[1] Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global Warming

The New York Times June 12, 2001Section A; Page 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON

President Bush made clear today that he had no intention of reversing his opposition to a global warming accord supported by the European leaders he will meet with this week. And he strongly suggested that any new accord would have to bind developing nations, especially China and India, to the kind of commitments that would be made by the United States.

In an effort to mollify his European critics in the hours before he left for Spain tonight on his first trip to Europe as president, Mr. Bush acknowledged the severity of the global warming problem and said the United States would "lead the way by advancing the science on climate change." He described several new research initiatives that could mark a potentially significant focusing of American climate study. But while suggesting a new approach to the issue of global warming, Mr. Bush remained firm in rejecting the 1997 Kyoto accord, noting that it set no standards for major emitters of greenhouse gases, like China and India, while creating mandates for the United States that could prove economically crippling. His aides further argued that the accord -- aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases below 1990 levels -- was written to make it easier for Europe than for the United States to meet the goals.

Mr. Bush's outright rejection of the treaty two months ago led to an uproar in Europe. While unapologetic about their decision to back away from the accord, White House officials concede that they did a poor job of explaining their objections or their approach to the problem of reducing heat-trapping gases.

So today, Mr. Bush stepped into the Rose Garden with several of his cabinet members and publicly embraced a recent report from the National Academy of Sciences that concluded that temperatures are rising because of human activities. At the same time, he insisted that his rejection of the Kyoto protocol "should not be read by our friends and allies as any abdication of responsibility."

"We will act, learn and act again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology evolves," he said.

In essence, Mr. Bush was arguing that the market should be allowed to solve the problem, with the United States pushing along research "consistent with the long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere."

While advocating an attack on the problem of the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the president once again rejected the mandates in the Kyoto treaty that the United States and other developed nations cut their emission levels of those gases to well below 1990 levels, a move he said would be economically disastrous for the United States and the world. He offered no concrete alternatives to the Kyoto cutbacks, however, beyond research and the gradual application of new technology. And he reiterated his longstanding pledge that he would not agree to any accord that exempts the developing world. "The world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases is China," Mr. Bush said, with Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell at his side. "Yet China was entirely exempted from the requirements of the Kyoto protocol. India and Germany are among the top emitters. Yet India was also exempt from Kyoto."

Mr. Bush omitted any direct criticism of Europe, even though his aides have been saying, publicly and privately, that the members of the European Union have deliberately manipulated the debate -- and unfairly caricatured Mr. Bush as an enemy of good environmental practice -- to cover up their political problems coming into compliance with the Kyoto mandates.

Andrew Card, Mr. Bush's chief of staff, told reporters over lunch here today that the target of cutting greenhouse emissions to below 1990 levels was picked with "Machiavellian intent" because it enabled them to count in East Germany just before its economy was collapsing. One result is that Europe must now cut its emissions far less than the United States does, he argued.

Mr. Card argued that Mr. Bush had taken a courageous position that other nations would eventually come to appreciate. "The emperor of Kyoto was running around the stage for a long time naked," he said, "and it took President Bush to say, 'He doesn't have any clothes on.' "

Mr. Bush's statement today only seemed to fuel his disagreements with Europe, even as it was intended to tamp them down. "Everyone will be polite this week, I'm sure," said a senior European diplomat here, "but the standard everyone will be holding him to is how this stacks up against Kyoto. Where is the target? What is the U.S. timetable?"

Moreover, he has probably re-ignited the dispute with the developing world. China, for instance, has managed to reduce its emissions significantly in the last few years, and it argues that the United States has done comparatively little. Chinese officials have already said they view efforts to force stricter controls as part of a move to contain Chinese economic power.

Just as China and India have rejected limiting their economic potential by imposing strict environmental standards, Mr. Bush made clear today that he would not agree to any environmental limits that would slow the economy of either the United States or the world.

"We account for almost 20 percent of the man-made greenhouse emissions," he said. "We also account for about one-quarter of the world's economic output. We recognize the responsibility to reduce our emissions."

But he added that "we also recognize the other part of the story," saying the targets in the Kyoto treaty would "have a negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers."

Mr. Bush's statement was dismissed by a range of environmental groups as an effort to evade the issue by promising new scientific initiatives, but leaving unclear how much he was willing to spend, or how long the studies should take.

While Mr. Bush called for a "national climate change technology initiative" today, former members of the Clinton administration said it bore great resemblance to a $4.5 billion, five-year program they proposed four years ago. Congress never fully financed it, and Mr. Bush's recent budget did not support it.

"It's very weak tea," said David B. Sandalow, the former assistant secretary of state for oceans, environment and science and one of the negotiators of the Kyoto protocol in the last administration. Mr. Sandalow, now a senior fellow at the World Resources Institute, said, "If you were trying to develop a strategy to make sure China and India would not cooperate, you couldn't develop a better one than what Mr. Bush announced today."

What was striking about today's statement, though, was Mr. Bush's extensive discussion of the issue, and his commitment to do something about it -- even as he swathed the specifics in a cloud of ambiguities.

He characterized global warming as a serious long-range problem but one whose dimensions were still too little understood.

He tacitly acknowledged that the United States' rejection of the Kyoto accord had estranged the United States from many nations with which it has good relations generally.

Accordingly, Mr. Bush said he would push for new efforts to study global warming and more coordination among research institutions. He called for more money to pay for research into ways to control greenhouse gases.

If some of the president's statements today about technology and America's own advances sounded familiar, it may be because it had echoes of his father's speech nine years ago this week at a major environmental conference in Rio de Janeiro that set the stage for the Kyoto negotiations.

"Let's face it, there has been some criticism of the United States," the first President Bush said at the time. "But I must tell you, we come to Rio proud of what we have accomplished and committed to extending the record on American leadership on the environment. In the United States, we have the world's tightest air quality standards on cars and factories, the most advanced laws for protecting lands and waters, and the most open processes for public participation."

He added, "Now for a simple truth: America's record on environmental protection is second to none."

In the years since, the United States has continued to support research and new technology and to push for limits on automobile exhaust and factory emissions.

By repeating his fidelity today to negotiating with other nations under the 1992 climate treaty signed by his father, Mr. Bush is essentially trying to reset the clock, arguing that Kyoto should be scrapped in favor of a new, market-based accord that did not impose such an onerous economic cost.

But it is far from clear that he can win any converts to that position. Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, a nonpartisan group that works with many large corporations seeking to scale back their emissions, said today that she was "confused" about Mr. Bush's political goal.

"He is meeting with Europeans who are doing some very ambitious things to reduce emissions," she said. "Yet what we don't have from him is something that talks about how you go about reducing emissions."

Some of that, Bush administration officials said, is contained in his energy report, issued last month. Mr. Bush, for instance, called for the increased use of nuclear power, because it emits no greenhouse gases. In a sign of how far apart he and the Europeans are, Germany today reached an agreement with its utilities to phase out the use of nuclear power, in part because of the growing problem of disposing of nuclear waste.

