context. Thus, what impact have political and structural factors had, and still have, on the development of the conflict, and to what extent have these factors changed over time? What is political culture in a Sri Lankan context? Is the protracted social conflict model applicable to the conflict in Sri Lanka? In other words, is Azar’s theory still useful in understanding the conflict today and does it represent an adequate tool with which to explain the dynamics and causes of the conflict? 

The hypothesis presented is that despite its valuable contribution to the field of conflict resolution Azar’s model has not paid enough attention, in particular, to domestic elites and their potential to exacerbate conflict for which reason a broader theoretical mapping is needed. This dissertation will argue that political factors such as elite - and intra-group politics especially- have had a great impact on the nature and development of the conflict. As such, this is not an attempt to negate Azar’s model, which, as will be argued, in many ways represents an excellent tool with which to analyse the conflict, but rather an attempt to extend his framework and raise a dimension that has been overlooked in his analysis. 

There is a tendency to categorise the concepts of elite and leadership as homogeneous entities thereby neglecting the many actors and important dynamics within these entities that have a major impact on conflict and its outcome. It is argued in the dissertation that in order to track conflict dynamics and identify the real problems in the conflict one has to distinguish between underlying conditions such as identity, security and recognition that Azar is suggesting, and the proximate causes such as bad leadership, the issue of devolution, and intra-group power struggles. 

In short, proximate causes or triggers in conflict exist only on the basis of underlying conditions, which means that all factors together form a nexus wherein conflict has to be understood. Nevertheless, it seems as if a pattern has become increasingly clear: proximate causes have not only been an increasing hindrance to the initial phases of the peace talks in the last decade and in the present ceasefire period, they have generally constituted a significant problem throughout the whole post-independence period and prevented efforts at peace-making. Thus, it is argued that these political and structural problems have to be dealt with whilst addressing the underlying conditions of security, identity, and recognition. Admittedly, this distinction between conditions and causes is not water-tight, but is nonetheless important to make as this generates an appreciation of the multifaceted nature of the conflict and the problems involved in solving it.

3. Methodology

In the first chapter I will review scholarly thinking about the causes of ethnic and internal conflict. Azar’s theory will constitute the central focus around which other theories and views will interact, giving on added utility to Azar’s work and putting it into a broader perspective. Together this creates a theoretical mapping with which to understand the conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. The utility of Azar’s causal analysis of conflict is explored through a discussion on the main elements within it, namely the four preconditions for protracted social conflict: communal content, needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages. I have chosen Azar’s theory, as this seems to be one of the broadest and best applicable to the Sri Lankan context. However, despite its comprehensiveness it misses out one of the most important aspects of the conflict: the political power struggles within domestic elites such as the one between the two leading Sinhalese parties, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP), and also that which takes place between the Tamil groups. It will be argued that all parties to the conflict exploit issues such as identity, security and recognition for their own political benefit, and have in so doing, prevented any resolution of the conflict. The divided nature of the political and religious elites in Sri Lanka indicates a strong heterogeneous rather than homogenous character of the parties involved in the conflict, which Azar seems to overlook. However, Michael E. Brown covers this aspect in his two-by-two matrix where internal, elite-level factors such as power struggles are one of four sets of problems that generate conflict. According to Brown scholars have not properly addressed the role of bad leadership in instigating conflict. As this concept constitutes an important element of my analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict I will explore the meaning of the concept in a Sri Lankan context. The concepts of political culture and bad leadership are closely linked to the western concept of good governance. Identifying the elements within this concept and its utility will also be illustrated in a Sri Lankan context in order to see whether there is a potential linkage between good governance and prospects for peace. 

Power struggles as a conflict dynamic seem to be upheld by a merging of structure and human agency. The elite’s decisions and actions only have meaning in terms of structure and vice versa. I have chosen to illustrate this synthesis on the basis of Anthony Giddens structuration theory. This will serve as the theoretical basis for my arguments and an important supplement to Azar’s PSC model. Furthermore, the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever on security speech acts demonstrates the instruments leaders have in their power to manipulate and control the masses in conflict situations. These views are closely related to the primordial and instrumentalist/constructivist schools and the debate that has followed on the causes of ethnic conflict. 

Moreover, the review will include arguments that support Azar’s arguments, such as the human needs theory by John Burton, which provided a solid base for the PSC model. Furthermore, in recent years a political economy school has gained a footing where scholars such as Mary Kaldor, Mark Duffield, and David Keen have argued that on-going processes of globalisation have altered the ways in which conflicting parties, states and external actors interact in deep-rooted conflicts. Privatisation, commercialisation, and deregulation have had a negative impact on the competence of many third world states and undermined traditional bases of state power, which have ultimately exacerbated conflicts even further. In continuation of Kaldor, Duffield and Keen, Paul Collier also challenges Azar’s theory by arguing that conflict is driven by greed rather than grievance. 

In short, the above-mentioned theories together create a theory mapping and an important basis for analysing and understanding the proximate causes and underlying conditions in the Sri Lankan conflict.

The third chapter will give an outline of the history of belief and intolerance that has played a dominant role in instigating tensions. The fourth chapter, divided into two parts where the first covers the period from 1948-88 and the second covers the period from 1988-2002, will elaborate on the political and structural problems of the conflict. I have chosen to distinguish between these two periods due to the fact that Azar, by 1988, had completed his workshops on Sri Lanka and that Premadasa was elected President in 1988, which gave way to peace talks in 1990. As such, the structural and political problems during 1948-88 are important to bear in mind when analyzing the course of the conflict in the 90s. Within the first period Sri Lanka had several important opportunities for peace that all were missed because of a narrow-minded, partisan political culture. In the 90s this partisan political culture seems to have exacerbated tensions, having a great impact on the failure of peace talks in 1990 and 1994/95. Comparing the two periods a pattern of continuity seems to appear demonstrating the challenges that the present cease-fire is encountering.
 
The arguments presented in this dissertation will be based on a range of secondary sources including books written by western and Sri Lankan academics, reports, papers and journals from various research institutes and think tanks, and peace- and reconciliation centers such as the National Peace Council and the Centre for Society and Religion both based in Colombo. In analysing recent developments several local newspaper sites will be used as well as other local and international organisations that write about the topic. 

Furthermore, in the Summer 2002 during a study trip to Sri Lanka I made several interviews with leading peace activists within the grass-roots environment and officials from the government. The interviews were mainly conducted in groups on the basis of semi-structured open-ended questions that on one hand did not restrict the interviewees; on the other hand, this semi-structured approach allowed me to guide interviews and take up subjects that arose during the interviews. By following up with one-to-one interviews on the basis of a selected sample from the group of people I first interviewed I was able to cross-check data. The fieldwork research enabled me to gain insight, into and obtain a better understanding of, political and structural processes in relation to the peace process in Sri Lanka and it constitutes a valuable support for the arguments presented here.    
4. The protracted social conflict theory

Azar’s protracted social conflict theory (1990) stands out as a landmark within the field of conflict resolution. When it emerged in the late 1970s and during the 80s it represented an alternative to the dominant Cold War approach to conflict and its resolution. First, it contrasted strongly with the realist view of conflict between states, that conflicts were to be ended by methods of diplomacy or the use of force and served as an alternative to prevalent analyses that narrowly framed conflicts as a question of material interest such as commercial advantages or resource acquisition. According to Azar, a tendency had emerged where conflicts were analysed as either internal or external. Several attempts at trying to link the two dimensions had still not provided the field with a systematic framework with which to analyse the complex interaction. Second, a rather narrow understanding of conflict as being a linear process going from genesis, to maturity, to reduction, and finally to termination did not fit into the classification of protracted social conflicts. Third, conflicts were only conceived as such if they were overt and violent. In relation to these tendencies Azar pointed out that the demarcation between external and internal sources and actors were not that clear cut, that conflicts do not necessarily enter certain phases at certain times, and that there are a range of causal factors, changing dynamics and goals prevalent that make conflicts difficult to put into fixed frameworks of analysis. Consequently, he developed a framework wherein conflicts were defined as a struggle for “such basic needs as security, recognition, and acceptance, fair access to political institutions, and economic participation.” Furthermore, the focus of these conflicts centered around “religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity” and from this he concluded, “Most contemporary conflicts are about developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and security”. These factors constituted the main pillars in his PSC model. Unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs as the above mentioned would eventually lead to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioral patterns where neither military means nor balance of power mechanisms were appropriate tools with which to address the conflicts. Instead, Azar suggested that the only means with which to manage these conflicts were through political and economic development, thereby reducing the insecurity of individuals and communities and meeting their basic needs.  

Azar acknowledged that these dynamics might not lead to overt or violent conflict and outlined those factors that constituted triggers for conflicts to turn overt and violent. Thus, he identified two clusters of variables as in-built mechanisms of conflict: communal actions and strategies, and state actions and strategies. 

In the following I will explore the genesis/dynamics and the triggers of PSC and weave this into a broader theoretical mapping.

4.1. Communal content

Azar’s first precondition for PSC is the role of communal content of a society. His argument is that if a society is characterized by multicommunal composition, which refers to politicized groups whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics, PSC will be more likely to arise. Two factors assert themselves in rising politically active multicommunal societies: 1) the colonial legacy, and 2) a historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors. During colonialism unique political landscapes were created where states were formed on the basis of the principle of “divide and rule”. The incorporation of a multitude of communal groups into one state produced a disarticulation between society and the state where the latter often was unresponsive to the needs of society.

Imposed integration of large numbers of often conflictual communities make nation-building a difficult task and fragmentation and protracted social conflict are more likely to arise. According to Ted R. Gurr this context helps breeding an ethnocultural identity for people with shared descent, cultural traits, and historical experience, and the more likely they are to define this identity in ethnocultural terms the more easier it is for leaders to manipulate this for collective action against a perceived enemy. Protracted social conflict occurs when groups see conflict as the only way to redress their grievances. Cited in Gurr “members of society usually resent their disadvantages and seek redress not only, or even necessarily, with self-interest in mind, but with passion, self-righteousness, and solidarity with their kindred”. According to Gurr, the incentives for ethnocultural action is a function of collective disadvantages, the loss of political autonomy, and repression. These emotions invoke a certain kind of victimization and marginalisation that political leaders have exploited in order to serve their own and their groups’ narrow interests. Azar and Gurr’s analysis, however, assume that groups are necessarily a fixed entity. It is argued here that groups, rather, tend to splinter into smaller factions along lines of class, religion, ideology, or power. This raises the question of the role of leadership, control, representation, and legitimacy in conflicts and the importance of addressing this issue in order to manage conflict. Moreover, the dynamics and interactions between different factions need to be addressed.

In recent years a debate has evolved around the issues of greed or grievance in instigating ethnic conflict. Paul Collier, an economist, argues that economic agendas appear to be central to understanding the outbreak of civil wars. While the grievance argument by Azar and Gurr, according to Collier, has dominated the literature on civil wars the greed argument and the economic dimensions of conflict have been largely neglected. Collier’s economic analysis tends to see “rebels” as merely criminals and “rebellion” as a form of organized crime where the discourses of grievance only serve as an appropriate cover up. The organization simply needs to align itself with a sense of grievance; otherwise it will fail as an organisation. As Collier argues, main grievances such as inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion. Rather, economic characteristics such as dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war. 

