Glantz, David M. Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941. Tempus Publishing Inc. Charleston. 2001.

Appendix I

German planning documents associated with Operation Barbarossa

Directive No. 21 'Plan Barbarossa'

The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander Fuhrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces 18 December 1940

OKW/WFSt./Abt.L(l)
Nr. 33 408/40 g.Kdos Chefsache
Top Secret

Directive No. 21
Operation ‘Barbarossa’

The German Wehrmacht [Armed Forces | must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia in one rapid campaign, even before the war with England has been concluded.
The Army [des Heeres] must, in this case, be prepared to commit all available Formations, with the proviso that the occupied territories must be secured against surprise attacks.
The Air Force [Luftwaffe] must make available for the support of the army in the Eastern Campaign forces of adequate strength to ensure a rapid termination of the land action and to give the East German territories maximum protection against enemy air raids. Making the main effort in the East must not be carried to the point where we can no longer adequately protect the totality of our battle and our armament zones against enemy air attacks, nor must the offensive against England, and in particular against England's supply routes, suffer as a consequence.
For the Navy [Kriegsmarine] the point of main effort will remain consistently against England, even while the Eastern Campaign is in progress.
I shall give the order tor the assembly of troops, etc., for the proposed operation against Soviet Russia, should the occasion arise, eight weeks before the operation is due to begin.
Preparations that require more time than this shall — so far as they have not already been made — be begun at once and arc to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Great stress, however, must be laid on disguising any offensive intentions.
Preparations by the high commands are to be based on the following considerations.

1. General Intention
The mass of the army stationed in Western Russia it to be destroyed in bold operations involving deep and rapid penetrations by panzer spearheads, and the withdrawal of combat-capable elements into the vast Russian interior is to be prevented.
By means of a rapid pursuit, a line is to be reached from beyond which the Russian air force will no longer be capable of attacking the territory of the German Reich. The operation's final objective is the establishment of a defensive barrier against Asiatic Russia running along the general line of the Volga to Arkhangel. From such a line the one remaining Russian industrial area in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe should the need arise.
During the course of this operation, the Russian's Baltic Fleet will quickly be deprived of its bases and thus will no longer be capable of continuing the struggle.
Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be prevented from the very beginning of the operation by means of powerful strikes against it.

2. Anticipated Allies and their Tasks
1. On the wings of our operation we can count on active cooperation in the war against Soviet Russia by Rumania and Finland.
How exactly the combat forces of those two countries will be under German control when they go into action is a matter that the Armed Forces High Command will arrange and set forth at the proper time.
2. Rumania's task will be to pin down the enemy's forces opposite that sector and to provide assistance in rearward areas.
3. Finland will cover the movement in the Northern German Group coming from Norway (Elements of Group XXI) and will then operate in conjunction with this group. The elimination of Hango will also be Finland's responsibility.
4. It may be anticipated that the Swedish railways and roads will be made available for the movement of the Northern German Group, at the latest when the operation has begun.

3. The Conduct of the Operations
(A) Army (in accordance with my operational concept):
The area of operations is divided into northern and southern halves by the Pripiat Marshes. The point of the main effort will be made north in the northern half Here two army groups are to be committed.
The southern of these two army groups — in the Centre of the whole front — will have the mission of breaking out of the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong panzer and motorized formations and destroying the enemy forces in Byelorussia. This will create a situation that will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then cooperate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states. Only after the accomplishment of offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronshtadt, are further offensive operations with the objective of occupying the important Centre of communications and of armaments manufacture, Moscow.
Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of the Russian ability to resist could justify an attempt to achieve both objectives simultaneously.
The primary task of Group XXI, even during the Eastern operations, remains the protection of Norway. Forces available other than those needed for this task (Mountain Corps) will first of all be used to protect the Petsamo area and its mines, together with the Arctic road, and will then advance, in conjunction with Finnish forces, against the Murmansk railway and will cut the Murmansk area's land supply route.
Whether an operation of this nature can be carried out by stronger German forces (two to three divisions) coming from the Rovaniemi region and to the south depends on Sweden's willingness to make the Swedish railways available for such a move.
The mass of the Finnish Army will have the task, in accordance with the advance made by the northern wing of the German armies, of tying up maximum Russian strength by attacking to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga. The Finns will also capture Hango.
The army group south of the Pripiat Marshes will make its point of main effort from the Lublin region in the general direction of Kiev, with the objective of driving into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces with strong armoured formations and of then rolling up the enemy along the Dnepr.
The German-Rumanian group on the right flank will have the mission of:
(a) Protecting Rumanian territory and thus covering the southern flank of the entire operation.
(b) In cooperation with the attack by the northern wing of Army Group South, of tying up the enemy forces in its sector of the front; then, as the situation develops, of launching a second thrust and thus, in conjunction with the Luftwaffe, of preventing an orderly enemy withdrawal beyond the Dnestr.
Once the battles south or north of the Pripiat Marshes have been fought, the pursuit is to be undertaken with the following objectives: In the south, the rapid occupation of the economically important Donetz Basin, In the north, the speedy capture of Moscow.
The capture of this city would be a decisive victory both from the political and from the economic point of view; it would involve, moreover, the neutralization of the most vital Russian rail Centre.

