Contrastivism and Closure

I want to defend contrastivism against a problem from which I have argued it suffers.[1] The problem concerns closure principles for knowledge, and the desire of Jonathan Schaffer's contrastivism to preserve closure in such a way that contrastivism can mirror the anti-skeptical stance taken by most versions of contextualism.[2]

Before turning to contrastivism proper, we need to make sure we understand the antiskeptical stance that contrastivism hopes to mirror. According to standard versions of contextualism,[3] the standards for the truth of a knowledge ascription rise or fall depending on the context. Contextualists have not been wholly successful in explaining what makes the standards rise or fall, but one factor is cited frequently. That factor is the salience of the risks of error and in particular of specific skeptical hypotheses that imply that we are in error. In ordinary circumstances, such skeptical hypotheses are not salient, and so, according to some versions of contextualism, they do affect the truth value of knowledge ascriptions. In ordinary contexts, that is, knowledge ascriptions can be true even though, once skeptical hypotheses become salient, the standards for knowledge rise to the point that the same knowledge ascriptions are false.

This factor of standards raising and lowering allows contextualism to steer between the extremes of Moorean optimism regarding the truth of knowledge ascriptions and Pyrrhonian skepticism regarding the same. In certain contexts, the ordinary ones, Moorean optimism is exactly right; in other contexts, the Pyrrhonians win. What makes the view antiskeptical is that the Pyrrhonians exhibit the childish trait of never being satisfied without going undefeated. The view is antiskeptical precisely because skepticism is not universally true.

It would be equally accurate to say, from the other perspective that contextualism is anti-commonsense. Not much mileage can be had by emphasizing this feature of the view, so contextualists tend rather to tout the antiskeptical nature of the view rather than the anti-commonsensical feature. Being more of a Moorean optimist about knowledge, I simply can't pass on the opportunity to emphasize this point, however. When the view is portrayed as anti-skeptical, it gains a rhetorical advantage in contemporary epistemology–nearly all of us join in the chorus. When it is portrayed as anti-commonsensical, however, the advertising agency in charge of public relations for the view mulishly balks: this is no way to market a view in the contemporary climate! Of course, I'm being a bit unfair in my characterizations here–any discomfort can be avoided by characterizing contextualism in terms of wanting to end the philosophical wars between Mooreans and skeptics.

My focus, however, is on contrastivism rather than contextualism, and Schaffer develops the view to mirror the anti-skeptical characteristic of contextualism. He does so by endorsing a closure principle that guarantees such a result. He says,

> The following valid knowledge-transmitting inferences can be adduced from this picture of local knowledge: (I) Expand *p*: if $p_1 \rightarrow p_2$ then $Ksp_1q \rightarrow Ksp_2q$, and (ii) Contract *q*: if $q_2 \rightarrow q_1$ then $Kspq_1 \rightarrow Kspq_2$; whereas the following transmission principles will be invalid: (iii) *Contract *p*: *if $p_2 \rightarrow p_1$ then $Ksp_1q \rightarrow Ksp_2q$, (iv) *Expand *q*: *if $q_1 \rightarrow q_2$ then $Kspq_1 \rightarrow Kspq_2$, (v) *Replace *p*: *$Ksp_1q \rightarrow Ksp_2q$, and (vi) *Replace *q*: *$Kspq_1 \rightarrow Kspq_2$.[34] The validity of (I) and (ii) shows that the contrastivist respects deductive closure *suitably understood* (in particular (I) shows how mathematical proof still counts as knowledge-transmitting). But the invalidity of (vi) shows that Moore's knowledge that he

has hands rather than stumps is compatible with his ignorance as to whether he has hands or vat-images of hands: K*mhs* does not entail K*mhv*.[4]

Schaffer here endorses the following closure principle:

C1: If S knows p rather than q, p entails r and t entails q, then S knows r rather than t.

This principle allows one either to weaken the known claim or strengthen the contrast claim. The benefit for contrastivists of requiring that the contrast claim can only be strengthened and not weakened, as Schaffer emphasizes, is that it allows contrastivism to mirror the antiskeptical stance of most versions of contextualism while avoiding the perceived extreme of Moorean optimism. Achieving this middle road between skepticism and Mooreanism depends on rejecting the idea that there there is an alternative principle with a weaker antecedent that will allow one to draw the conclusion that one knows that skeptical hypotheses are false.

