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Introduction
In
the past decade, the CGIAR has collaborated more and
more with business. On the one hand, industry is increasing
its research activities, especially since the development
of genetic engineering; on the other hand, public
research institutions, including the CGIAR, are increasingly
looking for additional funding from the private sector.
While the CGIAR operates on an annual budget of USD
350 million, the "Life Sciences" industry
invests more than USD 7 billion into research. Both
the companies and the public research institutions
officially praise these so-called public-private partnerships
saying that it is a win-win situation. But does the
farmer or the social objectives of public institutions
really 'win' from this kind of collaboration?
To
date, the indications are not good. A terrible pattern
of biopiracy, undermining of public-oriented research
agendas and a continuing flow of knowledge and resources
from the South to the North has been established.
Private use of the IRRI genebank, for example, has
benefited the rich countries enormously. The gene
banks, which are based on the wealth of generations
of farmers from all over Asia and the rest of the
world, were supposed to serve research work for poor
countries. But they have provided germplasm for ¾
of the rice harvest in the US bringing the country
an economic gain of $1 billion since 1970. In fact,
the rice germplasm from IRRI adds $655 million in
value to the rice industry of the US, Australia, New
Zealand and Canada every year.
A
privatized approach has major consequences for the
direction of agricultural research and for kinds of
products that find their way into farmers fields.
There is danger of a replacement of the social objectives
of the public sector with the profit oriented goals
of the private sector. Also important are the initiatives
that get ignored and the farmer-oriented research
that never gets done. Strong links with the private
sector brings into question the independence and integrity
of the CGIAR. Already, many questions have been raised
about their ability to be 'trust'worthy in their role
of holding germplasm in trust and protecting it from
patents and exploitation by private companies. The
stated aims of corporations (to make money) and the
CGIAR (to increase food security) are completely different.
So, where does a private sector approach leave farmers
and the issue of food security? Are farmers only relevant
as a potential market? We must demand farmer control
of agricultural research. Agriculture research should
not be something done on their behalf with farmers
seen as passive children who do not know what they
need, but something done by and with the farmers of
the South.
Private
money, private agenda
CGIAR
and the private sector have talked of increasing partnerships
for many years. There are two major kinds of 'partnerships'
between the CGIAR and the private sector. The first
are official relationships through recognized channels.
The second kind are examples of biopiracy where the
private sector uses CGIAR resources without the permission
of the original donating party. Some examples of biopiracy
are done with the consent and cooperation of the CGIAR,
others are done by companies ignoring the correct
channels. In either case, the CGIAR has been unwilling
or unable to protect the germplasm that has been donated
by farmer communities around the world from exploitation
by companies. Biopiracy constitutes no small part
of the public-private "partnerships" of
the CGIAR and companies.
Official
relationships between business and the CGIAR occur
at project level, where a particular project such
as a biotech research project is done in collaboration
with a company, and at a policy level.
Collaborative
projects
When
the Private Sector Committee (PSC) was established
by the CGIAR in 1995, one of the first activities
was to investigate the current examples of cooperation
between CGIAR and industry at the project level. Since
this time, however, investigations of cooperation
projects looked at single examples only. This means
that a complete list of joint projects is not possible.
Examples, however, include joint research ventures,
licensing agreements, equipment donation and loans,
grants, training and exchange of personnel. Some of
these, such as grants, may be seen as very positive
for cash-strapped public research centers. Yet the
donations may also decrease the independence of the
CG group and change research direction. A survey showed
that when industry contributes to public research
the priorities of the research objectives often change,
and the use of the research results is restricted
in most cases.
Donations
by private companies sometimes go along with less
visible or hidden agendas. Monsanto's donation to
Mexico of a gene-transfer technology for potato virus
resistance, according to the International Service
for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA)
who brokered the deal, helped to establish in Mexico
the biosafety procedures favorable to US industry.
There
are other examples of collaborative projects with
the private sector found at CIMMYT in Mexico. CIMMYT
has a number of Material Transfer Agreements with
private companies including maize trials conducted
by private seed companies in developing countries.
CIMMYT has also collaborated in a project funded by
Pioneer Hi-bred (now DuPont) to evaluate the maize
accessions held in Latin American Gene Banks. This
evaluation was no doubt a worthy business investment
for Pioneer Hi-bred as they will have a thorough menu
of traditional varieties to be used, and possibly
patented after some small modification, in their commercially
oriented breeding programs.