Collier’s argument rests on an economic analysis that categorizes greed versus grievance in an extremely dichotomous manner. It seems as if there is neither room in Collier’s analysis to understand the grey zone in between the two poles of grievance and greed nor room for seeing the coherence between the two arguments. On many occasions grievance may breed greed. A view expressed throughout this dissertation is the importance of acknowledging the grey zones and acknowledging that the picture of war is not that simple. 
4.2. Human Needs

The fulfillment of human needs is another precondition for PSC. According to Azar individual or communal survival is dependent on the satisfaction of material needs. However, it is not the deprivation of basic material needs per se that fuels conflict, but rather the unequal access to social institutions or the market, which allocate the means to satisfy such needs. Thus, access to social institutions and to economic and political decision-making is crucial in meeting basic human needs. The lack of means to satisfy those needs are often more noticeable in third world countries and are related, some would argue, to the economic strategy adopted. However, more often it is a consequence of not recognizing or accepting the communal identity of other groups. So Azar is arguing that the acceptance and recognition of identity may be understood as a basic developmental need. He points to Lebanon where denial of basic needs such as acceptance and security of communal identity led to conflict. Thus, security, lack of access to government institutions, cultural tolerance and acceptance of diversity are all parts of basic human needs as a whole. As it will be illustrated later with examples from Sri Lanka these are all closely related and cannot be understood without reference to one another.

As one of the pioneers within conflict resolution Burton’s human needs theory is of great value when analysing Azar’s PSC model. His theory is based upon the notion that all human beings have universal, ontological and genetic/generic human needs, which must be fulfilled. These basically constitute the need for identity, recognition, security, and perhaps, ultimately, the need for development. The Burtonian theory distinguishes between three categories: those that are universal in the human species, those that are cultural, and those that are transitory. These can be reflected as “needs”, “values”, and “interests”. Whereas values and interests may be compromised on occasion by individuals and at times constitute a scarcity, needs are neither negotiable nor a scarcity. Thus, according to Burton, true conflict resolution rests on satisfying these primordial needs, because if they are not, protracted, identity-based conflicts will occur. Whereas human needs according to Burton are the same in all cultures the satisfiers with which to fulfill these needs are not. Each economic, social and political system adopts different methods for the satisfaction of the same fundamental human needs and they may vary according to time, place and circumstance. As such, satisfiers may include, among other things, forms of organization, political structures, social practices, subjective conditions, values and norms, spaces, contexts, modes, types of behavior and attitudes. In short, satisfiers are individual or collective forms of being, having, doing, and interacting, in order to actualize needs. 

However, the demarcation between what are needs and what are interests may be in certain contexts rather blurred, as it will be argued later in relation to Sri Lanka. Groups that are trying to pursue their political, economic or social interests, but denied them through marginalisation and exclusion on the basis of identity, may mistake their interests for needs. An interest in obtaining power is not a basic need, but nonetheless a reason for why wars in many parts of the world continue. 

4.3. Governance and the state’s role

The upward trend in ethnopolitical conflict and the “creation” of cultural identities, animosities, or aspirations that have sparked these conflicts have to be seen, according to Gurr, as a consequence of long term global processes of modernization and especially the growth of the modern state and the state system. As Gurr argues: “state building almost everywhere in the Third World has meant policies aimed at assimilating national and minority peoples, restraining their historical autonomy, and extracting their resources, revenues, and labor for the use of the state”. The net effect of this has led to severe damage in many countries and increased grievances even further.  Elaborating on this Azar argues that the responsibility of satisfying or depriving people of their basic needs rests with the state. He argues that since most policy capacity in protracted social conflict-laden countries is limited by a rigid and fragile authority structure the state is prevented from meeting these needs. Demonstrated later in the case of Sri Lanka, this fragile and incompetent authority structure has severe implications for a country and the escalation of conflict. As in Sri Lanka, as in many other so-called weak states, monopoly of political power tends to lie with one communal group or a coalition of hegemonic groups, who use the state as an instrument to maintain power and serve narrow purposes. This not only threatens the distinction between the political sphere and the private sphere, but also creates a crisis of legitimacy, which exacerbates already existing competitive or conflictive situations. Thus, according to Azar the regime type and the level of legitimacy is directly linked to the level of satisfying basic needs. 

K. Holsti distinguishes between vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Whereas the former expresses the authority, consent and loyalty to the ideas of the state and its institutions, the latter refers to the nature of the community over which formal rule is exercised.  As such, both phenomena, which mirror state- and nation building respectively, are crucial in dealing with conflict. Northern Ireland and Israel are good examples of where vertical and horizontal legitimacy is very low as groups within the state have no trust in one another and there is no trust between minority groups and the state.

Policies of exclusion create internal scapegoats to deflect criticism and disloyalty, and thus, build a stronger basis for the “right to rule”. The examples are many: Nazi-Germany, Ex-Yugoslavia during the Milosevic regime and Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda. This creates a security dilemma for the state as state security and individual security are closely related. According to Barry Buzan in cases “where state and citizen are severely at odds, domestic disarray may threaten the coherence of the state in ways that make the concept of national security difficult to apply”. He adds, “Unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the minds of population, the state as a whole has no secure foundation”.  

Azar as well as Gurr, Holsti, Buzan and Burton talk about the state and groups as more or less homogenous entities. But whom do these entities consist of and what dynamics take place between and within them? In the light of the role of domestic elites and human agency in aggravating conflict, the following section will provide an added perspective to the PSC model.

4.4. The role of domestic elites: interaction between structures and human agency

Many journalists and policy makers have over the years blamed ancient hatreds for causing bloody, violent conflicts. Many scholars reject this view as too simplistic, a view, which does not present the true picture of why some conflicts become overt and why some are much harder to resolve than others. This debate between the origins of ethnic conflict is characterized as a dispute between the primordial and the instrumentalist/constructivist schools. 

Whereas the primordial school argues that the feeling of belonging to a common culture has been transmitted over generations and created a sort of historical continuity within which certain characteristics have been created such as myths, memories, values, and symbols the instrumentalists/constructivists regard ethnicity as a social construct that changes over time and space. This social construct is manufactured rather than given. In short, the primordial view regards structures and boundaries between groups as fixed and static and the instrumentalist/constructivists school contend that political elites play decisive roles in constructing and shaping ethnic identities and that their actions are mainly driven by economic and political self-interests. 

Both schools have their strengths and weaknesses. What is important to notice is that it is problematic to make sweeping generalizations about very different kinds of groups. The best option is to draw on both the primordialists and the instrumentalist/constructivists positions. As Milton Esman argues: “ethnicity can not be politicized unless an underlying core of memories, experience, or meaning moves people to collective action…Ethnic identities are also contextual, adaptable to and activated by unexpected threats and new opportunities…Thus every ethnic collectivity and solidarity can be located on a spectrum between (primordial) historical continuities and (instrumental) opportunistic adaptations”. The instrumentalist/constructivist view is supported by the so-called structuration theory by Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1979 and Giddens 1984), which aims to show how agency and structure are mutually constitutive such that action is only meaningful in terms of its relationship to structure, and the latter only exists in terms of human behavior. In addition, this relationship has to be seen in light of time-space relations and the concept of power. Two essential assumptions assert themselves in the structuration theory: first that violent conflicts form an aspect of social systems and secondly, that these systems are drawn upon and reproduced through the activities and articulations of knowledgeable social agents. According to Giddens the political and social sciences had paid little attention to this relationship and failed to relate action theory to problems of institutional transformation. Both had accorded priority to structure over action. Emile Durkheim emphasised that the characteristics of the social whole are different from those of individual agents. As such, society is external to its individual members and every person is born into an already constituted society where their actions are only part of the larger group. This view represents a structuralist view that Giddens with his structuration theory attempts at moderating and broadening into a more flexible position where human actions are as important as structure. 

According to Giddens it is important to uncover the representational systems, which underpin structures of signification and legitimation surrounding war and to identify how social agents manipulate these. Religious texts represent a good example of this interrelationship. These are manipulated so that they form a shared world of meaning for certain groups and in the end reproduce discursive structures of signification and legitimation. Furthermore, structuration theory argues that language has a performative function in that “language constitutes the public domain of political discourse and is the medium through which identity is constructed. Moreover, it is the medium through which contestations become manifest”. In short, symbols and articulations such as self-imagery and enemy images legitimize a violent discourse that refers to dichotomous representations of self and otherness, of the deserving and the guilty, of the pure and the impure.  In order to understand the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese, these factors are crucial.

The powerfulness of language and human agency is illustrated in the so-called speech acts, which demonstrate processes of securitization wherein the creation of an existential threat requires the power holders to act and special measures to be taken against this threat. However, it is important to notice that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is how the threat is being designated, what measures that are being taken to avoid the threat and how this designation is being accepted by a significant audience. As such, in some cases securitization becomes institutionalized, which in certain countries such as Sri Lanka breeds a violent discourse. Furthermore, there is a performative force to the speech act in the way it breaks the ordinary and establishes or produces a context that does not already exist. As Ole Waever argues “by uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it”. Speech acts become crucial to power holders when structures and their legitimacy weaken and the act becomes an ideal instrument to regain power. Under these circumstances a problem turns into a security issue whenever so defined by power holders. As illustrated later the securitization of society and creation of enemy images have been crucial tools in the hands of Sri Lankan power holders since independence. Rather than deconstructing enemy images into more positive images they have exploited speech acts and created a society wherein fear and animosities between Tamil and Sinhalese communities have gradually increased.

These built-in mechanisms of conflict have to be identified in order to manage the conflict. Therefore, it becomes crucial to analyze not only the perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experience of conflictual interactions, such as stereotyping and polarization, but also to identify actors, their actions and decisions, instruments available to them, overall structures and the interplay between these factors.

Despite the fact that both Azar, Burton and Gurr, and to a lesser extent Holsti and Buzan explore the dynamics between state level and individual/communal groups they do not elaborate on the important dynamics of human agency and how it expresses itself within domestic elites. Holsti and Buzan, especially, underline the structural characteristics of weak states, that is by looking at the patterns and features created and/or created by larger forces, including colonial legacies and the international system. Here it will be argued that structures as well as human agency are important features of understanding conflict.
 
4.5. Underlying conditions versus proximate causes

Brown distinguishes between underlying conditions such as economic problems, problematic group histories, and discriminatory political institutions, and proximate causes such as bad leaders (power struggles), domestic problems (i.e. modernization), neighbors (i.e. deliberate decisions by governments to trigger conflicts in neighbor states for political, economic, or ideological purposes) and neighborhoods (spill-over effects from flows of refugees or soldiers). The distinction between underlying conditions and proximate causes is not water-tight and Brown recognizes the close linkages. His focus on bad leadership and power struggles is interesting and he argues that this deserves more attention. As a report shows from Human Rights Watch, playing the ethnic card became a vital tool for leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman to remain in power, undermine stability and push countries towards a conflict spiral by dividing and polarizing people along ethnic fault lines. 

According to Ahmedou Ould Abdallah most civil wars are the result of incompetent political leadership including leaders of the majority, of the opposition, and of civil society organisations indicating a view on the causes of conflict that a conflict is more or less “owned” by the country’s national leaders. However, this view has given rise to criticism. Kakar argues that this “creates an inaccurate image of evil politicians and innocent masses” and according to Pandey it leaves “too little room for individual acts by ordinary people who engage in conflict behavior.” As Carolyn Nordstrom argues “there are no wars, no peaces, without individuals: someone stands behind every gun that fires a shot, behind every action to stem the flow of violence”. This has also been the case in Sri Lanka and therefore it is important to acknowledge the mutual interaction between elite groups and sections of society in instigating conflict.
 
Paul Lederach also stresses the importance of identifying key actors in conflict situations. In his pyramid model (1997) he looks at the broader implications leaders at the top-level, middle-range level, and grassroots level have in exacerbating conflict and their mutual interaction. Certain features assert themselves within the top leadership level: first, these leaders are highly visible. Publicity, visibility, and profile are essential means to consolidate and maintain their base of legitimacy. Second, by virtue of their high public profile, these leaders are often locked into positions taken in regard to certain issues and attitudes in conflict. The pressure to maintain strength vis-à-vis their adversaries and their own constituencies often constrain the freedom of political maneuvering and, thus, any wrong steps taken will threaten their career. Finally, these leaders are often perceived to have the ultimate power, but as the case of Sri Lanka shows, power does not always rests with the more visible leaders. Among the Sinhalese domestic elite religious leaders belonging to the middle-range level have far more influence than the President. According to Lederach the middle-range actors are far more numerous and flexible than the top actors and constitute the central link between the top leadership and the grassroots leadership. Thus, it is important to take account of the interaction that takes place between the different levels of leadership. 

