Judge Richard McDermott

Noted for 9:00 am February 7, 2002

 

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON

COUNTY OF KING

 

LARRY E. PITTMAN and SYLVESTER        )

PITTMAN, MICHAEL PITTMAN,                )           No.  99-2-52345-8 KNT

TERRANCE A. DAVIS, KEITH KERN,        )

YOLANDA ESKRIDGE, MICHAEL             )           RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

DAVIS, GREGORY CODY, DAVID             )           DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

LISTIOWEL ABRUQUAH, ARTHUR           )           SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON

FOREST, NATHAN A. KILCREASE,           )           AFTER ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

JOSEPH A. DONKOR, DARREL CODY,     )

MARY COLEMAN, ERIC ARHIN,               )

SHABAE DIQUAN, SIDNEY LANIER,        )

RE-LASHIA SEARLES, JAMES GOODE,    )

CURTIS HOLLIS, and BENJAMIN               )

BARNES, individually,                                     )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiffs,                       )

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )

KING’S COMMAND FOODS, INC.,           )

a Washington business corporation,                   )

                                    defendant.                    )

____________________________________)

 

            Plaintiffs LARRY E. PITTMAN, et al, through their undersigned attorney, respond in opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on After Acquired Evidence.  The plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference, the facts set forth and the legal authorities cited and argued in the Standards for Summary Judgment, the Material Facts, and the Relevant Substantive Law sections of the Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiffs Michael Pittman, Sylvester Pittman, Relashia Searles and James Goode, in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiffs Abruquah, Barnes, Forest, Kilcrease, and Hollis; and in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiffs Michael Davis, Joe Donker, Yolanda Eskridge and Sidney Lanier (Plaintiffs’ Response I); the facts set forth and legal authorities cited and argued in the Material Facts with Respect to Plaintiffs Mary Coleman, Darrel Cody, and Gregory Cody and the Relevant Substantive Law sections of the Response in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiffs Mary Coleman, Darrel Cody and Greg Cody (Plaintiffs’ Response II); the facts set forth and legal authorities cited and argued in the Material Facts with Respect to Plaintiffs Terrance Davis, Shabae Diquan, Keith Kern, and Eric Arhin; the New Non-Plaintiff Declarations; Other Non-Plaintiff Declarations; and the Relevant Substantive Law sections of the Response in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiffs Terrance Davis, Shabae Diquan and Keith Kern, and to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Eric Arhin and Request for Sanctions (Plaintiffs’ Response III) and the facts set forth and legal authorities cited and argued in the Material Facts with Respect to Plaintiff Larry Pittman section of the Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiff Larry Pittman.

            The defendant cites after acquired evidence of application fraud allegedly committed by David Abruquah, Benjamin Barnes, Michael Davis, Terrance Davis, Shabae Diquan, Yolanda Eskridge, Arthur Forest, Curtis Hollis, Nathan Kilcrease, Sidney Lanier, and Larry Pittman.

            After acquired evidence is not relevant to any determination of wrongful termination because it could not have been considered by an employer defendant when the decision to fire was made.  This is a claim under Washington State law.  Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, (1995) 127 Wash. 2d. 302, 898 P. 2d. 284 and Allison v. Housing Authority, (1991) 118 Wash. 2d. 79, 821 P. 2d. 34 applied the substantial factor test to the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).  The plaintiff in a discrimination case need only prove that the prohibited ground was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action to prove that liability exists.  Facts not known by the employer at the time of the adverse employment action cannot be considered a factor in that decision.  If the plaintiff can show that the firing is based upon illegal animus, he prevails even where the employer can prove it would have the same decision for legal reasons.  Mackay at 127 Wash. 2d. 310.  The full panoply of relief is available, Id., Justice Madsen’s dissent at 315.