At
the same time these collaborations were underway,
a major scandal broke out in Mexico over contamination
of corn in the region which is a major center of genetic
diversity for maize. Yet despite concerns expressed
by the Mexican government over several months, CIMMYT,
supposedly a defender of genetic diversity and scientific
leader in the region, remained silent. In the CGIAR
meeting in February 2002 when the issue was discussed
CIMMYT did not advise bank directors to take any specific
actions or propose any specific policies or procedures
despite a general consensus that field contamination
will lead to gene bank contamination. Why the silence?
Does CIMMYT feel afraid to speak out against their
private sector "partners?"
The
dangerous world of biotechnology
One
of the major areas of project-level collaboration
between the CGIAR and the private sector is in biotechnology.
In fact, biotechnology is perhaps the major force
behind the current calls for increased partnerships.
Biotechnology research is expensive, slow and often
beyond the reach of the public sector. Genes isolated
by the private sector are safeguarded by "patent
thickets" and are not available to public researchers
except after extensive negotiations. Neither IRRI
nor the national agricultural research systems (NARS)
have had much success in isolating and cloning their
own genes, leaving the development of transgenes to
the private sector and the labs of the North. This
means that Northern corporations can call the shots
when it comes to what research is done and under what
conditions.
The
subservient and dependent role of the CGIAR's biotechnology
programs to corporations mean that the biotech programs
are forced to sit and wait for potential "technology
transfer" opportunities to arrive. When such
"opportunities" have arisen, IRRI, for one,
has jumped all over them. No matter how far fetched
the benefits may to small farmers in the South, IRRI
tends to incorporate these technologies in its research
and development in its program with little consultation,
little advanced strategic planning and minimal assessment
of the impacts. For instance, when the Swiss Federal
Institute of technology developed a pro-vitamin A
gene construct for rice, it was IRRI's management
that prioritized IRRI's involvement - before consultation
with the National Agricultural Research Systems and
without a thorough evaluation of the social and economic
impacts. IRRI has now applied for a permit to import
the gene construct for the vitamin A trait and is
carrying out research to insert the gene into IRRI
varieties.
In
this ill-structured decision-making process, research
priorities rarely address the needs of the farmers.
Bacterial blight rice (rice that has been genetically
engineered to resist bacterial blight, known as BB
rice) is a case in point. IRRI's decision to use BB
rice as the first field test is primarily an exercise
in public relations: to establish a precedent in terms
of public acceptance of transgenic rice in general.
Dr. Datta of IRRI admits that bacterial blight is
not a major concern as a trait but that BB rice "is
the safest product one could demonstrate and a good
starting point for transgenic rice." This is
not a rationale based on the needs of the farmer or
on the common good but on paving the way to an increased
public acceptance of genetic engineering. Such acceptance
is, of course, of major concern to the biotech companies
like Monsanto who are only too happy for the CGIAR
to do their sales and promotional work for them.
With
heavy concentration within the biotechnology industry,
its reliance on high-level science, large capital
inputs and huge research and development costs, there
is little hope that the industry will do anything
but deepen existing structural inequalities between
rich and poor. The need for a highly educated and
scientific/technical labor force and for sufficient
finance to withstand the long gestation period - often
up to ten to twelve years - of much product development,
mean that the biotech industry is highly concentrated
in the North. The USA, where the industry first started
with the foundation of Genentech in 1976, is the world's
undisputed leader in all three aspects of research,
development and commercialization of biotechnologies.
It is an industry dominated by the Northern multinationals
and with their needs and goals in mind.
Research
and development at these institutions in the North
rarely, if ever, addresses the needs of small-scale
farmers. It is no surprise that companies invest their
research and development in areas that will financially
reward them. The cost of research is high and it is
basic economics for them to look in turn for big returns
to justify this investment. What is a surprise is
the claim that the research done by large Northern
companies is being done in the interest of the South
or the poor. There is a fundamental conflict within
agricultural research and development between an agenda
that caters to the needs of industry and one that
addresses the needs of resource-poor farmers, the
bulk of Asia's population.
The
biotech industry is also very concentrated and specialized
which increases the power of the few remaining companies.
Only five companies now dominate the global market
for commercial seed. DuPont and Monsanto, the two
biggest companies in the seed market together command
41% of all significant agricultural biotechnology
patents and share about 93% of the GM seed market
worldwide. These companies are the very same companies
that dominate the pesticide and agrochemical industries.