It is important to note that C1 is best understood as an indicator of the direction to look for a contrastivist closure principle, rather than the precise principle they have to endorse. Closure principles of any stripe face several well-known difficulties, and C1 is no exception. The simplest non-contrastivist closure principle claims that if you know p and p entails q, then you know q. This principle implies that anyone who knows anything is logically omniscient, leading to qualifications of the simple principle in terms of requiring that the entailment itself is known to be true. More qualifications are needed, however, and among the more plausible final proposals that try to address all of the problems is something like the following (for non-contrastivists): if you know p and competently deduce q from p in such a way that no non-overridden defeaters arise in the process of deduction for one's knowledge that p or the resulting belief that q, then one knows that q.[5] Contrastivists who endorse C1 should be understood as

presenting C1 as the first step toward some such more refined principle, and the qualifications included in this last non-contrastivist principle can be inserted easily into the approach indicated by C1.[6] In order to keep the discussion simple, however, we can here pursue the issue of closure using C1 itself in place of the more cumbersome refinement just suggested.

Returning to the main point, the value of endorsing C1 or something like it is that it provides the contrastivist with the conceptual resources to mimic the anti-skeptical stance of contextualism. There is a deep problem with this approach to closure, however. Suppose I know that the second entry in the show is a mule rather than a horse. I can deduce from this knowledge that the second entry has at least one ancestor that it is a horse, but this claim does not contrast with being a horse or with anything stronger than being a horse, since it is consistent with the entire class of consequences of the second entry's being a horse.

It is worth noticing that this problem affects not only contrastivist principles such as the above, but also relevant alternatives theories that try to preserve closure. The original relevant alternatives view proffered by Dretske and Goldman[7] were used to show that closure principles are suspect at best, but Gail Stine argued that the relevant alternatives theory could be developed in a way that preserves closure. The trick, according to Stine, is to keep the class of alternatives the same when you move from known claim to deduced claim.[8]

This approach will not work, however, for there is no guarantee that every proposition entailed by *p* will share a relevant contrary with *p*. We can make a stronger claim: nearly every proposition entails that something exists, and the claim that something exists is compatible with nearly any alternative of any such proposition. Of course, it is not compatible with the claim that nothing exists and claims that entail that nothing exists, but it will not always be true that the

claim that nothing exists and claims that entail it are *relevant* alternatives to ordinary claims such as "I have hands," or "That's a zebra." So if we begin with a set of relevant alternatives to such claims, we can often find an entailed claim (such as *Something exists*) that is compatible with every relevant alternative of the original claim. Hence, it will be relatively simple to show that, for the entailed proposition, the class of relevant alternatives is empty. That's the demise of the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge, not its salvation.

The question I want to pursue here, though, concerns whether contrastivism can be developed in a way that preserves closure. The simple formulation above will not work, but perhaps other approaches will have a better chance. The obvious way to try to remedy this problem is to look for logical relationships in the neighborhood that might be of use. C1 uses the notions of weaker and stronger, so perhaps instead of requiring that the contrast be at least as strong as the original contrast, maybe we could get by claiming that it is no weaker:

C2: If S knows p rather than q, p entails r and t is no weaker than q, S knows r rather than t,

where the notion of logical weakness is as follows: x is weaker than y iff y entails x. C2 would allow us to contrast having at least one ancestor that is a horse with being a donkey, for example. The problem is that it offers no guarantee of contrast in the problem case above, since having at least one ancestor that is a horse also fails to be no weaker than being a horse.

So, let's focus on finding a contrast, on making sure that any substitute for the original contrast will be incompatible with the deduced claim. We can do so by insisting on incompatibility:

C3: If S knows p rather than q, p entails r and t is a contrast to r and is not weaker than q,

then S knows r rather than t,

How does C3 fare on the mule/horse example? We deduce from the second entry's being a mule that it has a horse for an ancestor. On C3, when we deduce that the second entry has at least one ancestor that is a horse, we need to find a contrast that is not weaker than being a horse. Finding contrasts is easy: having no parents at all, being a tiger, etc. One quite natural contrast in the mule/horse example is that in deducing that the animal has at least one horse for an ancestor, we are implicitly comparing that claim with the claim that the animal is a donkey.

