Messerschmidt, Manfred. “June 1941 Seen Through German Memoirs and Diaries.” Operation Barbarossa (1993, Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher) ed. Joseph L. Wieczynski

German Presumptions.

The two important characteristics of the Soviet Union assessed by the German strategists were 1) the Intentions and 2) the Capabilities. The former is, obviously, useless without the latter. Yet, the main goal of our modern assessment is to establish whether the sixty year old German assessments about the Soviet intentions are similar to the ones advocated by modern revisionists like Suvorov, Topitsch and others.

Soviet Intentions.

It is important at first to discuss the Soviet intentions and war aims, or more correctly, how the Germans viewed and understood them. Central to the Soviet foreign policy is Stalin’s speech of May 5, 1941. According to revisionists it was an open revelation of the plan to attack westwards. Careful analysis does not support this view. In fact, when in mid-June 1941 Marshal Timoshenko proposed to order full preparation of the western districts, Stalin’s reaction was a surprising one: “This would mean war, you understand?” (215, Kirsin) Today there is plenty of evidence that Stalin was interested to avoid a war in 1941, as a war later on was more appealing since the Red Army would be better prepared. His speech, therefore, had more of a morale-lifting purpose in the view of his full understanding of the massive German deployment on the border. (223)
In any case, what did the Germans make of this speech back in May 1941? Well, the translated version of his speech that was available to the German embassy read as follows: “Stalin said, the Soviet Union was presently not ready for war with Germany and therefore looked to gain time.” (223)

What did the Germans think of the Soviet expansionism in general?

German General Staff operational planning:

Military Attache General Kostring believed that “an aggressive expansionist military policy of the Soviet Union was not likely to be implemented in the near future.” (216)

General Tippelskirch, Oberquartiermeister in the General Staff of the Army believed that “for political and military reasons it was highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would wage a war with Germany in near future.” (223)

“The German General Staff concluded that the Soviet deployments were defensive because of their ‘schematic array’ of mobile forces in the rear, which according to the army, were meant to counter German Panzer divisions once they had pierced the Russians defenses.” (219)

The German opinion on Stalin’s intentions in Bessarabia was the opposite of the one advanced by Suvorov. Stalin’s moves in Bessarabia were seen only as “protection of approaches” by “Fremde Heere (Ost).” (216)

Most importantly, Marck’s and Lossberg’s plans of the invasion assumed Soviet deployments to be not for offensive purposes, which would mean that at the beginning of the war the Germans would have a necessary numerical superiority (as it, in fact, had happened).

“At no time in 1940-41 had this planning been based on the assumption that the Wehrmacht might be forced to counter a Russian attack.” (216)

Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel General Halder on Soviet Intentions and Capacities:
*Soviet deployments as defensive (Zossen, June 4) (226)
*“He [Halder] did not think that a large scale offensive by the Red Army was probable.” (226)
*“The Russians could not, he said, effectively counteract the German attack because of a lack of large operational reserves.” (June 24)
Red Army prepared for a general defense, judging by the logistical bases in the region.

“Interestingly, what German propaganda in 1941 and representatives of the preventive war idea today put forward as proofs of Soviet war intentions was seen by Halder before and after the German attack as indications of Soviet defensive preparations. There is no doubt about the fact that neither Hitler nor the military leaders feared a Soviet attack in 1941.” (226)

Germans’ Conclusion.

Red Army’s strategic mission as understood by the Germans:
*defense of the territory of the USSR
*in the case of advantageous developments shift actions to enemy territory. (219)
In other words, as we now know, Germans understood the Soviet “Answering Strike” strategy largely correctly.

Soviet Capabilities.

Preparation:
*Hardware: supplies, weapons
*Software: training, leadership, plans
*Deployment: ready to unfold or too deeply echeloned?

In military terms the army should be adequately well supplied with weapons, ammunition, trained and commanded regardless its defensive and offensive mission. Therefore, if the Red Army was not prepared for a general defense, how could it be prepared for an offense? The revisionists misrepresent supply stockpiles, but the emphasize above all the pattern of the army’s deployment. Therefore, disregarding the hardware and software, it is conceivable that the Red Army suffered great losses in the first weeks of the war because it was deployed for an offense and not a defense.
Next part of the article discusses the German understanding of all the above-mentioned factors combined. Naturally, if Red Army was ready for an offense, sufficient supply stockpiles would be promptly mentioned in diaries and memoirs whether for honesty or to reinforce the Nazi propaganda line to justify the invasion post facto. The German understanding of the Red Army’s deployment is also important to note here.

The Beginning of Combat Operations.