In the next section I will outline the fourth cluster in Azar’s PSC model: international linkages.

4.6. International linkages

Endogenous factors are not the sole reason for the state’s ability or inability to meet the needs of society. Azar identifies two models of international linkages that have significance for the formation of social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state. The first model focuses on economic dependency within the international economic system where “such a dependent relationship not only limits the autonomy of the state, but also distorts the pattern of economic development, impeding the satisfaction of security needs. The second model focuses on political and client relationships with strong states, which implies that the patron provides protection to the client in return for loyalty. This involves some sacrifice of autonomy and independence and, thus, a change in policy priorities with implications for the needs of the public. 

Mary Kaldor talks about a new type of war economy, the “globalized” wars, which are dependent on local predation and external support. Referring to the debate on greed versus grievance Kaldor and David Keen both support the economic aspect of Paul Collier’s argument arguing that civil wars persist partly because of rational economic calculations.
These globalized wars are kept alive by exchange of arms, soldiers, capital, and mineral resources across borders, remittances from abroad, direct assistance from the diaspora living abroad and from foreign governments. Furthermore, in the 90s a debate has evolved around the role of international humanitarian aid in fuelling conflict or exacerbating tensions prevalent in the recipient countries. Experiences from amongst other places such as Sudan and Somalia show that support to war-torn countries risks ending up in the wrong pockets where it is being recycled via various forms of asset-transfer and black-market trading into military resources. The parallel economies that are being created as a consequence of this further undermine the role of the state, destroy local markets and exacerbate the grievances of the local populations.

Mark Duffield supports the view of Kaldor and argues that conflicts in the south are deeply embedded within a global political economy. Within this context the nature of power and authority has changed. Northern governments have on the basis of the institutionalisation of global liberal governance including democratization, the right to self-determination, and good governance found new methods and systems through which to reassert their authority over the South. The concept of good governance, in particular, has manifested itself as one of the strongest instruments with which to dictate to the governments of third world countries to take on more responsibility with regards to the fulfillment of their citizens’ needs. However, the concept has many meanings according to which international organisation that uses it and this has led to a strong debate on the concept’s validity. For example, the World Bank’s emphasis on public management without looking at the political structures of the state has set the scene for debate. Like Duffield, Adrian Leftwich takes a skeptical position to this interpretation of good governance and how it dictates what is best for third world countries. The World Bank’s policy expresses a technical or practical approach to good governance that is far too simplistic and naive. Rather, it is the structure and character of the state, in political terms, that determines the capacity for good governance, not simply the intensification of “institution-building”. National political leaders play an important role in this process, as they have to demonstrate political will and capacity to maintain and establish such principles and processes. However, power structures are not always that clear-cut as demonstrated in Lederach’s pyramid model. In Sri Lanka there are forces present that hinder the process of good governance, demonstrating a reluctance to change the present context. 

Sri Lanka: the merging of theory and praxis

In the following chapters the aim is to test the usefulness of the theoretical mapping outlined in chapter two. As such, Gidden’s structuration theory incorporates elements of Azar’s PSC model, Holsti’s concepts of vertical and horizontal legitimacy, Buzan’s concept of weak states, Brown and Lederach’s focus on leadership, and Wæver’s concept of speech act into an overall framework with which I will analyse the conflict in Sri Lanka.

5. Belief and intolerance

5.1. The Ethnic geography

Sri Lanka consists of a multi-cultural and multi-religious population of which two groups are the most prominent. The Sinhalese, of whom 90 % are Buddhists, comprise approximately 74 % of the population. They are said to be descendants of the Aryans of Northern India and speak Sinhala, an Indo-European language related to the language of Northern India. The Tamils, being predominantly Hindu and descendants of the Dravidian race of Southern India, represent 18 % of the population. Tamils speak Tamil, and have another cultural and religious tradition. Whereas both communities include a minority of Christians there is, furthermore, a strong Moslem community in Sri Lanka that comprises about 7 % of the population. On top of this mosaic, 6 % of the population belongs to an Indian Tamil community originally imported by the British as a plantation labor force. These are known as Estate Tamils and within the Tamil community there is a clear distinction between being an Indian Tamil or a Sri Lankan Tamil. 

The country is divided into eight provinces where the Tamils, generally, live in the northern and eastern provinces, Sinhalese throughout the rest of the country, and the Moslems mainly in the eastern and western provinces. Over the years several conflicts have evolved between Tamils and Moslems, Tamil Hindus and Tamil Christians, and Christian Sinhalese and Christian Tamils, but the focus here will mainly be the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese-Buddhists (hence this group will be referred to as Sinhalese). 

5.2. The creation of religious and ethnic identities

Until 1815, Sri Lanka had never been physically united. Rather, it consisted of smaller kingdoms inhabited by Tamils, Moslems and Sinhalese, respectively. After a bloody war the British managed to wrest control over the region creating greater interaction between the different groups. Despite distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics considerable ethno-cultural mixing took place in the pre-colonial period. Both Tamil and Sinhalese rulers pursued a policy wherein toleration towards their religious minorities was a priority. Consequently, Tamils and Sinhalese have lived side by side, reflecting a tolerance that is found in Buddhism and Hinduism. 

In an effort to build an efficient state apparatus that served colonial purposes, the British increased intercommunal competition and distrust by granting better jobs to Tamils and by giving them preference within the education system. As the 19th century was drawing to a close the process of group identity formation in Sri Lanka gradually began to take place. To begin with these group identities expressed themselves in a kind of unity across religions against a common enemy: the British. 

Gradually, however, in light of the colonial power’s failed nation-building attempt a significant Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalist ideology began to take form. Thus, while colonization created solidarity across religious groups it also sharpened divisions between Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Religious identities were articulated that soon became intermingled with concepts of nationalism and ethnicity. As the Sri Lankan anthropologist Chandra de Silva argues, religion as a mode of identity became linked to “being Sinhala” or “being Tamil”. This constituted an extremely complex process where a contingent of factors influenced this process. Gradually, Buddhists began to push for a distinct and separate religious and cultural identity where Tamils were viewed as “the others” and Sinhalese-Buddhists began to blame non-Buddhists and non-Sinhalese communities for the ills of Sinhalese society. As such, a closed pattern of formation within the Buddhist religious elite began to take form, which strongly distanced itself from the secular political pattern that asserted itself in Sri Lanka at the time. 

5.3. Buddhist revival

The Mahavamsa, the prototype Buddhist history written in the fifth century, constitutes an excellent myth charter for Sinhalese who wanted to stress their superiority and define Sri Lanka as a nation that rightly belongs to Sinhala-Buddhists. According to Obeyesekere the statements made in the Mahavamsa “is a terribly important development in Buddhist history because it produces a theory, or at least a rationale, for killing one’s enemy that contradicts the Buddhist doctrines and the Buddhist faith, and overthrows the primary Buddhist ethical postulates of compassion and nonviolence”. As such, the Mahavamsa plays a great role in understanding why Buddhism, a religion of radical nonviolence, could generate the extent of violence the world has witnessed in Sri Lanka, and it constitutes a strong basis for the creation of the politics of exclusion. As illustrated in chapter two this demonstrates how manipulation of religious texts can shape a meaning for certain groups and reproduce legitimacy for a violent discourse. 

As a leading figure within the Buddhists revivalists’ movement in the early 20th century Anagarika Dharmapala, born in 1864, was to have great impact on the ethnification of the political process from the 1950s and onwards. By abusing history and the old religious texts he and his fellow monks created a programme capable of generating an ethnic consciousness and mobilizing support for a political system dominated by that ethnic consciousness. This was possible because of the fear embedded in Sinhalese society of the 50 million Tamils living in the state of Tamil Nadu, in southern India. For this reason the conflict in Sri Lanka has often been described as a conflict between a majority with a minority complex and a minority with a yearning for majority status, or in other words, a minority with a majority complex. As such, this reflects a double minority factor. Consequently, Dharmapala undertook to reform both monks and laity and early in the century the “political bhikkhu” was born, a religious militant who would come to play an important role throughout the 20th century.  

5.4. The Tamil Response

Tamil revivalism came as a response to mistreatment by the majority. Some hold the argument that it in many ways was the mirror image of Sinhala revivalism as they both played a similar role in fostering “ethnic antagonism” and mutual intolerance. Like the Sinhalese historical justifications Tamils also regarded themselves as a chosen people attached to a holy land. Rather than being oriented toward Dravidian nationalism the Tamil response was centered around Tamil grievances based on linguistic and territorial rights and their sense of being oppressed. Until the 1970s the response was marked by a non-violent approach, but as the grievances were not recognised by the Sinhalese elites the Tamil response took a much more militant form. 

5.5. Conflict dynamics

In short, the distinctions between religion and ethnicity became extremely blurred in Sri Lanka. Despite the fact that the Tamils were never discriminated agaist because they were Hindus, but because they had a different language and ethnic identity, the Sinhala majority nevertheless invoked Buddhism as a basis for legitimizing Sinhala cultural and political superiority in Sri Lanka. When both Tamils and Sinhalese-Buddhists saw their position threatened owing to economic and political grievances, policies that favored one group over the other or deprivation or loss of an advantageous or privileged position, religion became a tool with which to regain the losses. Buddhist monks managed to create and manipulate the conflicting identity profiles between Tamils and Sinhalese, where a psychology of mutual suspicion, fear, anxiety and the ever-recurrent cycle of defense mechanisms asserted themselves very strongly. This kind of extremist religion did not occur in a vacuum or solely by the action of individuals; its course of development was likewise determined by the particular colonial setting in which it existed and under which structures were formed to awaken ethnic animosities. Furthermore, socio-economic changes, the process of modernization and failure to accommodate political demands are all factors that are part of that setting.

The above chapter confirms not only Azar’s first cluster of his PSC model, communal content, but it also demonstrates the usefulness of the structuration theory, a combination of the primordial and the constructivist views and the need for looking at domestic elites’ role in instigating conflict. By independence in 1948 a Sinhalese ethnocultural identity had taken form instigated by religious leaders and enforced by structures that merely supported this development. On the basis of a nationalistic and ethno-religious foundation politicians were, in the post-independence period, successfully exploiting this trend to their own political benefit, which had catastrophic consequences for the country.

6. Political and structural patterns of conflict: 1948-1988

In order to understand the present context and the negotiating efforts and peace talks during the 90s one has to consider certain events, such as attempts at peace making in 1957, 1965 and in 1985, and structures that have shaped the political process today. Three elements are important in this process: The military contest between the government and its Tamil military adversaries, mainly the LTTE; the negotiation of constitutional arrangements and power sharing with minority communities, or in other words: the devolution debate; and the establishment and maintenance of a “Sinhala consensus” and to a lesser extent a “Tamil consensus”. As Teresita Schaffer rightly argues: “the would-be peace-maker must manage all three aspects simultaneously and also find an effective way to communicate between parties that routinely misconstrue the messages they are sending and receiving.” These three elements will constitute important issues around which the following analysis will center. 

