Although scientists suggested as early as the 1960s that human activities were damaging the ozone layer, the issue did not attract significant attention until 1974. At that time, two scientists hypothesized that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) could destroy substantial amounts of stratospheric ozone. With this supposition, the international debate about the ozone layer was launched.
Following unilateral actions by some countries, an international agreement was opened for signature in 1985. This document, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, acknowledged the potential severity of the problem but did not impose any obligations upon nations. Building on this achievement, 27 countries signed a landmark protocol in Montreal in September 1987 (the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer) that committed every signatory state to reduce its use of certain CFCs by 50 percent of their level of use in 1986 by 1999. Three years later, at a meeting in London, the Montreal protocol was strengthened in a number of ways: The use of many CFCs and halons was to be eliminated by the turn of the century, and new controls were to be introduced on a variety of other ozone-depleting substances. The scope of the process was also widening, for more than 80 countries agreed to these changes in London. Thus, the Montreal protocol, as adjusted and amended in London, was the legal linchpin of the international regime to protect the ozone layer.
During 1992, as in many years throughout the history of the ozone layer issue, scientific findings sparked the political process. In January, researchers discovered ozone losses of up to 20 percent in the Northern Hemisphere and a maximum depletion over Russia of between 40 and 45 percent below normal for a few days. These findings prompted the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to issue the following statement: "On the whole, the 1991-92 winter can be classified among those with the most negative deviation of systematic ozone observations, which started in the mid-1950s." Given that this depletion was not only severe but also unexpected, many argued that the need to preserve the ozone layer demanded a reconsideration of the terms of the Montreal protocol. Moreover, they maintained that the implications of a thinner ozone layer could not be easily dismissed: The incidence of skin cancers, cataracts, and infectious diseases among humans would increase; agricultural yields of certain crops would fall; many manufacturing materials would weaken prematurely; and ecosystems would destabilize.
This scientific information was fed into the political process. As required under the terms of the Montreal protocol, the signatory parties continued to meet to consider the state of the ozone layer regime. In addition to the Copenhagen meetings, the other key gatherings in 1992 were the sixth and seventh meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group, which took place in Geneva in April and July, and a set of informal consultations that was called and convened in Brussels in September by Mostafa K. Tolba, then executive director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Moreover, there were three sets of meetings in Copenhagen in November: the eighth meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group, the preparatory meeting, and the fourth meeting itself. Although newly discovered scientific evidence was suggesting that the parties should strengthen the terms of the protocol, the economic and political atmosphere indicated that such action was not guaranteed.
The agreements that have been reached on the ozone layer issue, along with the respect accorded them, reveal that members of international society have been able to address some of the challenges associated with this particular issue. In a little more than 10 years, political negotiations have yielded a strong legal instrument that is at the heart of an equally strong international regime. Because few now question the need to take action to halt and reverse the destruction of the Earth's protective ozone layer, the politics of the ozone layer may be entering a new phase--one no longer solely concerned with how the regime might be formed but, rather, how it might be strengthened and maintained.
These comments notwithstanding, no one should assume that the problem of ozone layer depletion is by any means solved. Ozone-depleting chemicals will continue to be produced for a number of years to come, and deterioration of the ozone layer is expected to continue well into the next century. How the regime evolves, therefore, will be crucial. At least three elements of the broader debate are likely to continue to be critical factors.
First, scientific findings have been important forces in encouraging politicians to accept more rapid phase out schedules. This has been evident throughout the issue's history from the 1974 scientific paper that initially implicated aerosol spray-cans as ozone depletors; to the 1985 discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica; to the increasing depletion during the first 10.5 months of 1992; and, finally, to the Copenhagen meeting itself, where a scientific article was issued that argued that, if global warming were to occur, the likelihood of an ozone hole over the Arctic would increase. As for the future, because the contributions of scientists have been formalized and institutionalized in the documents of the regime, their influence would seem to be assured. Clearly, the protocol is flexible enough to respond to ongoing scientific findings. In this way, the ongoing work of the protocol's assessment panels, in particular, is critical.
Second, the power of industrialized interests in the political process is equally undeniable. Perhaps the most important event during the period immediately after the 1987 conference in Montreal was the announcement by DuPont officials, in March 1988, that their goal was an orderly phase out of fully halogenated CFC production. The availability, however, of commercially feasible substitute chemicals may have been a contributing factor to DuPont's decision. In Copenhagen, the hypothesis that industrial interests are crucial seemed to be given more weight. Representatives from the United States, for example, often directed attention to the domestic economic costs associated with accelerated phase out timetables, and French officials placed high value on the interests of French industry during the HCFC negotiations. Moreover, representatives from the developing world also highlighted costs of regulations, particularly the costs of regulating methyl bromide. As the debate about transition substances continues, countries will continue to defend their national interest--perceived primarily in broad economic terms--and will therefore remain hesitant about entering into commitments that place substantial burdens on their indigenous industries.
Finally, much of the negotiation will continue to turn on a North-South axis. Since 1989, when developing countries first played a visible role in the deliberations, the question of resource transfers--both in terms of the quantity that is required and the way in which they will be governed--has been at the heart of this debate. At the end of the Copenhagen meeting, it was clear that there were two important structures for the transfer of resources in international society: the Multilateral Fund and the Global Environment Facility. The precedential value of each will undoubtedly continue to be the subject of much debate during the foreseeable future. Additionally, however, the much stickier question of technology transfer has yet to be resolved adequately within international society. Although many accept the notion that countries of the developing world must leap-frog; the dirty technologies now being phased out in the industrialized world, it remains to be determined how the transfer of the next generation of technologies will be facilitated. Although most representatives from developed countries accept the need for technology transfer, they also argue that it is not theirs to give because it is owned by private companies. Moreover, they are hesitant to weaken intellectual property rights, lest they destroy the incentives for research and development.
Together, then, science, economics, and politics-- broadly defined--will all be crucial in the evolution of the international regime to protect the ozone layer. Although international negotiators achieved much at the recent meeting in Copenhagen, the issue is by no means resolved. Meanwhile, the problem of ozone depletion is only one element on the enormous agenda of international environmental issues and, at that, a relatively small and easy problem to solve. Still, the experience that has been gained by addressing ozone depletion could prove to be invaluable as the international community attempts to resolve much more complex dilemmas, such as climate change and the loss of biological diversity.