(B) Luftwaffe:
It will be the task of the Luftwaffe, so far as possible, to damage and destroy the effectiveness of the Russian air force and to support the operations of the army at the points of main effort, that is to say in the sectors of Army Group Centre and in the area where Army Group South will be making its main effort. The Russian railways will either be destroyed, or, in the case of more important objectives close at band (i.e., railway bridges), will be captured by the bold use of parachute or airborne troops. In order that maximum forces may be available for operations against the enemy air forces and for direct support of the army, the munitions industry will not be attacked while the major operation is in progress. Only after the completion of the mobile operations will such attacks, and in particular attacks against the industrial area of the Urals, be considered.

(C) Kriegsmarine:
During the war with Soviet Russia, the Kriegsmarine's mission will be to protect the German coastline and to prevent any hostile naval force from breaking out of the Baltic. Since the Russian Baltic Fleet will have lost its last base and thus will be in a hopeless position once Leningrad has been reached, major naval operations previous to this are to be avoided. After the destruction of the Russian fleet the Kricgsmarine will be responsible for making the Baltic fully available for carrying sea traffic, including supplies by sea to the northern wing of the army. (The sweeping of minefields!).

4.
It is important that all of the Commanders-in-Chief make it plain that the taking of necessary measures in connection with this directive is being done as a precaution against the possibility of the Russians adopting an attitude toward us other than what it has been up to now. The number of officers engaged in the early stages of these preparations is to be kept as small as possible, and each officer is only to be given such information as is directly essential to him in the performance of his mission. Otherwise the danger will arise of our preparations becoming known, when a time for carrying out of the proposed operation has not even been decided on. This would cause us the gravest political and military disadvantages.
I anticipate further conferences with the Commanders-in-Chicf concerning their intentions as based on this directive.
Reports on the progress made in the proposed preparations by all services of the armed forces will be forwarded to me through the Armed Forces High Command [OKWJ
[signed] Adolf Hitler

Directive No. 33

The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander Fuhrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces 19 July 1941

OKW/WFSt./Abt.L (I)
Nr. 441230/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Directive No. 33
The Further Conduct of the War in the East

1. The second offensive in the East has been completed by the penetration of the 'Stalin Line' along the entire front and by the further deep advance of the panzer groups to the east. Army Group Centre requires a considerable time to liquidate the strong enemy groups that continue to remain between our mobile formations.
The Kiev fortifications and the operations of the Soviet 5th Army's forces in our rear have inhibited active operations and free manoeuver on Army Group South's northern flank.
2. The objective of further operations should be to prevent the escape of large enemy forces into the depth of the Russian territory and to annihilate them. To do so, prepare [as follows] along the following axes:
a) The Southeastern sector of the Eastern Front. The immediate mission is to destroy the enemy 12th and 6th Armies by a concentrated offensive west of the Dnepr, while preventing them from withdrawing beyond the river.
The Rumanian's main forces will cover that operation from the south.
The complete destruction of the enemy 5th Army can be carried out most rapidly by means of an offensive by the closely cooperating forces of Army Group Centre's southern flank and Army Group South's northern flank.

