Understanding the Culture
War:
Gramscians, Tocquevillians and Others
We start the new century and the
new millennium with a problem of major proportions: the seemingly
unstoppable march of political correctness through American
institutions and life. A recent article in the journal Policy
Review, published by the Heritage
Foundation, is worth reading for its insights into how we have
ended up in this predicament – and also for why we seem unable to
figure a way out of it. The article is by John Fonte, of the Hudson Institute, and is entitled
"Why There Is a Culture War." If this article is any indication,
Fonte’s forthcoming book Building a Healthy Culture, of which
the article is an excerpt, is likely also worth reading as a
barometer of where we stand.
Fonte contrasts "two competing
worldviews" that are currently struggling for dominance in America.
It would be fair to say that the two really are at war: Fonte
somewhat euphemistically calls the contest an "intense ideological
struggle." One he calls "Gramscian"; the other, "Tocquevillian,"
after the intellectuals he credits with having authored the
respective warring ideologies: the Italian neo-Marxist philosopher
Antonio Gramsci, author of Prison
Notebooks and other works, and the French political
philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, author of the influential Democracy
in America.
It becomes clear that one cannot
understand either the meteoric rise or apparent immunity of
political correctness to attack without understanding Gramsci.
Rarely would I recommend actually studying a Marxist social
philosopher, but this guy merits our attention. Gramsci (1891-1937)
agreed with Karl Marx that every society could be divided into
"oppressor" and "oppressed" classes (e.g., Marx’s own "bourgeois"
and "proletariat"), but for the first time, expanded the latter into
an ensemble of subordinate, marginalized groups instead of a single,
homogeneous group. Whereas Marx had spoken only of the proletariat,
Gramsci spoke not just of propertyless workers but also of "woman,
racial minorities and many ‘criminals.’" Fonte documents how Gramsci
distinguished two ways the dominant group exercises control, whereas
Marx had only written of one. First, there is direct domination
through coercion or force – political might in service of the
economic interests of the bourgeoisie. Second, there is what Gramsci
calls hegemony, which means the pervasive and mostly tacit
use of a system of values that supports and reinforces the interests
of the dominant groups. The repressed groups may not even know they
are repressed, in Gramsci’s view, because they have internalized the
system of values that justifies their repression. They have
internalized a "false consciousness" and become unwitting
participants in their own domination.
Is this sounding familiar yet?
Think of the radical feminist philosophy professors and law
professors who speak of romantic candlelight dinners – a staple of
ordinary American life – as a form of prostitution. They justify
this seemingly outrageous claim on the grounds that American women
exist in "false consciousness," the hegemonic product of
male-dominated (and capitalistic) values. The sense of abhorrence
felt by "ordinary" women at radical feminist claims is nothing more
than this "false consciousness" asserting itself. Gramsci went on to
argue that before there could be any "revolution" in Marx’s sense it
would be necessary to build up a "counter-hegemony," or system of
values favoring the repressed groups that would undermine or
delegitimize the hegemony-created consciousness. And because
hegemonic values permeate the whole of society and are embodied in
the warp and woof of daily life, daily life becomes part of the
ideological battleground. All the institutions we take for granted –
schools, churches, the media, businesses, as well as art,
literature, philosophy, and so on – become places where the
"counter-hegemonic" values can be seeded and allowed to take root.
They become domains to be infiltrated, and brought into the service
of the movement. As the radical feminists put it, "the personal is
the political." It is interesting how the latter have lifted this
idea from a white male European philosopher mostly without credit.
The point, however, is to create a new kind of "consciousness" free
of the values that allow the dominant group(s) to repress the
subordinate groups. Only this will throw off the shackles of
"hegemony" and lead to true revolution.