6.1. A lack of a constitutional framework

Despite the visions of a multi-ethnic state Sri Lanka’s first president, S. W. R. D. Senanayake and his British sponsors failed to create a new mass political culture that would make average citizens commit themselves to a process of democracy. The root causes of this failure stemmed from the provisions laid out in the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 and the Soulbury Constitution of 1947. Fundamental problems ingrained in both commissions were that they encouraged a political culture of division and polarization. At first, the latter constitution seemed to provide a certain degree of security for minorities. Section 21, subsection (2) and section 29, subsection (2) provided that Parliament would not have authority to confer upon any section of the Sri Lankan community advantages and benefits that would not be equally enjoyed by other sections of the community. Furthermore, the latter section also provided for a secular state where there was no express mention of any religion. However, in section 29, subsection (4) it declared that it would be possible to depart from any provisions contained in the constitution in the case of a two-thirds majority. In other words, if a Sinhalese majority was determined to transgress the rights of minorities they would be able to erode sections 21 and 29, subsection (2), at any time. As G. L. Peiris argues, “the weakness of that method, therefore, is that the protection of the minorities becomes very much dependent on the vagaries of political culture and political circumstances.” Given the fragile situation in Sri Lanka at the time, neither constitutions were able to overcome the combination of the majority electoral advantage that the Sinhalese achieved through the majoritarian democratic system of the unitarist Westminster model of governance, nor the “communalist virus” instigated by Buddhist monks. The Soulbury Constitution in effect completely evaded the problem of minority protection and rather assumed “the possibility of communal harmony without supportive institutional procedures.”  Without any robust and independent judiciary the Sinhalese post-independence governments endeavored to convert the Sri Lankan government into a government of the majority where denial of the political rights of minority groups, exclusionists policies and discrimination constituted the main elements of Sinhalese political culture. This system of governance and the politicians’ ability to exploit it are crucial factors in understanding the failure of nation-building and state-building in Sri Lanka.

6.2. Majoritarian dictatorship

Coming to power in 1956 on the basis of Buddhist values and the rejection of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) under the leadership of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike introduced Sinhala as the national language and Buddhism as the state religion. Emerging from the British period many with Buddhist leanings who argued that the Sinhala people and their Buddhist culture were in peril pushed for a “Sinhala-only” policy that recognised Sinhala as the only official language. This hostile linguistic rhetoric was implemented in the “Sinhala-only” bill from 1956. Furthermore, new citizenship laws stripped one million Indian Tamils, the so-called plantation Tamils, of their citizenship. This legislation facilitated the formation of ethnically based Tamil parties to resist discriminatory laws.  As a consequence of riots between Tamils and militant Sinhalese-Buddhists Bandaranaike met with the Tamil leader S. J. V. Chelvanayagam in 1957 in a round of talks that were to become known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact. That this contrasted the hostile stand Bandaranaike had taken the year before demonstrates how revivalism for Bandaranaike was more a convenience in order to win the election than a cause. The pact, in which Sri Lanka was acknowledged as a multi-ethnic society, where the Tamil language was to be recognized as a national language and the northern and eastern provinces were to be given a high degree of self-administration, was brought to an end by the same communalist and ethnocentric forces that Bandaranaike himself had encouraged and nurtured.  The leader of the oppostion party, J. R. Jayewardene called it a “betrayal of the Sinhalese” and took political advantage of the situation by “out-chauvinizing” the SLFP. As one observer recently stated in regard to the pact, if “the politicians had agreed to this in the 50s, it would have saved the country a lot of bloodshed” or as Stanley Tambiah argues, this agreement was “a great opportunity, fatefully missed, to settle the Tamil question for all time”. Radical structural reforms in the name of pluralism and a renovation of the popular mindset were required. By the end of the 50s this was not yet possible. 

Another attempt at solving the conflict was made in 1965 by the prime minister of the UNP government, D. Senanayake. This attempt became known as the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, but this also had to be abandoned due to opposition both from within and outside the government. In general, the post-independent governments were not willing to fully implement the structural changes, which could rectify the imbalance between the ethnic groups. This was mainly due to a lack of political commitment and widespread opposition from the Sinhalese-Buddhists who grounded this on fears and suspicion that any constitutional devolution would only lead to a separate Tamil State, which would soon be annexed by Tamil Nadu in South India.

6.3. Constitutional reforms 

The 1972 constitution was a turning point in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The declaration of Buddhism as state religion and Sinhala as the official language ignored the provisions outlined in the Soulbury Constitution on the protection of minority rights and contravened the Tamil’s main demands for a federal system of government and parity for their language. The constitution further institutionalized the concentration of power with the central government and rationalized the unitary state system. This was a decisive symbolic rebuff to the Tamils, impairing the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Tamil population. As such, the 1972 constitution constituted a major landmark in the process of national disintegration. Not only did Tamils reject it, naturally, but the opposition party, the UNP, also opposed it. The constitution represented the first republican constitution with a strong instrumental purpose: “Sri Lanka’s two “homegrown” constitutions were both designed as instruments for achieving political or economic goals.” Furthermore, the constitution was also responsible for the introduction of a strong centralised political structure with few checks and balances where enormous power was vested in the National State Assembly. Taking into account that the main Tamil party at that time, the Federal Party, campaigned at the 1970 General election on a platform of federalism, the introduction of a unitary state reflected a lack of respect for the Tamil leadership. Furthermore, it was a political maneuver that was ignorant to the fact that more and more Tamil youths were getting extremely frustrated with their political leadership’s non-violent approach.

The second constitution in 1978 only reinforced the provisions outlined in the first one: a concentration of power in one institution. In addition, this one was tailor-made to give incumbent President J. R. Jayewardene, UNP, absolute power. This expressed itself in the president’s complete immunity from legal proceedings, the power to dissolve Parliament a year after its inauguration, the ability to assign himself ministerial portfolios, and the power to legislate by emergency regulation. Not surprisingly, the authoritarianism nurtured by the first republican constitution was further consolidated by the second republican constitution. Thus, the principle of constitutionalism, sometimes referred to as liberal constitutionalism, and its focus on limitation of power and the protection of individual autonomy was not recognised by the Sinhalese political leaders.  

In short, the 1972 and the 1978 constitutions laid the framework for violent conflict. As Neelan Tiruchelvam argued: “Sri Lanka’s failure to lay down the constitutional foundations of a multi-ethnic society based on equality, ethnic pluralism and the sharing of power has exacerbated the ethnic conflict.” Consequently,  a new dimension of hostility between the Tamil community and the state developed where Tamil youths for the first time put forward a more radical demand for a separate state in the north. 

6.4. The Thimpu Talks and Principles

From the late 70s to the mid-80s when Azar held his problem-solving workshops on Sri Lanka the development of the conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese had taken a new and much more violent course. During the 70s Tamil militancy had sporadically shown its existence but it was not until July 1983 when the LTTE ambushed and destroyed an army patrol that a war started between the government and the LTTE. Consequently, riots began in Colombo in which thousands of Tamils were either expelled from the country or killed. This event paved the way for spiraling violence and militarization of the conflict. According to the Sri Lankan historian Stanley Tambiah the riots in Colombo were very well prepared by the government, and it was a classic example of how certain politicians were able to direct and manipulate the crowd to take up arms against a so-called enemy. In 1985 India brokered peace talks between LTTE and the government, which took place in the Bhutan capitol of Thimpu. At the Thimpu talks four principles were presented by Tamil negotiators before the government that have had immense importance for peace talks held ever since: 

a)	Recognition of the Tamils as a distinct nationality
b)	Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity
c)	Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation
d)	Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the Island as their country. 

The government’s response was as follows: “if the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the Government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country.” Consequently, the Tamil delegation presented a Joint Memorandum that included the rationale behind the principles: “the four basic principles that we have set out at the Thimpu talks as the necessary framework for any rational dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government are not some mere theoretical constructs. They represent the hard existential reality of the struggle of the Tamil people for their fundamental and basic rights.” In the light of these two statements it is obvious not only to see the gap of different opinions or perceptions between the parties, but also that the parties were operating on two completely different ideological and conceptual plans. Whereas the government was in their proposal nowhere close to the devolution of powers and decentralization and failed to recognize the ethnic conflict as a national question the Tamils’ proposals were according to the Centre for Policy Alternatives “anything other than an ideal, bereft of constitutionalism and legalism”. 

In short, in the mid-80s there was no meeting ground between the two sides. As Jayadeva Uyangoda has rightly put it, the prerequisites for peace were not prevalent: “behind the rhetoric of negotiations and the reality of failure was indeed one important dynamic in conflict formation and conflict resolution: the Sri Lankan armed conflict had not reached a stage of settlement that can be worked out through negotiations at all. It was too early for the Sri Lankan government to come to a compromise with Tamil militants, because the government still believed that the guerilla could be defeated by military means. It was too early for the Tamil militant groups too to abandon the armed struggle in favor of a negotiated settlement, because they had just begun what they perceived as a “liberation war”.” Another factor that complicated the implementation of the talks was the Buddhist clergy’s and the main opposition SLFP’s resistance calling for the postponement of the Thimpu talks until “terrorism” had been wiped out and Sinhalese settlers resettled in the north eastern part of the country. The four principles of the Thimpu declaration were to constitute a platform of dispute in all peace talks in the future between the LTTE and the government as these four principles constituted to the LTTE the only basis for a solution to the conflict.

6.5. Conflict dynamics 

As such, in the period from 1948-90 the conflict was driven by several factors that more or less fit into the PSC model. First of all, communal needs to address social, economic and political injustices committed against the Tamil people, including an unequal access to social institutions and to economic and political decision-making, verify Azar’s second precondition for PSC: human needs. Equally verifiable is the third precondition that Azar outlines: governance. The above illustrates that state actions and strategies to extend the power of the government and thus, of the majority, have increased the tensions between the groups. The Sri Lankan government kept making loose promises to the Tamil parties of meeting their needs, but none of the promises were ever implemented. Rather, a number of peace talks during the 50s, 60s, and 80s demonstrated that Sinhalese politicians had neither the political will to meet these needs nor the commitment to change the structures that eventually could fulfill Tamil demands. As Sathivale Balakrishnan argues the talks were dominated by quick-fix solutions with no confidence building measures. Even when there was the opportunity to change the structural framework through constitutional reforms and power sharing arrangements, the Sinhalese politicians got caught up in institutionalised enemy images of the Tamil threat, blown out of proportions by radical Buddhists, and in political power struggles between the two main Sinhalese parties, the UNP and the SLFP. This demonstrates the usefulness of Holsti’s concept of vertical and horizontal legitimacy of the state in a Sri Lankan context. Neither were prevalent in Sri Lanka in the mid-80s, which made national security seem more elusive than real. In line with weakened state structures, power struggles between politicians and would-be leaders within the Tamil as well as Sinhalese parties intensified and, thus, policies of inclusion/exclusion were used as political tactics to maintain or gain power. As will be illustrated in the following during the 90s security speech-acts made by government representatives as well as LTTE representatives became common features of the war, which legitimated their actions and the institutionalisation of violence. This demonstrates the usefulness of structuration theory as an analytical instrument. As such, in the period 1948-88 there were neither the structures nor the political commitment available to deal with the dimensions of the war, even at this early stage. The main failure at that time, and which would be stressed repeatedly during the 90s, was a culture of reaction rather than of prevention, which influenced the domestic elites’ approach to conflict resolution. 

7. Political and structural patterns of conflict: 1988-2002

According to Dr. Firth, Director at the Centre for Society and Religion in Colombo, the nature of the conflict has remained the same over the years. It is still a question of unmet needs on behalf of the Tamils that sours the relationship between the LTTE and the government. However, other conflict dynamics have been added, which have turned the conflict from an ethnic conflict into a conventional war between two warring parties. The changes are seen in the form of an increased militarization and polarization of society, an increase in destructive misconceptions, and also an establishment of what Firth terms big business of conflict in relation to political and economic gain. An argument put forward by Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake is that the war in Sri Lanka, as in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Somalia, has become the continuation of “economics by other means” and a way to acquire otherwise illegitimate profit, power, and protection.  From this a new elite has been born, such as armed forces personnel and their families who have grown rich through this hidden economy of corruption, which has been maintained by the so-called security situation. This hidden economy and the new identities created on the basis of this has provided the war with its own internal momentum, which confirms the war-economy arguments by Kaldor, Keen, Duffield and the greed argument of Collier discussed in chapter two. In a group interview at the University of Peradiniya, the economic factor was stressed as a more crucial element in the conflict than the ethnic factor. According to G. Samaranayake scholars have largely neglected frustrations based on lack of economic resources. However, this view gives rise to dispute and in another interview it was argued that the economic argument undermines the political factor, thus, disclaiming the domestic elites, especially the politicians, the responsibility for the malaise of the country.

