Walter Crocker on Nehru's Rape of Goa

By Walter R. Crocker, from his book, Nehru: A Contemporary's Estimate. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966. p. 119-127. Crocker had been Ambassador of Australia at Delhi during Nehru's rule, and was also a fellow-Liberal and an admirer of Nehru. Comments & Footnotes by Lúcio Mascarenhas.
©Lúcio Mas, formerly "Prakash". June 28, 2005.
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Towards midnight on Sunday December 17, 1961, Indian forces invaded Goa. Three columns of infantry, led by parachutists and supported by tanks and artillery, crossed the Indo-Portuguese border at three points, while the Indian Air Force bombed the one Portuguese airport and the Indian Navy, marshalled in strength along the Goa coast, shelled the only Portuguese craft in Goa, an old-fashioned frigate. Armed Services Attaches in the various Embassies in Delhi later, after study, believed that there was no cause for either air or naval bombarding except to allow the Air Force and the Navy to share in the glory of the conquest1. At the same time as the attack on Goa was launched the two other, and much less important, Portuguese territories, Damao and Diu, were occupied2.

On the following day, Monday, December 18th, the Security Council of the United Nations was seized of a Portuguese complaint of Indian aggression. Soviet Russia vetoed a discussion of the subject.

Nehru had been back only a few weeks from a peace tour which had taken him to Belgrade, Moscow, Washington, Mexico and the U.N. At the U.N., he had proposed a year devoted to peaceful co-operation.

Goa, with an area of about 1,500 square miles, and lying about 200 miles south of Bombay, had been under Portuguese sovereignty for four and a half centuries. Nearly half the population of Goa were Catholics of long standing; a large proportion of the non-Catholics were of immigrant stock from India3. The standard of living was higher, and taxes were lower, than in India; for which reason Indians liked to migrate there. Life was easy going and relaxed in the Portuguese way; there was no self-government of the British kind4 but Government was paternalistic as well as more efficient than in India, and, except for a handful of malcontents, most of whom had migrated to Bombay, and, in spite of Indian money or other support given to the agitators among this handful of malcontents, there was no appreciable discontent and no appreciable demand for absorption into India. The Portuguese Governor-General was respected, and by all accounts deserved to be. Portugal's retention of Goa might have been an anachronism but it was not resented by most Goans. India's claims to Goa was never stronger than that she had a right to the whole Peninsula (saving Pakistan)5; by which logic Spain has a right to Portugal or the Irish Republic has a right to Ulster. This is simply the claim of I want it.

The Indians had worked for a coup d'etat in 1954; but their plans had failed. Indian propaganda about an uprising inside Goa for joining India had been exposed at the time. The reports of The Times correspondent exemplify the position. As is usual in Portuguese colonies, race and personal relations were good. Nehru appeared to have had little or no part in the 1954 affair, but he did break off diplomatic relations with Portugal6. Since 1954 considerable effort had been made from time to time to whip up a pro-India movement. Among the people in Goa the movement was met with indifference when not with hostility; just as throughout India as a whole there was no interest in Goa. The only success was in Bombay amongst the Goanese migrants, mostly professional people; and it was difficult to know how sincere their agitation was. One of these people, a medical man, for instance, gained Nehru's attention in the 'fifties and got a good medical appointment, though he was not well regarded by leaders of the medical profession in Delhi. Agitating inside India and amongst Indians against Portugal gave such an escape from anonymity. Now that Goa has been taken over they have relapsed into a few hundred or thousand among 500 million Indians and count for nothing.

In the last week of November 1961 the Indian press, on information supplied by the Government, reported an incident of what was officially described in headlines as 'Portuguese firing on an Indian passenger ship'7. (It later turned out, though this was reported in only a few papers, that 'the passenger ship' was a 'country craft' sailing-boat of yawl size, and that it was in Portuguese territorial waters apparently flouting warning signals.) This was followed by what was played up, on Government prodding, as 'another Portuguese firing incident', this time an Indian fishing boat. This incident was blown up enough to awaken the ever acute nationalistic sensibilities in India. It was not revealed that the boat was poaching in Portuguese waters. Some missions at Delhi believed (but as far as I know produced no evidence for their belief) that the boat had been sent there by the Indian authorities as an agent provacateur. Next came a series of reports, blown up more and more, about what were described, again in headlines, as 'Portuguese attacks on Indian villages'. The information was highly-colored, but also highly vague; as were the accompanying allegations about 'Portuguese troops massed on the Indian border'8. Some of the Indian newspapers, presumably not by accident, published articles on the Inquisition in the Goa of the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries at the same time as they published the reports alleging Portuguese aggressions9. By the beginning of December troop movements from all over India towards the Portuguese territories, more particularly towards Goa, were on such a scale that they could not be concealed. Passenger and ordinary freight services were cancelled by the Railways for some days on end. Around Delhi itself we could see the trains moving troops and materials to the south, day after day.

