Soul in a Vat
Alfred Tang
February 11, 2001 ©
Hosted by Drs. John and Joyce Boyland
There
are two main views of the mind-body problem—substance dualism and monism. Theists typically take the body and the soul
as two distinct substances with the soul as the source of personal
identity. Monism is usually expressed
in terms of physicalism and materialism.
Examples of physicalist models are causal theory of mind and
central-state materialism. There are
three general attitudes in this mind-body business: (1) Mental states do not
exist. For instance, Wittgensteinians
deny the existence of mental states and call them nomological danglers
instead. (2) Mental states exist but
are not accessible to observers. It is
called epiphenomenology. (3)
Mental states exist and are accessible to observers.
Even some opponents of dualism admit that consciousness
is not just a simple effect of physical stimuli. Daniel Dennett believes that there is an interpretative element
to mental states. He calls this
interpretative action of the brain heterophenomenology. He also uses hallucination as an example of
the multiple draft model.
Physicalists sometimes use the Turing machine to model
consciousness. Examples are Roger
Penrose (The Emperor’s New Mind) and Frank Tipler (Physics of
Immortality). If each neuron is
represented by 1 bit, then there is not enough memory to support the complexity
of consciousness. Another way to see
why the human mind is not a computer per se is that it does not crash.
Some New Age gurus claim that consciousness can influence
quantum systems. The classical example
is the Schrödinger cat problem. The
implication is that it takes the same kind to influence a kind. Therefore consciousness must be physical in
nature. The Schrödinger cat problem is
one of measurement theory of how a classical device interacts with a quantum
system. It does not necessarily imply a
physical connection between consciousness and quantum mechanics. In other words, it is a sophism.
Saul A. Kripke has also shown in Naming and Necessity
the logical fallacy of identifying mental states with brain states.
John W. Cooper shows in Body, Soul, & Life
Everlasting that the Bible conveys both the concept of holism and
dualism. Hebrew words such as nephesh
(soul), ruach (spirit), basar (flesh) and qereb (inner
parts) all have holistic meanings. On
the other hand, the talk of life after death in both OT and NT clearly points
to the continuity of the soul apart from the body. Cooper argues that holistic dualism is the proper attitude
toward Biblical anthropology. Although
Cooper does not provide a language to resolve the mind-body problem in terms of
holistic dualism, one has the impression that the midpoint between the extremes
of substance dualism and monism is the preferred Biblical attitude.
Suppose that holistic dualism is the correct
attitude. I take a step further to
provide a mechanism for the mind-body connection. In nature, we see examples of two distinct entities unified as a
whole. Electricity and magnetism are
two aspects of the same dynamics--each sharing common sources such as charge
and/or current. In mathematics, two
parametric equations are unified with a common parameter. Similarly, the mind-body dichotomy can be
seen as a unity if they are derived from the same source. In this case, the source is the Holy Spirit. Man is created in the image of God (Ge 1:27)
in a sense that God has given man His Spirit (Ge 2:7). Sinless man has the fullness of the Holy
Spirit in both his body and mind. Sin
grieves the Holy Spirit (Eph 4:30) and the fullness of his dwelling is
diminished (Jas 4:8). This theory of
Biblical anthropology partially resolves the mystery of the hypostatic union,
i.e. the unity of Christ’s human and divine natures, in that a perfect
man is fundamentally and fully identified with God by default.
To ensure independence, the Holy Spirit limits the
sensory experience of an embodied soul to the interpreted stimuli received by
the body. This limitation is lifted in
a disembodied soul as in the case of a near death experience. This limitation may also explain the
apparent limitation of the incarnated Christ’s omniscience in the New
Testament.
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Body Mind

Body Mind
Holy Spirit Holy Spirit
Sinless State
Sinful State
In essence, this model says that the mind-body is
fundamentally dependent on God for all man, i.e. the Holy Spirit is the
glue between the mind and the body. It
explains Pascal’s God shaped vacuum. Physical
death is equivalent to the separation of God’s Spirit from man. Animals are not created in the image of God
and do not depend on God for their mental life. Some may even argue further that animals are not conscious.
The mind is said to be a substance because it can exist
independently of the body and the Holy Spirit because God has created man in
His image as a free agent. Independence
is an essence of freedom. The body is
not a substance because its survival depends on both the mind and the Holy
Spirit.