OKW Reports:
*Enemy surprised, bridges taken undestroyed, fortifications undefended.
*Red Army withdrawing [east] from Bialystok, advancing from Zhitomir [west] to Lutsk.
*“Fremde Heere (ost)” report - motorized units brought forward from about 400 km [!] behind the border.
*Fieldmarshal Leeb, AG North - “Enemy near border opposite Army Group obviously fighting only with rearguards.”
*Manstein - strong tank concentrations near Bialystok and Lemberg deployed not for immediate aggression. (220)

Guderian and Hoth were particularly successful in capturing Minsk, but could they do it so fast on 26-27 June if Red Army was really prepared for offensive actions?

Halder and Chief of “Fremde Heere (Ost)” on Soviet offensive intentions:
*“No order indicating preparations for the attack was captured.”
*“The deployment of the strong Soviet forces was undertaken out of apprehension about our intentions, but also in view of a possible attack towards the west.”
(Germans correctly realized that the Red Army could not yet effectively organize large scale offensive operations.)

Airforce aide-de-camp Nicolaus v. Below: “The Russians expected a German attack, but not yet in 1941.” (224)

Henning v. Tresckow (Army Group Center Staff): Soviet “troop dispositions did not indicate that the Red Army was informed about the imminent attack.” (224)

Preventive and Preemptive Wars.

The concept of the “preventive war” is very ambiguous. In German history it goes back to 1880's, when the Prussian officers were the main advocates of such wars. To them it seemed that preventive wars against European powers would be advantageous at that time in order to avoid necessary or inevitable wars in the distant future. Clearly, this kind of preventive war was considered as a longsighted political move. Chancellor Bismarck opposed such a long-term investment war, as he did not trust “military intelligence” about future political developments. Therefore, when Moltke was ready to wage Nationalkrieg against France in 1867, Bismarck refused to make such a daring move even though, as we know today, the war did take place only 4 years later. Bismarck himself approved of only a “preemptive war” against an imminent blatant military threat. The word “preventive,” therefore, can be understood in two basic ways: 1). the short term meaning - an action meant to preempt a soon to be realized threat or 2). the long term meaning - an action meant to prevent a itself or a similar action in the distant future.
The concept of a preemptive war is basically military. The idea is similar to a surprise tactical assault against an enemy preparing his own offensive. Now, assuming that the difference in offensive and defensive preparations is only in deployment (weapons, ammo and training are the same), such a preemptive attack can be successful only if the enemy ready for offense is not prepared for a defense in depth. So, for Barbarossa to qualify for this kind of war, the Red Army should be:

1). Sufficiently prepared in terms of materiel, manpower, support and training;
2). Deployed for an offensive with strong mobile formations near the border ready to exploit breaches in the enemy lines.
In other words, similar to the German armed forces on the eve of the war.

Yet all the available evidence from the German intelligence sources and personal memoirs presented above, makes it clear that Barbarossa was not a preemptive offensive because Red Army did not qualify for either of the requirements. Very few on top of the German command, but quite a few regular soldiers believed the Nazi propaganda that Germany was immediately threatened by the Red Army in 1941.
To some German officers like General Warlimont the idea that Barbarossa was a preemptive war was preposterous: “he considered the war an unlawful one”. Warlimont, in particular, felt an embarrassing discomfort when he had to affirm the official line that “alleged Russian border violations, alarming deployment” left Germany no choice but to defend itself by a preemptive strike. Nonetheless, Warlimont and all the others went on to spread the official Nazi propaganda through the army branches. (221)
Therefore, it can be justly claimed that there was no immediate (nor did most German military officials believe there was) a Soviet military threat to the Nazi Germany in summer 1941, nor would it exist for days, weeks, months or, most likely, years. Barbarossa was not a preemptive strike against an enemy ready to attack.

Finally, the concept of a preventive war is mostly political. The idea is that since certain political problems must be solved sooner or later, it might be beneficial to solve them sooner without waiting to see which side time will favor in the long run. Tangible military threats are, therefore, not necessary at all. Central to implementation of a preventive war are certain political and strategic goals which would better be achieved sooner than later. Historical Operation Barbarossa can qualify only as such a preventive war.

Hitler’s Aims.

Hitler’s “preventive” war had the following characteristics: it was Weltanschauungskrieg (war of annihilation), it was a war for future Lebensraum for the Aryan race, it was also a war to improve the Third Reich strategic position by achieving vital political and economic goals.

While it can only be speculated whether Hitler himself believed in a Soviet offensive in 1941, enough evidence exists that he saw a war against USSR as inevitable. Hitler always desired a showdown between two opposed Weltanschauungen (Ideologies). Judging from Soviet actions to consolidate their power in the Baltic states and Bessarabia, he concluded USSR was getting ready for war against Germany. (221) Since Red Army would slowly rebuilt and, most likely, attack Germany when convenient, Germany would have to keep strong forces on its eastern borders while Great Britain was still not knocked out of the war in the west.