Nehru made many statements from late November. As was not unknown with him, the statements could mean several things; the blankets of verbiage wrapped up his meanings so thickly that they were hard to unravel. But two points were repeated. First, there is a crisis. The crisis was indicated only vaguely. Second, and more boldly, if Portugal does not renounce sovereignty over Goa in favor of India, and do so forthwith, there can be no peace. The time for negotiations has passed.

Foreign Governments, receiving reports from their missions in Delhi, began to sense that something untoward might be afoot. Diplomatic efforts were therefore initiated from several quarters to forestall violence. Several Latin-American Governments, notably Brazil, offered help and suggested mediatory courses. The British Government also offered its services, asked Nehru to give an assurance that India would not resort to force (which he refused), and pressed for a diplomatic solution. U Thant on behalf of the U.N., like the United States, also asked India not to resort to force, but with more perfuntoriness than the British or the Latin-Americans. U Thant did offer to send U.N. observers to the Indo-Portuguese borders; Nehru rejected the offer.

Nehru announced to the Indian public, with more frequency and in increasingly bellicose terms, that India's patience was coming to an end. With diplomats, however, he was indirect. Although shifting his ground with them more than once, certain points did recur. These were:
  1. Goa was a threat to India's security. There was 'a tremendous military build-up' there; it had become 'an armed camp'; 'aggressive manoeuvres' were going on which India could not ignore; (After, but as far as I could find out, not before, the Indian invasion, Nehru spoke darkly of 'NATO Weapons'—which the Indian public took to mean nuclear weapons—in GOa, and of a 'tie-up with Pakistan which made the problem more urgent than the border dispute with China'.)

  2. Inside Goa law and order had broken down because of a nationalist uprising of the people against the Portuguese. The 'white Portuguese'—another significant phrase—after trying to crush the uprising with 'a reign of terror', 'mass imprisonment', 'torture atrocities' and 'massacres', which Nehru characterized as 'gruesome', were fleeing the country to escape from their overwrought subject. At one stage, the Governor-General was announced to have fled; untruthfully. Further, at Belgaun, near the border, there were said to be between 15,000 and 20,000 volunteers and 'Goa commandos' waiting to rush in to relieve theri martyred compatriots. The Indian Army could not hold back these volunteers much longer. When the invasion was at last announced the Order of the Day to the Indian troops said that they were going in to liberate the people in Goa and to restore law and order, which 'the colonialists can no longer maintain'. On the following day, the 18th, Heads of Mission in Delhi were given a Note on the invasion in which it was stated, inter alia, that the Indian Army was taking over Goa 'to end the holocaust and massacres', as well as to end the threat to Indian security.

  3. The pressures on the Indian Government to take over Goa was 'irresistible', 'unbelievable'; all the Parties in India, Ambassadors and foreign pressmen were told, wanted India to take over; if Nehru did not acquiesce he would have to resign as Prime Minister.

  4. India had exhausted all her efforts for peaceful settlement and now had no alternative than to use force. (Some months before that he had said that India would never use force to solve the Goa problem.) India would not negotiate except over matters to be settled after Portugal had handed over Goa to India. But Portugal must quit, and at once.
Certain foreign newspapers of standing, like the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, the Daily Telegraph, and The Times, happened to have had their correspondents, responsible and trained observers, in Goa at this time; two of them there for a fortnight before the invasion as well as during it. What struck them all were the lies—'fantastic lies' was the term used to me by two of them—about the internal situation in Goa being poured out over the Indian radio and in the Indian press prior to and during the invasion. Some of the correspondents doubted if there were any volunteers at Belgaun at all. One though that there might have been a handful there, mostly clerks and minor political types brought down from Bombay and dressed for the occasion, for photographic propaganda purposes. As for 'the tremendous military build-up', a senior General concerned with the operation told me months later, by which time Volunteers and 'the Goa Commandos' had been forgotten (and were never heard of again), that it would have been criminal on the part of the Portuguese authorities to have resisted the Indian invasion as they had only about 2,500 troops; and they were poorly trained and without proper equipment, and they had no armour or artillery worth speaking of, no air support, and only one naval vessel, the old-fashioned frigate already mentioned.

