I can still remember my first encounter with history during my high school days. It was something awful. I thought history was nothing other than memorizing the dates and the names of historical individuals. I thought that the work of a historian is simple: collect data then present the data. The presentation of the data is also protected from critical scrutiny I thought a historian could easily get out of trouble by insisting that the data can speak for itself. All of these are misconceptions of history. Perhaps there are students in history who share the same understanding and therefore take the subject, the teacher and an author of a history book very lightly. Probably they think of history as an uneventful experience, simply a waste of time. All of these misconceptions changed as I see in history a very fertile field of research, a very fruitful venue for intellectual discourse especially in relation to the art of interpretation. In my understanding, Hermeneutes, Critical Theorists and especially Postmodern thinkers simply do not make sense if remained unenlightened by historical discourses. For instance, interpretation is considerably unsuccessful if it does not take into consideration the historical context because the text is a product of history. Gadamer recognizes the importance of history in interpretation. The concept of tradition, prejudice and historically effected consciousness are nothing but explicit affirmation that for interpretation to achieve its purpose it must take the historicality of the text.

The selection for Hegel's philosophy is personally significant. Hegel is a prism in which German legacy multiplied into various fields of interest upon impact. Existentialism and Marxism grow from Hegel's garden. Phenomenology and Hermeneutics were cooked in Hegel's kitchen. Hegel's philosophy of history also generated considerable influences to some contemporary philosophers of history even if these influences are generally critiques rather than affirmations. This paper then attempts to analyze Hegel's Philosophy of History. The first part presents the phenomenology of spirit as a warming up for his philosophy because this philosophy does not simply make sense without it. The second part presents the important elements of history that nurtures the spirit's growth and how the spirit directs history. The third part evaluates Hegel based on the writings of contemporary philosophers of history.

Part I. Introduction

1. Life.

   Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born at Stuttgart on August 27, 1770. His father was a civil servant. In his school years in Stuttgart the future philosopher did not distinguish himself in any particular way, but it was at this period that he first felt the attraction of the Greek genius being especially impressed by the plays of Sophocles. In 1788 Hegel enrolled, as a student in the Protestant theological foundation of the University of Tubingen were he befriended Schelling and Holderlin. The friends studied Rousseau together and shared a common enthusiasm for the ideals of the French Revolution. But at school, Hegel did not show impression of exceptional ability. After leaving the University, Hegel worked as a family tutor, first at Berne in Switzerland (1793-96) and then at Frankfurt (1797 - 1800). Though outwardly uneventful these years constituted an important period in his philosophical development (Copleston 1974: 159). Hegel died on Nov. 14, 1831 at the age of 61.

   Any treatment on Hegel's philosophy can easily see two important divisions. The first one is the Early Hegel where Hegel's writings were considered theological. In fact very evident throughout his writings is the use of subject matters that are also the concerns of theology like the concept of God and the role of God in the life of man and His role in the world

2. Writings.
   1. Difference Between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling (1801)
   2. Critical Journal of Philosophy ( (1802- 03)
   3. The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)
   4. The Science of Logic (1812-16)
   5. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (1821)
   6. Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817)
   7. The Possivity of the Christian Religion (1795-96)
   8. The Spirit of Christianity and its Faith (1800)
   9. Fragment of a System (1800)
   10. Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schellling (1801)

3. Features of Hegel's Philosophy
   1. Hegel is a Great Synthesizer.

      His entire philosophy is designed to resolve all forms of conflict that always take the form of a triad. For instance, he explains thoroughly the relation between Finite; Infinite and Absolute Spirit as dialectically related with each other so much so that one cannot simply be conceived without the other. He also distinguishes Object, Subject, and Nature in his phenomenology. The famous Thesis, Anti-thesis and Synthesis (though not essentially Hegelian because this distinction is originally conceptualized by Schelling and Fichte) appears as the method that directs the flow of his thought. He also explained the relation between Consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason as interrelated. His conception of the Absolute is also elucidated intricately in differentiating Logic, Nature and Spirit. The triad paradigm exemplifies conflict. However this conflict is always resolved in the third stage of dialectics. This resolution wins him the name of an Optimist Philosopher.

