Bible
Study
Chapter
3 God’s Eternal Decrees (part IIi): Human Responsibility
By:
Moses Flores
Our studies on the decrees of God have not been easy and neither do they get easier as one studies the decrees. We have seen that “whatsoever comes to pass” is all decreed by the sovereign will of God from all eternity. Hard as it may seem, we have seen evidence from the Scriptures that God also decrees evil and sin in the world, yet without being the author of it. How this is so, we may not fully understand especially since sin and evil can only happen through the decrees and will of God.
What is more is how we as creatures of God are responsible at all to God if all things happens because He wills them in a sense. Most people have the idea that our responsibility to God is based on the “freedom” of the creature to choose. So, one typically asks themselves when they hear of the decrees of God: “How am I a responsible creature if I am not ‘free’ from the decrees of God? Doesn’t that mean that I don’t have a choice in anything that I do? Don’t I have a ‘free will’? ”
This is the question that we are now faced with in the decrees of God. We will begin be exploring different types of “freedom” that have been proposed in theology and philosophy. Here, we must note that we step outside of the bounds of Scripture and into the realm of metaphysics, for Scripture does not explicit deal with this topic of the nature of the human will. It does, however, reveal example of how human most likely make their choices and what they are based on. We must, especially, be clear to define “free will” and understand its implications. After viewing various proposed forms of “choice theory”, we must then evaluate, based on Biblical data which theory, if any at all, is most consistent with the Scriptures. And then in doing so, we must then ask if the choice theory the Bible appears to teach is consistent with saying that God does not, as the Confession says,
“represses the will of his created beings, or that he takes away the freedom or contingency of secondary causes.”
These are not light subjects at all. In fact, depending on which choice theory one selects for their world view, they can deny altogether the existence of a true God, and change the Gospel of Grace. It is with a holy posture, then, that we engage this subject.
Forms of Freedom
The big question that we are getting into deal with whether or not we are “free” creatures who can, therefore be responsible to God for the things that we do. To even begin answering this question at all, especially as it relates to clearing God of the charge of committing evil and even determining evil through the creatures, we need to understand what is meant by “free” especially as it relates to the human will. Philosophically speaking, there have been various views of “freedom” that have been offered. We will look at only a few, evaluate them and then see which ones are most consistent with Scripture.
Determinism
To begin with, we look at a position that doesn’t so much describe “freedom” but is rather a matrix in which views of freedom have emerged from. This view is called Determinism. As the name suggests, Determinism is the belief that all choices are determined by something else. Every event that happens has a cause that makes it happen exactly the way it happens so that it cannot be otherwise. Each event necessarily happens. There is no room for “contingency” – or unnecessary events.
For
instance, when a person commits a crime – say a murder – determinism would
argue that the person committed that crime necessarily. That is, given certain conditions that were
met (causes), the person necessarily choose to take an innocent life
(effect). While this position sounds
“fatalistic” it is not due to one slight difference. Fatalism involves the belief that an event
unavoidable. That is to say, determinism
at least works with human agency while Fatalism can say that an event would
have happened with or without human agency.
In other words, determinism operates logically in that given circumstance x, event y will
necessarily take place. Fatalism, on
the other hand, merely posits events x and y occurring without necessarily using agency to get from x to y.
Another difference from determinism and fatalism is one respecting attitude. The determinist, since still an agent within the cause and effect relationship of events, may feel a connection to events, such as emotions. The fatalist, on the other hand, accepts that since events happen inevitably, he has no real connection to events since they would have occurred with or without them. The attitude of a fatalist, in other words, personifies Doris Day’s song, “Que Sera, Sera” – whatever will be, will be.
Theologically speaking, determinism is certainly attuned with the sovereign decrees of God, which is that all things that happen have been predetermined from all eternity. Thus, we could call the belief in the eternal immutable decrees of God “Theistic determinism”. That is to say, the Reformed or Calvinist traditions believes that all events happens precisely as God has foreordained, or predestined them to happen (cf. Eph. 1:11). So in a very real sense, a Christian who believes in the God described in the Bible must necessarily believe in determinism.
The main critique against determinism is this: If all events happen necessarily, then how, or on what basis, is man free and responsible for his actions? For instance, to give a Biblical example, the Scriptures plainly teach that Judas was chosen from the beginning to betray Christ. Now, if Judas was chosen to betray Christ, and the betrayal was foreordained and determined by God, this mean that Judas necessarily betrayed Christ, for otherwise God’s decree would not have come to pass and God would not be sovereign, and ultimately not God. Is Judas responsible for this act that was committed of necessity according to God’s decree? A “hard determinist” position would say that Judas holds no moral responsibility, for Judas’ action was caused by something beyond his own control. A “soft determinist” stills maintain moral responsibility.
