The International Classification of Diseases (in 2 volumes: 1356 pages) is a list of diseases which are codified by numbers, i.e. each disease is assigned a specific number. It is intended only for physicians. When physicians make a diagnosis, they place in their notes the number of the disease. This system of classifying diseases, originating with the World Health Organization of the United Nations, is now accepted by all physicians in the member nations of the United Nations. It is essential that the right number accompany the right diagnosis.

The reason why this topic is discussed is that Mr. Justice Boudreault made strange and logically unacceptable comments regarding this classification. On page 195 of the Judgment, he writes:

The matter of numerous errors in classification numbers (codes) has appeared unimportant to the Tribunal. The evidence has revealed that the numbers, placed by non-medical staffs, serve only a statistical purpose.

Of course for the Tribunal numerous classification errors are not important, because these errors clearly demonstrate the psychiatrists' incompetence or dishonesty.

However, when the Classification is convenient for him, or rather for my adversaries, he recites meticulously the full number and diagnosis of a disease -- from the same "unimportant" Classification! For example, on page 46 of the judgment he treats the International Classification in a different way when he quotes an extensive definition of diseases with the ICDA code numbers. But, lo and behold, the judge did not quote the diagnosis "schizoparanoid", the "diagnosis" which was not proved and for which I was tortured for six months.

The Judge's interpretation of the "numerous errors" and "evidence" from them is unacceptable by standards of common sense. He invented as ostensible "evidence" that the "numerous errors in classification" in medical records were "placed by non-medical staffs". Therefore, if there were errors in classification, it is not the psychiatrists' fault but that of the nonmedical staffs! Such claims were not even made by the psychiatrists themselves.

This is one of many obtrusive examples of the judge's doublethink reasoning.

First and foremost we presume -- and we presume also that the judge knows the same -- that non-medical persons are neither authorized nor trained to make and codify diagnoses. Therefore, for nonmedical persons it would be absolutely impermissible to identify and code the diagnoses, and in any case they would be unable to do so. Second, the numbers (codes) in medical records are handwritten or the typed notes are endorsed only by the psychiatrists, which we can easily establish by just casting a glance at the medical records. Contrary to the judge's opinion, the psychiatrists are solely responsible for the "numerous errors". The judge's reasoning is inaccurate, to say the least. Besides, we know, and I am certain that the judge knows as well, that statistics are of paramount significance in everyday life: science, economy, politics, and the administration of justice.

In many ways the psychiatrists were caught in traps of their own making, but the judge as a follower of George Orwell and perhaps using the power of magic, was always able to save his "officers of the court" -- lawyers, and "honest, diligent and competent" psychiatrists from disgrace.

How could a judge say that medical regulations are strictly for archivists? This is merely one of many examples indicating that Mr. Justice Boudreault did not write his judgment with logical premises.¹⁹⁴ The fact that the International Classification of Diseases (ICDA) is accepted by World Health Organization of United Nations speaks for itself. It is only intended for physicians from all over the world, certainly not archivists or anybody else. And, for statistical or other purposes, the way the codes were placed supports my assertion that the psychiatrists involved are incompetent.

The statistical information is a very important and useful instrument for communication among the physicians and also between the physicians and the WHO. On the basis of these statistics they plan and implement various medical actions (preventive or curative). I am acquainted with this subject, because, as a physician in former Yugoslavia, I used the same Classification (ICDA) in my every day work.

The following is found in the Introduction of the ICDA, page xii:

Classification is fundamental to the quantitative study of any phenomenon. It is recognized as the basis of all scientific generalization and is therefore an essential element in statistical methodology. Uniform definitions and uniform systems of classification are prerequisites in the advancement of scientific knowledge. In the study of illness and death, therefore, a standard classification of disease and injury for statistical purposes is essential.

It is not surprising to see how whimsically the judge used his judicial and legal discretion! We have already seen how the judge reversed in a simple way the medical records -- the best reliable evidence according to the law and the judge's own references -- into unreliable "aide-mémoires"! We have also seen that the judge reversed the "accablante", i.e. disgraceful evidence, mentioned in his Judgment,¹⁹⁵ into honourable deeds done by "honest, diligent and competent" psychiatrists. Now we have a regulation published and promulgated by the World Health Organization (WHO) of the United Nations, which Mr. Boudreault discredits, too, in a very simplistic and unreasonable way. That is why I wrote at the beginning that some judges need to be judged.

Hoping that these lines will be read by some judge, even Judge Boudreault,it would be helpful to quote from Black's Law dictionary -- Fifth Edition on judge's discretion.

Judicial and legal discretion. These terms are applied to the discretionary action of a judge or court, and mean discretion bounded by the rules and principles of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that of the law. The exercise of discretion where there are two alternative provisions of law applicable, under either of which court could proceed. A liberty or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is fair and equitable under the peculiar circumstances of the particular case, guided by the spirit and principles of the law. Manekas v. Allied Discount Co., 6 Misc.2d 1079, 166 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369.