Prussia is an absolute monarchy. Its ruler, King Frederick William III, theoretically exercises complete authority over every aspect of the life of every Prussian citizen. In reality, though, Prussia is beginning to develop a ministerial and bureaucratic form of government. While the king still appoints the ministers, the ministers have increasing latitude in setting policy in the nation. In short, the king appoints the ministers based on his approval of their general outlook on domestic or foreign affairs, and the ministers then undertake specific actions based on those general outlooks. While their authority derives from the power of the monarch, they have a great deal of independence, especially when the ministers are very strong-willed and the monarch is easily swayed, as is currently the case in Prussia.
Thus, a few words about Frederick William himself (age 44) are in order. A widower with ten children, he is acknowledged modest, honest, and hardworking for a king; but it must also be admitted that the king of Prussia is not famous for his intellect and is prone to following the lead of more dynamic personalities than his own. He generally listens to whichever faction currently is on top in Prussian politics, which for the past several years has been the liberal reformers under Prince Karl von Hardenberg and Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt: a wise choice, since they have made Prussia the most progressive country on the Continent, as well as again one of the European Great Powers. Oddly, considering his favor to liberals in his own government, the King has begun in the last year or two to ally himself politically with the Tsar of Russia, whose own domestic political system can hardly be described as liberal or progressive. Opinions differ on whether this is merely a convenient political arrangement or the king of Prussia might have fallen under the spell of the Tsar�s considerable personal magnetism.
The liberal reforms undertaken by von Hardenberg and von Humboldt have included reforms in both the army and the civil service, instituting professional training programs and rewarding performance over pedigree; the institution of a university system that would be the model of the modern American system (indeed, until WWI, American scholars wishing to earn advanced degrees flocked to Germany for doctoral study); the extension of full civil rights to Jews living in Prussia; and the abolition of serfdom. They also have begun laying the groundwork for a social security system. These reforms, however, do not include electoral reforms. In that respect, Prussia remains an absolute monarchy, and its subjects do not enjoy the franchise.
Prussia suffered grievously at the hands of Napoleon. It concluded a peace treaty with France on amenable terms in 1802, following its unsuccessful wars against the revolutionary government, receiving territory in central Germany in compensation for ceding some Prussian lands on the left bank of the Rhine to France. The peace would not last, however, as Napoleon made continued incursions into Prussian�s western territory in 1805. Both France and Prussia danced around a diplomatic solution to their difficulties, with Napoleon proposing that Prussia be granted the duchy of Hannover (ruled by the king of Britain) in return for an alliance. While the deal was formally completed, Prussian mistrust of France remained, and Russian diplomacy brought Prussia into the Third Coalition, along with Austria and Britain, against Napoleon in 1806. Prussia was defeated soundly at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, and Napoleon occupied Berlin in the autumn of 1806. Frederick William III, however, took shelter with the Russian army, and attempted to continue the fight. Unfortunately, the Russians were themselves soon defeated, at the battle of Friedland, and both nations were forced to come to terms with Napoleon. Prussia by far got the worst of the bargain.
According to the Tilsit agreements, Prussia was greatly reduced in size, losing almost all of her lands west of the Elbe River, and also all her Polish lands, which Napoleon incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (a French puppet state). According to the later Treaty of Koenigsberg, the Prussian army was restricted to 42,000 men under arms.
For the next five years, anti-French feeling grew in Prussia, but the nation maintained an official policy of friendship towards France, which culminated in the signing of a Franco-Prussian alliance in 1811. That meant that Prussia had to provide 20,000 troops for Napoleon�s invasion of Russia in 1812. Once those troops got into the field, however, their commander declared them neutrals, and Prussia quickly joined Russia and Austria against France, after the disaster of 1812. While under the restrictions of the Treaty of Koenigsberg, Prussia�s liberal ministers cleverly had instituted a reserve system for the country�s military that allowed it to circumvent the 42,000-soldier limit. Under this plan, called the Kr�mpersystem, groups of 42,000 men each would be enrolled in the army sequentially, each for a short period of intense training. Once trained, each group then was decommissioned to reserve status, while another 42,000 men were enlisted. The �decommissioned� soldiers, however, were fully trained and ready to mobilize when the word came. As a result of this clever system, Prussia was able to field an army of 279,000 men in 1813, by far the largest army as a proportion of total population of any of the allies.
Thanks to the reforms instituted by the liberals, Prussia can boast the most efficient and best-trained army in Europe, numbering, as noted, 279,000 men. Many of those troops currently occupy France and the Rhineland, while others stand poised to occupy Saxony (see below). The Prussians have no navy worth speaking of.
Prussia suffered grievously from Napoleon�s aggression, losing great stretches of territory and many citizens. Also, as noted, they made the largest contribution as a proportion of total population to the coalition army that eventually defeated Napoleon. These facts give Prussia great influence in Vienna. And they intend to use that influence to guarantee compensation for the territory and citizens they lost to Napoleon back in 1806. The Prussians are very clear about the form that compensation should take: the kingdom of Saxony. Saxony is a logical choice, from the Prussian perspective, for annexation. The Saxon king was among the very last European rulers to abandon Napoleon�s cause, Saxony borders Prussia, and Saxony is rich in natural resources. The nation was only raised to royal status by Napoleon (as was Bavaria); before that, it was a mere electorate. This means it can boast no traditional royal family worthy of restoration, and so it could reasonably easily be incorporated into Prussia. The fact that annexing Saxony would greatly increase Prussia�s power, and extend its border with Austria are, in the Prussian view, objections unworthy of mention.
Prussia also supports Russia�s desire to make Tsar Alexander king of Poland. In part this is because Alexander�s dynamic personality has great influence over Frederick William III, whom he sheltered from Napoleon following the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt. It is also because, quite pragmatically, the Russians support Prussian designs on Saxony: quid pro quo.
Prussia is currently viewed as a second-tier power trying to become a first-tier power; they have that lean and hungry look of a nation trying to improve its lot among the Great Powers. Gaining Saxony would go a long way towards assuring Prussia of first-tier power status, but nations that favor stability and balance-such as Austria and Great Britain-fear and mistrust Prussia�s hunger for territory. Individual Prussians are regarded, like most Germans, as sentimental and emotional. The Romantics Goethe and Schiller are the great figures in German literature right now! On the other hand, the Prussians have certainly done wonders reforming and rebuilding their nation, and their contributions to Napoleon�s defeat are certainly worthy of respect. Most of the delegates at the Congress would agree, at least in principle, that Prussia deserves something to compensate her for her past losses to Napoleon-the question is, what, exactly? For the Austrians, who face a strengthened Prussia on their borders, and for the British, who face a disrupted balance of power, though, their respect for Prussia�s recent accomplishments is not enough to counterbalance their suspicion of Prussian desires for expansion. Austria feels nervous at the prospect that Prussia possibly could absorb the central German states that formerly belonged to the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the Prussians certainly were willing to cooperate with Napoleon when it suited them, before 1806; they were even willing to take Hannover, the ancestral homeland of British monarch George III, when Napoleon offered it to them. That certainly has not endeared the Prussians to the British.
On a more personal note, but one which illustrates both the personal nature of politics in the era and the interplay of politics and society, the Prussians-or at least their chief minister at the Congress-have little reason to like the British, either. Prince von Hardenberg was originally from Hannover himself, and as a young man entered the Hannoverian civil service. He was forced to leave, however, when his wife had an affair with Prince George, currently Prince Regent of Britain. He entered Prussian service, and rose to his current position as chief minister.