Although this will be Mr. Bush's first trip to Europe since taking office, White House aides said today that the president, who critics have said has had little exposure to foreign countries, has made several previous trips to the region.

A White House spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said Mr. Bush had been to the Britain at least three times, most recently in 1990, when he also visited Spain, Portugal and Morocco. He also said Mr. Bush had visited France, though no date was provided.

 

[2] Russians Firmly Reject U.S. Plan to Reopen ABM Treaty

The New York Times October 21, 1999 Section A; Page 3; Column 1; Foreign Desk By MICHAEL R. GORDON MOSCOW

Senior Russian officials today strongly rejected an American proposal to renegotiate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, raising the stakes for the United States debate over antimissile defenses.

The Clinton Administration is scheduled to make a formal decision by June on whether to proceed with antimissile defenses against potential missile attacks by North Korea, Iran and other third world nations. Washington has sought to persuade the Kremlin to amend the accord and has even offered to help Russia complete a missile-tracking radar installation near Irkutsk, Siberia.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Rakhmanin, said Russia was not interested in bargaining over the treaty. "We aren't negotiating any kind of amendments to the ABM," Mr. Rakhmanin said.

The accord, a cornerstone of arms control for more than 25 years, sharply restricts the testing and deployment of antimissile defenses. The Clinton Administration is now trying to amend it so that the United States can build a new "battle management" radar system in Alaska by 2005 and deploy 100 antimissile interceptors there. A second battle-management radar could be erected in North Dakota and 100 interceptors deployed there by 2010, under the plan.

The sharp Russian response suggests that Washington may be confronted with a stark and unpalatable choice, withdrawing from the treaty in the face of strong opposition from Russia and China. That would give the United States the opportunity to erect a defense against possible missile attacks by third world nations, but it would risk a new arms race with Moscow and Beijing.

Administration officials say the Russians may be posturing in the hope of undermining public support for antimissile defenses in the United States.

But Russian officials said that they were simply being blunt and that Washington had understated the political and military risks of its plan to its public and its allies.

"There can be no compromise on this issue," the first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, Col. Gen. Valery Manilov, told reporters today.

Washington insists that its plan would pose little threat to the Russians, because they could easily overwhelm the defenses with their sizable missile force.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has said the Clinton Administration seeks nothing more than slight adjustments to the accord that should not concern the Russians.

Not all the United States' allies accept that argument. The French Government, in particular, is extremely critical.

Russian officials, for their part, argue that what the Administration calls minor modifications amounts to a wholesale reversal of the central prohibition against the establishment of a nationwide defense.

The Russians also say that radars, command and control systems and satellites deployed under the American plan could be building blocks for a more comprehensive missile defense.

Stepping up the political pressure on Washington, the Russian military warned today that it would consider an American decision to withdraw from the accord as a move that would free Moscow from its arms-control obligations under several strategic-arms accords.

The Russians noted that they ratified Start I, which reduces long-range nuclear arms, on the assumption that the ABM treaty would remain intact. The Russians have yet to ratify Start II, which would make deeper cuts. But the Russians say it, too, would be jeopardized by a United States decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty.

"An attempt to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty would destroy the entire system of treaties dealing with the restriction and reduction of weapons of mass destruction," General Manilov said. "All these agreements can be implemented only as a single whole"

The Russian military also said it had developed plans to augment its nuclear force if Washington withdrew from the treaty. The plans include deploying new multiple-warhead missiles and mobile land-based missiles.

"Russia can take about 20 steps without a substantial increase in costs," the commander of Russia's strategic forces, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, said. "The history of weaponry suggests that the shield is always weaker than the sword."

 

[3] Russians Resist Rumsfeld Effort To Set Aside ABM Treaty

The New York Times August 14, 2001 Section A; Page 7; Column 1; Foreign Desk By THOM SHANKER MOSCOW

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld met President Vladimir V. Putin and his defense minister today for talks that threw into sharp relief the disagreements over whether to deploy missile defenses, how to slash nuclear arsenals and whether arms control talks can even be the tool to bridge their differences.

It was a day when Mr. Putin spoke of negotiations and Mr. Rumsfeld spoke of consultations to create a new relationship in which treaties are unnecessary. When Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov said any missile defense deployment would have to be tightly linked to reducing warheads, Mr. Rumsfeld only agreed that the two issues were related.

"We still think that the ABM treaty is one of the major important elements of the complex of international treaties on which the international stability is based," Mr. Ivanov said.

Later, Mr. Rumsfeld urged again that "the Antiballistic Missile Treaty be set aside, and new arrangements between our two countries be established, so that we will in fact be able to take steps to no longer be vulnerable to handfuls of ballistic missiles."

But in welcoming Mr. Rumsfeld to the Kremlin, Mr. Putin said that the treaty was unequivocably a part of the security relationship between the two countries and that it was bundled with current treaties that limit nuclear arsenals. "For us, it is unconditionally linked with both the Start II and Start I Treaties," he said, referring to strategic arms reduction treaties negotiated between Washington and Moscow. "I would like to underline that."

If the two countries are to move forward in their talks, Mr. Putin said, Russia requires specifics on proposed levels of offensive weapons, a timetable for cuts, understandings on verification and transparency and confidence-building. In essence, Mr. Putin was demanding detailed and formal negotiations.

Mr. Rumsfeld demurred. Afterward, he said, "With respect to how these discussions and consultations will evolve, I think that's an open question." The absence of cold war hostilities simply makes arms talks unnecessary, he added.

President Bush, after meeting Mr. Putin last month in Genoa, ordered his national security team to begin consulting with Russia on missile defenses and reducing arsenals. The president envisions a framework of relations that would dispose of treaties and seek to bind the United States and Russia more broadly and more loosely through trade and economic and military ties.

A senior Pentagon official said, "The dialogue is proceeding as we expected it would." Mr. Rumsfeld stressed that he would not discuss specific proposals for shrinking the offensive arsenal because a strategic Pentagon review will be completed "in the next month or two." Asked to describe the direction the study would push the arsenal, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "There is no doubt in my mind that we'll be able to go down to substantially lower numbers."

Mr. Rumsfeld also said the United States could not possibly brief the Russians on its exact plan because it is in initial research, development and testing. The tentative schedule for testing is widely expected to violate ABM limits by late next spring.

Mr. Rumsfeld's mission was to illustrate the administration's broader approach to security ties with the Russians, and he trumpeted the virtue of investment.

 

[4] U.S. Repeats Call For Land Mine Ban

The New York Times August 16, 1996 Associated Press UNITED NATIONS

The United States repeated its call today for an international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling and production of land mines and said it would spend $50 million next year to help clear the devices from Bosnia and other former war zones.

"The U.S. is dedicated to eliminating these weapons, while taking into account our global responsibilities and concern for the safety of our soldiers," the United States Deputy representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, told the Security Council during a debate on land mines and their effect on peacekeeping operations. Land mines pose the greatest physical danger to peacekeepers and hinder peace agreements by blocking the movement of people and resources, he said.