Simultaneously with the turn by Army Group Centre's infantry divisions southward, after they have fulfilled the missions assigned to them and have been re-supplied and protected their flank along the Moscow axis, commit new and primarily mobile forces into combat. These forces will have the missions of preventing Russian forces that have crossed to the eastern bank of the Dnepr River from withdrawing further to the east and destroying them.
b) The Central sector of the Eastern Front. After destroying the numerous encircled enemy units and resolving supply problems, the mission of Army C Iroup Centre will be to cut the Moscow-Leningrad communications lines and, at the same time, protect the right flank of Army Group North advancing on Leningrad with mobile formations that will not participate in the advance to the southeast beyond the Dnepr line, while further advancing toward Moscow with infantry formations.
c) The Northern sector of the Eastern Front. Resume the advance toward Leningrad only after the Eighteenth Army has restored contact with the Fourth Panzer Group and the Sixteenth Army's forces are protecting its eastern flank. When that is accomplished, Army Group North must strive to prevent Soviet forces that are continuing to operate in Estonia from withdrawing to Leningrad. It is desirable to capture as rapidly as possible the islands in the Baltic Sea, which can be Soviet fleet strong points.
d) The Finnish Front. As before, the missions of the Finnish main forces, reinforced by the German 163rd Division, are to attack the enemy by delivering their main attack east of Lake Ladoga and, later, destroy him in cooperation with Army Group North's forces. The aims of the offensive operations being conducted under the command of the XXXVI Army and Mountain Infantry Corps remain unchanged. Since there is no possibility of providing strong support by air formations, one must expect the operation to be prolonged.
3. First and foremost, the Luftwaffe's mission is to support the advance of forces along the principal axes in the southern sector of the front as they are freed up in the central sector. Concentrate the required aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery in their respective regions by bringing up additional forces quickly and also by regroupings.
As quickly as possible, it is necessary to begin air raids on Moscow by forces of the Second Air Fleet, temporarily reinforced by bombers aircraft from the west, which must be 'retribution1 for Russian air raids on Bucharest and Helsinki.
4. The Kriegsmarine's mission remains the defence of sea communications, particularly to protect ground operations in so far as the situation at sea and in the air effects them. To the degree possible, the fleet's efforts are to threaten the enemy's naval bases to prevent his fleet's combat forces from entering and being interned in Swedish ports.
As soon as naval forces {torpedo boats and minesweepers in groups of one flotilla each) are freed up from the Baltic Sea, they must be transferred to the Mediterranean Sea. It is necessary to dispatch some quantity of submarines to the Barents Sea to support German forces in Finland, whose operations are being hindered by the transport of reinforcements to the enemy by sea.
5. All three armed forces branches in the West and in the North must anticipate repelling possible English attacks against the islands in the Gulf of La Mancha |the English Channel] and the Norwegian coast. It is necessary to prepare Luftwaffe forces for rapid transfer from the West to any region of Norway.
Hitler
Addendum to Directive No. 33

The Chief of Staff of OKW Fuhrcr Headquarters
The Chief of Staff of the 23 July 1941

Operations Department
Mr. 442254/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Addendum to Directive No. 33

After the report of the OKW on 22 July 1941, I order [the following] as an addition to and broadening of Directive No. 33:
1. The Southern sector of the Eastern Front. The enemy still located west of the Dnepr must be completely and fully annihilated. As soon as the operational situation and material-technical support permit, the First and Second Panzer Groups, subordinate to Fourth Panzer Army headquarters, and the infantry and mountain infantry divisions that are following them, are to undertake an offensive across the Don into the Caucasus after capturing the Khar'kov industrial region.
The priority mission of the main mass of infantry divisions is the capture of the Ukraine, the Crimea and the territory of the Russian Federation to the Don. When that is accomplished, Rumanian forces will be entrusted with occupation sen-ice in the regions southwest of the Bug River.
2. The Central sector of the Eastern Front. After improving the situation in the .Smolensk region and on its southern flank, Army Group Centre is to defeat the enemy located between Smolensk and Moscow with sufficiently powerful infantry formations of both of its armies and advance with its left flank as far as possible to the east and capture Moscow.
The Third Panzer Group is temporarily assigned to Army Group North with the mission of supporting the hitter's right flank and encircling the enemy in the Leningrad region.
To fulfill the subsequent missions — the advance to the Volga - the intention is to return the Third Panzer Group's mobile formations to their former subordination.
3. The Northern sector of the Eastern Front. I laving received control of the Third Panzer Group. Army Group North will be capable of allocating large infantry forces for the advance on Leningrad and thus avoid expending mobile formations on frontal attacks in difficult terrain.
Enemy force still operating in Estonia must be destroyed. While doing so. it is necessary to prevent their transport by ship and penetration through Narva toward Leningrad.
Upon fulfilling its mission, the Third Panzer Group must be once again transferred to Army Group Centre's control.
4. Subsequently, as soon as conditions permit, the OKW will fix its attention on withdrawing part of Army Group North's forces, including the Fourth Panzer Group, and also part of Army Group South' s infantry force, to the Homeland.
While doing so, the combat readiness of the Third Panzer Group must be fully restored at the expense of transferring to it material and personnel from the Fourth Panzer Group. If necessary, the First and Second Panzer Groups must accomplish their missions by combining their formations.
5. The instructions contained in Directive No. 33 remain in force for the Fleet and Air Forces.
In addition, the Naval Fleet and Air Forces must ease the situation of the Mountain Infantry Corps. [It will do so] first, by decisiveaction of naval forces in the Barents Sea; and second, by transferring several groups of bomber aircraft into the region of combat operations in Finland, which will be carried out after the battle in the Smolensk region has ended. These measures will also deter England from attempts to join the struggle on the coast of the polar seas.
6. Forces allocated for the performance of security services in the occupied eastern regions will be sufficient to fulfill their missions only if the occupation authorities liquidate all resistance by employing extensive fear and terror to rid the population of any desire to resist rather than by legal judgement of the guilty.
Appropriate commands and the forces subordinate to them are entrusted with the responsibility for order in the occupied regions.
The commanders must find means to ensure order in the secured region, while employing appropriately Draconian measures and without requesting new security units.
Keitel