Furthermore, the war has, in line with an increased militarization since the mid-80s, seen more destruction and violence at the expense of the population and, thus, become what Carolyn Nordstrom terms a “dirty war”. As such, a culture of violence has emerged at all levels of society that has hardly been addressed and has therefore allowed violence to take place in a vacuum of analysis and conflict resolution. 

In short, the conflict has taken on new dimensions since Azar held his workshops in the mid-80s. At these workshops focus was mainly on clashes over needs and values and how state actors versus communal actors reacted to this. The conflict has moved beyond this and taken on even more complex dynamics. According to Jayadeva Uyangoda “the conflict has moved far from causes that originally produced it; rather, it is the consequences that carry the conflict forward”. This is a point that Azar fully anticipates as he says that some “conflicts appear to start with one set of stated goals, primary actors and tactics, but very quickly acquire new sub-actors, new goals and new types of resources and behaviors”. This is an important point, which confirms the position taken in this dissertation that in trying to solve the conflict in Sri Lanka today one has to deal with the proximate causes such as bad leadership, the issue of territory, and economics which in recent years have become dominating issues in the conflict whilst addressing the underlying conditions such as security, identity and recognition. This does not negate Azar’s PSC model. On the contrary, the PSC model serves as an important basis for an understanding and analysis of how and why these consequences have arisen. 

However, while recognising Uyangoda’s point that new dynamics have arisen it is equally important to acknowledge the continuities in the conflict in the form of political and structural problems. As indicated in the last chapter the tensions within the Sinhalese group have been a major hindrance to peace talks and devolution plans to succeed since independence. As such, there has always been a hidden political power agenda that permeated decisions and behavior of the Sinhalese politicians indicating continuity in the conflict. In the late 80s, during the 90s and in the new millennium this hidden political agenda has seemed to reveal itself more openly and more ruthlessly, but not only within the Sinhalese group. Despite the fact that the LTTE since the mid-80s has served, or liked to see themselves, as the mouthpiece of the Tamil population there has taken place a bloody power struggle within the Tamil nationalist movement. This Tamil power struggle will be elaborated on later. These power struggles can overall be categorized as political culture. Thus, what effect has this political culture had on the development of conflict in the 90s? This question will be explored in the next section while also looking at the structural problems that assert themselves significantly as hindrances for peace in Sri Lanka.

7.1. Premadasa-LTTE talks

When Premadasa came to power in December 1988 Sri Lanka was deeply entangled in war on two fronts: against the LTTE in the north and against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in the south. The latter, a marxist-oriented Sinhalese youth movement mobilised around fear of Tamil domination, Indian imperialism and reduced social and economic conditions of the country, had led to powerful anti-state insurrections in 1971 and in 1988. The government’s security forces ruthlessly put both down and its leaders were eliminated. In 1988 the JVP commenced its campaign of destabilization as a result of the Indo-Lankan Accord of 1987. Negotiated between President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in order to bring peace to the island, the Accord left a 100.000 strong Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) in the Northern province aimed at destroying or disarming the LTTE. However, the IPKF did not achieve its aim but rather ended up hurting innocent Tamil civilians. When Premadasa took over power, an unexpected rapprochement followed between the government and the LTTE, and a range of confidence building measures were taken on behalf of the government. In early May 1989 peace talks began between the two parties where the role of the IPKF dominated the agenda. However, despite meeting on this common ground the government and the LTTE approached the talks with different intentions. While the LTTE’s aim was to force the IPKF out of the northern province, Premadasa’s aim was to take the sting out of the JVP’s terror campaign. Once in negotiations two other political concerns asserted themselves high on the agenda: 1) the repeal of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, and 2) the dissolution of the North East Provincial Council and the holding of new elections at which the LTTE as an official political party would be able to contest.

A closer look at these concerns is necessary because of their significance to the failure of the peace talks. The Sixth Amendment was an addition to the 1978 Constitution that had been promulgated in the wake of the 1983 riots to further appease the Sinhalese electorate. This safeguarded the unitary state and eradicated separatism by providing that; “No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka.” Furthermore, it prescribed extreme penalties for any person or group (LTTE) who contravened this provision and declared that no local authority, development council, etc. were allowed to support, promote, or advocate the establishment of a separate state, which clearly denied the LTTE from contesting for elected office in a Provincial Council or Parliament. 

In regard to the other concern, following the Indo-Lankan Accord (1987), the Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978 was amended to establish Provincial Councils and the central powers to be devolved (known as the 13th Amendment). This gave special significance to the North-East Province by recognizing the merger of the Northern and Eastern Province, subject to a referendum to follow within a year. Furthermore, the provision articulated “parity of status” to both Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. However, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)-led Provincial administration declared in its first policy statement on assuming office, “The Provincial Government is of the view that the devolved powers offered under the Thirteenth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution hardly satisfy the aspirations of the Tamil speaking people of the North East Province.”  In short, the Sri Lankan government once more demonstrated its shallow promises by systematically denying power to the province.

The LTTE also had their concern about the councils, but that had more to do with an intra-Tamil clash. They expressed concerns during the negotiations that the EPRLF-led administration did not represent the Tamil population and that their leader was a puppet of the Indians. Their request to Premadasa was for him to dissolve the councils and call upon fresh elections at which point they could demonstrate that they, the LTTE, were the right representatives for the people in the North East. Despite the serious legal and political problems inherent in these requests and how difficult they would be to accomplish Premadasa undertook to work on them. This approach, nevertheless, has to be seen in the light of Premadasa’s role as the representative of Sinhala nationalism and his repeated assurances to the Sinhalese people of never letting them down. Furthermore, Premadasa had in the past stoutly rejected the Tamil propositions outlined in the Thimpu principles, especially, the “traditional homeland” concept, for which reason it seemed doubtful that he would change that in the future. So what were his motives? Bradman Weerakoon gives several options, but the most likely according to him was that once Indian troops had left he would eliminate LTTE once and for all by turning the refreshed and renewed Sri Lankan forces on the weary LTTE. This Weerakoon supports on the basis of a statement articulated by Premadasa’s Deputy Minister of Defense soon after the war restarted in June 1990, “No half way house with me… Now I am going all out for the LTTE. We will annihilate them.” Whether this characterizes Premadasa’s personal motives is doubtful. Having served as Presidential Adviser to Premadasa and as Secretary for several Prime Ministers it is likely that Weerakoon’s view represents what he believed were Premadasa’s motives and should be his motives. Based on the letters exchanged between Rajiv Gandhi and Premadasa it seems as if Premadasa had a genuine faith in LTTE to readjust their demands in order to fit Sinhalese needs, thus, to give up their concept of homeland and the idea of a separate state. When the talks broke down in June 1990 after thirteen months of negotiating Premadasa was criticized for being too enthusiastic and amateurish. As such, it seemed more likely that a personal political agenda had influenced his motives as Premadasa’s presidential election campaign had been based on finding a suitable remedy to the major problems the country was troubled by. This only confirms the pattern of partisan politics that the whole conflict had been embedded in since independence. When things did not go his way he used the same strategy as his predecessors, the “delaying tactics” strategy. As Lederach notes when talking about leadership, leaders are often locked into positions taken in regard to certain issues and attitudes in conflict and this was the case with Premadasa. Furthermore, he was constrained by the Buddhist religious leadership, the middle-range leadership, to take certain decisions, which demonstrates the interaction between the different leadership levels. On the one hand, he had promised the LTTE to amend the 13th Amendment, but on the other hand, he was very reluctant to touch upon issues that would give space for his opponents within and outside the party to accuse him of being soft on the LTTE. By using “delaying tactics’ Premadasa might think he could win time, instead the LTTE lost their patience. According to Chandrakanthan these tactics and the power game within the UNP leadership were factors that made the LTTE loose confidence in the bona-fides of Premadasa despite the fact that Premadasa and the LTTE, according to Chandrakanthan, had far more in common than any other President before or after him.

Thus, Premadasa’s freedom for political maneuvering was severely constrained. The age old contradiction haunting all presidents trying to create peace – i.e. that the maximum political concessions the Sinhala parties were willing to give the Tamil parties never lived up to the Tamil demands – also killed all initiative in the Premadasa-LTTE peace talks. If too many concessions were made to the Tigers there would be a Sinhala backlash, and if too few concessions were granted to the Tigers then they would start a new war. Premadasa seemed to view the latter options as the worst scenario.  As showed later in the chapter there appears to be a strong similarity between the situation Premadasa was in and the situation that Prime Minister Ranil Wikreminsinghe is in today. 

7.2. The Premadasa-LTTE talks from a LTTE perspective

According to Dayan Jayatilleka critics, commentators and partisans of Premadasa have missed one very important point: the true intentions of the LTTE leadership, i.e. of Prabhakaran. Premadasa’s policy of Glasnost and Perestrojka towards the Tigers and the Tamils, in other words, breaking traditional enemy images and providing the LTTE with a human face, constituted a serious strategic and political threat to Prabhakaran and the Eelam struggle. Prabhakaran’s political existence was relying on war and enemy images of the Sinhalese threat, and by pursuing his so-called Glasnost strategy Premadasa deprived Prabhakaran of an enemy. Jayatilleka’s point is that “Prabhakaran did not (and does not) want his cadres and the Tamil people to get accustomed to peace. He did not want any real reform that could undercut the momentum of the Eelam struggle. Therefore he created incidents, situations of tensions, which preempted or aborted peace.” This confirms the powerfulness of the security speech acts mentioned in chapter two and the important instrument they constitute to legitimize a violent discourse. Prabhakaran had ambitions that were far wider than what the Sinhalese establishment understood at the time. These ambitions were illustrated when Rajiv Gandhi offered Prabhakaran the Chief Ministership of Jaffna and he replied, “but I already am the Chief Minister of Jaffna.” The Sri Lankan system could not give Prabhakaran the status he could achieve by military means. This somewhat critical view of LTTE also has to be seen in the light of LTTE becoming extremely impatient with and loosing faith in the Sinhalese political leadership after a decade of president Jayawardene’s game of “delaying tactics”. Consequently, they were not willing to see these tactics repeated again.

It has later been revealed that the LTTE leadership did not consider Premadasa a political partner in any serious sense and did not regard him as a strategic ally whose interests and base they should not harm. By assassinating one of Premadasa’s close political allies in 1990 despite Premadasa’s attempts at building confidence, the LTTE leadership demonstrated that there was nothing that prevented them from embarrassing him politically. As such, it seemed as if anything that came in the way for Prabhakaran in fulfilling his own political ambitions was eliminated. This also expressed itself in the LTTE’s relationship to other Tamil parties and the Tamil population in general. 

