The rule providing for execution of the arrest warrant contains additional important safeguards. It may be executed only between 7:30 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on days when court is in session; the debtor must be brought directly before a Superior Court judge; the debtor shall be furnished with a blank form of the questions on the information subpoena; and upon answering the questions, the debtor shall be immediately released. _R._ 6:7-2(g). Thus the deprivation of liberty will be minimal in duration and limited in scope. The debtor will not be placed in a holding cell or jail. He or she will not be "processed" as are traditional arrestees by fingerprinting, photographing and the like. Upon answering the questions, the person may leave. Although this is an arrest, and indeed a temporary deprivation of liberty, it is designed to be a minimally intrusive means of compelling compliance with court orders. Answering the questions on the information subpoena is a simple matter. Before being subject to arrest, a debtor is given three chances, by means we have determined to be effective, to answer them. The notices adequately inform the debtor of the potential consequences of failure to comply. The debtor is given an opportunity to appear in court and explain to a judge why compliance should not be required. The debtor is informed of the right to seek vacation of a default judgment and is urged to seek the advice of counsel. Balancing the rights of creditors to have their judgments satisfied efficiently, without undue delay or cost, _New Brunswick Sav. Bank v. Markouski_, 123 N.J. 402 (1991), against the minimal intrusion on a debtor's liberty only after multiple notices and opportunities to avoid the intrusion and subject to the safeguards we have discussed, we are convinced due process is satisfied. ^See footnote 2 <#Footnote2> There was no basis to refuse to issue the arrest warrant. We are mindful that _Rule_ 6:7-2(g) provides that the court "may" issue an arrest warrant upon submission of the required proofs. This allows for judicial discretion to refuse issuance in appropriate circumstances. The reason for rejection here was that proof of service was insufficient because of a lack of proof that defendant was personally served with or had actual notice of the order for arrest. This is not legally required. Because the judge's decision was made under a misconception of the applicable law, it did not constitute an appropriate exercise of discretion and we need not defer to it. _State v. Steele_, 92 N.J. Super. 498 , 507 (App. Div. 1966); _Kavanaugh v. Quigley_, 63 N.J. Super. 153 , 158 (App. Div. 1960). Neither the trial court here nor the court in _Reed_ considered the special safeguards incorporated in _Rule_ 6:7-2(g) applicable to arrest warrants, which provide appropriate and adequate protections to debtors whose liberty interests are at stake, beyond the protections provided to those debtors facing only the loss of a property interest. _Reed_ is overruled. Reversed.