Gramsci saw an important role in
the transformation of society for those he called "organic"
intellectuals (as opposed to "traditional" intellectuals). "Organic"
intellectuals were to be intellectuals belonging to the repressed
groups and making an effort to undermine the "hegemony" with the
assistance of any "traditional" intellectuals they could persuade to
defect from the dominant point of view. They will flourish as the
roots of counter-hegemony grow. In other words, Gramsci was
recommending recruiting radicalized women, members of minority
groups, and others into the fold – affirmative action before that
term was coined. Changing the minds of "traditional" intellectuals
was particularly valuable, as they were already well positioned
within the dominant educational institutions. The "long march
through the institutions" – a phrase we also owe to Gramsci – began.
Antonio Gramsci’s name is not
exactly a household word. Many people concerned about political
correctness have no doubt never heard of him. To describe him as
important, however, is probably the understatement of the new year.
He sketched, in works such as Prison Notebooks, the basic
outline of the agenda that would begin to be implemented in American
colleges and universities, and then carried to the rest of society,
in the final quarter of the 20th century. The efforts
accelerating in the 1990s, no doubt helped along by having one of
their own (perhaps it was two of their own) in the White
House. Clearly, we find echoes of Gramsci’s notion of an "organic"
intellectual in today’s calls for more and more "diversity" in all
areas of society: universities, the workplace, etc. The mass
conversion of "traditional" intellectuals to the Gramscian struggle
helps explain why this diversity is a diversity of faces and not
ideas. "Traditional" intellectuals have power, especially in
education. The gatekeepers control who is admitted to the academic
club, and the "traditional" intellectuals control the gatekeepers.
Today, an outspoken conservative might as well not even apply for an
academic appointment in a public university. But feminists of all
stripes and colors (and sexual preferences and fetishes) are more
than welcome!
Gramsci, we ought also to note,
described himself as an "absolute historicist," whose views derive
from the philosopher Hegel. All systems of value, all moral codes,
etc., are entirely the products of the historical epoch and culture
which gave rise to them. There is no such thing as an "absolute" or
an "objective" morality. There are only systems of value that
represent either the (mainly economic) interests of those in power
or of those not in power; and one of the jobs of "organic"
intellectuals is to develop systems of value that will undermine the
former. Capturing control over language, especially the language of
morality, has a major role to play in this because of the doors it
opens to psychological control over the masses. Most people will
reject ideas and institutions if they become convinced of their
basic immorality; most people, too, lack the kind of training that
will equip them to untangle the thicket of logical fallacies that
might be involved. This all helps pave the way for the Gramscian
transformation of society.
Clearly, political correctness in
all its manifestations, from academic schools of radical feminism,
"critical race theory," gay and lesbian "queer theory," etc., to the
preoccupation with "diversity" as an end in itself, is the direct
descendent of Gramsci, and the chief arm of enforcement of the
ongoing Gramscian transformation of American society. Consider
efforts to transform our understanding of the law. Fonte observes:
"Critical legal studies posits that the law grows out of unequal
relations of power and therefore serves the interests of and
legitimizes the rule of dominant groups." The academic movement
known as "deconstruction," however one defines it, is a systematic
effort to destroy the legitimacy of the values of "dominant groups":
straight white Christian males of (non-Marxist) European descent.
The values to be destroyed: truth as the goal of inquiry,
transcendent morality as the guide to human conduct, freedom and
independence as political ideals, hiring and contracting based on
merit. All are rationalizing myths of the dominant consciousness, in
the Gramscian scheme of things.
The transformation is now very
much underway, as Gramscian footsoldiers have captured not just the
major institutions in the English-speaking world (Ivy League
universities) but also huge tax-exempt foundations (Ford,
Rockefeller, Carnegie, and so on) that have been bankrolling
Gramscian projects for decades. Fonte cites author after author to
document the millions that have flowed to academic feminist
endeavors, diversity-engineering projects in universities and
sensitivity-training re-education programs in corporations. The
plain truth is, we can no longer trust large corporations. Fortune
500 companies have become as reliable footsoldiers in the creation
of a politically correct America as universities. Even Bill Gates of
Microsoft has gotten on the official bandwagon, with his creation of
minority-only scholarships last year. With the money now behind it,
small wonder political correctness has become so difficult to
oppose!
But there is an opposition force.