Since the early 70s the Tamil youth movements had practiced authoritarianism and strict obedience to the party line outlined by the LTTE. The effect of this was to weaken democratic ideals amongst Tamils. A new romanticism developed where political activists thought in terms of military structures, secret societies and undercover work. To have different opinions mounted to treachery and tolerance and open discussions were unknown phenomena within this context. By the mid-80s several trends came to the fore. First, competition between the different groups became more and more distinct. Militarily, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) had come to rival the LTTE. However, when all the Tamil groups united in 1985 to form the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) it seemed as if political and military rivalry belonged to the past. This turned out not to be the case. The formal unity of the ENLF was a façade and the “boys” (the Tigers) were not going to listen to the people. By killing opponents from other military groups, academics, and grass root activists in Tamil society the LTTE proved that it had a mind of its own – a totalitarian mind. This totalitarian mind also expressed itself within the LTTE leadership where a political power struggle took place from the mid-80s to wipe out those elements that either constituted a serious threat to Prabhakaran’s own political aspirations or the military aims of the LTTE. When Prabhakaran’s own deputy and chief negotiator, Mahattaya, began to follow the line of Premadasa’s peace song, Prabhakaran prevented this by going back to war and later tortured and killed Mahattaya. In short, the LTTE was incapable of tolerating any kind of pluralism or any sort of competitive politics. According to Jayatilleka they were clearly monopolistic and intolerant of any but themselves. This hegemonic leadership structure contrasts the one of the Sinhalese that was more dynamic and in interaction with the middle-range level leadership. The LTTE had no middle-range leadership level to account for, which is a significant difference in power structures between the two communities.

As such, on the basis of the intra-political power struggles that took place within the Sinhalese parties and the Tamil groups the same pattern as seen in the period from 1948-88 starts revealing itself. The conflict was not necessarily ethnic, despite a genuine ethnic problem, but an age old struggle for power by several competing groups. Tamils killed Tamils, Sinhalese killed Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan state supported the LTTE when it was in their interest to do so while the Indians armed other Tamil groups. Both parties to the conflict used the Tamil issue to ride to power while internally becoming more and more divided. In between were the victims of the conflict, the civilian population. All this shows the complexity of the conflict and the challenges Premadasa’s successors had to face.  

7.3. The Kumaratunge-LTTE talks 1994-95

In August 1994 the People’s Alliance (PA), consisting of a range of Sinhalese leftist parties and Tamil minority parties but mainly dominated by the SLFP, came to power under the leadership of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge (CBK), the daughter of the two former presidents after seventeen years of UNP rule. She won on a platform of installing peace in the island, which came as “fresh winds” blowing the country. This mandate for peace was further supported in November 1994 when she overwhelmingly won the presidential elections. As such, the people had spoken and Sinhala chauvinism had to concede defeat. Also the LTTE had to realize the changed attitudes amongst the Tamil population since a large number of Tamils, including Tamils in some of the conflict areas, had voted overwhelmingly in favour of CBK. Civil society groups, which had been dormant during the Premadasa era were euphoric, which culminated in huge peace demonstrations in the streets of Colombo. During the autumn 1994 the new government and the LTTE started talks, which culminated in a cessation of hostilities agreement. 

CBK’s way to power and peace talks had been turbulent and obstructed by the UNP who had done everything in their power to stop her from winning the elections. Not only using the tried and tested Sinhala-Buddhist card, which in the past had been a passport to gain political power in Sri Lanka, they also accused the PA of conspiring with Tamil parties to pave the way for a Tamil Eelam (These accusation were repeated seven years later by the PA against the UNP). In response, CBK labeled those that opposed her peace plans of being “war mongers” and in an interview with the BBC in Colombo, she accused the army of sabotaging the peace process which she had initiated. This not only reflected the army’s attitude, but also said something about CBK’s attitude to the peace process: like Premadasa, she made the establishment of peace her own political crusade. However, the process of negotiation with Prabhakaran took place via exchanges of letters, which appears to be a rather unusual medium to conduct negotiations with the purpose of solving a complex and protracted problem. Moreover, in sending her personal friends and not an experienced negotiation team of a senior political status, some argued that CBK was not prepared to concede to the LTTE the parity that they wished to have. Others argued that it is reasonable to presume that the President was making a genuine gesture towards the LTTE. Whatever the reason, what is of importance here is that the LTTE rejected her process as an act of bad faith. According to Weisberg and Hicks this is a very significant feature about parties in conflict that they frequently resort to dichotomous thinking where each party appears to consider the other party’s actions as a sign of insincerity. According to the LTTE strategist Anton Balsingham: “from the outset, Mr. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, was skeptical of Chandrika’s gesture. He felt it was a political ginmick to win the support of the Tamils and Sinhalese for the fourth-coming presidential election.” When CBK furthermore took various unilateral measures aimed at “easing the hardships of the Tamil People” without consulting the LTTE on the matter, the LTTE was not impressed. In the end, acts and gestures that were supposed to be acts of confidence building had become sources of suspicion. 

It soon became apparent from the exchange of letters that the LTTE and the government once more had fundamentally different agendas and that none of them were willing to deviate from their stated principles. This time the clash also expressed itself in the negotiation process where the government wanted to use a multi-track approach, that is negotiating simultaneously guidelines for a formal cease-fire, a programme of reconstruction and rehabilitation for the north and east and a political package to solve the ethnic conflict. But the LTTE favored a step-by-step process. For the LTTE this meant a “normalisation” of life in the north and east before political negotiations could commence thus arguing that the consequences of war needed addressing before discussing its causes. When the government and the LTTE were unable to meet on common ground the LTTE announced their withdrawal from the negotiation process and went back to war in April 1995. 

There have been many explanations offered as to why the process broke down: that there was no political commitment on behalf of the Sri Lankan government to bring “normalcy” to the north and east; that both parties used the period of peace to re-arm and re-group; that the LTTE was not committed to a democratic development in the north and east leading to the solution of the ethnic conflict; and that the government merely sought to put themselves in a more favorable light in relation to the international community in order to secure economic assistance. These reasons might all seem plausible, but one reason, which overshadowed the process once again, was the parties’ different conceptual understanding of the root causes of the conflict. This expressed itself in that the government on the one hand viewed the problem as an ethnic one, which could be resolved by addressing the grievances of the Tamil people within a unified framework of the state. The LTTE’s perception on the other hand was that the conflict had changed into a crisis between two nations, the Sinhalese and the Tamils. What Sinhalese politicians had missed out on was the shift in the Tamil political consciousness since 1983 expressed in a transformation of Tamil ethnic subjectivity from an aggrieved ethnic minority to a nation denied of its sovereignty through genocidal processes of the state. The paradigm of anxieties and fear had added another set of categories to the Tamil and Sinhalese political consciousness: sovereignty, unity, survival, rights, and territory. Thus, the survival of the Tamils as a community as well as a cultural and linguistic group was now contingent on the re-claiming of political sovereignty for Tamil as a nation and not merely as a people. That this transformation has taken place is confirmed by Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s political adviser, who in an interview with Tamil Guardian argues that the nature of Sinhala oppression, genocidal in intent and aimed at destroying the national identity of the Tamil people, changed the mode of struggle for the Tamil people.

7.4. A war for peace 

As a consequence of LTTE’s declaration of war CBK decided to implement a new government strategy, termed “war for peace”. While pursuing a military campaign CBK introduced a framework of constitutional reforms or the so-called “Devolution Package”, without the involvement of the LTTE, where extensive proposals for regional autonomy and power sharing at the centre were presented, as well as redefinitions of the constitutional framework. These proposals deviated significantly from the existing system of devolution introduced under the terms of the 1987 Indo-Lankan Accord and the 13th Amendment. The powers of the centre and the regions were to be reconstituted, with greater autonomy ceded to new regional councils. A fundamental amendment to be introduced was the re-formulation of the Sri Lankan state from a unitary entity to a “united and sovereign republic with a Union of Regions”. These changes would require the people’s consent through a referendum and the usual two-thirds Parliamentary majority. By January 1996 a legal draft of the Devolution Package was ready to be submitted for discussion to the parliamentary select committee, which in the end rejected the draft. Opposition came from three quarters: some sections of the Buddhist clergy, the UNP, and the LTTE. The former expressed their aversion to the package as “the biggest threat faced by Sri Lanka in…more than 2,500 years.”; the UNP rejected it and instead published the first installment of its own constitutional proposals, which assured that the PA government would not be guaranteed the two-thirds majority required for passing the package into law; and the LTTE described them as “irrelevant” and stated that it would not only be political suicide for the LTTE but also national suicide for the Tamils. Especially the former’s and latter’s statements express forms of speech acts where a securitization of society is being legitimized as a fence against the enemy. As such, the word security does not necessarily appear, but enemy images are nevertheless being confirmed and each party express fear of being victimized. Thus, emergency action is required to avoid such a situation culminating in a spiral of violence.

The proposals were the most far-reaching any Sri Lankan government had submitted. The thorniest issue, the merger between the north and east – a requirement for all Tamil parties and an anathema for the Sinhalese majority – was kept on the sideline to be dealt with later. As Lakshman Marasinghe argues the devolution package offered a structure of a unitary state within which there is a certain degree of devolution of power. As such, this contains a substance between what any government in Sri Lanka can concede to the Tamil people and at the same time maintaining its political legitimacy in the eyes of the Sinhalese majority. However, this structure did not even come close to the aim of Eelam. As Marasinghe indicates the structure that comes closest to Eelam is a confederation where two sovereign entities come together to form a state while each continuing to maintain its original separate sovereign status. This structure is, according to Firth, very similar to the Swiss Federation, which he envisions will be a structure that the Sri Lankan government sooner or later has to consider as an alternative to the present unitary state structures. According to Uyangoda it is difficult to envisage that the government will ever agree to such a solution. If it does it will risk greater political instability in the south, and likely its own downfall as well. Thus, these incompatible objectives constitute a serious threat to the present peace initiatives and a profound dilemma for Sri Lankan as well as international peacemakers.

These different perceptions produced weak proposals where substantive issues relating to reforms of the constitution were not raised. According to Schaffer the fundamental weakness of the proposals did not lie in the provisions, but in the background music. LTTE rejected them when the outline was publicly released and the Sinhalese community saw no reason to support it. Furthermore, the very acrimonious personal and political relations between CBK and Ranil Wikremasinghe, the leader of the UNP opposition, further spoiled the future implementation of the draft. Their relationship had deteriorated after the president criticized the “seventeen-year curse” of the UNP rule and made allegations against Wikremasinghe for playing a personal role in the violations of human rights of the period. Since the UNP had well over a third of the votes in parliament gaining two-thirds majority seemed as an impossible task for the government. In short, the lack of a “Sinhala consensus” in the Kumaratunge-LTTE talks and in relation to the subsequent war-for-peace strategy confirms that the Sinhalese parties have used over and over again the Tamil question to jockey for power.

7.5. Political culture in Sri Lanka

What has been illustrated above was another attempt at solving the conflict in Sri Lanka on the basis of devolution and power sharing between the majority and the minority. As all other attempts have shown this one also proved unsuccessful. There are two related reasons that have contributed to this failure: a) the inherent weakness of the proposals, and b) the resolve of the political leadership being undermined in the face of opposition from various forces. According to Jehan Perera there has to occur a total shift in the perspective of the country’s leadership before a positive outcome to the Tamil question can be achieved. Above it clearly appears that political leadership constitutes a crucial conflict dynamic and instigator to further conflict and, thus, why this variable is important to add the Azar’s PSC model. As a consequence of hardliners’ positions such as those of the Buddhist clergy, the PA and the UNP have more or less been forced to hold certain views in relation to the LTTE and constitutional reforms if they want to remain in or gain power. The devolution package of 1995-96 illustrates this political power struggle well and, consequently, why positive and progressive features in the package were lost or diluted. 

Based on events, structures and individual acts a political culture has over the years been created wherein politicization of ethnic identities has taken place. This culture is located in a conjuncture of state crisis. Uyangoda distinguishes between Sinhala majoritarian and Tamil minoritarian political cultures in Sri Lanka, which have evolved in opposition to each other during the formation of the modern nation-state building process. During this phase a certain level of exclusion has taken place confirming Gurr’s argument (2001), mentioned in chapter two, that animosities between groups or aspirations that sparked conflict have to be seen as a consequence of the growth of the modern state and state system. However, despite being exclusive, majoritarian and minoritarian political cultures are structurally inter-connected, since one needed the other for its own reproduction, sustenance and self-legitimization. 