In Bosnia, as many as three million mines were laid during the nearly four-year conflict and about 20 United Nations peacekeepers and civilian employees have been killed by land mines since 1992.

Mr. Inderfurth added that the NATO peacekeeping force, which replaced the United Nations in Bosnia last year, had suffered 55 casualties in land-mine accidents, including 10 deaths.

The Clinton Administration decided last May against banning American use of land mines even though it has called for a permanent worldwide ban. The United States military sees land mines as an important defensive weapon.

 

[5] Clinton Agrees to Land-Mine Ban, but Not Yet

The New York Times May 22, 1998 Section A; Page 3; Column 1; Foreign Desk By STEVEN LEE MYERS WASHINGTON

In a shift in policy, the Clinton Administration has pledged that by 2006 the United States will sign the international treaty that bans anti-personnel land mines, but only if the Pentagon comes up with an alternative weapon, Administration officials said today.

Although President Clinton has voiced support for banning the most pernicious types of land mines, the Administration had previously refused to commit itself to signing the treaty, known as the Ottawa Convention after the city where more than 100 countries agreed to a ban last December. The Administration's pledge -- made in a May 15 letter from the President's national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont -- contains a very big caveat: The Administration did not set a firm deadline for the Pentagon to come up with an alternative.

For that reason the pledge is symbolic, in large part because Mr. Clinton will no longer be President by 2006. However, the Administration's pledge sets a path to bring the United States into compliance with the treaty.

The Pentagon resisted setting a firm deadline for finding alternatives in a series of intense internal discussions in recent weeks, even as some officials in the State Department and the National Security Council pressed for a firmer deadline And today officials at the Pentagon played down the real impact of the Administration's pledge.

"It's optimistic to say you can have alternatives by any deadline," a senior Administration official said today. "Right now no one can tell you what an alternative would even look like."

Nonetheless, the Administration's latest position is an evolution from the stance it took last December when it refused to sign the Ottawa treaty and declined to say that the United States would ever do so. For that reason, supporters of an international ban on land mines welcomed it today as a step toward the day when the United States would join the 125 other countries that have signed it.

"Now it becomes a question not of if we'll sign it, but when," said Mr. Leahy, a Democrat who has been one of the leading advocates for an international ban.

The Administration's pledge emerged as a result of a showdown with Mr. Leahy over a little-noticed law that imposes a moratorium on the use of anti-personnel land mines, starting next February.

That moratorium, sponsored by Mr. Leahy, became law more than two years ago -- long before the international treaty became an issue -- and remained on the books despite the Administration's opposition to a ban, raising concerns among the nation's military leaders, who feared a moratorium could leave troops oversees vulnerable to attacks.

In exchange for the Administration's pledge to sign the Ottawa declaration, Mr. Leahy said today that he would agree to support what amounts to a repeal of the moratorium, allowing the Administration to waive it on national security grounds. The moratorium was already challenged: the House has passed legislation repealing it and today the powerful Republican chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, Jesse Helms of North Carolina, sent his colleagues a letter strongly opposing it.

Mr. Helms also attacked the Administration for negotiating with Mr. Leahy on the Ottawa treaty, saying that "some within the Executive branch are all too willing to accede to this blackmail." He called for an unconditional repeal of the moratorium.

The Ottawa treaty bans the manufacture, stockpiling and use of land mines specifically intended to kill or maim individuals. It does not, however, prohibit anti-tank mines. The problem for the United States is that the Pentagon designed its anti-tank mines in a way that mixed in anti-personnel mines to keep enemy soldiers from defusing the anti-tank weapons.

In last-minute negotiations in Ottawa, the treaty's authors refused to grant the United States an exemption for these so-called mixed systems, although several countries were allowed to keep their anti-tank mines with other kinds of anti-tampering devices.

Mr. Clinton has pledged that the United States will unilaterally halt its use of anti-personnel land mines everywhere except in Korea by 2003 and altogether by 2006. But those dates specifically did not apply to the anti-tank "mixed systems," the main stumbling block on signing the Ottawa treaty. By pledging to sign at some point, the Administration has now put added pressure on the military to develop alternatives sooner. Indeed, the Administration has called on the Pentagon to "search aggressively" for alternatives.

Bobby Muller, the president of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and a leader of the international campaign against land mines, noted that many military experts already believed that alternatives to the anti-personnel land mines exist, although the Pentagon disputes that.

"The pledge shifts the debates from the treaty to the alternatives," Mr. Muller said, adding that the pressure would grow on the United States to sign the Ottawa treaty sooner than 2006. "And with that we're going to put this over the goal line."

[6] The World: Diana's Dubious Legacy; Land-Mine Ban Has Trouble Getting Off the Ground
The New York Times September 5, 1999 Section 4; Page 3; Column 3; Week in Review Desk By STEVEN LEE MYERS WASHINGTON

It has been two years since the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, gave a last, emotional boost to an international treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, then being feverishly negotiated in Oslo. Many say her efforts to draw attention to the fiendish effects of mines before her death may be one of her greatest legacies.

But what kind of legacy is it? Despite a treaty signed by 135 countries to ban their use, production and stockpiling, anti-personnel land mines appear to be as popular as ever in fighting wars these days.

Yugoslav troops planted thousands of them during 18 months of civil war in Kosovo. So did the ethnic Albanian rebels they were fighting. Russia has acknowledged using them in recent weeks against Islamic insurgents in the southern province of Dagestan (and apologized to neighboring Georgia for accidentally dropping some of them from aircraft into Georgian territory).

Their use has been reported in the recent flareups between India and Pakistan and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as in civil wars in Turkey, Colombia, Congo, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.

In a survey completed last April, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines, which won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, reported that governments or rebel groups in at least 13 countries had used mines in the 15 months after the treaty was signed, though before it officially went into force. Among those were three that signed the treaty banning them: Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Angola, the country Diana made the focus of her own anti-mine crusade.

WHAT'S more, despite the campaign's publicity, several major countries still refuse to adopt the treaty, including the United States, Russia and China, most of the nations in the Middle East and many in Asia.

"It is a little disheartening," said Marissa Vitagliano, the coordinator of the U.S. Campaign to Ban Land Mines.

She and other supporters of a ban say it is far too soon to write off the treaty as a failure. On the contrary, they point to progress that has been made, especially in reducing the worldwide production of mines and their availability in the international arms market, according to arms control monitors.

Mary Fowler, the deputy chief of the United Nations' Mine Action Service in New York, noted that the countries that have signed on to a ban have destroyed 14 million mines that had been stockpiled when the treaty was written two years ago. Even countries that have so far refused to sign the treaty -- including the United States and Russia -- have pledged to stop exporting mines and to stop making certain kinds altogether.

Perhaps the treaty's greatest impact has been on public perception. Reports of mines now evoke images of legless veterans, of maimed children, of Diana in protective gear walking near a minefield in Angola.