The Times representative, some weeks after the invasion, and after collecting and collating the facts, wrote a long objective article; but his editor, in the interests of good Anglo-Indian relations, decided not to publish it; the plain facts were not agreeable10.

For against the exiguous Portuguese forces the Indians sent in an invading force estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000 troops, trained, highly equipped, and with support weapons11. Most of the Indian newspapers did their best to glorify the invasion, including spreading misinformation about the Portuguese, such as that they had carried out 'a scorched earth policy'. Indian journalists in fact were not allowed into Goa for nearly a week after the invasion. The truth became available only because some foreign journalists happened to be there when the invasion took place.

Not that the Portuguese authorities were above criticism. There is little or nothing to be charged against those on the spot but the Government in Portugal persisted right to the end in an unrealistic attitude, as well as in the legalism about Goa being no colony but an integral part of Portugal, years after warning had been given. Confronted with the claims of the Indian Government, and with the position in the U.N., Portugal should have offered to hold a plebiscite in Goa, under U.N. supervision if possible, otherwise under any ad hoc international supervisory group, for or against the status quo. It is doubtful if India would have won the plebiscite.

The reaction in India to the Goa affair surprised most foreign diplomats. Some it astounded, as did the whole affair. They had not expected, on the one hand, such a conformist acceptance of what was so manifestly a put-up job, or, on the other, such an outburst of nationalism of the crude tribal sort. Very few Indians at any level protested against it. J.P. Narayan was one of the leaders who did. Rajagopalachari, great and greatly courageous once more, after so many occasions, denounced it squarely for what it was. This was only a few weeks before the General elections; he knew that it would cost votes to the party he was leading, but he did not hesitate (Statement in newspaper Swarajya, December 15, 1961 & January 6, 1962). various other people of importance, including at least two Cabinet Ministers, deplored it, but only in private. Krishna Menon, not Gandhi, was not the guide for policy. For whether, as was thought, Krishna Menon conceived and launched this aggression or not it was surely in his spirit. Prior to the invasion he, in his role of Minister of Defence, proclaimed to the Indian forces that they were 'going to help the people of Goa following the collapse of colonial administration due to the liberation movement of the local people'.

After the aggression not a few speeches were made. Nehru spoke several times. Then on December 28th he spoke for two hours. Evading the real issues, he argued that the action was not against, but in conformity with, U.N. principles; that it was virtually non-violent; and that Gandhi would have justified it (a claim disputed by several of the few genuine Gandhians left in Indian public life). Then came dark hints about the racial division of the world; it was only the whites who had criticized India. and how terrible this racial division could become ('for the whites'—this was not added in words but was clearly intended). On January 13th he made a speech at Banares praising the Army—he would have known nothing of the black marketing or the assualts alleged on Goan women12—for its 'brilliant manner' in 'restoring Goa to the Motherland' and 'ending Portuguese colonialism'. Krishna Menon also spoke on several occasions but without Nehru's cat-like delicacy in leaping from one hot brick to another. Krishna Menon just dropped the bricks. For instance, he ridiculed the idea that there was anything in the affair contrary to the U.N.; India on the contrary was carrying out the U.N. resolution on ending colonialism. Once Nehru commenting on a suggestion in the New York Times that India, in remorse for her unilateral violence, should now return Goa to Portugal, said that if any effort were made to get India out of Goa there would be thermo-nuclear war (presumably launched by Russia, who was praised handsomely for showing that she was a true friend to India because she had vetoed the Portuguese complaint in the Security Council. That Russia was also one of the Whites seems to have been overlooked.)

The Indian press throughout the Goa affair had disappointed most foreign observers, especially those not long in India. Nehru's part in it had outraged them. More than one who hitherto had been admirers and lauders of Nehru now turned on him and denounced him as a cynical imposter. Nehru sensed his loss of status. When, three weeks or so after the invasion, a Head of Government arrived at Delhi airport and the Ambassadors were there to take part in the usual welcoming ceremonies, Nehru, for the first time in my experience, did not greet the assembled Ambassadors and he avoided looking at them. A member of his family at this time told me that he was 'crucifying himself over Goa'. Letters regretting what he had done written to him by men whom he respected were said to have cut him to the quick. When reproached by an old fellow-Gandhian of my acquaintance he justified himself, with some sadness, and urged that his conscience was 'absolutely clear'; but my Gandhian friend was convinced that his conscience was not clear.