The interaction between majoritarian and minoritarian political cultures and the positions taken to defend them has constantly been articulated by a variety of their respective ideologies and consequently created those political power struggles within as well as between the groups that have been illustrated above. Within both political culture political consciousness has been articulated through a particular paradigm of belief where a set of futuristic political concerns such as ruin, extinction, erasure from earth, no where else to go, etc. have been predominant. Thus, both Sinhala and Tamil nationalism have continued to evoke sentiments of communitarian insecurity, victimization and marginalisation,which are all factors that Azar touches upon. By recognising the role of political actors’ behavior and decisions as well as the structural factors as determinants in conflict Uyangoda confirms the usefulness of structuration theory. As such, none of these actors or factors have been able to build mutually rewarding and productive common grounds where upon to manage the conflict. 

Janice Gross Stein has examined the role of leadership and argues that leaders can learn how to change enemy images that can lead to a reduction in conflict. Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat demonstrated political learning through trial and error and developed a far broader and more differentiated image of Egypt’s adversary that triggered a process of conflict reduction. This political learning and willingness to recognize each other as equal partners and the need for power sharing are factors that have to be part of political culture in Sri Lanka. Wæver’s concept of security speech acts, however, seems to dominate the political discourse in Sri Lanka. During the period 1995-2001 speech acts have manifested themselves within a violent, hostile rhetoric expressed by both parties. The Sri Lankan government vowed not to rest until the LTTE “was exterminated” and CBK stressed at an election rally in 2001, “we are determined more than at any time in our struggle to wipe out terrorism and we will continue to wage war against the Tigers to a logical conclusion”. This, she said, was a necessary step in order to fulfill the needs of the Tamil and Muslim people. By including the Tamil and the Muslim people CBK attempted to construct a shared understanding across ethnic groups of what was to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. Consequently, Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslims were then all to be included in a security discourse, the aim of which was to destroy their common enemy, the LTTE.

7.6. Good governance

According to Tiruchelvam “Sri Lanka’s failure to lay down the constitutional foundation of a multi-ethnic society based on equality, ethnic pluralism, and the sharing of power has exacerbated the ethnic conflict”. Beginning with the devolution package there has in recent years evolved a debate on issues regarding the need for structural rearrangements, but as Rohan Edrisinha argues there is no political party in Sri Lanka that is truly committed to what is the cornerstone of a constitutional democracy. As such, Sri Lanka continues to retain the institutions and practices of the modern democratic state but, as Uyangoda argues, with an extreme degree of resilience within them. 

The concept of good governance is far from an alien concept in a Sri Lankan context. Political modernity introduced an ensemble of practices on which state-society political relations were to be governed and regulated. As previously mentioned this was already the case in the Donoughmore and Soulbury constitutions of 1931 and 1947. However, representative democracy developed in line with certain practices of violence at both national as well as local level and structures have legitimized violence in the name of democracy. As such, the transformation of democratic politics has given way to a regime culture of authoritarianism, which has developed a tendency towards monopolizing political power by virtue of a claim to a people’s mandate obtained at elections. This mandate is often mistaken by the political elites to carry out violently hegemonic practices designed to serve regime interests. This regime behavior originated, according to Uyangoda, in the 70s, continued during the 80s and early 90s and resurfaced in the late 90s emanating from the age-old competition and rivalry between the ruling party and the opposition. As such, such rivalry is in general considered normal in the institutional relations of parliamentary governance, but what is not considered good governance is the monopolistic use of the state apparatus by the regime in power to exercise personal authority in an open conflict with the opposition. By the end of the 90s this political culture of regime authoritarianism has become normal in Sri Lankan politics. This makes it, according to Uyangoda, a paramount necessity to reconstruct the Sri Lankan state and change the democratic institutions and practices that serve exclusive sectional interests. 

As such, Sri Lanka herself does not have any strong defenses against ethnic exclusivity in politics as these have been destroyed by the post-colonial nation-state. Rebuilding those defenses imply building a new political culture that can accept ethnicity in politics. For this purpose international assistance can in some instances be helpful. In 1997 a British-brokered agreement between the PA and the UNP attempted to make the two parties reflect on how they related to each other and to the Tamil question. Liam Fox, Minister to the Commonwealth in the last Conservative government in Britain, encouraged the parties not to undercut each other’s peace making efforts. As the Sunday Times reported: “the main purpose behind the agreement between the two parties is to refrain from undermining the efforts of the government in office”. In England the Conservative and the Labour Party got together on a common platform to solve the IRA issue. This seemed to inspire the Sri Lankan politicians when Liam Fox presented the details in 1997, but fifty years of political power struggles cannot be that easily erased at the stroke of a pen and shortly after a lack of a “Sinhala consensus” was once again apparent. Had an agreement ever been established between the PA and the UNP a third factor within the Sinhalese establishment, apart from the Buddhist clergy, could have been able to undermine the process, namely the army. During the years the Sri Lankan forces have grown as a strong anti-Tamil institution, which have, in certain circumstances, worked against its government. 

Other initiatives were taken in order to manage the conflict. In July 1999 the government initiated, with strong international backing, the 3-R framework (Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation). This expressed a commitment to strengthen Sri Lanka’s capacity in terms of policies, guidelines, strategies and mechanisms to manage the conflict. This framework corresponds with Azar’s propositions for conflict resolution and both acknowledge that peace makers, in order to create common ground, have to address societal needs. One of the most urgent sources of conflict in Sri Lanka, as in any other protracted conflict, is the highly centralized political structure; conflict resolution necessitates an understanding of the importance of decentralizing these structures.

According to the Dutch Embassy in Colombo the 3-R framework contributes to building common ground and a common language between all actors on the political level that supports the peace process. A notable feature of the framework is the inclusion of civil society organisations such as the National Peace Council, which will in cooperation with the government generate a form of “bridging social capital” between different ethnic and religious communities. However, the 3-R framework excludes the LTTE, which indicates the international community’s lack of insight into and understanding of the conflict and the Sri Lankan government’s lack of political commitment to the peace-and reconciliation process. In light of Leftwich’s critique of the World Bank’s good governance approach this framework merely seems to maintain this approach. If the LTTE is not included how can it be possible to change its political culture and structures? In sum, what Sri Lankan structures and the domestic elite seem to have formed is a polity that derives its means of political sustenance from a culture of reform resistance. 

In the next section the latest peace making efforts will be analysed in light of the structural and political problems outlined above. It will also elaborate on whether these problems have diminished now, thus, proving that Sri Lanka has broken the continuity of political power struggles based on a politicization of ethnic politics.

7.7. The latest peace making efforts 

In the post-1995 period the war between the LTTE and the government has been characterized by an unrelenting escalation of violence.  Since the late 90s the international community, and particularly the Norwegian government, has made a strong effort to facilitate a peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. At the elections in early December 2001 people in Sri Lanka gave yet another peace mandate to their political leaders but this time to the opposition party, the UNP, which was a strong indicator of the failure of CBK’s war-for-peace strategy. The pronounced set back that accompanied the PA at the elections clearly demonstrated that the people’s faith in their government had evaporated. From being the harbinger of peace in 1994 to becoming the war-monger in 2001, a predicate CBK had accused others of, CBK now appeared to engineer the downfall of the PA. The devolution proposals presented since 1995 were not being implemented and an increasingly fierce atmosphere asserted itself between the LTTE and the PA expressed in a personal clash between CBK and Prabhakaran. During the run-up to the elections, the LTTE made it clear that they supported the UNP and in a speech in November 2001 Prabhakaran expressed willingness to drop the Tamil Eelam demand in exchange for a genuine peace process. He called for the voters to support the parties advocating peace indirectly boosting the UNP’s campaign. 

Furthermore, CBK had failed in living up to the expectations of the people. This included transparency in the peace efforts and a fair distribution of economic gains among all sections of society. Instead what happened was an increase in corruption where those who manned the war machine gained even more, and a severe decline in the economy, which surprisingly all through the war had been fairly stable. By also accusing the UNP of making a secret pact with the LTTE in order to impress its electorate the PA’s tactics proved once more that the conflict was being used as an instrument to gain power. 

In short, there are a number of factors in the present peace process that we have to take account of: the relationship between the Sinhalese parties and the LTTE, the conflict dynamics within the Sinhalese parties and within the LTTE, the prospects for power sharing and devolution, the impact of the people’s voice and the international community and finally the state of the economy. These factors deserve to be elaborated on.

7.8. Lack of a “Sinhala consensus”

Despite a convincing victory at the elections in 2001 the powers of the UNP-government were clipped due to the fact that CBK had won the presidential election two years before, which divided the executive power between the newly elected parliament and the president. This has not only proved a severe handicap to effective governance it has also been a serious constraint in the present peace efforts between the Prime Minister Ranil Wikremisinghe (RW) and the LTTE. Both the UNP and the PA have had weapons available to overrun each other. Whereas the president can sack ministers at pleasure and dissolve Parliament after a period of one year from its inauguration in accordance to the 1978 constitution the Prime Minister can attempt to impeach or abolish the executive powers of the presidency. At present it is feared that the President will use her powers to embarrass the government and dissolve it before it demonstrates its capability to establish peace. According to The Hindu the PA is “working towards toppling the government” and in the Sunday Leader it was reported that a constitutional coup was in the offing. In the light of these allegations, whether they are true or not, Perera’s statement, “the outcome of this power struggle will determine whether the present peace process moves forward or not” seems very true, confirming the argument presented in the first chapter that one has to deal with the political problems in order to tackle the conflict.

The major issue at the peace talks in Thailand 16-18 September will be the setting up of an interim administration for the north and east. This is a contested issue and in relation to this opposition politicians have threatened to bring people onto the streets to protest against the concessions that the government might give to the LTTE at the talks. Perera suggests that rather than constituting a hindrance for peace the opposition parties should devote their energy on ensuring that the process and the talks are more transparent and the politicians more accountable in what they do and say. However, the state of the economy constitutes a serious threat to RW’s peace efforts and the threat will not only come from the opposition parties, but from the population as well who have great expectations in him to relieve them of their suffering. 

In short, whereas the Sri Lankan government was confronted by two wars in the late 80s, one in the north and the other in the south of the country, a similar pattern is reflected today. However, whereas the one against the LTTE is set aside, the political contest between the UNP and the PA, moves on with continued strength in parliament.

7.9. The relationship between the Sinhalese parties and the LTTE

The LTTE’s rapprochement to the UNP constitutes an interesting change in the relationship between the Sinhalese majority and the LTTE. According to Perera the LTTE’s new quest for peace can be explained in light of the global clamp down on terrorism in the wake of September 11. This is supported by Kumar Rupesinghe who argues that the LTTE is keen on demonstrating to the international community that they are not a terrorist organization, but an organization fighting for the rights of their people. On top of that, both parties have reached a hurting stalemate where a continuation of the conflict will only lead to more losses on both sides. The LTTE as well as the government has realized that neither side can win on the battlefield. This leaves a political solution as the only option, which provides a “ripe moment” for political negotiations to commence. 

On December 24 2001 the rapprochement materialized in a LTTE proposal on entering a cease-fire with the newly elected UNP-government. In April 2002 Prabhakaran spoke at his first news conference in 12 years where he, for the first time, suggested that he would be willing to settle for something less than full independence. He added, “If the government offers a substantial solution that addresses the demands of our people, then we will seriously consider such an offer”. This change in attitude on behalf of the LTTE leader is paramount to how the process will unfold in the future. In line with the heightened tensions between the PA and the UNP the LTTE has declared that it is only prepared to negotiate peace with the UNP-government. Thus, should the President decide to dissolve the government as she has threatened to do then the risk of war seems realistic.