   2. Compementarity in his Writings.

      Understanding Hegelian system is very demanding. It means familiarity of both the Early and the Later Tradition. In fact it is safe to say that the later development can be properly understood only through familiarity with the early writings. Further his concept of Spirit resonates in his Phenomenology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of History, Political Philosophy and even his Ethics that to understand them properly requires familiarity with all. Hence, this paper starts with a brief discussion of the Early Hegel (to provide us a good background of the most important concepts) then ends with the Later Hegel. This presentation then requires critical treatment on the theological framework evident in the Early Hegel with a preliminary investigation of his triad of man, God and love. The second part of the paper tackles with the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Here I try to discuss the essence of the Spirit in order to properly understand his Philosophy of History (the third part of the paper).

      1. The Early Hegel

         The Problem: The Positivism of the Christian Religion

         When Hegel contrasted the Christian religion with that of the Greek religion he was so dissatisfied with the former's presentation of God as remote and transcendent. On the other hand Greek religion presents their gods and goddesses as immanent actively participating in all of human affairs. The Christian God is unreachable that a gulf has been built between Him and man. This gulf has caught Hegel's genius. He is definitely aware of the negative consequences of transcendent God especially in Christian morality. If God is transcendent and if morality is based on the transcendent God, then this form of morality is imposed from the outside. Although this moral imposition renders the entire morality universally influential with unquestionable authority (without mention the dogmatic attitude of the Church as a consequence) it enlarges the gulf that separates man and God. This separation is detrimental to his synthetic philosophy. Hegel finds comfort in the idea of Christ as a mediator. Christ, coming from God comes to earth and assumed a human form. This assumption bridges the alienated man from his God and thereby bringing him closer into God's divinity. However, the concept of Christ as a man-God poses a philosophical problem. While it is possible that the union between God and man can be attained through religion, this does not help in the establishment of philosophical foundations of the great synthesis (Hegel 1977: 525). Does the union exclude distinction? Does man when united with God still man or is he not like a little God? When God unites with man is his divinity also not affected?

         Hegel was forced to leave theology behind, as it is impossible for theology to untangle with the problematics of identity in distinction. Hegel proceeded to philosophy as he believes that philosophy's main goal is to overcome all possible oppositions. In this case the opposition between the finite and the infinite. Resolution then does not mean that that the finite is denied of what it is nor the infinite reduced to the multiplicity of the finite but a kind of integration of both.

         However, this poses a very serious problem. If finite and infinite are integrated then the instrument used must be reflection. Obviously, empirical method simply does not make sense but only through the power of intuition in a purely speculative and dialectical manner. But reflection is the same as understanding and even if both offer clarity of distinctions, these distinctions do not offer a synthesis - the goal that Hegel wants to achieve in his system. Hegel was forced to find assistance in Fichte and Shelling. Fichte proposes that the problem of identity in distinction can only be solved through the use of intellectual intuition or transcendental intuition, which makes itself its own object and one with it. Hence Ficthean tradition is highly speculative but Fichte justifies his stance in saying that unity (synthesis) can only be possible through speculation. Schelling, on the other hand, offers a concept of identity-in-distinction. This means that the Absolute is not lost in the multiplicity of the finite. The concept of the Absolute for Schelling means unity in the subject and the object and, like his philosophy of nature, nature is not simply the opposite of the ideal but a combination of real and the ideal (Hegel 1977: 163).