"Many, many mines were used in the Persian Gulf war, but no one thought about it," Ms. Fowler said. "Everybody is aware that mines were used in Kosovo. The treaty is setting a new international standard."

Still, as events have shown, a standard is one thing, the eradication of mines another.

Mines are cheap and durable and deadly. In Yugoslavia, which has not signed the treaty, Serbian troops heavily mined the routes along the mountainous borders with Albania and Macedonia that the Kosovo Liberation Army used to get in and out of the province; that forced the guerrillas into areas that exposed them to Yugoslav fire. Serbian police also used mines to booby-trap ransacked Albanian homes to keep refugees from returning home. (Many returned anyway, and died as a result.)

Another reason for discouragement is the weakness of the treaty itself.

The treaty -- the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction -- went into effect on March 1 on this year, six months after the 40th nation ratified it, but it has little force.

THERE is no governing organization to oversee it and no mechanism to punish those who violate it. It essentially relies on member states to monitor themselves and honestly report on what stockpiles they have and the efforts they are making to destroy them.

Supporters hope that global peer pressure will gradually force nations to comply. "You don't expect everybody to stop using mines overnight," said Caleb S. Rossiter, an analyst now conducting a study on mine strategy in Korea for the Vietnam Veterans of America. "Treaties like this take a long time to sink in."

There is universal agreement among the treaty's supporters that the biggest obstacle to that is the fact that the United States won't sign it.

Despite once advocating a ban, President Clinton bowed to pressure from Pentagon commanders opposed to the treaty's restrictions. They insist they need the most common type of land mines -- those left buried in the ground -- to protect South Korea from North Korea. They also want to keep using "smart" anti-personnel mines, sophisticated devices that self-destruct after a time, to shield larger anti-tank mines, which are not prohibited by the treaty since the weight of a human is not enough to trigger them.

The Administration has pledged to sign the treaty in the future -- but only after the Pentagon develops alternatives to mines, a process critics say has moved slowly.

"I don't think anybody questions the fact that we would be much further along if the United States was not only a participant in the treaty, but an active one," said Senator Patrick J. Leahy, a Democrat from Vermont and one of the most ardent advocates of a ban.

Without American support, Mr. Leahy added, "a lot of countries will say, 'Why should we sign when the United States, the most powerful country on earth, says it's not strong enough to give up land mines?' "

 

[7] Defense Dept. to Spend Millions to Bolster Germ-Warfare Defense
The New York Times May 22, 1998 By JUDITH MILLER

The Defense Department decided yesterday to spend $50 million to create biological response units in the National Guards of 10 of the most populous states, including New York, as President Clinton prepares to unveil several actions to increase the nation's defenses against germ attacks, Government officials said.

The steps are part of Mr. Clinton's determination to protect the nation against what he has called biological, computer and other "21st century threats" to American national security. The President will address these threats and his program to combat them in a speech today at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md. The measures include a long-planned consolidation of the Government's system for responding to such emergencies, and the making and stockpiling of early warning equipment, drugs and vaccines. They also commit the Government to spending more money on research and development to strengthen the nation's public health system so it can respond to germ terrorism and other such emergencies.

The White House has asked Government agencies to produce within two weeks estimates of how much the new steps will cost. But an advisory panel to the President has already urged Mr. Clinton to ask Congress to approve $2 billion over the next five years to "fill in the gaps in the nation's emergency preparedness system," one official said.

Officials emphasized yesterday that the President's program would enhance the Government's ability to deal not only with germ terrorism but also with the threat of infection from new germs, like H.I.V.

"With the revolution in genetic engineering, it is now possible to unravel how germs produce infections and to develop more effective medicines in blocking them," said Frank Young, the former director of the Department of Health and Human Services emergency preparedness office who headed the advisory panel that briefed Mr. Clinton last month at the White House. "Particularly relevant is the application of bio-technology to detecting and identifying germs within three-to-four hours, rather than days."

Dr. Young declined to discuss other recommendations in his panel's 16-page report, but other officials said that the document urged Mr. Clinton to stockpile enough vaccine and antibiotics against a bio-warfare attack in which up to six million Americans could be infected.

Before the speech, Mr. Clinton is expected to sign two directives to implement his policy on terrorism. In his speech, aides said, the President will announce the creation of a "national coordinator" to initiate anti-terrorist action, secure aid and iron out Government disputes. The job will go to Richard A. Clarke, now Mr. Clinton's special assistant for global affairs.

Senior officials told several reporters about the President's speech earlier this week on the condition that nothing be written before it was delivered. But other officials described the speech's content in greater detail yesterday after two newspapers broke the agreement.

An Administration official said that the Defense Department's 10new National Guard biological response units would help police, fire and public health officials in towns and cities cope with a germ attack. In addition to New York, the designated states are emergency response centers for the Federal Emergency Management Agency: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, Texas, Missouri, Colorado, California and Washington.

 

[8] U.S. Germ Warfare Review Faults Plan on Enforcement

The New York Times May 20, 2001 By MICHAEL R. GORDON and JUDITH MILLER

A confidential Bush administration review has recommended that the United States not accept a draft agreement to enforce the treaty banning germ weapons, according to American officials.

The recommendations appear certain to distress allies, who back the draft accord and are concerned that the new administration is concentrating too much on new military programs and not enough on treaties and nonproliferation. After six years of negotiations, diplomats in Geneva have produced the draft agreement, known as a protocol, which would establish measures to monitor the ban on biological weapons.

A 1972 treaty, which 143 nations have ratified, prohibits the development, production and possession of biological weapons. But the treaty has always lacked a means of verifying compliance. United States support for the protocol is critical to the effort to give the treaty teeth.

The Clinton administration cast the new protocol as an important tool to stem the spread of biological weapons. And international negotiators in Geneva have been rushing to complete it by November.

But the new Bush administration has taken a far more skeptical approach. In a unanimous review, its interagency team concluded that the current version of the protocol would be inefficient in stopping cheating, and that all its deficiencies could not be remedied by the negotiating deadline.

"The review says that the protocol would not be of much value in catching potential proliferators," a senior American official said.

The White House has yet to formally endorse the review's conclusions, but since all the relevant agencies agreed to it, the White House is considered virtually certain to go along. The real issue is what steps to adopt in light of the recommendations, and how to proceed diplomatically. Although the review strongly objects to the current version of the protocol, it does not rule out fresh attempts to address monitoring.

And the review is also emerging as a sensitive diplomatic problem. President Bush heads to Europe next month, and his administration has already been under fire for steering too unilateralist a course on foreign policy, by backing away from the Kyoto accords on global warming and, to a lesser extent, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. So the White House is eager to avoid a new split.

Tibor Toth, the Hungarian diplomat who has overseen the effort to negotiate the protocol, will fly to Washington this week to try to change the Bush administration's mind, American officials said.