Why, how, and when, it was decided to take Goa are questions which cannot yet be answered. On these questions the habitual secrecy of the Indian ruling group remains unpierced. Few of those in the ruling group, too, were in the know. The secret was as restricted and as well kept as was the secret of Eden's Suez adventure five years earlier. At the time various Indians in politics said that there had been no discussion in Cabinet. This has since been denied, but it is likely enough that there was no real discussion. The part played by certain individuals, such as the police officer Handoo, and General Kaul (who later retired from the Army after an unenviable performance during the Chinese attack a year later), would be of interest. Probably the part played by Krishna Menon was crucial. Even the factors leading to the aggression are not yet certain though among those cited at one time or another the following probably counted:
  1. The Elections. They were due to be held in the following month, January. The Government had an interest in taking voters' eyes off the Sino-Indian border where incidents had been disturbing public opinion which was inclined to be critical of Krishna Menon's part in Army and Border policy. Further, in Bombay itself, the only place where there was any sustained interest in Goa, Krishna Menon was fighting a key election against Kripalani, a former President of the Congress Party and the only man left in Parliament who could speak to Nehru with a semblance of equality. Nehru regarded this election as of exceptional importance, as his subsequent, and angry, campaigning there on behalf of Krishna Menon showed.

  2. Goa has the best deep-sea harbor in South Asia.

  3. Goa has great mineral wealth, especially iron ore.

  4. If India was to strike she must strike now as efforts to rpovke much interest, let alone an uprising in Goa itself, had failed, while inside India interest would not last long so that if there was to be action delay would diminish its political value.

  5. It would please the Afro-Asian bloc who would thus see that India is no Uncle Tom.
No one could be surprised that Nehru or India had wanted to end colonialism, or was sensitive about European rulers in Asia, or disliked Salazar. But India had no legal right to Goa; and it is not easy to see where, or how, she had any moral right to it. In any case she used force, she used it unilaterally, and she used it after being given an opportunity for negotiation and mediation. This was aggression. And the aggression was without provocation. Moresoever, it was aggression on a virtually unarmed neighbor. This, too, was the India of Nehru where hundreds of thousands of words had been uttered on peace and in condemning both force and unilateral action, particularly when gone in for by the West.

Some of the examples from speeches made by Nehru collected by the Daily Express at this time, are:
  1. "India has given a symbol to its people—the symbol of the Asoka Wheel, which represents peace, morality, and the ancient culture and peaceful ways of this country" — Speech in Delhi, 1951.

  2. "War today solves no problems but leaves behind only brutalized humanity and a trail of bitterness and hatred which forms the basis of another war" — Speech on Ghandi's teachings, January 1953.

  3. "Peaceful co-existence has been the Indian way of life and is as old as India's thought and culture" — Speech during the Bulganin-Krushchev visit, December 1955.

  4. "We do not show the clenched fist to anyone. We extend our hand in friendship towards everyone" — On Kashmir, August 19, 1956.

  5. "To seek to impose a settlement by foce is to disregard the rights of nations" — On the Suez Crisis, September 1956.

  6. "A very small conflict has the shadow of a big conflict behind it, and a big conflict has the shadow of a world war behind it" — On the Syrian Crisis, Sepember 1957.

  7. "The only approach we can make is an approach of tolerance, of avoidance of violence and hatred" — On the Dangers of the Cold War, October 1957.

  8. "It is the attitude of regarding one's own conception as righteous and everything else wrong that leads to conflicts" — At the Red Cross Conference, Delhi, October 1957.
Indeed not long before the aggression Nehru had made an eloquent plea to the World Council of Churches, then meeting in Delhi, against war. His plea made such an impression that I recall a visiting clergyman saying to me after Nehru's address that Nehru was teaching them to be better Christians. At the moment he made that speech the troop trains were already moving relentlessly towards Goa.

Finally the aggression was preceded by a campaign about Goa which was as impudent as anything Mussolini had said about Albania, or Hitler about Sudentenland, before they gorged those countries.