         Hegel, in the Jena lectures, argues that if finite and the infinite are set over and against one another as opposed concepts there is no passage from one to another. A synthesis is impossible. But we cannot think of the finite without thinking of the infinite. The concept of the finite is not self-contained and an isolated concept. This displays significant difference with Schelling. For Schelling the Absolute in itself transcends conceptual thought and we must approach the absolute identity by the via negativa, thinking away the attributes and distinctions of the finite. But for Hegel, the Absolute is not an identity about which nothing further can be said. It is the total process of its self-expression or self-manifestation in and through the finite. Hence if Absolute transcends conceptual thought then this Absolute is universally abstract. Here Hegel separates path with Schelling for he believes that the foundation of a Grand Synthesis is a conception of an Absolute that is both finite and infinite; both transcendent and immanent

      2. Later Hegel

         The question that Hegel wants to address during the last phase of his life is the concept of Absolute Spirit. This concept is dominant in all aspects of the Hegelian system be it in his philosophy of nature, phenomenology, political philosophy and philosophy of history. In fact the inter-relatedness of these philosophies poses in the researcher the need to treat the issue quite intensively. Hegel's concept of the Absolute is contained in his Logic (metaphysics), Philosophy of Nature, and Phenomenology of Spirit. Hence it is important to browse how the Absolute is being explained.

         1. What is the Absolute?
            • The Absolute for Hegel is in the continuous process of becoming. It is never static or self constituted. The Absolute is the totality of reality which means that it is universal and aside from universality, the absolute as manifested in reality must also be concrete. Hence it can aptly be described as a concrete universal (Hegel 1977: 9, 11, 12, 46).

            • Absolute Spirit becomes actual through development. Hegel views reality as a movement towards a particular telos directed by the Absolute. In fact he says that this telos itself is the absolute, the end of the entire process

            • Absolute as Totality is Self-thinking Thought. Spinoza contributed some explanations here. Spinoza says that the Absolute is Infinite Substance and the whole of reality is a constitution of the Absolute Spirit. As such the Absolute is essentially transcendental for what is material cannot be infinite. For Hegel Spinoza's description of the Absolute is inadequate (Copleston 1974: 226). The basis of this remark is that Absolute as transcendent creates problems with regard to a grand synthesis - a synthesis of the inherent relation between man and the infinite. Hegel then states categorically that the Absolute is not only substance (in the sense of Spinoza) but a subject as well. This new concept conveniently facilitates an object as a logical consequence. If the Absolute is a Subject then what is its object? Hegel says that the object is itself. In the dialectics of subject (say man -finite) and object (God - Infinite) the consequence of this dialectic is the Absolute. But since the idea of the Absolute is the end process, to conceptualize it as self-conscious, Hegel successfully limits the dialectic into three participants: Finite - Infinite - Absolute Spirit.

            • Hegel and Aristotle

              For Aristotle, the Absolute as self-thinking thought is a transcendent deity (Being). The concept of transcendence is very crucial because if transcendence means self-constituted its existence is independent of man's existence. In fact it implies absolute as a cause (necessary) and finite as contingent where the latter depends on the former. This distinction is detrimental to his dream of a philosophy that unites all oppositions. Hence Hegel's conception of an Absolute as a totality of reality is a process of self-reflection, that is reality that comes to know itself (becoming). He agrees with Aristotle that the Absolute (God) is the telos and as such it is Self-thinking. However, Hegel objects that it is self-constituted (an ens a se). This implies that Aristotle's Absolute is independent of the World. Hegel insists that the concept of transcendence in the Absolute is not intrinsically contradictory to a conception of emanation of the same. The whole of a dynamic reality is the Totality (emanation) of the Absolute towards the telos (which is the Absolute Itself).

         2. The First Principle: The Rational is Real and the Real is Rational

            This is what Hegel referred to as the principle of identification between the Absolute Spirit and Man. The relation between real and rational is clearly understood in Hegel's Philosophy of History. For him, history is more than what is originally intended by man. For instance an Arsonist burns a house (his original intention) but instead of one house burned the entire village was burned. The burning of the village metaphorically presents Hegel's concept of history as beyond the intention of man. For Hegel there is a certain FINALITY (determination) to history and reasonability of the world. Hence History is real because it is rational. It is rational because it is spiritual. With this Hegel attempts to unite the finite and the infinite.