Christian theism is right in maintaining determinism, for in it God is truly God and alone determines all things in the world. All things are ultimately caused by God in a primary level. God is the primary cause for all things. Still, the question of responsibility lingers. How are the creatures, who are acting out in accordance with God’s predetermined will, to be responsible? Christian theology must reject the position of non-responsibility for it is clear from the Scriptures that God holds us morally accountable for our actions as will finally be seen in the great day of Judgment.
Libertarian Free Will
Determinism was the position that all things are caused and happen necessarily through causation. We come now to the opposite end of that spectrum with a view that is called “Libertarianism” or more commonly as “free will”.
Philosophically
speaking, the view the most misunderstood view.
Theologically, it is the view that is currently dominating the
“the belief that the human will has an inherent power to choose with equal ease between alternatives. This is commonly called the ‘power of contrary choice’ or ‘the liberty of indifference’. This belief does not claim that there are no influences that might affect the will, but it does insist that normally the will can overcome these factors and choose in spite of them. Ultimately, the will is free from any necessary causation. In other words, it is autonomous from outside determination.[1]”
What this view is intending to say is this: That while deterministic factor certainly exist and often act upon the will, the will is totally free from such things so that it can choose between all options with equal ease. For instance, supposing that before me is a nice and delicious Porterhouse Steak which I love very much. Supposing, also that there was a plate of liver, which I personally do not like at all. According to the Libertarian model of freedom, although I certainly love steak (outside influence), in order to be truly free, I must be able to choose the plate of liver with equal ease. If I choose the steak, a Libertarian would argue that I was bound to, or not free from, my affection for steak. Hence, my choice was not truly free. Libertarians don’t argue against the existence of influences though. However, the true act of freedom is displayed when I choose contrary to the outside influences and other such things that would seek to determine my choice. The key understanding is that the will is autonomous.
According to this model then, responsibility is grounded in the ability to choose between contrary choices. Thus, if I am not able to choose between contrary choices with equal ability, then I am not morally responsible for the choice.
Theologically, where this really
comes into play is in the Gospel call and in the effects of sin, which in turn,
has implications for the meaning of the word “grace”. For instance, when a sinner hears the Gospel
message, the question we ask here is does the sinner possess the freedom to
choose the Gospel or is he bound to his sinfulness? Historically, a man by the name of Pelagius,
a British monk, argued against
But now the monkey wrench: If in order to be free my choices must not be caused by any outside influence, then what is the basis for making any choice at all? It would appear that there is no reason, or no cause for making a choice. The choice just happens or is random and it would appear that we have a violation of the maxim, “out of nothing, nothing comes”. Here comes the monkey wrench: If a choice “just happens” contrary to my own desires or circumstances, how can I be held responsible for the choice at all – whether good, leading to moral praise or bad, leading to moral punishment? For instance, supposing that I saw someone in trouble and needed my assistance. Now, if I helped them, what would be the basis of giving moral praise to me if the choice happened autonomously, or free from my person or character, or moral virtues? Technically, it is not the moral character that I possessed that made the choice thus, my person should not deserve the praise.
This is one of many problems with the idea of Libertarian, or autonomous free will. Among other problems include the fact that this view of human freedom is never explicitly taught in Scripture. Other problems include the fact that we do in fact hold people morally responsible for their choice. In fact, our entire legal and court system is based on the belief that people are accountable for their own actions. We also find this view in direct contradiction to previous teachings on the decrees and sovereignty of God which are explicitly taught in Scripture. John Frame’s “Doctrine of God” lists 18 reasons why we should reject the Libertarian view of Freedom that are well worth looking into.[2]
While we certainly must reject the Libertarian view of Freedom, we must maintain, though certainly not with the same grounds, that men are responsible for their own actions, especially their own sin. However, it is obvious that one cannot consistently maintain a belief in God and human autonomy as well, for if God is God, He must be God of all creation and thus ruling all that goes on within it. Were humans to be autonomous from God, then the only thing we could say is that functionally, we are equally God for we rule within our own sphere and God rules within His.