Therefore, a short victorious war against USSR would be to Germany’s advantage while Red Army is still weak, Britain safely contained at the home island, USA is not even in the war. It was crucial to the Third Reich’s success to deprive Britain and USA of a potential ally by eliminating USSR from the equation before the Allies could jointly invade Nazi-occupied Europe. The actual Allied invasion came in 1944, but that’s assuming the war in the East has been draining over 80% of Germany’s force since 1941. Assuming that Germany won the war against USSR by 1942, it is even likely that an Allied invasion would take place at all?

Stalin’s Goals and Soviet Strategy.

In the west it has always been popular to justify both Barbarossa and its brutality. This popular line of thought is a mix of confusion of cause and effect, general anti-communism, as well as anti-semitism, and even chauvinism towards Slavic people. The basic arguments of this sort are that somebody had to take the “steam” of the Bolsheviks anyways, after all it simply had to be done because of the evil nature of Soviet Union. A related argument also rises from confusion of cause and effect: the Jews were killed by the Nazi regime as a punishment for certain crimes.
All the available evidence, however, suggests that Hitler and the Nazi regime pursued certain policies not as a result of certain historical developments in the world, but of their own inherent reasons. When it comes to Barbarossa, it is obvious from all the German documents and memoirs that Soviet foreign policy was not the reason for the commencement of the invasion. Hitler, clearly, did not launch Barbarossa as a liberation campaign against the criminal Soviet regime. Nor did he implement genocide of such a wide scale against Jewish, Slavic and other people as a desperation measure in the light of Stalinist crimes. Only Nazi propaganda, and its modern variations, made such bizarre claims.
Finally, a popular belief that Stalin was at least partially guilty for the Nazi invasion also turns out to be a myth. The evidence listed above clearly shows that Nazi officials themselves understood well that Stalin did everything to avoid a war with Germany. Whether Stalin was guilty of inadequately preparing the country’s defenses, and, most importantly, deluding himself that Hitler was a realpolitiker guided by rational analysis, is another question.
Hitler made some strategic predictions, but they turned out to be entirely false: USSR was not knocked out quickly, in fact, the war in the East pushed the Western powers closer to USSR; the war weakened Germany so much as to allow the Allies to conduct a successful invasion of the Europe. In the end, Stalin seems to have overestimated Hitler’s strategic mind. Apparently, to Stalin himself, as well as many other senior Soviet officials, a full-scale military invasion of USSR seemed nothing more but suicide.
Both German and Soviet sources point out that Stalin’s overall foreign policy seemed to have been pretty moderate. In general, he desired to advance USSR’s power everywhere, especially westwards. This general doctrine, however, was heavily based on numerous variables. It was a doctrine of a moderate political opportunism. Stalin understood that in order to join a strong coalition with US and Great Britain, precious time and heavy fighting in the West was needed to seriously weaken Nazi Germany. Therefore, Stalin was not a gambler, but instead preferred long-term planning and careful political and military preparation. It is in this context that his menu of choice was greatly limited when the Operation Barbarossa was launched. In other words, Stalin “had not maneuvered the Soviet Union into a strategic dilemma as Hitler had done, but had settled the controversy with Japan,” by that securing the rear of the USSR.

“Hitler did not launch the attack on the Soviet Union in order to prevent an imminent danger, as the soldiers were told, and Stalin had not used the delay in the German preparations owing to the war against Yugoslavia and Greece to prepare an attack. To speak of a preventive war against the Russians while German preparations for an attack were under way for more than half a year makes sense only when the term is understood in the context of what the General Staff and top people in politics and industry had meant by this notion since the 1870's.” (225)

“Considering this sequence of events and decisions we have to ask what kind of praevenire it is that defenders of the preventive war idea have in mind? There is, on the other hand, no doubt that if Stalin had attacked before June 21, 1941, he would have started a preventive war in the proper sense of praevenire.” (227)

It is, of course, true that Red Army was reforming, and Soviet Union, in general, was preparing for war by the summer of 1941. Yet, one should not forget that German planning and preparation for the Operation Barbarossa go back as early as 1940 preceding Soviet measures! If we get cause and effect straight, it becomes obvious that while Barbarossa clearly was no preemptive war, a Soviet offensive in summer 1941 clearly would have qualified as one.

The influence of guiding factors of the Soviet Foreign Policy is still hotly debated, whether it was ideology of “world revolution,” ruthless pragmatism of cynical Realpolitik, or Stalin’s personal paranoia. As is debated the extent to which other Soviet leaders shared power with Stalin.

To conclude, it is obvious that the actual military threat coming from the USSR (even if it did in 1941), was not necessary. Hitler’s own inherent reasons, the ideology and identity of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Union were sufficient for the Operation Barbarossa to take place. Likewise, the same ideology and identity are also sufficient for modern neo-Nazis to justify that same invasion.