            The infinite is given by religion. Religion is nothing else but the recognition of the infinite. The finite is limited based on experience. If so then something must exert limitations. But such limitation can only come from the external and not simply internal. The infinite is the one that limits the finite. Hence both are correlative terms. However correlative, he rejects the finite-infinite relation as opposition. He also rejects the idea that the finite is caused by the infinite. He admits, instead, of the metaphysics of the spirit through a dialectic of the negation-of-the-negation.

         3. The Solution: Metaphysics of the Spirit through a Dialectic of the Negation of the Negation.

            The Dialectic can be described as a relation between the finite and the infinite. Whereas the existence of the infinite negates the finite and the finite negates the infinite, which means that the abstract infinite is finitized and the finite infinitized. The finite then can be conceived as the otherness of the infinite. As a consequence the infinite becomes a concrete universal.

            To illustrate,

            Infinite (not finite)	Finite (not Infinite)	Absolute Spirit
            Abstract Universality	Concretization Objectification Concrete Particularity	Concrete Universality

         4. Metaphysics of the Spirit

            Hegel's notion of the spirit is a spirit moving towards an active unification of all oppositions. This connotes activity. This is different from the Christian God because the latter connotes unchangeability. In other words the Absolute is both an absolute reality and a relative Reality which can be summarized as

            Thesis       Anti-thesis           Synthesis

            Finite       Infinite           Absolute spirit

            The Absolute as Logos is transcendent. With this understanding he agrees with Schelling, Aristotle and the Christian philosophers. But Hegel adds that this does not mean a separation from the world. In fact the world is the Absolute as its manifestation, through the world the Absolute comes to know of itself. Knowing the Absolute (as logos) in itself means that it emanates in nature and in history in short of the totality of human experience. Hence that Absolute comes to know of itself only through the finite and therefore it is not self-constituted.

         5. Philosophy of Nature

            Just as nature cannot possibly be without the existence of its particulars so is the Absolute cannot be without the finite. It does not follow that nature is reducible to the multiple expressions of the finite in the world like changes in weather conditions, different seasons, the laws of causality. Nature is known through its particulars as a whole (Hegel 1977: 145-147). This concept of Unity in multiplicity is central in Hegel's conception of the Absolute. Just as the Absolute is made manifest in the many it provides coherence, or I may call, intelligibility to all of human experience and of nature. Hence the universal is knowable through its particulars. Consistent with this line of thinking we can identify two faces of nature: nature as subject and nature as object. With this we can say that there is no clear objectivity (nature as contingent) without a clear subjectivity (nature as itself).

            The Absolute in itself (Idea) is Spirit but it is potential rather than actual Spirit. This means that this potentiality is nothing if not actualized. It does not generate force within itself but works (actualized) with the world. The Absolute as for-itself (nature) is a Spirit that is self-alienated which means it is the Spirit in its other-ness. This other-ness explains that the Absolute is self-conscious of something missing within it and that this missing element can be supplied by the finite. This calls therefore for an existence defined by mutuality and interdependence. Thus,

            SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT				OBJECTIVE SPIRIT
            		UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS

            The subjective spirit is conscious. This consciousness is described in terms of Freedom like the expression of one's will. However, this freedom presupposes a Right. It is impossible for freedom to be dialectically related to consciousness but remains non-functional. For freedom to truly function means that freedom is related to Right (like right to do whatever one wants) (Hegel 1977: 180-185). The Objective Spirit means consciousness of this right. In his philosophy of the State, Hegel described the Subjective Spirit as an individual. The individual is a conscious being as such he is also conscious of his freedom and right. However, this consciousness becomes multiple, as there are many individuals who are also aware of their own rights. Hence, the Objective Spirit as civil society is a collection of different expressions of freedom. These expressions can only become a universal expression in the State. The WILL of the State, having represented individual will, individual freedom, individual right is now the general will that is being protected and preserved by the State. Hence, the identification of the individual's interest in the State is the actualization of freedom. But the kind of State that Hegel had in mind was a Constitutional Monarchy exemplifying the Prussian State. He believes it is the most rational form.