We can put the dilemma this way; supposing that God wanted a particular person to be saved. God went to many extremes to provide righteousness for the person and atonement for sins, etc… Now, all that the person needs to do is to have faith in Jesus Christ in order to be saved and have all the work of Christ applied to his or her life. God’s will is obvious that He wants the person to be saved. But the person is free from outside influence. His choice must not be determined or influenced in any way so that he can be responsible for his will. It is all up to him or her. So, now, God is in the one hanging in the balance of waiting to see what choice will be made. Does this sound like the God of Bible? God left to the will of the creatures in order to see His own desires fulfilled? Obviously not. Daniel 4:35 reminds that God does “according to His will among the hosts of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand or say to Him, ‘what have you done?’”
Compatibilism
So how do we balance the extremes of determinism, which is obviously in agreement with the sovereignty of God and Libertarianism which is at least right in asserting that we are responsible creatures? One such view is a middle ground between Libertarianism and Determinism that is called “Compatibilism”. Compatibilism is referred to as such because it is a view of “freedom” that is compatible with determinism.
According to Compatibilism, while our choices our determined by influences such as circumstance and character, or desires, etc…we are free to choose within our own respective desires. Freedom, in other words,
“is a matter of not being physically or psychologically forced or compelled to do what one does. Your character, personality, preferences, and general motivational set may be entirely determined by events for which you are in no way responsible (by genetic inheritance, upbringing, subsequent experience, and so on). But you do not have to be in control of any of these things in order to have compatibilist freedom. They do not constrain or compel you, because compatibilist freedom is just a matter of being able to choose and act in the way one prefers or thinks best.”[3]
In other words, the will always acts according to its desires if it is to be considered “Free”. Thus, while there is a sense of determinism, it is not the case that we are mindless robots, or that we act in such a way that we are forced, or coerced, to do anything that we do not desire to do.
But here comes the objection: What of the person who points a gun to your head and asks you to give you your wallet or they will take your life? Does this type of situation take away freedom? According to this view, not necessarily. For even if a gun is pointed to our head, that merely functions to bring out a strong desire within every human being, which is the will, or the desire, to live. Thus, has the gun or external influence taken away our ability to choose? No. On the other hand, it has brought out strong desires that cause us to choose. For we could choose to give him the wallet out of a desire to save our life, we could choose to refuse the gunman and then he would take our life and our money anyway, or we could choose to not act at all or to freeze, if you will. All these are still choices. Which one wins out is determined according to our strongest desires at the moment of choice.[4]
If this model of human freedom is correct, then the essential question is not really the one of freedom when it comes to choosing, but really of desire. And that question get driven further when we must consider the nature of the one who is desiring. For instance, consider Jesus Christ. Being that He was God in the flesh and completely free from the corruption and stain of sin, indeed He was righteous to the very core of His being. Could Jesus Christ choose to sin? It would hardly seem viable that a person who was so pure in nature and which showed in His thought, word and deeds that he could choose to sin. But what about the sinner? If a sinner is one who is corrupted by sin, guilty of sin, loves to sin(John 3:19), desires to sin, has a heart that is enmity toward God (cf. Romans 8:7-8), then when it comes time to choose to live righteously or sinfully, what will the sinner choose? According to Compatibilism, he or is determined to choose sin. But we must note that he or she chose to sin of their own will based on their own desires, corrupted as they are.
Therefore, the sinner is responsible for their own sin. No one forces them to sin even though they sin of necessity (determinism) to their nature. In other words, they are free to be what they are by nature – sinners. There is no coercion or a “divine gun” to one’s head taking away the will of the creature. Thus, while God is the primary cause in that He has determined all things to be according to His decree, He has ordained it in such as way as to use the sinful desires of the creatures, thus giving way to “secondary causes”. This is what the Westminster Confession means when it says that God does not
“…represses the will of the creature, or that he takes away the freedom or contingency of secondary causes. Rather, the will of created beings and the freedom and contingency of secondary causes are established by Him”
God does not make the decisions though us. God has ordained and decreed that our desires cause our wills to make authentic choices. Thus, His primary will which causes all things decreed that the will of the creatures be used, though ultimately superintended, by God. The use of the will of the creatures is the establishment of secondary causes.
In summation, Compatibilism would certainly be in agreement with the sovereign decrees of God in determining all things, while also holding the creatures “free” and still responsible for their own sins. Responsibility, here, is not based on ability. Rather, responsibility is based on obligation to God and his commandments. In other words, human responsibility is a consequence of God’s authority.[5] Were we to base responsibility on ability here, then no one would at all be responsible for their sins because sinners can only sin, so they would not be accountable for something they didn’t possess the ability to do. But if a sinner is obligated to God, not because of his ability to commit or not commit sins, it should become clear that sinners, in a sense, are responsible for what they are: sinners.