            The defendant correctly identifies Goehle v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, (2000) 100 Wash. App. 609, 1 P. 3d. 579 and Janson v. North Valley Hospital, (1999) 93 Wash. App. 892, 971 P. 2d. 67 as providing that after acquired evidence of misrepresentation of facts on an employment application or other wrongdoing by the employee may limit an award for backpay or may be considered in the deciding upon the credibility of the testimony of a plaintiff as witness, but neither case provides that a summary judgment is appropriate to dismiss the claim.  The questions of credibility, severity, and backpay award limitation are clearly questions of fact to be resolved by the jury pursuant to Article I Section 21 of the Washington Constitution and do not afford summary judgment under Civil Rule 56, see Janson at 93 Wash. App. 902.  Therefore, the limitation of damages as requested by the defendant should be determined by the jury and not by a summary judgment.

            Sondra Goehle worked for many years at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Center)[1] when her immediate supervisor was replaced by a German national who allegedly repeatedly called her old and made ageist comments, and also allegedly made comments derogatory of Americans’ work ethic.  After she filed her lawsuit, the Center obtained evidence that Ms. Goehle misrepresented her educational qualifications on her employment application. Goehle found, at 100 Wash. App. 621:

            The United States Supreme Court held that evidence of an employee’s misconduct that is discovered after litigation is admissible and may reduce the damage award calculation, but it does not bar all relief.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356, 115 S. Ct. 879, 130 L. Ed. 2d. 852 (1995).  To limit the damage award, the employer must first establish that the misconduct was of such severity that the employee would have been terminated on the basis of the misconduct alone if the employer had known of it.  Id. at 362-63, 115 S. Ct. 879.

 

At 100 Wash. App. 622, the Center did not terminate Ms. Goehle when it discovered the misrepresentation and did not seek to limit damages on that ground.  However, the after acquired evidence of misrepresentation was relevant to Ms. Goehle’s credibility.

            In this present case, Larry Pittman filled out the employment application during a break after he was already working at King’s Command Foods, Inc., as directed by King’s Command management.  He was told that it was only a formality because he was already hired.  While the application appears to list a high school diploma, Mr. Pittman also informed King’s Command, specifically its agent Terry Smith, at the time that he did not finish high school.  Mr. Smith indicated that it was all right and that Mr. Pittman can go ahead and state that he had the high school diploma and that there would be no problem.  Declaration of Larry Pittman in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on After Acquired Evidence.  Furthermore, the defendant corporation’s own guidelines for the blue collar jobs do not list a high school graduation to be a requirement for these positions.  See Exhibits 14-16 to the Seventh Declaration of Terry Smith in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Plaintiff Larry Pittman.  Exhibit 14 is the defendant corporation’s job description for Laborer, it lists no specific educational requirements.  Exhibit 15 is the defendant’s job description for Line End (Pack off Line Lead Person), it lists no specific educational requirements.  Exhibit 16 is the defendant’s job description for Red Meat Cutter, it lists its educational requirement to include “Less than high school education, or up to one month related experience or training: or equivalent combination of education and experience.”  This is a far cry from a cancer research laboratory where completion of certain college degrees would bear directly upon the qualifications of an employee to perform such highly technical work.

            As far as honesty being a major criterion for employment at King’s Command, there is plenty of evidence in the record to indicate that honesty is NOT a major criterion for management employment at King’s Command.

            As to the other plaintiffs for which the defendant requests limitation of damages:

            Defendant complains that David Abruquah left Ikea because of inconvenient hours and then accepted full time employment at King’s Command.  These are not inconsistent statements as to fact.  Mr. Abruquah can be motivated by inconvenient hours to look for employment elsewhere.  When he finds it, then he can leave the previous employment.  Any misrepresentations of his family relationships with other King’s Command employees is not relevant to any issue in this case and would not be grounds for dismissal. As it is, the most that the defendant can allege is a difference in cultural viewpoints.  Mr. Abruquah testified in his deposition that he considered other people from Ghana as being effectively relatives, even if not within the strict definition of family relationships.  A similar viewpoint is expressed when black men consider each other “brothers” without any intent to mislead anyone about whether they share the same parents.  We see the same thing when labor unions refer to their members as “brothers”, example being the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.  Since September 11, 2001, we have seen firefighters from around the world considering themselves as members of a brotherhood.  That he left Allpak because of a change in address is not necessarily inconsistent with being fired from Allpak.  There is thus no evidence of fraud in Mr. Abruquah’s application.