Part II. Philosophy of History

1. Introduction.

   The conception of absolute spirit as truly immanent and universal is inevitable in order to provide sense and consistency to Hegel's concept of history. History for Hegel is the juxtaposition of a spirit that is abstract universal and the finite that is concrete and particular. The universal character of reason ensures an eternal presence in history. It cannot, therefore, be subjected to the limitation of space and time or circumscribed by a particular historical event or taken for granted/distorted by the intricacies of individual historian's interpretation of history. The consequence of course is essentially important to Hegel. In the first pace, Hegel concretizes his dream of a unity between abstract universality with that of concrete particularity. Secondly, and most importantly, Hegel attempts to solve the problem that haunted the Romantic School, that is, to ascertain unity and continuity in history. If history is indeed viewed as a necessary development of the past then both past and present and even the future must be created. Unity in history is vital to historians, as it is to hermeneutes alike. For historians unity means intelligibility and necessary in the interpretation of history. Some fibers of the past may be rejuvenated in not so distant future. As a matter of fact some historians especially those belonging to the Hegelian tradition believes that the French Revolution was the consequence of Rousseau's ideas.

   For Hermeneutes unity is vital to interpretation. If the text has to be understood properly then it has to be taken into a larger context. A text is historical hence proper understanding deemed it necessary to take into consideration the historical situation that surrounds the text. The concretenes and particularity of history, on the other hand, secures active participation of man. History is not simply induced, directed or determined from the outside. Man, too, participates in the making of history. The absolute spirit does not work apart from man. It works with man and in man so that history becomes a story of the mutuality of the infinite and the finite. It is a kind of sharing of essences, or a kind of meeting of heaven and earth, a synthesis of Platonic Metaphysics, a philosophy of optimism that sees the world as a unity in diversity. It is not simply a dialectics equated with that of antagonism but dialogical - the one that implies mutual dependence.

   I develop Hegel's philosophy of history because I am particularly interested in his conception of history as the development of freedom. Hegel talks lengthily of freedom in history in his book Reason in History (Hegel 1953: 25-48). First is the idea of freedom. In his Philosophy of Right Hegel described two aspects of freedom namely indeterminacy, that is abstraction from content, needs, and desires and the other one is determinacy of a content of an object. The relation existing between these two elements is negative. The dialectics eliminates the abstraction to eliminate the content. As I see it, the universal character of freedom (for instance consideration of the general welfare) has to meet with the particular character (my personal interest). Both aspects of freedom reside in the ego. In other words both the universal and the particular is present in the person (ego) so much so that the indeterminacy element is sacrificed and that determinacy reigns simply because the ego no longer concerns his own interest but also the interest of others. Indeterminate freedom could have been possible if the person is self-centered. Hence freedom as self-determination is nothing else but the unity of the particular and the universal in man. Elevated to a higher level, freedom resides in the state. The state is more important than the individual. The state ensures that freedom is secured through the implementation of laws. However this does not mean that the individual is sacrificed. The individual is united with the universal but it is the latter that takes precedence. In short, freedom is the pre-requisite for the spirit to flourish. The greater the freedom among the greater number in the state the greater is the chance for the spirit to grow. The cunning of reason progresses with freedom because history is a progression of freedom.

   Secondly, freedom pervades in a national spirit. The concept of national spirit implies a collection, that is, a collective world-view. The national spirit must be represented by particular individuals, however what is represented must be by nature collective and not personal.

   Thirdly, the national spirit must move further to the world-spirit. Particular national spirits to lead the word spearheads the emergence of the world spirit. Hence it is not enough that a nation or a people is free. They must lead and lead with a worldwide following. Probably, this is the final realization of the spirit in the world.