It was not for nothing that Nehru did not set foot in Goa until eighteen months after the invasion. By then the prosperity of Portuguese times had gone and the people of Goa, more particularly the Catholic and educated half, were more resentful than ever. The elections were not held until two years after the invasion. Nehru's party, Congress, then lost in every one of the 28 seats they contested. The United Goan Party, which wanted a separate Goa State, won half the seats; illustrating the clear division between the Catholic Portuguese-speaking Goans and the Hindus, illiterate low-castes predominantly among the latter. Goa was still ruled directly from Delhi.

Nehru's biographers, if they care for the high moral reputation which he had enjoyed for so long, and for its decline, will have to seek for the reasons which led him to Goa, no less than for the reasons which led to his stand on Kashmir. Until then Nehru remains charged with machiavellianism. We who watched him for so long are sure that he was not as machiavellian as this, and that he did not knowingly utter so much untruth13. Nehru, in spite of Goa, was no hypocrite and no imposter14. We do not know what were the compulsions he was under. But whatever the reasons, while he lost a great deal for something as small as Kashmir he lost still more for something still smaller, Goa. And whether, as is probable, he allowed himself to be edged, bit by bit, and especially because he was ill at the time as well as old and tired (he had to have teech extracted because of a toxic condition a few days after the aggression, and a few weeks later a serious kidney disease was diagnosed)15, into a situation from which escape was very difficult, he can be acquitted of hypocrisy. But he can not be acquitted of a failure16.


Walter Crocker's book on Nehru falls in the category of Hagiographies. He is a man who, despite seeing the false basis on which the Nehruvian Myth stands, yet nevertheless, offers it his homage, becoming an adulator and a worshipper, and part of the system to perptuate this Myth. It is not true that Nehru was either "great" or "moral", and, despite Crocker's desperate efforts to exonerate him, he is a hypocrite, or there is no such thing as hypocrisy! But it is true that Nehru had breeding, what the world considers "good manners" but which is not the same thing as morality, and also, a strong charisma. But none of this can substitute for morality and honesty, and Nehru was a man who lived in horror of both these "vices".

Yet, the truth about Crocker's own attitude is explained when one considers his own biography, made available after his death, the "Adelaide Institute". It is not stated, but it is apparent, that Crocker was a Freemason, for one is not favored and provided such opportunities as he was, unless one belongs to the Ruling Ascendancy, which is Freemasonry. It is significant that Crocker was of partial Jewish descent — Freemasonry being invented by and for Jewry, for achieving its final end, the coming of its "Moschiah" by subverting all other peoples, degrading them and preparing them to submit to a World Jewish Empire under their expected "Moschiah". As a Freemason, he would have recognized in Nehru a brother, for it is admitted that Nehru, like Ghandi, was a Freemason.

As a Goan, as a victim of Nehru's Rape of Goa, I am "touched", to say the least, by the solicitude Crocker displays on behalf of Nehru, and of the gratuituous excuse-making he indulges in. We Goans ought, I must presume, to be touched by the fact of the inconveniences and petty troubles that Nehru suffered, and these must be considered just cause for his crimes against the Goans, who were certainly not the originators of any of his troubles! If this is not hypocrisy, what is?


1. The official Indian Armed Forces website,, admits that the Goans had neither military aircraft nor anti-aircraft guns.

2. The Indian Air Force bombarded and strafed Goan civilian targets — both the Air Traffic Control facilities AND the Radio Stations, at each of the three places: Goa (Dabolim Airport & Emissora Goesa Radio Station at Bambolim); Damao and Dio. The official Indian Armed Forces proudly flaunts photos of the Dio ATC after Indian terrorists had vandalized it, and photos of the Bambolim Radio Station, both being attacked and after attack. The Dio ATC was left in this condition at least until 1983.

2. According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, 1911, Goa had a 85% Christian majority. Without territorial acquisitions, we are told that in 1961, Goa was 65% Hindu. That is unbelievable. Further, under Goan (i.e., Portuguese law), Goan citizens resident outside of Goa are still Goan citizens, so that the large emigre population of Goan Christians must be counted as part of the legal population of Goa. Again, Indian immigrants into Goa are not Goan citizens, under the same law. But under "Indian law", Goan Christian emigrants are not counted, while immigrant Hindus are! The net result: Before the invasion, Goa had a legal Christian majority, and a de facto Hindu majority; after the invasion, there is only a Hindu majority! Nevertheless, there remains a moral and cultural demographic majority of the Goan Catholics, who give it its particular flavor, as against the nighboring Indian tracts, that so appeals to the tourist, both Indian and others.