"Different constituencies seem to see different flaws, which indicates it is a pretty good compromise," Mr. Toth said in a telephone interview. "If it still needs to be fixed, we have the time. Barriers have been raised to nuclear and chemical proliferation. If the world community fails to agree on a protocol to strengthen the ban on biological weapons after six years of talks, it will send a very unfortunate message."

The first step to ban germ weapons was taken when President Richard M. Nixon and other world leaders signed the treaty in 1972, at the dawn of arms control. But the agreement had no means of enforcing compliance. That became an enormous concern after President Boris N. Yeltsin conceded in 1992 that the Soviet Union had violated the accord by maintaining a long-standing biological-weapons program after the treaty went into force. Then evidence was acquired after the Persian Gulf war confirming that Iraq also had germ weapons, heightening fears over biological warfare. Most of the dozen or so countries that are believed to have biological weapons programs -- like Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea -- are members of the 1972 treaty.

So a decade ago, during the administration of Mr. Bush's father, the United States and other nations began studying what could be done to monitor the treaty. Six years ago, they began talks on a new protocol.

There have been many obstacles. China, which has little experience with formal arms-control treaties, is reluctant to allow on-site inspections. Pakistan is concerned that inspectors searching for germ weapons might investigate its nuclear weapons sites. And in the negotiations Iran has been trying to weaken controls on the export of biological equipment and materials, saying they hurt its civilian economies.

The United States, for its part, has had conflicting motivations. On one hand, it has worked to limit the scope of visits by foreign inspectors in order to protect American pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, which dominate the worldwide industry and are concerned with protecting their trade secrets.

And at the behest of the Pentagon, the government tried to limit inspections of American biodefense installations, which develop vaccines and protective equipment and analyze the germ warfare threat.

As a result, the United States has not been as tough on verification as most of its allies. And yet Washington also hoped that the protocol would discourage cheating.

Under the 210-page protocol, parties agree to make known their vaccine production facilities, the largest biodefense installations and facilities that do genetic engineering or aerosol studies with germ agents that are most likely to be used in weapons. But it would not require a declaration of all types of facilities that could be used to make weapons, including food and beverage plants and some pharmaceutical plants.

As for inspections, a new executive council would be established and a majority vote of the body would be required before an investigation of a suspicious plant could be carried out. That procedure, insisted on by American industry, is less strict than a similar provision in the treaty banning chemical weapons, which stipulates that such investigations are to be done unless there is a vote by three-fourths of a similar body to block them. Inspectors under the biological protocol would have to be granted access 108 hours after an inspection was approved.

Defenders say the goal of the protocol was never to provide air-tight verification but rather to increase the chances that cheaters would be caught and thereby deter violations. Some monitoring and openness, they say, is better than none.

But critics of the protocol say the accord would not really provide much security. A nation that was determined to cheat could find a way to do so and might use the limited inspections to throw other nations off the trail, they say. In this view, the United States would open itself up to inspections and get little in return.

When the Bush administration took office, the issue came to the fore. Donald A. Mahley, the American negotiator at the talks, proposed a review. The interagency group he led included working-level officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the Commerce Department, the Energy Department and intelligence agencies.

The review found 38 problems with the protocol, a handful of them serious. But its basic assessment was very critical. It concluded that the verification measures in the treaty were unlikely to detect cheating. At the same time, the review concluded that these same provisions might be used by foreign governments to try to steal American secrets.

The review recommended that the United States not support the draft protocol that Ambassador Toth had overseen. And it concluded that there was not enough time to fix all the problems before the negotiating deadline.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has approved the review, which has been circulating in the administration. Officially, however, the White House insists that the review has not been completed, in part because it has yet to figure out a new policy.

But as word of the review has begun to seep out, it is already prompting debate. Barbara H. Rosenberg, a specialist at the Federation of American Scientists, said the Bush administration should have worked to improve the accord during the last negotiating round if it did not like it. Instead, the United States was passive, with the new administration claiming that it could not act while the policy review was supposedly under way.

"The U.S. sat quietly throughout the sessions and said nothing," Dr. Rosenberg said. "It made no effort to improve the text."

But Michael L. Moodie, a senior arms control official in the first Bush administration, said the protocol was severely flawed and needed to be replaced by a new approach.

"The protocol was not going to get the job done," Mr. Moodie said. "It is it not going to deter proliferation." And if it was put into effect, he said, "we still would not be confident that there were not major violations going on."

If the White House, as expected, affirms the review, it has several alternatives. One is to try to improve the accord before the November deadline but to accept the fact that the United States is unlikely to obtain all the changes it would like. But there is little or no support for that approach in the administration.

Another is to ask that the deadline be extended so that negotiators would work on a substantially different protocol.

Or the United States could take a significantly different approach. Supporters of that idea, which is being actively discussed in the administration, say Washington should propose a stripped-down version of the protocol that would provide for investigations when violations of the convention are suspected. Such inspections, for example, might be carried out if there was a suspicious outbreak of disease, as happened in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979 when anthrax spores escaped from a biological weapons plant.

There is a recognition within the administration that breaking off talks on biological-weapons monitoring altogether is not feasible because of diplomatic costs. That is especially the case because the administration is already involved in sensitive talks with its allies on the missile defense issue and has been eager to show that it is not ideologically opposed to arms control.

Still, the turnabout in American policy is likely to provoke concern from American allies, particularly the British, who have been very active on the treaty.

When Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Washington in February, he insisted that the United States promise to pursue nonproliferation measures and not just missile defense, and the Bush administration agreed to mention nonproliferation in the statement that both leaders issued.

Chart: "CLOSER LOOK -- A Biological Warfare Sampler"

Biological weapons like those listed below are banned under the germ weapons treaty.

Anthrax, a bacteria, causes fever, fatigue, cough and other discomforts followed by severe respiratory distress. Shock and death can occur within 24 to 36 hours.

Tularemia, a bacteria, can result in fever, headache, weight loss, pneumonia and other symptoms, occasionally leading to death.

Smallpox, a virus, causes fever, vomiting, headaches, and in some cases delirium. Patients should be quarantined.
Botulinum, a toxin, results in general weakness, dizziness, blurred vision, and leads to paralysis and respiratory failure.
(Source: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases)(pg. 12)

 

[9] U.S. Rejects New Accord Covering Germ Warfare

The New York Times July 26, 2001 By ELIZABETH OLSON GENEVA

The United States today rejected an international accord aimed at enforcing a 1972 treaty banning germ weapons but said it would continue looking for ways to salvage the proposal.

The American decision appeared to effectively scuttle an attempt to strengthen the original United Nations treaty that prohibits developing, producing or possessing biological weapons. The agreement, or protocol, that was rejected by the Bush administration today was aimed at providing compliance provisions that were lacking in the treaty. "We don't think it can achieve its objectives, nor can it be fixed," said the chief negotiator for the United States, Donald A. Mahley, referring to the proposed accord.

His remarks ended weeks of speculation about American opposition to an effort that sought to thwart germ warfare while at the same time allowing legitimate commercial use of biological materials.