Directive No. 34

The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces
OKW/WFSt./Abt.L (I)
Mr. 441298/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Directive No. 34

The course of events in recent days, the appearance of large enemy forces before the front, the supply situation and the necessity of giving the Second and Third Panzer Groups 10 days to restore and refill their formations has forced a temporary postponement of the fulfillment of aims and missions set forth in Directive Nr. 33 of I9JuIy and the addendum to it of 23 July,
Accordingly, I order:

I. Army Forces:
1. In the northern sector of the Eastern Front, continue the offensive toward Leningrad by making the main attack between Lake Il'men' and Narva to encircle Leningrad and establish contact with the Finnish Army
North of Lake Il'men". this offensive must be limited by the Volkhov sector and, south of this lake, continue as deeply to the cast as required to protect the right flank of forces attacking to the north of Lake Il'men'. In advance, restore the situation in the Velikic Luki region. All forces that are not being employed for the offensive south of Lake Il'men' must be transferred to the forces advancing on the northern flank.
Do not begin the anticipated offensive by the Third Panzer Group to the Valdai Hills until its combat readiness and the operational readiness of its panzer formations has been fully restored. Instead, the forces on Army Group Centre's left flank must advance northeastward to such a depth as will be sufficient to protect Army Group North's right flank.
The priority missions of all of the Eighteenth Army's forces are the clearing of all enemy forces from Estonia. After this, its divisions can begin to advance toward Leningrad.
2. Army Group Centre will go on the defence, while employing the most favorable terrain in its sector.
You should occupy favorable jumping-off positions for conducting subsequent offensive operations against the Soviet 2Ist Army and you can carry out limited objective offensive operations to this end.
A soon as the situation permits, the Second and Third Panzer Groups are to be withdrawn from battle and quickly refilled and re-equipped.
3. Continue operations in the southern sector of the front for the time being only with Army Group South's forces. The objective of these operations is to destroy the large enemy forces west of the Dnepr and create conditions for the subsequent crossing of the First Panzer Group to the eastern bank of the Dnepr by the seizure of bridgeheads at and south of Kiev.
The Soviet 5th Army, which is operating in the swampy region northwest of Kiev, is to be drawn into combat west of the Dnepr River and destroyed. It is necessary to avert the danger of a possible penetration by that army's forces northward across the Pripiat River.
4. The Finnish Front. Halt the offensive toward Kandalaska. Eliminate the threat of a flank attack from Motovskii Bay in the Mountain Infantry Corps' sector. Leave the commander of the XXXVI Army Corps only those forces necessary for defensive purposes and cany out preparations for a false offensive.
At the same time, attempt to cut the Murmansk railroad in the Finnish III Army Corps sector and, above all, along the Louklii axis by transferring all forces necessary to fulfill that mission to that region. In the event the offensive in the III Army Corps' sector misfires due to the difficult terrain conditions, bring up German units and subordinate them to the Karelian Army. This particularly concerns motorized units, tanks and heavy artillery.
Place the 6th Mountain Infantry Division and all types of transport at the Mountain Infantry Corps's disposal.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will determine the possibility for using the Narvik-Luleo railroad on Swedish territory.