In developing biotechnology, companies will be looking
to increase their markets and also to support their
other products. For example, Monsanto produces Round-up,
one of the most financially successful herbicides
of all time. Round-up is a poison and too much of
it will kill not only weeds but the plants themselves,
insects and, at high enough dosages, humans. What
better way to secure a market for their herbicide
than to produce plants that can withstand greater
doses of the poison before they die? Monsanto's annual
report itself explains that the development and production
of Roundup Ready corn, silver beet and soybeans is
designed to "support growth in volume and earnings
from Roundup herbicide." In fact, not only are
the new herbicide resistant varieties designed to
withstand higher applications of chemicals, but the
specter of an exchange between domesticated crops
and weedy relatives could ultimately result in the
need for more herbicides to control herbicide resistant
weeds.
These
are the priorities of the chemical companies, the
biotech companies, but what of the farmers? Debt ridden
and impoverished farmers who struggle every season
to find money for inputs are not looking for seeds
they have to buy every year and which take even more
inputs.
As
Marion Nestle has written, "In 1990, the leading
30 American agrochemical, animal health and agriculture
biotechnology companies spent nearly $400 million
on food research and development, but only one-tenth
as much on food problems in the developing world…
Let's admit that the primary beneficiary of biotechnology
research and development is not the developing world
but the food industry, which badly needs products
that can compete in today's fiercely competitive food
marketing system."
Patenting;
Farmers' heritage for sale
Another
danger of project level private-public partnership
is that the private sector may, and usually does,
impose restrictions on the end product of the research.
A particularly notorious example of this is the issue
of patents. If for example, a CGIAR institution like
IRRI wants to develop a new strain of rice using a
particular gene, and if the gene is patented by a
corporation, IRRI will need to enter into negotiations
with the corporation to determine the conditions under
which the gene can be used. Distribution of the end
product may require royalty payments or licensing
fees that would put the technology out of the reach
of farmers and Southern research stations.
The
biotech industry has a history of public-private "partnerships"
on projects that quickly degenerate into exploitation
and privatization. For decades, they have pursued
this course, even influencing such powerful institutions
such as Harvard University in the USA. Many of the
early developments in biotechnology were developed
using joint funding arrangements between industry,
universities and government in the US. Harvard University
used to have a policy that stipulated neither the
university nor the faculty would seek patents in public
health or therapeutic agents "except for dedication
to the public." In 1974, however, Monsanto provided
a package of grants and endowment totaling $23 million
over twelve years for research into biotechnologies.
Monsanto would receive an exclusive worldwide license
to patents in any inventions or discoveries that might
arise from the work supported by the company. The
following year, to bring its policy in line with practice,
Harvard University formally abandoned its policy of
dedicating results of research to the public. If the
world famous, powerful Harvard University cannot stand
up to Monsanto in the context of a "public private
partnership" how can the CG system?
The
patents on seeds mean that saving and reusing seeds
can become illegal. In countries where the relevant
legislation has been implemented, companies like Monsanto
already requires that buyers of Roundup Ready seeds
agree not to reuse them and hires investigators to
track down violators. Seed saving farmers in Europe,
the US and Canada have been forced to pay fines of
up to $35,000 to Monsanto. If these same patented
genes are used in research at the CGIAR, the CG system
has no choice but to negotiate with companies on an
extremely uneven footing.
IRRI
has its own policy on intellectual property. It states
that the seeds from the genebank which have been gathered
from, and donated by, countries and communities all
over the world should not be patented. But once a
scientist - public or private, Asian or American -
has done breeding work, the material can be patented!
The recent controversy over RiceTec's patent on basmati
rice has IRRI directly implicated. The Texan firm
got its basmati lines directly from IRRI, who got
them from India and Pakistan. Now there are patents
on them in the US. Jasmine rice from Thailand is also
prey to intellectual property in the US. It got there
thanks to IRRI.
Policy
level interventions by the corporate sector
There
are a number of CGIAR committees and panels which
prepare suggestions for the development of the CGIAR
and include representatives from industry. This gives
business considerable impact on policy discussion
within the CG system including the opportunity to
bring industry positions into decisive points of discussion
for example through the Biotechnology panel and the
Proprietary Science and Technology Panel.
