Lesson 4

The Problem of Evil

According to Augustine, evil is the absence of good.[1] One of the oldest arguments against the existence of God is the problem of evil. Simply stated, if God is all-powerful, He is not good because He allows evil to exist. Vice versa, if God is good, He is not all-powerful because He is too short-armed to eliminate evil. The problem of evil is one of the atheist’s most favorite arsenals. It is a source a distraction for many well-meaning Christians. I think that it is time worthy to address this timeworn topic.

Evil can be classified into the moral and natural kinds. Moral evil is that created by the immoral action of man. Natural evil on the hand is a consequence of the destructive forces of nature. There are at least three formulations of the problem of evil: (1) the deductive problem of evil, (2) the inductive problem of evil, and (3) the problem of gratuitous evil.

Deductive Problem of Evil

Atheologian J. L. Mackie is a key advocate of the deductive problem of evil. The strategy is to formulate the problem in such a way that theism is shown to be inherently self-contradictory. The formulation consists of the following statements:

1. God exists.

2. God is omnipotent.

3. God is omniscient.

4. God is omnibenevolent.

5. God created the world.

6. The world contains evil.

Propositions 1—5 constitute the theistic set (a set of propositions believed to be true in theism). Mackie assumes that the set logically implies “God created the world with no evil.” If it were the case, the proposition is contradicted by proposition 6. Then one concludes that an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God does not exist.

There are several problems with Mackie’s assumption that the theistic set logically implies “God created the world with no evil.” First it is not true that an omnipotent being can do anything. The most well known counter-example is that God cannot create a rock that is too heavy for Him to lift. Otherwise God has a limitation. Namely, there is a rock which He cannot lift. In other words, God’s omnipotence alone does not necessitate Him to create an evil-free world even if He wants to. Secondly it is not true that an omnibenevolent being always wants to eliminate evil as far as He can. It is possible that evil brings greater good. Therefore an omnibenevolent being may allow evil to exist in order to maximize goodness. In short, from these objections, it is generally agreed that the deductive problem of evil fails to show that the theistic set and the existence of evil are inherently self-contradictory.

In apologetics, there are two ways to answer the atheologians: theodicy and defense. A theodicy is a strong reason that justifies God’s ways to man.[2] A defense makes a weaker claim that it is rational to believe a certain Christian doctrine. There are only a few things in theology that can proven with certainty. It is generally safe to limit our strategy to a defense instead of a theodicy. Alvin Plantinga’s famous “free will defense” is an example.[3] Instead of arguing that God must necessarily create a world with evil, he simply suggests that evil is a logical consequence of a world populated by free agents. By virtue of being free, an agent must be able to choose between good and evil on his own free will. Therefore God created a world in which good and evil are both possible. The difference between a theodicy and a defense is mostly one of spirit. The actual lines of reasoning may not be different between the two. For instance, Plantinga’s free will defense is also used as the free will theodicy in some cases.[4]

Inductive Problem of Evil

While the deductive problem of evil tries to make the strong claim that theism is logically contradictory by virtue of the existence of evil, the inductive problem of evil tries to weaken theism by arguing that the quantity of evil is more than reasonable. This indirect argument presents a more powerful challenge than a direct one. Although most people agree that the existence of evil is not logical incompatible with theism, they may wonder why so much suffering is necessary.

The theist’s defense against the inductive problem of evil usually follows three tracks: (1) the free will theodicy, (2) the natural law theodicy, and (3) the soul-making theodicy. The free will theodicy justifies the quantity of evil by shifting the burden to the quantity of evildoers. In other words, evildoers abound and so do the evil which they create.

The natural law theodicy argues that the predictability of natural laws is essential for moral responsibility and that the quantity of evil is explained by the immensity of natural forces. An example may be helpful here. When one aims a pistol, he knows that the bullet will always follow a straight path. In this case, the predictability of natural law is the basis of his moral action. If God always interferes miraculously so that a bullet will never hurt anyone, He will consistently violate the law of mechanics and consequently robs one’s freedom to perform morally responsible actions. Therefore God must let nature run its course. But nature is amoral. It produces both good and evil effects. Natural forces are immense and so are the evils they generate.

The soul-making theodicy stresses that evil can facilitate character building. This way, the quantity of evil is explained by the abundance of souls that need making.

Problem of Gratuitous Evil

The problem of gratuitous evil focuses on the evil that serves no useful purpose. Possible examples are those children born with aids or innocent people killed in natural disasters. This problem challenges the doctrine of “meticulous providence” which says that (1) God is in control of all circumstances and (2) God has sufficient reasons for all circumstances. The most direct biblical support for the doctrine of meticulous providence is Roman 8:28, “And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose.” Divine providence is a well-established Christian doctrine. So let us go straight to probing the logical fallacies of the problem of gratuitous evil. First of all, it is difficult to know when evil is gratuitous. For instance, given that a child is born with aids, how can we show that this illness serves no useful purpose? Secondly a purpose can always be supplied by the free will and natural law theodicies. Therefore the problem of gratuitous evil does not post a different problem than the ones which we have already solved.

Conclusion

Adam and Eve wanted the knowledge of good and evil so badly that they were willing to lose their souls for it (Ge 3:6-7). Since the beginning, human beings, unlike animals, operate with a sense of good and evil, but only imperfectly.

An atheologian may assume that he knows the nature of evil and proceeds to point out its inconsistency with theism. The trouble is that the definition of good and evil is elusive. In fact evil is somewhat subjective. An example may clarify my point: C. S. Lewis lost his second wife Joy to cancer shortly after they were married. Her untimely death caused Lewis a great deal of pain. He arduously questioned God’s wisdom in taking her away. But at the end, he recognized that what seemed to him a tragedy was a celebration to his wife. Reflecting on Joy’s happiness in the face of death, he wrote,

How wicked it would be, if we could, to call the dead back! She said not to me but to the chaplain, ‘I am at peace with God.’ She smiled, but not to me.[5]

Evil may not have any objective meaning and is not known prima facie. For example, an immunization causes discomfort or sickness. It has the appearance of evil but is not actually evil because it saves life. I venture to say that much of the so-called problem of evil is based on categorical fallacies.

Job was a righteous man who suffered greatly for reasons which he did not understand. Three friends tried to impute his suffering to his sin. Apparently Job and his friends all thought that they understood the theology of good and evil. At the end, God answered Job by asking him seventy questions about the creation. In essence, God used these rhetorical questions to put Job in his place. It is fair to say that the knowledge of good and evil is synonymous to omniscience. To decide that something is evil, we may need to know its infinite repercussions, which requires an infinite knowledge. Adam and Eve wanted the knowledge of good and evil because they wanted to be like God—to be omniscient. In reality we do not always know what is good and evil other than the evil of our own souls. Since we are not omniscient, it is hard to know what exactly is the problem of evil. Therefore the atheologians do not have a well-defined problem by which they can challenge the existence of God.