II. Air Forces:
1. The northern sector of the front.
The Luftwaffe will shoulder the main effort of the air offensive in the northern sector of the front and, to do so, the main forces of the VIII Air Corps are attached to the First Air Fleet. These forces must be transferred as quickly as possible so that they can support Army Group North's offensive along the main attack axis from the very beginning (the morning of 6 August).
2. The central sector of the front.
The mission of Luftwaffe forces remaining with Army Group Centre is to provide reliable anti-aircraft defence along the Second and Ninth Armies' fronts and support their offensive. Continue the air offensive against Moscow.
3. The southern sector of the Eastern Front.
Missions are unchanged. We do not anticipate a decrease in the air forces operating in Army Group South's area.
4. Finland
The primary mission of the Fifth Air Fleet is to support the Mountain Infantry Corps. In addition, it is necessary to support the Finnish III Army Corps' offensive along axes where the greatest success is achieved. It is necessary to conduct corresponding prepared measures in support of the Karelian Army.
Hitler

Addendum to Directive No. 34

OKW Fuhrer Headquarters
The Staff of the Operations Department 12 August 1941
Nr. 441376/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Addendum to Directive No. 34

The Fuhrer has ordered the following on the further conduct of operations as an addition to Directive No. 34:
1. The Southern sector of the Eastern Front. As a result of the decisive battle in the Uman' region, Army Group South has achieved complete superiority over the enemy and has secured freedom of manoeuvre for the conduct of further operations on that side of the Dnepr. As soon as its forces firmly dig in on the eastern bank of that river and secure rear area communications, they will be able to achieve the large-scale operational aims assigned to them with their own forces with appropriate use of Allied forces and in cooperation with Rumanian ground forces.
Its missions are as follows:
a) Prevent the enemy from creating a defensive front along the Dnepr. To do so, it is necessary to destroy the largest enemy units located west of the Dnepr and capture bridgeheads on the eastern bank of that river as rapidly as possible;
b) Capture the Crimea, which, being an enemy air base, poses an especially great threat to the Rumanian oil fields; and
c) Seize the Donets Hasin and the Khar'kov industrial region.
2. The battles to capture the Crimea may require mountain infantry forces. It is necessary to verify the possibility of their crossing the Kerch Straits for employment in a subsequent offensive toward Batumi.
Halt the offensive on Kiev. As soon as ammunition resupply permits, bombing from the air must destroy the city.
The entire range of missions depends on these actions being carried out sequentially rather than simultaneously by means of maximum massing of forces. In the first instance, achieve the greatest concentration of forces by committing additional groups of bomber aircraft to support combat operations in the region between Kauev and Boguslav and then to assist the creation of a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnepr River.
3. The Central sector of the Eastern Front. The priority mission in this sector is to eliminate the enemy flank positions wedging to the west, which are tying down large forces of Army Group Centre's infantry. In the central sector of the front to the south, pay particular attention to the organization of the mixed flanks of Army Groups1 Centre and South according to time and axis. Deprive the Soviet 5th Army of any operational capabilities by seizing the communications leading to Ovrich and Mozyr1 and, finally, destroy its forces.
North of the central sector of the front, defeat the enemy west of Toropets as rapidly as possible by committing mobile forces into combat. Advance Army Group Centre's left flank far enough north that Army Group North will not fear for its right flank and will be capable of reinforcing its forces advancing on Leningrad with infantry divisions.
Regardless, undertake measures to transfer this or that division (for example, the 102nd Infantry Division) to Army Group north as a reserve.
Only after the threatening situation on the flanks has been completely eliminated and the panzer groups have been refitted will conditions be conducive for an offensive by deeply echeloned flank groupings across a broad front against the large enemy forces concentrated for the defence of Moscow.
The aim of this offensive is to capture the enemy's entire complex ot state economic and communications Centres in the Moscow region before the onset of winter, by doing so, depriving him of the capability for restoring his destroyed armed forces and smashing the functioning of state control apparatus.
Complete the operation against Leningrad before the offensive along the Moscow axis begins and return the aircraft units transferred earlier by the Second Air Fleet to the First Air Fleet to their former subordination.
4. The Northern sector of the Front. The offensive being conducted here must lead to the encirclement of Leningrad and link-up with Finnish forces.
Insofar as the situation with airfields permits, in the interest of the effective employment of aviation it is important that it be employed as rar as possible massed along distinct axes.
As soon as the situation permits, you should liquidate enemy naval and air bases on Dago and EzcT Islands by the joint efforts ot ground, naval and air forces. While doing so it is particularly important to destroy enemy airfields from which air raids on Berlin are carried out. The High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) is entrusted with coordinating the conducted measures.
The Chief of OKW
Keitel

