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Marx�s objective analysis of social phenomena is
conceived in terms of analytic thinking. To explain it in its crudest form, the
analytic thinking works by approaching a phenomenon in its totality or
abstracted concreteness. Before an analysis can be carried out, it is highly
imperative to break down the concrete into its component parts. Contradictions
surface as a result of the breaking down of parts and following the logic of the
dialectical thinking, a reconciling point that accommodates a unifying idea is
reached in order to come up with a coherent understanding of how the concrete
operates. For instance, in order to analyze a certain population, it is
necessary to divide it by its parts � none other than the classes that
comprise it (Craib, 1997). In terms of Rizal�s theory, in order to
understand the constitution of a religion, one must be
able to understand its underlying feature, i.e. its ideological foundation so as
to determine what parts of it are authentic and inauthentic. Let us suspend the
explanation for a while and look at how Rizal separates the objective from the
subjective. Rizal's objective method entails the separation
of the mind and of the heart and everything should become an affair of the
former (San Juan, 1968). Prioritizing reason as inherent in the minds of human
beings, an objective judgment is possible, but this presupposes the bracketing
of the heart that contains subjectivity. The heart in this sense is vulnerable
to ideologies, the part of the self that is captured by discourses, having fears
of countering the rules that are set, i.e. in the belief system. To make sense of the claim, let us utilize
Rizal�s account of religion. For Rizal, the religious discourse provides ways
of ensuring conformity from the believers, i.e. introducing symbols (for
instance, the birhen). In this case, the believers learn by heart their
obligations to the symbols (to the extent that
these obligations are converted into practicable purposes). These obligations
become routinized and converted as taken for granted realities. The heart is
regulated by the religious discourse in the sense that voluntary obedience is
introduced as an affair of the heart, that deviating from the beliefs (even at a
reasonable cause; to free oneself from being fooled) is reduced to be an action
of a person without a heart, an immoral act as far as the discourse of the
religion being attacked by Rizal is concerned. (See �Tunay/Bulaan:
Ang Diyalektika ni Rizal sa Usapin ng Pagkamakarelihiyon�) The separation
of the mind and of the heart therefore prevents the prostitution of reason to
the absurd (San Juan, 1968). Put simply, critically evaluating one�s belief
involves doing away with pre-notions, i.e. the already conceived (but
misrepresented) realities that are contaminated by ideological blinkers (in this
case, of religion); and if one is not able to do this, he is faced in the
dilemma of �prostituting his reason to the absurd�. Again, another parallelism is evident. Rizal echoes
Marx�s conception of ideology. For Marx, the blinkers of ideology operate
within one�s class position (Craib, 1997); for Rizal, the blinkers of
ideology are rooted in the discursive formations, i.e. of religion, as far as
the discussed example is concerned. Both of them treat
ideology as an impediment to analytic thinking (for Marx) and reasoning (for
Rizal) that conceals the real operations of taken for granted realities. In this
case, Rizal reflects Marx�s rationale of an objective analysis � we cannot
trust what people say about their circumstances for they are affected by false
consciousness and ideologies (Craib, 1997). For Marx, people feel autonomous as they carry out
their actions when in fact they are not. They act in accordance with the
pre-existing structures and they are unmindful of reproducing them (Craib,
1997). The idea of Rizal about religion is best to elaborate this point. For
Rizal, the mere practice of religious beliefs (coerced or otherwise) reproduces
the hegemonic power of the frailocracy, the dominating structure of the
inauthentic religion, which is the center of Rizal�s critical foil. In order
to understand these ideological workings, Marx proposes the employment of an
analytic thinking, while Rizal suggests prioritizing moral reasoning which is an
exclusive affair of the mind. But logically, reasoning presupposes the
ability to think in analytical terms; and if this is the
case, reasoning in Rizal�s terms, employs dialectical thinking. Let us now go back to the explanation that is
earlier suspended. And at this point, it is interesting to apply Marx�s notion
of analytical thinking on how Rizal carried out his critic of the inauthentic
religion. Rizal presented religion by distinguishing it in its authentic and
inauthentic form, in effect, dissecting its components. Rizal then analyzed the
forms that he separated, especially the inauthentic, revealing contradictions
and ironies i.e. by revealing the ideological foundations of the inauthentic
religion, he is able to present the authentic religion in its purest form and
provide prescriptions. The whole point is that through analytic thinking, one is
able to decide and to come up with the most rational moral belief that is devoid
of ideological misrepresentations (See �Tunay/Bulaan:
Ang Diyalektika ni Rizal sa Usapin ng Pagkamakarelihiyon�). In his affection to objectivity, Marx speaks as though he is not a member of society; that is, he does not account of himself as being affected by ideologies in his writings. Rizal goes otherwise. San Juan (2004) claimed Rizal�s writings to be affected by his own social and historical position as a writer. For instance, Rizal was not able to separate his family values in his theorizing about the source and reproduction of moral order. In his �Letter to the Women of Malolos�, Rizal remained tied with his pre-notion of sexual division of labor � which is mainly an ideological product of the structure of the family as an institution � by espousing the inherent duty of the women to rear their children.
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Copyright 2005.
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