Fonte describes the opposition to the avalanche of money and
resources flowing into the creation of a Gramscian world as the
"Tocquevillian counterattack." The key idea here is American
exceptionalism – the idea that there are normative values to
be embraced that are not mere historical products, that these values
have been embodied in America, and are what makes America a special
place. Fonte articulates a "trinity of American exceptionalism" that
defined our unique development: (1) dynamism (support for
entrepreneurship and economic progress, including the changes
economic progress yields, and support for equality of opportunity
for all individuals to participate in this process); (2)
religiosity (the idea that freedom is only possible to a
moral citizenry, that moral values have their origins with God, that
character development should be an important component of education,
and that social problems should be addressed at the local level
through the voluntary associations of men and women of good will and
character); (3) patriotism (love of country, and support for
Constitutionally limited self-government and the rule of law). It is
easy to see the roots of these ideas in the works of the political
and economic philosophers of the English-speaking world the
Gramscians abhor. These include Adam Smith, John Locke, and
especially Edmund Burke, among others leading up to and including
the Framers.
Fonte also discusses a "third" set
of views which oppose the creation of a Gramscian world but are not,
in his view, Tocquevillians because they do not accept all three
components of the above. They might emphasize one at the expense of
the others. For example, libertarian author Virginia Postrel
emphasizes the first in her book The
Future and Its Enemies which distinguishes "dynamists" from
"stasists." Most Libertarians seem to want to have nothing to do
with the second, believing with the philosopher-novelist Ayn Rand
that morality originates from the necessities of sustaining human
existence (the exercise of reason in responding to knowable
circumstances in an objective world) rather than from God. There
are, finally, members of the pro-South movement afoot today who
mistrust the first, and who believe the third can be carried forth
only through a new secession effort – which would end America as we
know it.
Those Fonte identifies include
"libertarians, paleoconservatives, secular patriots, Catholic social
democrats, [and] disaffected religious-right intellectuals"; he
doubts that they "will mount an effective resistance to the
continuing Gramscian assault. Only the Tocquevillians appear to have
the strength – in terms of intellectual firepower, infrastructure,
funding, media attention and a comprehensive philosophy that taps
into core American principles – to challenge the Gramscians with any
chance of success."
In some cases, this seems clear.
Many Libertarians will not succeed – if by success we mean actually
gaining political office or sufficient influence to make a
difference – the primary reason being their bullheaded atheism. A
people, over 90 percent of whom believe in a personal God, simply
will not support a political movement that tries to marry individual
liberties and natural rights with the idea that there is no God. For
intellectuals there are, or should be, too many problems with the
idea that a moral view of the universe can be built up on the
materialistic foundation that represents, for many of us, the dark
side of the Enlightenment. Materialism, after all, also gave rise to
Marxism and the Gramscian movement, and is far more compatible with
the idea that in the physical universe, superior might is what gets
the last word.
It is unclear, however, what Fonte
finds lacking in paleoconservatives. The only person he mentions by
name is Samuel Francis, a Buchananite writer who rejects the entire
Enlightenment as misguided. But there are different strains of
paleoconservatism just like there are different strains of
everything else. Some tend towards Buchananism; others don’t. Fonte
does not discuss these differing strains, so we are left in the dark
whether paleoconservatives are, for example, lacking in (1) above
because some are Buchananites or simply agrarians, or in (3) because
some favor secession. There can be no doubt that agrarian life has
its healthy side – as opposed to our present urban nightmares of
traffic, crime, stress and, of course, bureaucracy. And if one
believes in the Declaration of Independence than one believes that
secession is sometimes legitimate – period – even if it takes wars
for independence to make it stick.
It is clear, however, who Fonte’s
favorite Tocquevillians are. He lists them. They include William
Bennett, Michael Novak, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Marvin Olasky, Norman
Podhoretz – also scholars such as Williams Galston, Wilfred McClay,
Harvey Mansfield and Walter McDougall. Writers such as Irving
Kristol and Charles Kesler also get favorable mention. There are, to
say the least, more than a few neocons represented in this group,
and all are closely associated with what could be called the
Republican Establishment’s intellectual wing, associated with the
Republican Party – Heritage Foundation – National Review
axis.