Fuhrer order

OKW Fuhrer Headquarters
The Staff of the Operations Department 15 August 1941
Nr. 441386/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Order

After a report by the OKH, the Fuhrer orders.
1. Army Group Centre will halt its further advance on Moscow. Organize a defence in sectors whose nature will prevent any possibility of the enemy conducting enveloping operations and will not require air support to repel his offensive operations.
2. The offensive by Army Group North must lead to success in the immediate future. Only after this can we think about resuming the offensive on Moscow. Danger has arisen because of the appearance of enemy cavalry in the Sixteenth Army’s rear and the absence of mobile units in the I Army Corps’ reserve, which, in spite of strong air support, has halted the promising offensive north of Lake Il’men’.
Without delay, allocate and transfer as great a quantity of mobile formations from General Hoth’s panzer group (for example, one panzer and two motorized divisions) to Army Group North.
Chief of Staff of the OKW
Jodl

OKW order
21 August 1941

Order from the OKW to the OKH4

The OKH’s 18 August considerations regarding the further conduct of operations in the East do not agree with my intentions. I order:
1. The most important missions before the onset ot winter are to seize the Crimea and the industrial and coal regions ot the Don, deprive the Russians of the opportunity to obtain oil from the Caucasus and, in the north, to encircle Leningrad and link up with the Finns rather than capture Moscow.
2. The favorable operational situation, which had resulted in reaching the Gomel' and Pochcp line, must immediately by exploited by the conduct of an operation along concentric axes by the adjoining flanks of Army Groups South and Centre. Our objective is not to push the Soviet 5th Army back beyond the Dnepr by the Sixth Army's local attacks. Instead, [it is] the destruction of the enemy before he can withdraw to the Desna River, Konotop and Sula line.
Army Group South can do so only by digging-in in the region east of the middle reached of the Dnepr and continuing operations toward Khar'kov and Rostov with the forces operating in its Centre and on its left flank.
3. Army Group Centre is to allocate sufficient forces to that offensive to ensure the destruction of the Russian 5th Army's forces, and, at the same time, that it will be prepared to repel enemy counterattacks in the central sector of its front.
The decision to advance Army Group Centre's left flank to the hills in the Toropets region and tie it in with Army Group North's right flank is unchanged.
4. The seizure of the Crimean peninsula has colossal importance for the protection of oil supplies from Rumania. Therefore, it is necessary to employ all available means, including mobile formations, to force the lower reaches of the Dnepr rapidly before the enemy is able to reinforce its forces.
5. Only by encircling Leningrad, linking-up with the Finns and destroying the Russian 5th Army can we free up forces and create prerequisites for fulfilling the missions contained in the 12 August addendum to Directive No. 34. that is, a successful offensive and the destruction of Group Timoshenko.
Hitler

Directive No. 35
The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander Fuhrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces 6 September 1941
OKW/WFSt./Abt.L (1)
Nr. 441492/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Directive No. 35