The United States announced its decision during the final session of negotiations by 56 nations. Reading his statement to a hushed crowd at the United Nations European headquarters, Mr. Mahley said, "In our assessment, the draft protocol would put national security and confidential business information at risk."

Mr. Mahley, who has been the top American negotiator on the biological pact since 1993, said the administration still supported the germ warfare treaty, but he appeared to close the door on any incremental changes in the draft enforcement pact to win Washington's support. He argued that the current effort would not improve "confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those countries seeking to develop biological weapons."

In Washington, a senior administration official said that at least 37 items in the proposal made it "unacceptable" and that the Clinton administration had also had the same concerns that the Bush administration now has.

But Elisa Harris, a former Clinton administration official who worked to strengthen the germ treaty, said the Clinton administration would most probably have worked with European and Asian allies to "achieve a draft protocol that met all of our requirements."

Barbara H. Rosenberg, spokesman for the Federation of American Scientists, agreed, saying the current protocol, despite its flaws, was the "most effective way to strengthen the treaty."

The alternatives being considered by the Bush administration drew mixed reviews from arms control advocates. Michael L. Moodie, a former arms control negotiator, said that while he supported the administration's rejection of the draft protocol, the administration would not find much international support for the alternatives it had discussed so far.

He called proposals to strengthen export controls and criminalize violations of the treaty "not really alternatives to an international framework."

Amy Smithson, an arms control expert with the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, called the protocol a "lemon."

"The wheels would have fallen off the car before it got off the lot," she said. "But it is incumbent upon the administration to get back to the negotiating table soon with realistic proposals to strengthen the treaty."

A senior administration official said that was what the White House intended. "Give us a chance," he said, emphasizing President Bush's commitment to bolstering the treaty, but through innovative approaches. "This is not a temper tantrum," the official said. "We're not walking out."

He said the administration knew that negotiators in Geneva had to decide what they should report to the conference that will take up the protocol in November. "We have a stake in that outcome," he said. "But biological arms control requires new ways of thinking about how to stop the spread of these unique weapons."

Turning its back on the proposed accord is the latest in Bush administration policy positions that have run counter to European thinking. Washington has already upset its allies by threatening to abandon the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and rebuffing a treaty on climate change known as the Kyoto Protocol.

Nevertheless, most of the countries that took part in the seven years of negotiations on biological weapons verification appeared resigned to the American withdrawal from the agreement.

"It's not worth having without the Americans signing up," said Elizabeth March, spokesman for the British disarmament negotiating team, which has been a leading supporter of the draft pact. "It wouldn't be worth the paper it's written on."

 

[10] U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits

The New York Times September 4, 2001 ONLINE EDITION By Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad

Over the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the global treaty banning such weapons.

The 1972 treaty forbids nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, but it allows work on vaccines and other protective measures. Government officials said the secret research, which mimicked the major steps a state or terrorist would take to create a biological arsenal, was aimed at better understanding the threat.

The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them.

Earlier this year, administration officials said, the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal for germ warfare.

The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a superbug, which was first created by Russian scientists. A Bush administration official said the National Security Council is expected to give the final go-ahead later this month.

Two other projects completed during the Clinton administration focused on the mechanics of making germ weapons.

In a program code-named Clear Vision, the Central Intelligence Agency built and tested a model of a Soviet-designed germ bomb that agency officials feared was being sold on the international market. The C.I.A. device lacked a fuse and other parts that would make it a working bomb, intelligence officials said.

At about the same time, Pentagon experts assembled a germ factory in the Nevada desert from commercially available materials. Pentagon officials said the project demonstrated the ease with which a terrorist or rogue nation could build a plant that could produce pounds of the deadly germs.

Both the mock bomb and the factory were tested with simulants — benign substances with characteristics similar to the germs used in weapons, officials said.

A senior Bush administration official said all the projects were "fully consistent" with the treaty banning biological weapons and were needed to protect Americans against a growing danger. "This administration will pursue defenses against the full spectrum of biological threats," the official said.

The treaty, another administration official said, allows the United States to conduct research on both microbes and germ munitions for "protective or defensive purposes."

Some Clinton administration officials worried, however, that the project violated the pact. And others expressed concern that the experiments, if disclosed, might be misunderstood as a clandestine effort to resume work on a class of weapons that President Nixon had relinquished in 1969.

Simultaneous experiments involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents and the developoment of more potent anthrax, these officials said, would draw vociferous protests from Washington if conducted by a country the United States viewed as suspect.

Administration officials said the need to keep such projects secret was a significant reason behind President Bush's recent rejection of a draft agreement to strengthen the germ-weapons treaty, which has been signed by 143 nations.

The draft would require those countries to disclose where they are conducting defensive research involving gene-splicing or germs likely to be used in weapons. The sites would then be subject to international inspections.

Many national security officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations opposed the draft, arguing that it would give potential adversaries a road map to what the United States considers its most serious vulnerabilities.

Among the facilities likely to be open to inspection under the draft agreement would be the West Jefferson, Ohio, laboratory of the Battelle Memorial Institute, a military contractor that has been selected to create the genetically altered anthrax.

Several officials who served in senior posts in the Clinton administration acknowledged that the secretive efforts were so poorly coordinated that even the White House was unaware of their full scope.

The Pentagon's project to build a germ factory was not reported to the White House, they said. President Clinton, who developed an intense interest in germ weapons, was never briefed on the programs under way or contemplated, the officials said.

A former senior official in the Clinton White House conceded that in retrospect, someone should have been responsible for reviewing the projects to ensure that they were not only effective in defending the United States, but consistent with the nation's arms-control pledges.

The C.I.A.'s tests on the bomb model touched off a dispute among government experts after the tests were concluded in 2000, with some officials arguing that they violated the germ treaty's prohibition against developing weapons.

Intelligence officials said lawyers at the agency and the White House concluded that the work was defensive, and therefore allowed. But even officials who supported the effort acknowledged that it brought the United States closer to what was forbidden.

"It was pressing how far you go before you do something illegal or immoral," recalled one senior official who was briefed on the program.

Public disclosure of the research is likely to complicate the position of the United States, which has long been in the forefront of efforts to enforce the ban on germ weapons.

The Bush administration's willingness to abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty has already drawn criticism around the world. And the administration's stance on the draft agreement for the germ treaty has put Washington at odds with many of its allies, including Japan and Britain.

The Original Treaty

During the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union produced vast quantities of germ weapons, enough to kill everyone on earth.

Eager to halt the spread of what many called the poor man's atom bomb, the United States unilaterally gave up germ arms and helped lead the global campaign to abolish them. By 1975, most of the world's nations had signed the convention.

In doing so, they agreed not to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile quantities or types of germs that had no "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." They also pledged not to develop or obtain weapons or other equipment "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

There were at least two significant loopholes: The pact did not define "defensive" research or say what studies might be prohibited, if any. And it provided no means of catching cheaters.