4. "...there was no self-government of the British kind": Crocker forgets that, unlike in WASP majority Australia, New Zealand and Canada, British India WAS NOT provided self-government by the English AT ALL! British India gained self-government in 1946. On the contrary, Goans had de facto self-government under successive Portuguese constitutions, beginning from Pombal, with the exception of 1930-1946, when Salazar, under Nazi influence, adopted White Racism, and began to call Goa a "Colony"! In 1945, Goa and other ultramarine provinces of Portugal were reverted to their former constitutional position.

5. There is no logical reason why Pakistan, or for that matter, Ceylon and Burma, should be exempted from a pretended Indian irredentism, if Goa was to be legitimately acknowledged to be subject to such a pretension — more noteworthy, given that these territories have been separated from the Indian Union only in 1937 and 1947, while Goa has been separate from 1510! Crocker does not remark on the reasons for the exemption. The true reason is unmitigated and unadultrated hypocrisy, a charge that Crocker does not wish to apply to his friend Nehru!

6. The revelations made over the last few years, by certain participants in these events, prove the truth of the Portuguese and Goan patriot claims that Nehru DID know of the plans of the 1954 invasions, and that, indeed, he instigated and sanctioned them! See the confession of Prabhakar Sinari, available on the internet.

7. The so-called "Sabarmati" incident, from the name of the boat, Sabarmati. This was evidently as staged an incident as that staged by Hitler and Goebells to serve as a pretended provocation on the part of Poland, and as a pretext for the invasion of Poland. See also the Havana incident stagemanaged by the U.S.A. in order to serve as a pretext for war against Spain and to despoil it of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Marianas, Guam, etc. The name of the ship is particularly apt, for this is the name of an "ashram" of the great hypocrite Ghandi, Nehru's mentor!

8. There is no mention today of these "border intrusions" by the Goans, which were purely Indian lies. The traitor Xirodcar in his book attempts to justify these lies by speaking of an attack by the Goans on the GOAN border checkpost of Nizampir on December 17, 1961, but this was Goan territory seized by the Indians, and the Goans were merely attempting to recover their own border checkpost (See my article against Xirodcar: "Textbooks of Hypocrisy"!

9. It is noticed, even today, that when some Indian or Goan traitor wishes to attack the Goan patriotic cause, he will rake up the old bogey of the Goan Inquisition although it is by no means relevant to Goa, especially after the De-Christianization of Portugal by Pombal! By this, they demonstrate their hatred of Catholicism and of the Catholic demographic and cultural majority of Goa!

10. It would be of great value to have this article publicized!

11. Officially, according to the Indians, their forces numbered 50,000 plus some 20,000 for logistic support! Against them were pitted the grand number of 3306 White Portuguese soldiers, 1 African, and a few hundred Goans!

12. There is no reason to suppose that Nehru, who made such a song and dance of the terrors and dangers of war, was unaware of the large number of robberies of private properties or of rapes of Goan women by his ruffians-in-uniforms. One Goan recalls that the Indian troops specifically came around asking for 'white Portuguese women' (thankfully there were none left to the tender mercies of these subhuman dogs!) but that they nevertheless did rape several Goans, so that even a priest who had been pro-Indian was forced to warn the womenfolk against these criminals! Moreover, it is asking too much that one who has no compunction against raping his neighbor-country without provocation, should scruple at raping his victims! Nehru, far from regretting in this, must surely have rejoiced in it - the 'brilliant triumphs' of his barbarous troops!

13. It is certain that Nehru "did not knowingly utter so much untruth"... the poor chap was sleepwalking!

14. By this Crocker demonstrates himself either a determined dupe or a hypocrite like Nehru himself!

15. Perhaps, by this, we, the Goans, inoffensive victims of the enormities of this monster Nehru, ought to be heartbroken over the "persecutions" suffered by the poor Nehru as a result of natural ageing.... even as the enormities inflicted upon us must be ignored!

16. Personal regard, and not obligations of truth and equally applicable universal principles, besides the very probability of being a fellow Freemason, can move Crocker to exculpate and exonerate Nehru of being a hyprocrite and a monster, but truth convicts Nehru!
©Lúcio Mas, formerly "Prakash". June 28, 2005.
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