Initial operational successes against enemy forces between the Army Group South's and Centre's adjoining flanks and additional successes in encircling enemy forces in the Leningrad region, create prerequisites for conducting a decisive operation against Army Group Timoshenko, which is conducting unsuccessful offensive operations on Army Group Centre's front. It must be destroyed decisively before the onset of winter within the limited time indicated in existing orders.
To this end we must concentrate all of the efforts of ground and air forces earmarked for the operation, including those that can be freed up from the flanks and transferred in timely fashion.
On the basis of the OKI I's report, I am issuing the following orders for the preparation and conduct of this operation:
1. In the southern wing of the Eastern Front, destroy the enemy located in the Kremenchug, Kiev and Konotop triangle with the forces of Army Group South, which have crossed the Dnepr to the north, in cooperation with the attacking forces of Army Group Centre's southern flank. As soon as the situation permits, the freed up Second and Sixth Armies' formations, and also the Second Panzer Group, should be regrouped to carry out new operations.
The mobile formations on Army Group South's front, reinforced with infantry and supported along the main axes by the Fourth Air Fleet, are to begin a surprise offensive northwestwards from the bridgehead created by the Seventeenth Army through Lubna no later than 10 September, at the same time the Seventeenth Army is advancing along the Poltava and Khar'kov axis.
Continue the offensive along the lower course of the Dnepr toward the Crimea supported by the Fourth Air Fleet.
Movement of mobile forces southward from the lower course of the Dnepr to Melitopol' will considerably assist the Eleventh Army fulfill it missions.
2. In the sector of Army Group Centre. Prepare an operation against Army Group Timoshenko as quickly as possible so that we can go on offensive in the general direction of Viaz'ma and destroy the enemy located in the region east of Smolensk by a double envelopment by powerful panzer forces concentrated on the flanks.
To that end, form two shock groups:
The first - on the southern flank, presumably in the region southeast of Roslavl' with an attack axis to the northeast. The composition of the group [will include] forces subordinate to Army Group Centre and the 5th and 2nd Panzer Divisions, which will be freed up to fulfill that mission.
The second - in the Ninth Army's sector with its attack axis presumably through Belyi. In so far as possible, this group will consist of large Army Group Centre formations.
After destroying the main mass of Timoshenko's group of forces in this decisive encirclement and destruction operation, Army Group Centre is to begin pursuing enemy forces along the Moscow axis, while protecting its right flank to the Oka River and its left to the upper reaches of the Volga River. The Second Air Fleet, reinforced in timely fashion by transferred formations, especially from the northern sector of the front, will provide air support for the offensive. While doing so. it will concentrate its main forces on the flanks, while employing the principal bomber formations (Eighth Air Corps) for support of the mobile formations in both attacking flank groupings.
3. In the northern sector of the Eastern Front. Encircle enemy forces operating in the Leningrad region (and capture Shlissel'burg) in cooperation with an offensive by Finnish forces on the Karelian Isthmus so that a considerable portion of the mobile and First Air Fleet formations, in particular, the VIII Air Corps, can be transferred to Army Group Centre no later than 15 September. First and foremost, however, we must seek to encircle Leningrad completely, at least from the east, and, if weather conditions permit, conduct a large-scale airoffensive on Leningrad. It is especially important to destroy the water supply stations.
As soon as possible, Army Group North's forces must begin an offensive northward in the Neva River sector to help the Finns overcome the fortifications along the old Soviet-Finnish border, and also to shorten the front lines and deprive the enemy of the use of air bases. In cooperation with the Finns, prevent enemy naval forces from exiting Kronshtadt into the Baltic Sea (Hanko and the Moonzund Islands) by using mine obstacles and artillery fire.
Also isolate the Leningrad area of combat operations in the sector along the lower course of the Volkhov as soon forces necessary to resolve this mission become available. Link-up with the Karelian Army on the Svir River only after enemy forces in the Leningrad region have been destroyed.
4. During the further conduct of operations, ensure that the southern flank of Army Group Centre's offensive along the Moscow axis is protected by an advance to the northeast by a flank protection grouping m Army Group South's sector created from available mobile formations. [Also ensure] that Army Group North's forces be directed to protect Army Group Centre's northern flank and also the advance along both sides of Lake Il'men' to link-up with the Karelian Army.
5. Any curtailment of the period for preparing and acceleration of the operation's beginning will accompany the preparation and conduct of the entire operation.
Hitler

Addendum: In so far as the Fourth Air Fleet has not allocated forces to support the offensive from the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead, the Fiihrer considers it desirable that all of the motorized divisions participate in the First Panzer Group's offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead.
The 198th Infantry Division and also Italian or Hungarian forces are holding on to the bridgehead.
The Chief of Staff of the OKW

Directive No. 39.
The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander Fuhrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces 8 December 1941
OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (1)
Nr. 442090/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Directive No. 39
The early arrival of cold winter on the Eastern Front and resupply difficulties associated with it are forcing us to halt immediately all large-scale offensive operations and go on the defence. The manner of this defence's conduct depends on the aims that it pursues, namely:
a) I lold on to those regions that have important operational and military-economic importance for the enemy;
b) Rest and replenish the forces;
c) By doing so, create conditions necessary to resume large-scale offensive operations in 1942.
Accordingly I order:

I. The ground forces
1. As soon as possible, the main forces of the Eastern Army will go over to the defence in sectors designated by the ground forces High Command and then begin to refit all formations while withdrawing, first and foremost, all panzer and motorized divisions from the front.
2. In those sectors of the front where the front lines will shifted to the rear on our initiative, that is, where the enemy has not yet forced us to, it is necessary to prepare rear positions that provide better conditions for our units withdrawal and the organization of defences than the previously occupied positions.
The abandonment to the enemy of important lateral communications in connection with the withdrawal of the front lines can create danger for other sectors of the front that have not been fortified. In these instances time, based on the overall situation, it is necessary to designate the time for the forces withdrawal to separate sectors of the front lines.
3. The configuration of the new front line must favor the forces with regard to their dispositions and the organization of the defence and provide the most favorable conditions for the provision of supplies, in particular during thaw conditions.
It is necessary to select cut-off and rear positions and, while exploiting the entire work force at your disposal, to construct them as rapidly as possible.
4. Within the framework of the main defensive mission, the forces must resolve the following specific missions:
a) Seize Sevastopol' (This decision is relative to the further employment of the Eleventh Army's main forces, with exception to those units necessary for coastal defence, which will be determined upon the completion of combat operations).
b) Despite all difficulties, in favorable weather conditions, in the course of the winter, Army Group South will prepare an offensive to reach the line of the lower Don and Donets Rivers; thanks to which prerequisites will be created for the successful conduct of a spring offensive against the Caucasus.
c). Army Group North will shorten the front of its eastern and southeastern defence line north of Lake Il'men'. However, it is to do so while denying the enemy the road and railroad from Tikhvin to Volkhovstoi and Kolchanovo that support restoring, reinforcing and improving his positions in the region south of Lake Ladoga. Only by doing so am we finally complete encircling Leningrad and establishing communications with the Finnish Karelian Army.
d) If we determine that the enemy has withdrawn his main forces from the coastal belt on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland and does not intend to offer serious resistance there, we should occupy that sector of the coast to economize forces.

II. The Luftwaffe
1. The Luftwaffe's mission is to deprive the enemy of the capability of refitting and filling out it armed forces. To that end, it should destroy his military industrial and combat training Centres, first and foremost, those such as Leningrad, Moscow, Rybinsk, Gor'ki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar and others. Attach special importance to the constant destruction of enemy communications, which, for the enemy, are the railways by whose use the enemy threatens a series of our front sectors.
In addition, together with the suppression of enemy aviation, the Luftwaffe must support the ground forces in repelling subsequent enemy attacks with all available forces.2. I agree with the plan presented to me on the dispositions of the air forces within the limits of the army groups and the quantity of air force units located in the East. Upon completion of the ground forces' operations, if conditions permit, selected Luftwaffe formations can be withdrawn to the rear for combat training and refitting.
3. For the effective repelling of possible enemy winter attacks and considering our forces intended winter operations, we must maintain an airfield network sufficient to allow us to conduct rapid transfers of operating air force formations and their reinforcement at the expense of air force units refitting in the rear. Therefore, the refitting and combat training regions must he disposed as close to the front lines as possible.
4. It is especially important to conduct continuous and careful long-range aerial reconnaissance that can reveal and control all regroupings by enemy forces. The ground force and air forces must cooperate in that matter, both in the matter of allocating forces to fulfill that mission and on the matter of deploying their own forces.
5. Henceforth, I reserve for myself the approval of force withdrawals from the Moscow front and, in addition, those that envision their employment on Army Group Smith's combat region.
6. The air force must provide for the defence of force deployment regions, supply regions and also important rear communications objectives. In the event of enemy air attacks we must rapidly concentrate our fighter aviation units along the main axes of the enemy's air forces' operation...

OKW Order (excerpt)
OKW Fuhrer Headquarters
The Staff of the Operations Department 16 December 1941
Nr. 442182/41 g.Kdos
Top Secret

Order

I order:
1. Army Group North is permitted to withdraw the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies' internal flanks to the Volkhov River line and the railroad line running northwest from Volkhov Station. Establish continuous communications with the XXVIII Army Corps' right flank along that railroad line.
The army group's mission is to defend that line to the last soldier, do not withdraw a single step, and, at the same time, continue to blockade Leningrad.
I especially call your attention to reinforcing air defences south and southeast of Leningrad.
2. Army Group Centre. Any sort of significant withdrawal is inadmissible since it will lead to the complete loss of heavy weaponry and equipment. By their personal example, army commanders, formation commanders and all officers must inspire the forces with fanatic persistence to defend their occupied positions without paying attention to enemy forces penetrating along and into our forces' flanks and rear. Only such methods of conducting combat operations will gain time necessary to bring forward from the Homeland and the West the reinforcements that I have already ordered forward.
We can think about a withdrawal to the rear cut-off positions only after reserves have arrived at these positions
3. Army Group South will hold on to its occupied positions.
Yon must seize Sevastopol' with all of your energy in order to free up reserves and transfer them from the Crimea to other sectors of the army group's front.
[signed] Adolf Hitler