            Benjamin Barnes left The Boeing Company in 1983.  Whether he was laid off or voluntarily quit is so immaterial to the issues of whether he qualified for employment in a blue collar position at King’s Command that to classify the distinction as a “severe misrepresentation” is ridiculous.  Furthermore, The Boeing Company has a procedure where an employee may be “voluntarily laid off”.  See Declaration of Roger W. Knight in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on After Acquired Evidence.  Therefore, Mr. Barnes characterization of the reason for leaving Boeing as “Lay Off” is not a false statement of fact.

            As to the issue of Mr. Barnes statement on his application that he was never “cited for safety violations” the violation alleged against him at the Department of Corrections was sleeping on the job, which he denied.  Sleeping on the job may be a safety violation, but it may not, the defendant does not supply evidence one way or the other.  The assault charge was not on the job, it was allegedly the reason that he was asked to resign.  Nevertheless, the application form did not have room to list more than one reason for leaving a prior job.  Therefore, it is not a falsification if the applicant lists “too stressful” as the reason for leaving the job.  Serving as a guard in a prison might well be quite stressful, as testified by Mr. Barnes on his application.

            Mr. Barnes left Nichirei because he believed that plant was going to shut down. That is what he indicated on his application.  That the plant continued operation after being sold to new ownership was something that he could not anticipate at the time he quit his job there.  Predicting the future can be difficult.  No falsification there.

            Mr. Barnes understands that there is a difference between “prison” and “jail”.  This is another cultural issue, similar to the above example of Ghanaian “relatives.”  People convicted of felonies and sentenced to terms longer than one year are usually sent to the state prison system.  They may serve their time at Clallam Bay, McNeil Island, Monroe, Walla Walla, Airway Heights, and other prisons operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections.  The women will serve their time at Purdy, also known as a prison and operated by the Department of Corrections.  Those convicted of misdemeanors or awaiting trial usually serve their time in the county jails, operated by the county sheriff departments.  This distinction between “prison” and “jail” is well known among inmates, correctional officers, police, and the courts.  While people who have not been exposed to the criminal justice system may believe that Mr. Barnes’ distinction between “prison” and “jail” is a semantic, he can be forgiven for believing that the application form was asking a specific question about “released from prison in the last ten years” to not include “released from jail”.

            As to Mr. Barnes’ admission that he was convicted of assault in 1990 while he listed no criminal convictions within past ten years on his 1997 application, the questions of severity of this misrepresentation in the context of a blue collar job and any limitation of backpay award is a question for the jury.  It certainly does not preclude a finding that Mr. Barnes was discriminated against because of his race.

            Same is true for Michael Davis.  His failure to list a criminal conviction within ten years prior to his 1999 application presents a question of severity of this misrepresentation in the context of a blue collar job and any limitation of backpay award is a question for the jury.  It certainly does not preclude a finding that Mr. Barnes was discriminated against because of his race.  The defendant does not presently present evidence as to what the crime was, though he argues that it was a “drug crime”.  That could be anything from a minor marijuana misdemeanor to trafficking in ton quantities of crack cocaine.  Perhaps the defendant can be more forthcoming with the specific details of this alleged conviction so this court and the jury can appropriately evaluate for severity and limitation of backpay award.