These points cannot sustain C3, however. Take some skeptical hypothesis, such as some version of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis (the BIV hypothesis). We assume the hypothesis is so formulated that it is incompatible with the truth of ordinary claims, such as the claim that a certain animal is a horse, or a donkey, or a mule. The problem is that the BIV hypothesis is not weaker than q: q isn't entailed by it; instead, it is incompatible with it. So C3 requires of knowledge by deduction that one know that the animal in question has at least one ancestor which is a horse rather than that the BIV hypothesis is true. If one desires to mirror the antiskeptical characteristics of contextualism, one is not likely to think that such a contrastive knowledge claim is true. So, to the extent that mirroring contextualism is central to the motivation for a closure principle, to that extent C3 must be rejected.

Of course, contrastivists who are also unrepentant Moorean optimists can embrace C3 wholeheartedly. In the present context, however, the search was for a version of contrastivism that keeps such optimism at a distance and yet embraces anti-skepticism. Given this combination of predilections, C3 won't do.

I think the conclusion to draw here is that no contrastivist principle is going to do the

trick that resorts to adding logical restrictions on propositions entailed by, or entailing, what is known and its contrast. Even so, I don't think contrastivists have to give up here. After all, the closure principle doesn't generate that virtue for contextualism; it's an independent assertion of the contextualism that their position has antiskeptical virtues. Contextualists endorse closure, and then assert that higher standards come into play when the deduced claim is a threatening skeptical claim.

How do the standards get raised, according to contextualists? It is important to see here the centrality of the concept of salience to the contextualist project. According to contextualists, there are mechanisms that cause standards for the truth of knowledge ascriptions to rise and fall. If we try to avoid the position that salience is an important aspect of these mechanisms, we will focus on objective features of a person's epistemic situation, such as the likelihood of certain skeptical hypotheses. Such an explanation can hardly get off the ground, however, since the objective likelihood of a skeptical hypothesis doesn't vary much between contexts. Another attempt would be to consider the epistemic likelihood of skeptical hypotheses relative to a body of evidence. Such a likelihood might be high if the body of evidence included beliefs that confirm the hypothesis, but, again, it is hard to see how that would happen with an regularity at all.

It is for this reason that contextualists turn subjective here, if they wish to accommodate skeptical intuitions at all. In certain contexts such as listening to a compelling presentation of Descartes' evil demon argument, the possibility of there being such a demon becomes salient for a person. It becomes salient because the person worries that they lack grounds for ruling out the hypothesis, and thus lack grounds for believing the hypothesis to be false. In the usual case,

something else is present as well: an application of closure, so that being unable to rule out the hypothesis threatens one's justification for all of one's beliefs.

The crucial point here is the way in which the skeptical hypothesis can engulf the logical space of one's cognitive attention. It is not simply that there is a claim that one would like to believe is false but which one lacks grounds for so believing. It is rather that one lacks such grounds and the possibility in question threatens the entirety of what one believes, or a vast array of one's important beliefs. The possibility in question is salient for a person insofar as it threatens important commitments of the person when evidence possessed is viewed as insufficient to rule out the possibility in question.

I am not endorsing this contextualist position, nor am I claiming that such a contextualist position is preferable to other contextualist positions. Contextualism could be true and skeptical hypothesis never gain sufficient credence to raise the standards to where knowledge attributions are nearly always false. Contextualism could also be true and skeptical hypothesis always keep the bar high enough that knowledge attributions are nearly always false. My point is not to delineate my preferred version of the view, but is rather the conditional claim that if one wants a version of contextualism that finds a middle ground between Moorean optimism and skeptical pessimism, a key ingredient in the account of the mechanisms at work in the story of how standards rise and fall will be salience regarding possibilities of error.

If salience plays such a crucial role in the contextualists' anti-skeptical stance, there is no reason the contrastivist cannot appeal to the same mechanism in trying to mimic the anti-skeptical virtues of contextualism. As I see it, the heart and soul of the contrastivist claim that every knowledge claim involves a contrast claim already implicitly appeals to something like the

notion of salience, anyway, since it is hard to see how the contrast could fail to be a salient one and yet the knowledge ascription be true. If we focus on the knower's epistemic situation rather than the speaker's situation, the contrast to be filled in, when considering the knower's knowledge that p, will depend on the salient contrasts to p *from the perspective of the knower*.