In the following decades, several countries did cheat, some on a huge scale. The Soviet Union built entire cities devoted to developing germ weapons, employing tens of thousands of people and turning anthrax, smallpox and bubonic plague into weapons of war. In the late 1980's, Iraq began a crash program to produce its own germ arsenal.

Both countries insisted that their programs were for defensive purposes.

American intelligence officials had suspected that Baghdad and Moscow were clandestinely producing germ weapons. But the full picture of their efforts did not become clear until the 1990's, after several Iraqi and Soviet officials defected.

Fears about the spread of biological weapons were deepened by the rise of terrorism against Americans, the great strides in genetic engineering and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left thousands of scientists skilled in biological warfare unemployed, penniless and vulnerable to recruitment.

The threat disclosed a quandary: While the United States spent billions of dollars a year to assess enemy military forces and to defend against bullets, tanks, bombs and jet fighters, it knew relatively little about the working of exotic arms it had relinquished long ago.

Designing a Delivery System

In the mid-1990's, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies stepped up their search for information about other nations' biological research programs, focusing on the former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Libya, among others. Much of the initial emphasis was on the germs that enemies might use in an attack, officials said.

But in 1997, the agency embarked on Clear Vision, which focused on weapons systems that would deliver the germs.

Intelligence officials said the project was led by Gene Johnson, a senior C.I.A. scientist who had long worked with some of the world's deadliest viruses. Dr. Johnson was eager to understand the damage that Soviet miniature bombs — bomblets, in military parlance — might inflict.

The agency asked its spies to find or buy a Soviet bomblet, which releases germs in a fine mist. That search proved unsuccessful, and the agency approved a proposal to build a replica and study how well it could disperse its lethal cargo.

The agency's lawyers concluded that such a project was permitted by the treaty because the intent was defensive. Intelligence officials said the C.I.A. had reports that at least one nation was trying to buy the Soviet- made bomblets.

A model was constructed and the agency conducted two sets of tests at Battelle, the military contractor. The experiments measured dissemination characteristics and how the model performed under different atmospheric conditions, intelligence officials said. They emphasized that the device was a "portion" of a bomb that could not have been used as a weapon.

The experiments caused concern at the White House, which learned about the project after it was under way. Some aides to President Clinton worried that the benefits did not justify the risks. But a White House lawyer led a joint assessment by several departments that concluded that the program did not violate the treaty, and it went ahead.

The questions were debated anew after the project was completed, this time without consensus. A State Department official argued for a strict reading of the treaty: the ban on acquiring or developing "weapons" barred states from building even a partial model of a germ bomb, no matter what the rationale.

"A bomb is a bomb is a bomb," another official said at the time.

The C.I.A. continued to insist that it had the legal authority to conduct such tests and, intelligence officials said, the agency was prepared to reopen the fight over how to interpret the treaty. But even so, the agency ended the Clear Vision project in the last year of the Clinton administration, intelligence officials said.

Bill Harlow, the C.I.A. spokesman, acknowledged that the agency had conducted "laboratory or experimental" work to assess the intelligence it had gathered about biological warfare.

"Everything we have done in this respect was entirely appropriate, necessary, consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and was briefed to the National Security Council staff and appropriate Congressional oversight committees," Mr. Harlow said.

Breeding More Potent Anthrax

In the 1990's, government officials also grew increasingly worried about the possibility that scientists could use the widely available techniques of gene-splicing to create even more deadly weapons.

Those concerns deepened in 1995, when Russian scientists disclosed at a scientific conference in Britain that they had implanted genes from Bacillus cereus, an organism that causes food poisoning, into the anthrax microbe.

The scientists said later that the experiments were peaceful; the two microbes can be found side-by-side in nature and, the Russians said, they wanted to see what happened if they cross-bred.

A published account of the experiment, which appeared in a scientific journal in late 1997, alarmed the Pentagon, which had just decided to require that American soldiers be vaccinated against anthrax. According to the article, the new strain was resistant to Russia's anthrax vaccine, at least in hamsters.

American officials tried to obtain a sample from Russia through a scientific exchange program to see whether the Russians had really created such a hybrid. The Americans also wanted to test whether the microbe could defeat the American vaccine, which is different from that used by Russia.

Despite repeated promises, the bacteria were never provided.

Eventually the C.I.A. drew up plans to replicate the strain, but intelligence officials said the agency hesitated because there was no specific report that an adversary was attempting to turn the superbug into a weapon.

This year, officials said, the project was taken over by the Pentagon's intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Pentagon lawyers reviewed the proposal and said it complied with the treaty. Officials said the research would be part of Project Jefferson, yet another government effort to track the dangers posed by germ weapons.

A spokesman for Defense Intelligence, Lt. Cmdr. James Brooks, declined comment. Asked about the precautions at Battelle, which is to create the enhanced anthrax, Commander Brooks said security was "entirely suitable for all work already conducted and planned for Project Jefferson."

The Question of Secrecy

While several officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations called this and other research long overdue, they expressed concern about the lack of a central system for vetting such proposals.

And a former American diplomat questioned the wisdom of keeping them secret.

James F. Leonard, head of the delegation that negotiated the germ treaty, said research on microbes or munitions could be justified, depending on the specifics.

But he said such experiments should be done openly, exposed to the scrutiny of scientists and the public. Public disclosure, he said, is important evidence that the United States is proceeding with a "clean heart."

"It's very important to be open," he said. "If we're not open, who's going to be open?"

Mr. Leonard said the fine distinctions drawn by government lawyers were frequently ignored when a secret program was exposed. Then, he said, others offer the harshest possible interpretations — a "vulgarization of what has been done."

But he concluded that the secret germ research, as described to him, was "foolish, but not illegal."

 

[11] Powell Will Not Attend United Nations Meeting on Racism

New York TimesAUG 27, 2001 On-line edition By DAVID STOUT WASHINGTON

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell will not take part in a United Nations conference on racism because the administration objects to language offensive to Israel that is being used by Arab delegates, the State Department said today. Moreover, the department refused to rule out a United States boycott of the event.

"It's clear to us now the secretary will not go to this conference," said the department's spokesman, Richard Boucher, confirming recent news reports. The conference in Durban, South Africa, begins Friday and runs until Sept. 7.

Mr. Powell's participation at the conference had been much anticipated because of his stature as the highest-ranking black official in the United States government. But President Bush said on Friday that the United States would not take part as long as some delegates to the conference want to "pick on Israel."

The Palestinian representative to the United Nations, Nasser al-Kidwa, said on Friday that Arabs planned to sharply criticize Israel at the conference. He said the theme of the criticism would be that all racism is unacceptable, "including those manifestations which are coming from Israel."

Israel objects to any reference to its struggle with the Palestinians on the grounds that it is a political dispute, not a racial one.

Mr. Boucher said the "exact nature and level of our representation, if any, is still being considered."

The phrase "if any" immediately prompted questions from reporters. Was it likely that the United States would "boycott the conference entirely," Mr. Boucher was asked.