            The same thing can said for whether or not either Michael Davis or Terrance Davis received a high school diploma considering the blue collar positions they held.  Let the jury evaluate the value of completing sufficient credits in Trigonometry, English, Social Studies, History, Spanish, and Physical Education to qualify for a diploma from Wilson High School to the meat processing positions the plaintiffs held at King’s Command, and whether falsely stating the such a diploma was earned constituted a fraud in any way upon the defendant corporation.

            Terrence Davis mistakenly believed the question about felony convictions was limited to such convictions within the State of Washington.  His failure to list the out of state felony conviction on his application presents a question of severity of this misrepresentation in the context of a blue collar job and any limitation of backpay award is a question for the jury.  It certainly does not preclude a finding that Mr. Barnes was discriminated against because of his race. Against the defendant does not present evidence as to what the conviction was for, handicapping this court and the jury in any evaluation for severity.  If Mr. Davis believes that his termination from Cascade Plastic Company was a layoff, he did not defraud anyone in such a listing on his application.

            Shabae Diquan’s misrepresentation that Larry Pittman was his in-law is quite irrelevant to his qualifications for employment, that to classify it as a “severe misrepresentation” is ridiculous.  Mr. Diquan’s education at Bryman Medical College might be relevant if the defendant was the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center.  Let the jury evaluate the relative value of completing 18 months of classes or completing an MA degree to the meat processing positions he held at King’s Command, and whether falsely stating the such a degree was earned constituted a fraud in any way upon the defendant corporation.

            Similarly, let the jury evaluate the value of any certificate degree from Seattle Vocational Institute to the blue collar position held by Yolanda Eskridge at King’s Command and whether her false listing of such certificate on her application constituted a fraud in any way upon the defendant corporation.  She studied word processing and computers at Seattle Voc-Tech, and her job at King’s Command was physically handling meat and other foods.  She did not work in the office at King’s Command.  If the defendant corporation actually believed that she completed a certificate, then perhaps race played a role in its decision not offer her a job in the office.  Also, let the jury evaluate the value of not listing her employment at Providence Medical Center to her blue collar position and whether her omission on her application constituted a fraud in any way upon the defendant corporation.  Same evaluation for the question of two or four absences from her previous job during the previous year.

            As to Arthur Forest’s application, the form only has room for listing of four prior employers and no provision for listing additional employers.  Therefore, Mr. Forest did not engage in a misleading “omission” when he listed four previous employers.  The defendant does not present evidence as to what were the “falsifications” with respect to his reasons for leaving his previous employers, therefore, this Court is handicapped in evaluating for severity.  His underestimate of absences in his application seems like a minor misrepresentation, all the more so in that he did reveal his criminal conviction, and was hired by an employer who was informed.

            This is very interesting.  If previous criminal convictions did not disqualify Mr. Forest, then how could such convictions disqualify other applicants?  If the only issue is the honesty of the job applicant, then where is the concrete assurance for most applicants that a criminal conviction does not disqualify them if revealed?  It may be that applicants with records have long and bitter experience of being turned down for employment when they are honest about their previous problems, and would have no reason to believe that King’s Command is different, in spite of the assurance on the application.  And if such previous convictions are not a barrier or disqualification, then why ask the question on the application at all?  Would it not be of greater fairness for a corporation to only ask for convictions of crimes on a specific list, which would directly bear on employability, while specifying that applicants need not list misdemeanor marijuana convictions if they can pass a current urine analysis test?

            West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U.S. 379, 582-583, 81 L. Ed. 703, 57 S. Ct. 578 found that freedom to contract was a qualified and not an absolute liberty.  Therefore it could be regulated, Washington could enact predecessor to chapter 49.46 RCW because employer and employee do not stand on equal footing in negotiating the rate of pay and conditions of work.  The same thing is true when an applicant is asked potentially embarrassing questions about his or her history that are not relevant to the job for which they are applying.  Yet when King’s Command asks such questions and place the applicants in the difficult position of choosing between honesty and employment, it then claims that the making of such choice constitutes a fraud upon the employer and should limit the award if the defendant corporation is found to have discriminated on the basis of race.