According to Perera “there is a reason to believe that the larger part of the success of the peace process up to now has been the positive relationship between the top leaderships of the government and LTTE”. Since the initiation of the cease-fire the exchange of words between the UNP and the LTTE has been surprisingly positive, which stands in stark contrast to the bitter exchanges that took place between the former government and the LTTE. This illustrates the change in policy that the RW government is pursuing. Rather than a policy of confrontation the present government appears prepared to work with and through the LTTE. As Firth mentioned the good relations are also a result of seven years intense confidence-building between RW and Prabhakaran while being in opposition to the PA government. This signifies a change in political culture and thus a break with past records of confrontational politics. However, critical voices also assert themselves that there appears to be a lack of transparency and to some extent of political honesty in the manner in which the cease fire agreement, the so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), has been rushed through. This was explored in the interview with Firth where he expressed doubtfulness about the motives of RW. To what extent is he pursuing peace for the sake of the people and not for the sake of maintaining his position? This question cannot be answered now and only time will show whether the UNP government has been capable of building a political and institutional framework wherein conflict resolution constitutes the backbone.

The international community has an important role as facilitator in the process and mediator between the parties and at present both parties have expressed confidence in Norway as an impartial third party, which is an important prerequisite for its success. However, it is questionable as to whether Norway and the international community will be able to tackle the complexity of the conflict and persuade the LTTE and the Sri Lankan political elite to move towards realistic compromises, outside the framework of narrow demands and negotiating stances. A concern to Kethesh Loganathan is that the government and the LTTE are merely playing to the international “gallery” without addressing each other on substantive issues and that the peace process ends up as a contestation for international support for their respective causes. Thus, international support and efforts at implementing good governance cannot be a durable solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka if there is no national consensus and political commitment to the process. As such, the burden lies within Sri Lanka in shaping the contours and content of an agreement that can provide all Sri Lankans with long lasting peace.

7.10. A Tamil consensus?

The LTTE has only in vague terms expressed satisfaction with less than independence, but it is very hard to define what this means. Furthermore, the LTTE leader has not officially given up his demand for a separate state called Eelam. However, in a recent survey carried out by Social Indicator (SI) only 4.3 % of the residents of Jaffna equate peace with a separate state. Thus, while respecting peace and acknowledging a political solution to the conflict Prabhakaran also has to face up to democratic politics and the voice of the Tamil people. This might turn out to be a serious hindrance for peace since Prabhakaran will measure his chances for power and his own personal security in the final outline for peace. 

Officially the Tamil political parties seem today to uphold a common front in regard to Tamil demands and the peace process, which contrasts with the internal combat of previous years. This Tamil consensus has culminated in an agreement that gives the LTTE the absolute power to express the demands of the Tamils while the other Tamil parties have promised to refrain from engaging in politics until the government and the LTTE have worked out an acceptable solution to the Tamil problem. Some would argue that this agreement is a result of the LTTE systematically putting pressure on other Tamil parties and forcing them into an agreement. In light of the Tamil past this seems very plausible, but one also has to take account of other dimensions such as the motives of the Tamil parties in entering such an agreement. As it is argued in the Midweek Mirror, the Tamil parties’ agreement also has to be seen in light of the political benefits that may accrue to them from striking a deal with the LTTE. In short, according to Midweek Mirror it seems to be the conventional wisdom amongst the Tamil parties that such an agreement might improve their political fortunes in time for the next general elections. However, the agreement put some of the parties such as the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) in a somehow difficult situation as they have generally been supportive of the PA government policy on the war and peace process and has since 1990 fought alongside the Sri Lankan Army against the LTTE. 

Thus, the Tamil consensus is far from strong. The EPDP, expressing a claim to power sharing within the UNP-proposed interim administration for the north-east, and the People’s Liberation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), having been “persuaded” to join the Tamil alliance, are both indicators of the political turmoil that might be expected in the north-east in the future. Furthermore, the implementation of an interim administration has to deal with yet another issue, namely the heterogeneous nature of the Eastern Province, which consists of an equable number of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims who all have different reservations about a merger of the northern and eastern province. As a civilian sarcastically remarked, “If the Northerners thought that they could consolidate their political freedom and security at the expense of the East, they are going to be sadly mistaken”. In other words, the LTTE has to share the cake with many contenders of not only Tamil origin but also Sinhalese and Muslim. The latter group, especially, has demonstrated unwillingness to obey the LTTE. Recent riots in the Summer 2002 between Muslims and LTTE cadres in the East underline the importance of the Muslim dimension in the peace negotiation, which so far has been severely neglected by the government and the LTTE.

The ethnic riots and the latent dissension within the Tamil nationalist movement reveal the inner complexity of Tamil nationhood. As the self-determination project is gradually being formed and implemented differences arise where regional concerns and local political, economic, cultural, ecological and other interests constitute obstacles in the second phase in the process of Tamil nation-building. As Raj Gonsalkorale points out, the attitude has changed amongst the Tamil population from blind obedience to the LTTE to a more critical attitude and the ethnic issue which gave rise to the growth of the LTTE during the 80s and 90s has no longer the same validity. It has to be considered to what extent the LTTE and the other Tamil parties are driven by power or whether a genuine desire to address the issues, which have confronted the Tamil community, is prevalent. In a survey carried out by the National Peace Council it is revealed that many Tamils and Sinhalese perceive the ethnic issue as something more about politics and power than culture. The survey further states that asymmetrical devolution where the LTTE becomes the arbitrary ruler is what neither Tamils nor Sinhalese envision for the future.

As such, the above demonstrates that there is a need to revise the concept of political culture within a Tamil context. Rather than focusing solely on majoritarian versus minoritarian political culture, one also has to look at the political culture within the respective political cultures. At the moment most analyses focus on the problems inherent within the majoritarian political culture, but in order not to create another war in the north and east it is crucial also to look at the problems that assert themselves within the minoritarian political culture.

7.11. Conflict dynamics

In short, the above chapter demonstrates the negative impact political and structural factors have had and still have on peace making in Sri Lanka. Significant for the period 1988-2002 is the more and more ruthless intra-group political power struggles. As the 90s drew to an end it became clear that the quest for political survival within the parties constituted one of the main hindrance for peace. However, with the presence and active participation of the international community, a changed international context after September 11, a strong mutual trust between RW and Prabhakaran, and the general air of cautious optimism that sweeps the island these problems are increasingly being dealt with. 

In order to illustrate the impact of political and structural problems Azar’s PSC model, Giddens’s structuration theory, Lederach’s pyramid model, Brown’s concept of bad leadership and Wæver’s and Buzan’s concept of security speech acts have been presented as an appropriate theoretical basis. Leaders of both parties have in the past twelve years exploited the Tamil question and issues such as security, recognition and identity to their own political benefit. Their decisions and violent actions have been legitimized by virtue of constitutional structures, security speech acts and by the creation of enemy images and exclusionist policies. This is rooted in the majoritarian and minoritarian political cultures that developed during colonialism and during the state-and nation-building process of the post-independence period.

In recent years the LTTE’s demands for security, recognition and identity are gradually being met culminating in the present peace talks in Thailand where they are participating as a de-proscribed and recognized representative for the Tamil people. Moreover, their power position has been more or less secured through the establishment of an interim-administration, which they are to govern. This demonstrates the gradual fulfillment of the LTTE demands illustrating the distinction between the political interests of the LTTE/Prabhakaran and the needs of the Tamil population. Within this context the PSC model appears as a valuable framework with which to understand the distinction between needs and interests. 

So far, incompatible objectives have been one of the main hindrances for peace. In light of the new government and especially of RW this incompatibility gradually seems to appear less clear. However, the incompatibility and the partisan politics between the sinhalese parties is still growing and the Tamil consensus is slowly disintegrating. These factors can also in the future prevent peace in taking root. In short, there is a need of a theoretical mapping that is broad enough to encompass the complex spectrum of the Sri Lankan conflict and to determine what role structural and political factors play. The mapping outlined in the second chapter approaches the complex relationship between needs and interests, which is essential in order to understand the conflict.
 
8. Conclusion

The conflict in Sri Lanka reflects a complex pattern of inter-related causes and underlying conditions. Thus, in light of this it has been argued throughout the dissertation that structural and political factors such as power-sharing and intra-group power struggles have to be addressed whilst dealing with underlying conditions such as identity, security and recognition. This pattern of conflict dynamics can not alone be explained on the basis of Azar’s PSC model since this model overlooks the significant role played by domestic elites in instigating or worsen conflict. Furthermore, the model tends to neglect the heterogeneous character of the elites involved in the conflict assuming that the conflict is merely a conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese. Thus, despite serving as an excellent tool with which to analyse the underlying conflict dynamics such as inequality and lack of power-sharing between Sinhalese and Tamils Azar’s model does not cover all aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict. This confirms the hypothesis of the dissertation and, hence, why a broader theoretical framework is needed. On this basis Giddens’s structuration theory, Lederach’s pyramid model, Buzan’s and Wæver’s concept of security speech acts and Brown’s concept of bad leadership constitute valuable supplements to the PSC model. Together they form a theoretical mapping that is essential in order to understand conflict dynamics in Sri Lanka. 

The theoretical mapping has been applied two periods: 1948-1988 and 1988-2002 from which we can establish that structural and political factors have constituted a current obstacle to peace. By independence in 1948 a Sinhalese ethnocultural identity had taken form instigated by religious leaders, enforced by colonial political structures that supported such a development and maintained by local politicians who saw a potential to cultivate their own political interests. Because of this development, issues such as identity, security and recognition were never properly dealt with. Sinhalese politicians were never willing to nor capable of meeting the needs of the Tamil people for fear of the Buddhist clergy, of loosing power and because of a genuine belief in Sinhalese superiority. Intra-group feuds arose in the post-independence period where the Tamil question was exploited as a means to gain or stay in power between the two competing Sinhalese parties, the SLFP and the UNP. In short, this confirms the importance of the first three preconditions in the PSC model: communal content, human needs, and governance. The fourth, international linkages, as a conflict dynamic seem to correspond to the role played by the concepts of good governance and democratization. If these concepts are implemented, as envisioned by the World Bank, good governance and democratization efforts can do more harm than good to the peace process.

In a mutual interaction with Azar’s preconditions for conflict structural and political problems have dominated any attempt at peace making in Sri Lanka. From the peace talks in 1957 and 1965 to the peace talks in the 90s and the present peace process between the UNP government and the LTTE issues such as devolution, power struggles between and within the groups and constitutional reforms have dominated the political agenda. These problems are to be analysed in light of unmet needs, structures and human agency, behaviors and decisions, contrasting perceptions, incompatible objectives and a divergent political consciousness that all reflect a multi-faceted and complex interplay of dynamics and actors. These factors all rest in two political cultures, the majoritarian and minoritarian political cultures that express themselves in regime authoritarianism, enemy images and exclusionist policies, reform resistance and bad leaderships.

As such, some conflict dynamics and patterns have changed since independence. As it was argued the war has created a big business that few influential people live of and new identities have been formed on the basis of this new economy, which supports the war-economy arguments by Kaldor, Duffield, Keen and Collier. However, the political and structural conflict dynamics have remained the same. The latest peace making efforts merely confirm that political power struggles are stronger than ever between the two Sinhalese parties, the SLFP and the UNP, and that the so-called Tamil consensus is far from firm. These intra-group struggles, the problems of security, recognition and identity of the Tamil people and the recent riots between Muslims and the LTTE in the Eastern Province have to be properly addressed by the Sri Lankan domestic elites and by the international community in order to create long term peace. The latter actor plays a vital role in facilitating peace and putting pressure on both parties to the conflict to lay down a constitutional framework that is based on equality, ethnic pluralism, and power-sharing in the north-east as well as in the rest of the country. 

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