Thus, in the compatibilistic model of freedom, the dilemma of Divine sovereignty and human freedom is neutralized. God remains sovereign and humans remain responsible for their moral acts, all while be able to act out who they are. There is never any coercion.
Is Compatibilism Biblical?
It would seem to be the case that Compatibilism is the most reasonable view to take in regards to human responsibility and the decrees of God, especially regarding sin and evil. But we must ask for more than reason here. We must ask the consent of Scripture.
When looking for evidence of this view, we must understand that we ought not to expect an explicit statement defining what Compatibilism is. Indeed, the writers of Scripture were not concerned with such metaphysical definitions, nor did they have them in mind. What we are looking for is implicit evidence that will help us to understand God’s rule and our responsibility to Him, without placing God as the direct agent of choices involving sin and evil. Let’s start off with the “big one”, the fall of Adam and Eve.
In Genesis 1:31 we are told the all of the creation of God, including man in it, was “very good.” Yet, as we see it today, something has obviously happened. Who is responsible for it: God or man? According to Compatibilism, Adam and Eve desired to act in such a way so as to disobey God. The Scriptures show that this is the case and it happened through the agency of the serpent. In Genesis 3, the serpent encounters Eve and he begins to instill doubts in her mind about the goodness of God by asking, “Did God say you shall not eat of every tree of the garden?” After some dialogue about becoming like God, the way Eve viewed the fruit was different. The Scriptures says that when Eve saw the tree after her dialogue that the tree “was good for food, that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree desirable to make one wise…” Notice the influences molding Eve’s will – her senses, her values and her very desires are all being acted upon here.
Upon having these desires, then Eve’s will springs to action and the Scripture says that she took of its fruit and ate (Gen. 3:6). Adam also ate with her. Thus, here we see that the desires shaped the will of Adam and Eve. God did not make them fall in anyway. They fell of their own will through their own desires.
This is not the place to be exhaustive about such a presentation, but certainly I think the Scriptures support the compatibilist theory of freedom. Even in James 1:14 says that we are tempted when we are lured and enticed by our own desires. That is to say, our sinfulness inherited from Adam is the cause of our own temptations. God does not tempt us. Our own sinfulness and old desires that still linger cause us to sin, yet we are still responsible to God for them and yet, God has “predestined all things” (Eph. 1:11). There is no contradiction in understanding here at all.
Conclusion
These topics certainly are not easy at all to cover. This study has only been able to cover three proposed theories of freedom and responsibility out of many others. However, it seems clear that Compatibilism is the most consistent with the Scriptures. In this theory, we always choose according to our strongest desires. These desires could be immediate desires or long term desires as well.
In regards to God’s decrees and evil, we can see that God is not responsible for evil because He has nothing evil within Him. Rather, God uses secondary causes, or the will of the creatures governed by the nature and desires of the creatures to bring about God’s will and carry out the decrees of God in the world. This is not always easy to accept, but certainly there are not serious objections of people to the concept of freedom as doing what I want to do. That is the most common way we use the term. We do what we want to do. The question now, is “what do I want to do? What do I desire to do?” And then here we are driven further to the nature of the one desiring. And it is man, that is the agent of evil in this world. God is not the one who is sinning. He does allow for much freedom of the creatures to be what they are and do what they want to do; be at enmity with Him. Yet God is in total control of how much enmity against Him they are allowed to express. Why God allows some particular evils we will never know. But the complaint shouldn’t be directed as to say that men are not free. Indeed, men are free to be whatever they desire.
“From all eternity and by the completely wise and holy purpose of his own will, God has freely and unchangeably ordained whatever happens. This ordainment does not mean, however, that God is the author of sin (he is not), that he represses the will of his created beings, or that he takes way the freedom or contingency of secondary causes. Rather, the will of created beings and the freedom and contingency of secondary causes are established by him.”
Amen.
[1] McGregor
Wright, R. K. , quoted in “The Doctrine of God” by John M. Frame, Presbyterian
and Reformed,
[2] Frame, “The Doctrine of God”, pg. 138-145
[3] Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT1 , accessed on October 11, 2006
[4] This
material from “Chosen by God” by R.C. Sproul, Tyndale House Publishers,
[5] Frame, Doctrine of God, pg. 119