            School teachers are forever telling their students that their grades will follow them around for the rest of their lives.  Actually grades don’t.  But convictions do, even two-bit misdemeanors, such as possession of an ounce or less of marijuana or drinking while underage.

            As to Curtis Hollis, he was in jail after being arrested on a warrant for a theft committed in 1992.  But he does not testify that he was convicted and the defendant does not present evidence of a conviction.  He testifies that he was held for four days in King County Jail before he found out what it was all about.  He did not plead guilty but believes the resolution was to pay the money back.  There does not appear to have been a trial, bench or jury.  Perhaps with the payment of the money in question, the charges were dropped.  Plenty of people are released from jail without convictions.  Here is how it works: police have probable cause that a person committed a crime.  The person is arrested and placed in jail.  It turns out that either he did not do it or that it cannot be proven that he did it.  He is released.  To require that a person put through such an experience reveal such a fact on job applications for the next ten years is an unfair punishment for a crime without the criminal conviction.  This is one reason for the distinction between “prison” and “jail”.  The question on the application appears to be patterned on Evidence Rule 609(b), which applies to admissibility of conviction of a crime of the witness and the time limit for old convictions.  The rule reads in part:

            Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

 

It is perfectly reasonable for Mr. Hollis to conclude that what the question on the application is asking is if he had ten years of living outside of prison with a clean record.  Being imprisoned for four days after an arrest on a warrant that does not result in a conviction is clearly not included in the Evidence Rule, and it is patently unfair for the defendant corporation to consider the failure to list such a confinement on an application a fraud in any way, shape, or form.

            Let the jury determine the value to the blue collar positions filled at King’s Command by Curtis Hollis of his previous employment history and whether his omissions on his applications constitute a fraud upon the employer and should limit the award if the defendant corporation is found to have discriminated on the basis of race.

            With Nathan Kilcrease, a high school diploma seems to be unimportant to the job he was hired to perform and the promotions he earned after he was employed, but the false listing of such educational achievement is argued to constitute a fraud upon the employer.  As above, let the jury evaluate the value of completing sufficient credits in Trigonometry, English, Social Studies, History, Spanish, and Physical Education to qualify for a diploma from a high school to the cleaning and supervisory positions he held at King’s Command, and whether falsely stating the such a diploma was earned constituted a fraud in any way upon the defendant corporation.  Likewise, let the jury similarly evaluate his failure to list his driving without a license conviction in 1995, given that a conviction did not disqualify Arthur Forest.  And let the jury consider why King’s Command needs such information to evaluate any applicant for the sanitations jobs at its facility.

            As for Sidney Lanier, he had more than one reason for quitting his employment at National Service Company.  The application only had room list one reason for leaving.  He managed to list two reasons.  There is no false statement as to fact here.  He listed Interim as his employer for a period of time and did not list all of the contractors to whom he was farmed out.  This is claimed as a serious misrepresentation.  This claim is patently frivolous.  His failure to disclose a previous firing from King’s Command cannot constitute a fraud because King’s Command certainly knew about it and hired him anyway.

            As to the issue of disparate treatment, did the defendant also engage in a background check of non-plaintiff employees to the same extent as the plaintiffs and if so, did it find evidence that any of the non-plaintiffs misrepresented educational achievements and absence of criminal convictions on their applications?  Because the defendant now, at this late date in the proceedings, raises this issue, the plaintiff has the right to question whether there was disparate treatment between the races as to effect of past criminal convictions not listed on applications and of the listing of educational achievements in excess of the truth on such applications.

CONCLUSION

            For these reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on After Acquired Evidence should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, February 6, 2002,

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Paul H. King                             WSBA #7370

                                                            Attorney for Plaintiff


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[1] Founded by Dr. William Hutchinson, who named the center after his brother Fred Hutchinson, a standout pitcher for the Seattle Rainiers and the Detroit Tigers who was taken by lung cancer.

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