The
major committee to deal with corporate interests is
the Private Sector Committee, established in 1995.
At the same time, an NGO Committee was formed so that
the CGIAR officially treats industry interests at
equal level with NGO interests. The objectives of
the Private Sector Committee are to provide the CGIAR
with a private sector perspective and to serve as
a link between the CGIAR and industry. The PSC also
intends to improve cooperation at policy and project
levels. Aventis (now owned by Bayer), Monsanto and
Novartis all have high ranking representation on the
committee.
Another
major role of the Private Sector Committee and of
the industry representatives on other CG committees
and panels was to introduce industry positions into
the 1998 CGIAR System Review. The CGIAR System Review
took eighteen months and involved consultation with
a wide variety of stakeholders. The report of the
Panel, headed by the former UNCED Secretary General
Maurice Strong recommended that; the CGIAR should
intensify its genetic engineering approach; patent
its research results; and, collaborate intensely with
industry, especially in opening up new markets and
providing poor farmers access to industry products.
These recommendations correspond very closely with
the Private Sector Committee Proposals. The proposals
of the NGO committee have been largely ignored.
According
to the System Review report, the reason for such industry
friendly recommendations is that US patents laws could
become an international standard, and a small number
of private corporations would be the primary patent
holders. Because public research institutions may
then lose their effectiveness, their future is at
stake, and the CGIAR has no other choice but to patent
its genetic engineering products. Alternatives are
not discussed at all.
Biopiracy
While
intellectual property regulations favorable to the
biotechnology industry are being tightened, farmers'
rights are being trampled upon. Biopiracy is booming.
Some enroachments are criticized and stopped such
as the attempts of Australian organizations in 1997
to patent chickpea varieties obtained from one of
the CGIAR institutions, the International Center for
Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). These
varieties had been developed be generations of Indian
peasants and were being held in the genebanks of ICRISAT
when they were accessed by the Australian 'researchers'
and patented. The Jasmine rice controversy where germplasm
accessed from IRRI was given, without a material transfer
agreement, to an American researcher who declared
that he would be using it to develop new strains of
Jasmine rice that can be grown in USA and are suitable
to be harvested easily by machines shows the kind
of 'partnerships' we have seen to date between the
private sector and the CGIAR.
In
most of these examples, the CGIAR group has been publicly
silent and has not made any effort to protect the
farmers or to reverse the instance of biopiracy. One
exception to this is the move by the International
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT - based in Cali,
Colombia) to file a formal request for re-examination
of US patent no. 5,894,079 - also known as the yellow
bean or "Enola bean" patent. The patent,
as described is a blatant example of biopiracy on
a bean used and traded by Mexican farmers for years.
CIAT made this appeal after months of lobbying by
civil society groups such as ETC.
Unfortunately
there are no doubt other cases that have slipped by
the radar of civil society. These kinds of partnerships
represent the most flagrant form of exploitation.
Conclusion
The
increasing power of the private sector has serious
consequences for public research. As the influence
of the industry lobby on the public sector increases,
there is a real danger that commercial interest will
override public interest. In the setting of research
priorities and policy directions for ongoing CGIAR
work the hand of business is heavy. In its system
review, the CGIAR endorsed the vast majority of private
sector proposals whilst marginalizing the inputs of
other groups such as farmers and women.
The
transnational food and agriculture industry is worth
over $700 billion a year. In the fierce competition
to gain this market, corporations see the CGIAR as
a way to push new corporate technologies onto farmers
and to open up new crops to commercialization. The
CGIAR is seen as an "honest broker," a known
"public" institution that can be used to
infiltrate new markets. Corporations are behind the
current push for biotechnology in the CGIAR system
and stand to benefit from access to the precious germplasm
in CG genebanks, from the increased markets opened
up if the technology is popularized through the CGIAR
and through royalties and profits gained off CGIAR
research.
Why
should the CGIAR rush to support industry claims to
patent food crop species, varieties or traits, when
its target groups, the poor farmers, are about to
lose their rights to replant, exchange and save seeds?
The CGIAR puts its future at stake if it supports
industry friendly instead of environment and farmer
friendly initiatives.
References:
Special
thanks to:
Susanne Gura for letting us extensively use her publication,
"Public-Private Partnership for Global Food Security?
The cooperation between the CGIAR and the "Life
Sciences" Industry" published by German
NGO Forum Environment and Development and Miserior
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