If we recall the problems with the earlier principles, the problem is that none of them allow weakening the contrast claim. Given the centrality of salience to the contrastivist position, the place to start trying to find an acceptable closure principle is to allow weakening, but only in certain conditions. So we can endorse:

Necessary Condition 1 on Contrastivist Closure: If S knows p rather than q and p entails r, then S knows r rather than t only if t is a salient contrast to r for S.

Of course, this necessary condition is clearly not sufficient. We can determine what to add to yield a sufficient condition, however, by considering what a contrastivist should say about knowing p rather than q. Under what conditions does this contrastive knowledge obtain? Whatever we say here, it will have to be sufficient for ruling out the epistemic possibility of q. It would be a mistake to interpret ruling out in terms of possessing information sufficient to guarantee that q is false, unless we have some special argument that such a strong construal is required for the possession of knowledge. Instead, what I am pointing to with the language of ruling out is the possession of some body of evidence against q sufficient to open up the possibility of knowing p rather than q.

We should not expect that having evidence sufficient to show that q is false is sufficient for knowing p rather than q. First, there are the obvious necessary qualifiers: p has to be believed, and p must be true as well. Second, there is the Gettier gadfly always buzzing around.

But even beyond these obvious qualifications, there is a further one. We must insist that the belief that p is properly based, for otherwise there will be cases where one is in a position to know because one possesses adequate evidence for knowledge but where one believes for utterly bizarre reasons. There is no need to go into the matter of what proper basing amounts to, but it is clear, in the context of the evidentialism I'm assuming, that there are no more than two ways for this to occur: either the belief is foundational in a way that does not involve being justified by evidence (and so is based properly in an utterly trivial fashion), or the content of the belief is justified by evidence and hence the belief must be based on the evidence for the content of the belief. When the belief is properly based in either of these two ways and the belief is true, I will say that the person in question is in a position to know. So the additional requirement is that it is not enough to rule out the possibility of the contrast claim being true; one must also be in a position to know.

These points allow us to formulate additional necessary conditions on a proper closure principle for contrastivists. The first point allows us to say:

Necessary Condition 2 on Contrastivist Closure: If S knows p rather than q and p entails r, then S knows r rather than t only if S has ruled out the possibility that t.

The second point about needing to be in a position to know allows a further point:

Necessary Condition 3 on Contrastivist Closure: If S knows p rather than q and p entails r, then S knows r rather than t only if S is in a position to know that r rather than t by having competently deduced r from p.

My claim is that these three conditions yield a satisfactory solution to the original problem raised for contrastivism. That is, in place of C1, we should accept:

CWinner: If S knows p rather than q, then if p entails r, t is a salient contrast to r for S the possibility of which S has ruled out, and S is in a position to know r rather than t by having competently deduced r from p, then S knows r rather than t.

This principle is superior to the original principle precisely because it allows a weakening of the contrast case. The idea is that you can open up the closure principle to allow weakening of the contrast claim, and still preserve the antiskeptical position of contextualism. The way in which such opening up occurs is by analogy with a central feature of contextualism. The contextualist has to give us an account of the mechanisms that generate the raising of standards. Contrastivists need an account of the mechanism that generates permission in a context for weakening the contrast claim in certain ways (and not in others). In both cases, an appeal to salience is plausible.

The crucial point to note here is the relationship between the contrastivist's three-place knowledge relation and the two-place epistemic relation of ruling out. The above account makes the three-place relation depend on a couple of two-place epistemic relation, the relation of ruling out as well as the positive relation of having based the belief on whatever evidence is involved.

In my view, this result is all to the good, since I'm not sure how to understand the alternative view. If we want a theory that cites three-place relations "all the way down," then we should talk in terms of something's being evidence for p rather than q, but not evidence for p rather than r; and we should talk in terms of ruling out p in the context of considering q but not in the context of considering r.