There is "intellectual firepower"
in this group; no doubt about it. But only one observation need be
made: thus far, this group – for whatever reason – has not stemmed
the Gramscian tide. It has not even come close. Perhaps it is unable
to. It has its foundations, too – Bradley, Olin, Scaife, and select
others. However, none of these even begins to match the bottomless
pit of resources available to leftists from the Rockefeller and Ford
Foundations. Perhaps there are other reasons, unstated, why this
group has not seized the moral high ground despite all its
"intellectual firepower." (For whatever it is worth, the home page
of the Hudson Institute’s website openly embraces "A Global
Perspective." The Gramscians are also globalmaniacs, but they want
to extend political correctness and welfarism worldwide instead of
liberty and technology.)
Whatever the reason, the
Republican Establishment has not stopped the advance of political
correctness – the war against the political and economic philosophy,
and the moral and religious values that built this country. Here is
one theory: Fonte’s favorite intellectuals are simply too close to
the forces of centralization on which the Gramscian advance is
riding to resist its advance effectively. Both groups, that is, are
benefiting massively from the increased centralization of society
(and the Western world generally) that is taking us into the New
World Order. How far, for example, is loyalty to (3) supposed to go?
Does "patriotism" mean loyalty to a set of ideals on which a country
was founded, or merely blind obedience to those currently running
it? Do we impose our brand of "patriotism" on other nations, and
then, if they resist, use force? One reason many of us do not trust
neocons is that they have been all too willing to favor military
interventionism around the globe in the name of "democracy" – as if
having forgotten that free institutions require a longstanding
philosophical tradition that developed mainly in the
English-speaking world and nowhere else. In major respects, the
neocons claim to support Constitutionally limited government, but
many accept the centralized mega-state that began to grow with
Lincoln, took quantum steps with the Wilson and Roosevelt
administrations – and then took its biggest quantum leap during the
Johnson-Nixon era. Many neocons, let us also remember, are former
socialists who came to reject socialism itself but not one of its
first premises, which is the efficacy of centralization in getting
things done. You cannot mount an effective strategy against an
opponent if you share that opponent’s key premises; those premises
will be turned and used against you.
Assuming that sincere efforts
among those with influence are underway to stop the Gramscian march
to the center of power in American society, one thing is clear: they
need all the help they can get! That would include infusions of new
ideas from paleoconservatives, pro-South types and others routinely
dismissed as "out on the fringes." Republicans, it is easy to show
just by looking at Bush Jr.’s cabinet nominees so far (with a few
exceptions such as John Ashcroft), have been largely co-opted; the
rest just do not have the backbone to stand up to the Gramscian
assault. Moreover, the Gramscian element that long ago co-opted the
Democratic Party expresses its agenda using moral language. Result:
left-liberal Democrats who have the courage of their convictions are
acceptable, because their agenda advances "social justice";
conservative Republicans who have the courage of their convictions
are not acceptable because their agenda is "unjust" or "immoral."
Republicans at the center of influence have failed to respond to
such insinuations effectively.
If any neocons are perchance
reading this, I would implore them to stop being so elitist. Pay
attention to all those "red states" on the now-infamous map, and
realize there is activity going on out in the Midwestern
hinterlands, in the Far West, and, of course, down here in the
South. Not just in the Washington – New York City – Boston corridor
which (along with the West Coast) has also been the major hotbed of
Gramscian activism. Those at the center of influence ought to seek
out some new blood, both because they need all the allies they can
get and because we are all running out of time.
January 6, 2000
Steven Yates has a Ph.D. in
Philosophy and is the author of Civil
Wrongs: What Went Wrong With Affirmative Action (ICS Press,
1994). He is at work on two manuscripts tentatively entitled
View From the Gallery and The Paradox of Liberty, and
also lectures occasionally. He lives, freelance writes, and is
available for occasional lectures in Columbia, South
Carolina.
Steven Yates
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