Introduction June 2 pp. 1-28

What is the overriding goal of states? 2 Why do great powers behave the way that they do? 3 What is a great power? 5 What is the use of theories? 8-9 What are the three core beliefs of liberalism? 15-16 What are the three main variants of liberalism? 16-17 What are the three core beliefs of realism? 18 What are the two main variants of realism? 18-19

Anarchy and the Struggle for Power June 3 pp. 29-46

What are the five bedrock assumptions of Mearsheimer’s theory? 30-31 Why are states unlikely to ever feel secure in the international system? 34-5 What is a hegemon? 40 What is the difference between a global and a regional hegemon? 41 In what ways do power considerations affect the intensity of fear among states? 44 When a state surveys its environment to determine which states pose a threat to its survival, what does it focus on? 45

Wealth and Power June 4 pp. 55-75

What are the two kinds of power that states possess? 55 Why should we not equate power with outcomes? 60 Why is wealth an important measure of power? 61 What is ‘mobilizable wealth’? 62 What is GNP? 63 How does Mearsheimer measure wealth? 67 How do the histories of France, Germany (in the 19^th Century), and Russia (up to 2000) illustrate the importance of wealth in determining power? 68-75

Strategies for Survival & Great Powers in Action

June 5 pp. 138-40 & 147-52; 168-72 & 209-13

What are the specific goals of great powers? 138 What are the strategies they use to achieve these goals? 138-9 What are the four arguments for why war is a losing proposition? 147-8 What are the five rebuttals that Mearsheimer gives to these arguments? 149-51 Who were the five dominant great powers over the past 150 years? 169 Which cases support offensive realism? 169 How do the United Kingdom and United States also support offensive realism, when on the face, they appear to contradict it? 170 What is the distinction between expanders and over-expanders, and why does Mearsheimer see this distinction as flawed? 210 What can we say about learning from the failures of previous great powers to attain regional hegemony? 212-13

The Offshore Balancers and Balancing versus Buck-Passing

June 9 pp. 234-238 (and assigned case study)

What was the overarching goal of American foreign policy throughout the 19^th Century? 236 Why did the US not try to conquer Europe or Asia? 236 If great powers cannot become global hegemons, what then, is their ultimate goal? 236-7 Why did the UK not try to conquer Europe? 237

Case Studies: Japan (1868-1945), Germany (1862-1945), Soviet Union (1917-1991), and United States (1800-1990)

The Causes of Great Power War June 10 pp. 334-359

What is a great power war? 334 What types of systems are most peaceful and most prone to deadly conflict? 335 What are the three patterns of power arrangements? 337-8 Why is war more likely in multipolar systems? 338 Why are unbalanced multipolar systems especially war-prone? 344-5 From 1792 to 1990, Mearsheimer divides up the distribution of power in Europe according to varying time-spans. What is the dominant trend in each time-span?348-56

Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century

June 11 pp. 384-402

What are the two likely scenarios for the power structures in Europe and Northeast Asia for the next 20 years? 385-6 Why is the US unlikely to fight a war in Europe or Northeast Asia? 388-9 Who are the likely great powers in Europe? 392 What would be the consequence – in balance of power terms – if the US pulled out of Europe? 394 Who are the likely great powers in Northeast Asia? 396 What are the two possible scenarios for the power structure in Northeast Asia? 399-400 What is the most dangerous scenario for the United States? 401 How has the US performed in confronting or eliminating this threat? 402