I'm not sure, however, how to understand these locutions. Start with the idea of something's being evidence for p rather than q. I can make sense of the idea if we explain it in

some way in terms of 2-place predicates. For example, if we try to clarify the nature of evidence in terms of the language of probability, the view isn't 3-place all the way down. The best we could say is that p is more probable on e than q is, or we might compare likelihoods here, comparing the probability of e on p with that of e on q. Each of these approaches is a comparison between two 2-place predicate claims, not a 3-place predicate claim. The same happens if we clarify evidence for p rather than q in terms of what rules out q but leaves it open whether p, and if we use the language of what one has proven rather than presupposed: we'll get a relation between premises and conclusion for what is proven, not some three-place relation. So in all these cases the fundamental epistemic notions will not be three-place relations.

The same difficulties arise with trying to clarify a purportedly three-place relation of ruling out. I can understand contextualist and relativistic approaches to ruling out, where p is ruled out in one context but not in another. The discriminating reader will have noticed how I fudged the distinction between these latter views and the three-place relation approach by writing above as if there is a three-place relation of having ruled out p in the context of considering q. I used this language because it would be mysterious to claim that there is a three-place relation of having ruled out p rather than q: that's just a combination of two two-place relation claims of someone's having ruled out p but not having ruled out q. Moreover, if we want the ruling out to depend on context in some way, we can make sense of this idea by treating the two-place relation in question contextually.

There are hard questions here that none of the above answers, but it is far from clear here that endorsing the view that knowledge is a three-place relation is in tension with the fundamental epistemic notions being two-place relations. One may wish for symmetry here, but

the lack of symmetry is no obvious argument against the view.

Compare in this regard the view of Stephen Hetherington that knowledge comes in degrees.[9] I think this view is mistaken, but that is not my point here. Instead, my point has to do with the relationship between knowledge and its components, which include belief, truth, justification, and some condition to assuage Gettier. Hetherington's position gains some argumentative support from the fact that justification comes in degrees, since if none of the components of knowledge came in degrees, we naturally would wonder why anyone would propose that knowledge comes in degrees. We might even endorse the following principle: if none of the components of X come in degrees, then X does not come in degrees. I do not know if this principle is true, but it may be true. If it is true, then Hetherington's position is in desperate need of finding a component of knowledge that comes in degrees, and here there is a happy result: justification does.

Of course, it doesn't follow that knowledge comes in degrees simply because one of its components comes in degrees. The property of being over seven feet tall doesn't come in degrees, but it has a component–being tall in a world like this one–does. Nor does it follow that if being tall comes in degrees that any component of it comes in degrees.

The point of this discussion in the present context is that even if knowledge is a three-place relation and all of the components of knowledge are not, no refutation of contrastivism results. (Having a justification that is ultimately undefeated by (non-misleading) defeaters is more than a two-place relation, but not the contrastive three-place relation of contrastivism.) Even if symmetry considerations count in favor of a view, it would be a mistake to hold that the lack of symmetry in some way undermines the view. At most, such lack of symmetry would only

require some explanation as to why knowledge has more places (or a different number of places) in its representation than the more fundamental notions do, but a reasonable answer to that question might cite the linguistic data contrastivists need anyway.

Besides this issue of symmetry, there are two other potential problems with the account presented here that I wish to disarm. The first has to do with a circularity issue. If ruling out a hypothesis means knowing that the hypothesis is false, then we have the problem of needing a separate two-place knowledge relation in addition to the three-place relation posited by contrastivism. To avoid this problem, the contrastivist must deny the involvement in question. There is no problem claiming that ruling out implies knowing, but since ruling out is a two-place relation between a person and a proposition, it cannot be identical to a three-place knowledge relation. Moreover, it is trivial that ruling out implies knowing that the claim is false rather than true, so contrastive knowledge is implied by ruling out; but that is no reason to think that ruling out must be defined in terms of knowledge.

There may be a more serious worry, however, regarding the connection between the conceptual resources employed in Cwinnner and the nature of knowledge. CWinner appeals to the notion of having evidence sufficient for showing that a certain claim is false, and one prominent view about evidence makes being able to know that one has that evidence a necessary condition for having that evidence. Internalists notoriously think of evidence in this way, claiming that evidence must be the sort of thing that one can detect that one has by armchair, or a priori, reflection. Noticing this connection between the concepts of evidence and the concept of knowledge may lead one to wonder whether we can rest content with a two-place evidence relation while favoring a three-place knowledge relation.