"Oh, I'm not going to try to gauge likelihood of different scenarios," the spokesman replied. "There are different possibilities that we would have to consider. I think if you look at what the President said on Friday, if this doesn't change, if it stays the same, his feeling, I think was what he put it, maybe we shouldn't go at all. So that's obviously one of the possibilities that's still in play."

A United Nations spokeswoman, Marie Okabe, told The Associated Press that the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, had spoken with Mr. Powell over the weekend. She said she had no details of their exchange.

Mr. Annan, who is traveling in Austria, told reporters today that "efforts are being made" to refine the language that will come up at the conference in order to meet Israel's objections.

Mr. Boucher seemed to acknowledge that process when he said, "We'll have to look at the situation, about how this might evolve or change, based on the efforts that various people are making." But whatever those efforts are results, as of today Mr. Powell is not going.

The announcement that Mr. Powell would not attend was sure to please some people and disappoint others. The leaders of some Jewish organizations have pressed the White House to stay away from the conference. But some civil rights and human rights groups will probably be disappointed that the Secretary of State will not be there.

And Mr. Powell himself may be disappointed, even if he has concluded that he must stay away. Before the controversy erupted over the language regarding Israel he was known to be looking forward to the gathering.

 

[12] U.S. and Israel Quit Racism Talks Over Denunciation

New York Times September 4, 2001 THE OVERVIEW On-line edition By RACHEL L. SWARNS

DURBAN, South Africa, Sept. 3 — The United States and Israel walked out of the United Nations meeting on racism here tonight, denouncing a condemnation of Israel in a proposed conference declaration and lamenting that a meeting intended to celebrate tolerance and diversity had degenerated into a gathering riven by hate.

South Africa rushed tonight to convene emergency meetings to redraft the declaration and program of action in the hope of averting other walkouts, and a spokesman for the European Union delegation, which also raised concerns, said its diplomats would take part in the efforts to rewrite the draft documents.

In announcing his decision in Washington, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "I have taken this decision with regret because of the importance of the international fight against racism and the contribution that the conference could have made to it."

”But following discussions today by our team in Durban and others who are working for a successful conference, I am convinced that will not be possible," he said.

Secretary Powell said negotiators here had failed to persuade Arab delegates to remove criticism of Israel from proposed conference documents that assail "the racist practices of Zionism" and describe Israel's treatment of Palestinians as a "new kind of apartheid."

Questions about whether Israel should be condemned for its treatment of Palestinians and whether the West should pay reparations for slavery and colonialism have roiled conference preparations for months. Washington has said repeatedly that it would not consider language that criticized Israel or legitimized reparations for descendants of slaves.

The fact that the United States did not send Secretary Powell to the conference, which opened on Friday, was a sore point with many of the countries represented here. The United States and Israel both sent mid-level delegations.

The decision to withdraw even those delegations dashed the hopes of thousands who have brought their fight against intolerance to a country chosen by conference organizers for its remarkable story of racial reconciliation.

Olivier Alsteens, spokesman for the European Union delegation, said it had no immediate plans to withdraw, "But if at one moment, we feel there is no other opportunity, then we will leave all together."

The American and Israeli pullout was warmly applauded by Jewish groups but greeted with great regret by South Africa and other developing countries and with anger by black Americans and their supporters. It seemed likely only to heighten the frustration and divisions between the increasingly polarized groups.

Tonight, black Americans and their allies took to the streets here, chanting "Shame, shame U.S.A." The protesters said they were deeply disappointed that the United States could not find a way to compromise and sign an international declaration that is expected to condemn slavery and racial discrimination.

The Rev. Jesse Jackson, who has been urging the Arab League to back away from the charged language, and members of the Black Congressional Caucus also criticized the Bush administration's decision.

Representative Donna M. C. Christensen, a Democrat who is the delegate to Congress from the Virgin Islands, said, "It leaves African- Americans with no recognition of all the suffering we have had and all of the suffering we continue to have."

Representative Tom Lantos, Democrat of California and a delegation member, said he was sorry that the United States was pulling out. But he said the team, headed by E. Michael Southwick, a deputy assistant secretary of state, had no choice because the Palestinians and their supporters refused to compromise.

The American and Israeli decision came after officials from the United States and Norway had huddled for hours in closed-door meetings with Palestinian and other Arab officials, trying to broker a deal.

Norwegian diplomats proposed new language that mentioned the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but was fair to both sides, according to American officials. But the effort failed, and some meetings were so heated that participants ended up shouting.

"It was an ugly meeting," Mr. Lantos said in an interview. "This was not a question of persuading people. This was a question of an iron wall we were up against, and there was no give."

Arab officials blamed the Bush administration for the failure of the talks. Farouk Kaddoumi, a senior member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, accused the United States of using the dispute as a pretext to avoid serious discussion of slavery and reparations for the descendants of African slaves.

The Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Maher, said the Norwegian compromise document trivialized Palestinian suffering.

"The only mention of Israel is that the Palestinians and Israelis should go back to the peace process," Mr. Maher said in an interview. "That is not enough.

"We are talking about a war waged using the most sophisticated weapons on a civilian population," Mr. Maher said. "This is a government that has taken an official decision to assassinate people. You want this conference, which deals with discrimination, not to mention these things? That is precisely what must be raised."

Polarization has also been evident in the interactions of delegates from civic groups meeting here in the hope of influencing the final declaration on racism, which is to be completed on Friday.

Last week, some Arab groups here distributed offensive literature that included posters of Jews with big noses and bloody fangs. Members of Palestinian and Jewish groups shouted at each other during competing rallies. And on Saturday, about 25 Jews walked out of a meeting of civic groups when someone suggested removing references to anti-Semitism.

After the Jewish groups walked out, the coalition of civic groups approved a report that accused Israel of "racist crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide" in its treatment of Palestinians. The report is not binding, and it is unlikely the language would be adopted.

"The U.S. did not reject a discussion about racism, they rejected a conference that was tainted by racism," said Stacy Burdett, an assistant director at the Anti-Defamation League, who is attending the conference. "This wasn't a discussion about legitimate issues. It was a hijacking that vilified and demonized Jews."

Mordechai Yedid, the head of the Israeli delegation, said in an interview, "Our position has always been to agree to generic language, to the suffering of people, to war, to occupations."

"This time because the conference was so important to us and to our history as a people who suffered from anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, we have gone beyond, to specific language," he said.

Several human rights groups argued tonight that the United States should have stayed to improve the language about Israel and to show solidarity with the many suffering people in the world.

"We're very troubled by the whole Zionism as racism formulation as well, but we think our responsibility is to stay and have the conversation," said Karen K. Narasaki, president of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. "You certainly don't build your moral standing in the world by running away."

And the South African government warned that by leaving, the United States might give the impression that it was ducking tough issues, like race relations within its own borders.

"It will be unfortunate if a perception were to develop that the U.S.A.'s withdrawal from the conference is merely a red herring demonstrating an unwillingness to confront the real issues posed by racism in the U.S.A. and globally," the South African government said in a statement.