More needs to be said here to reveal a difficulty, however, and it is worth spending some time seeing what additional things must be said. If there is a problem here, it is a problem arising from the fact that contrastive knowledge of any claim is arrayed on a continuum from quite easy knowledge to quite difficult knowledge. For example, it is quite easy to know that I have hands rather than stumps–all I need to do is look to find out. It is quite hard, however, to know that I have hands rather than vat-images of hands. Given this array of contrastive knowledge claims, the internalist faces the problem of saying exactly what kind of contrastive knowledge must be available in order for there to be evidence of a certain sort. If the contrastive knowledge needed is very easy knowledge, then the condition imposed will be easy to satisfy; if the needed knowledge is hard knowledge, then the condition will be quite difficult to satisfy.

This issue is one that we need not settle in the present context, however. If a contrastivist wishes to be an internalist about evidence, he or she will need to address this problem. No matter what the outcome of this inquiry is, however, no special problem arises for CWinner. A problem might arise if we *defined* contrastive knowledge at least partially in terms of this closure condition, and then went on to define the notion of evidence used in that condition in terms of contrastive knowledge via some internalist constraint on the notion of evidence. But nothing of the sort is being attempted here, so there is no reason to think that an internalist constraint on evidence will jeopardize the tenability of CWinner.

The other remaining issue is whether the contrastive closure principle above is adequate to deal with the counterexamples that plague C1. The first counterexample involved knowing that a certain animal was a mule rather than a horse, and inferring that it had at least one ancestor that was a horse. Since the principle above allows substituting contrasts that are weaker or

unrelated to the initial contrast, one could come to know that claim in question if one had also ruled out, for example, that it was a donkey. In quite ordinary circumstances, one will have ruled out the possibility of it's being a donkey while ruling out the possibility of it's being a horse (by looking), and if so, the above principle would allow one to come to know by deduction that it had at least one ancestor that was a horse rather than being a donkey.

In objecting to the relevant alternatives approach to closure as developed by Stine, I considered a case in which a person knows p, where p entails that something exists, and yet the claim that nothing exists was not a relevant alternative to p. Applied to the contrastivists' view, the example would go as follows. Suppose you know that p rather than q, and deduce from p that something exists. You've never considered the claim that nothing exists and take no attitude toward it. Does the closure principle above allow one to come to know that something exists in this way?

The answer is yes, so long as the following occurs by the time the deduction is complete. By the end of the deduction, one must have ruled out that nothing exists, and since that claim is the opposite of the claim that something exists, it will have been ruled out by the deduction itself and will be salient to the mind of the knower in the same way that the negation of a claim is always salient to the mind of one considering a given claim.

In conclusion, I see no reason to question either the acceptability of CWinner or its usefulness to the contrastivist in presenting a closure principle that allows it the anti-skeptical virtues of contextualism.

Endnotes

1. I argue this point in “Contextualism, Contrastivism, Relevant Alternatives, and Closure,” *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming 2005.

2. Jonathan Schaffer, “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” *Philosophical Studies* 2003, pp. 73-103.

3. See, for example, Keith DeRose, "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52 (1992): pp. 913-929; and Stewart Cohen, "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1998): 289-306.

4. Schaffer, p. 92.

5. Timothy Williamson, in *Knowledge and Its Limits*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), proposes the general approach in terms of competent deduction, and the qualifications beyond competent deduction can be found in John Hawthorne’s “The Case for Closure,” in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, edited by Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing Co., 2004).

6. Schaffer’s most developed approach is contained in “Closure, Contrast, and Answer,” manuscript, defending a closure principle along the lines of C1. His most recent account favors turning the consequent of the closure principle into the claim that a certain individual is *in a position to know* rather than actually knowing. Since I am not sure what being in a position to know is supposed to involve, I prefer to develop a closure principle not containing this notion, as I attempt here.

7.See Fred Dretske, “Epistemic Operators,” *Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 1007-1023; and Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” reprinted in *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, edited by Pappas and Swain, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 120-145.

8.See Gail Stine, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” *Philosophical Studies* 29 (1976), pp. 249-261.

9. Stephen Cade Hetherington, *Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).