2. Three types of History

   Hegel identified three types of history namely,

   1. Original history - recording and description of deeds and events within the within the limits of historian's experience
   2. Reflective history - extend beyond the limits of historians experience as it involves didactics
      
   3. Philosophy of History - signifies a thoughtful consideration of history.

   Thoughtful means that in history reason dominates the world and that world history is thus a rational process. Human history then is the unfolding of the Spirit. How do we know? Hegel can only say that we have to discern the significant rational process using historical materials at hand. History is a process whereby the spirit comes to actual consciousness of freedom. Hence history means progress in the consciousness of freedom or the World-Spirit comes to explicit consciousness of itself as freedom that is attained only and through the mind of man. But even then the study of history concentrates on the study of nations and not the individual. Hence the unit in the concrete development of the World-Spirit is the National Spirit of the people (Volkgeist) (Coplestone: 220). For Hegel the Volksgeist is imbedded in culture, which includes among others, political conditions and traditions, morality, art, religion and philosophy. Each member of this culture is, then, a bearer of this Volkgeist. Sometimes Hegel uses the National Spirit and World Spirit interchangeably. But it is clear that National Spirit is a phase a moment in the life of the Weltgeist or World-Spirit - the result of the interplay of the World-Spirit. Hegel assumes that in a given period, one particular nation represents in a special way the development of the World-Spirit. This people are the dominant people in world history for that period. But a nation cannot occupy the center of the stage more than once.

   In the succeeding parts I will show how freedom grows and develops and become the ultimate reason of the rise and fall of nations whose leadership are not sustained and completely lost.

   1. The Orientals

      The Orientals are represented by cultures whose role to the development of reason is considered significant. China and India contributed to the development of philosophy and religion. In the Near East, ancient cultures are also discussed for Hegel believes that the development of modern thought started with the wisdom of the ancients. Hence the Persians and the Babylonians were discussed in order to see how these cultures help form the great Greek civilization.

      Common among oriental politics the centering of power among the chosen few or in some instance in one person. The political structure is developed according to the belief of inequality. The bestowal of power is divinely inspired. This is common among kings in Babylon Persia and Assyria or among emperors of China and Japan. Obedience to the law is emphasized or aptly over-emphasized. In the Philosophy of History Hegel describes this,

      While we obey, because what we are required to do is confirmed by an internal sanction, there the law is regarded as inherently and absolutely valid without a sense of the want of this subjective confirmation. In the law men recognize not their own will, but one entirely foreign (Hegel 1956: 112)

      I consider this observation significant for two reasons. Firstly, obedience or disobedience to laws is a struggle of power to the disadvantage of the subjects over their masters. The subjects always view their masters as godly or harbingers of the gods. The gods were conceived as working closely with kings whose commands are obeyed because they are coming from the gods. Harmony is interpreted as obedience and if such obedience is explicitly shown then blessings in terms of material abundance flow. This is also very close to the Hegelian belief that reason works with the "harbingers", the servants of the progression of reason. This means that development is not a product of collective effort but by individuals (inspired by reason) representing the spirit of the people. This is however the kind of political situation described by Hegel in this paragraph,

      It is not the individual of the subject that is revered but that which is universal in him; and which among the Thibetans, Hindoos and Asiatics generally is regarded as the essence pervading all things. This substantial unity of Spirit is realized in the Lama, who is nothing but the form in which spirit manifests itself (Hegel 1956: 171)

      Complete obedience to the harbingers of the gods is detrimental to the development of freedom. Hegel believes that history flourish with the flourishing of freedom. Freedom nurtures the spiritual seed to maturity in terms of historical ruptures. Freedom is definitely absent among the subjects. Freedom is bestowed on the kings or the selected few.

      All that we call subjectivity is concentrated in the supreme head of the state, who in his legislation has an eye to the health, wealth and benefit of the whole (Hegel 1956: 113)

      In other cultures, the exercise of freedom is defined only by the arbitrary promulgation of laws. Deprivation of power from the majority is sacred in terms of defining specific roles among various social classes. For instance the concept of caste system in India appropriates freedom only to the Brahmin class. Hegel says,

      For though we find the organization of the state no longer, as in China, determined and arranged by the one all absorbing personality (the head of the state) the distinctions that exists are attributed to natural and so become differences of caste. The unity, in which these divisions must finally meet, is a religious one, and this facilitates the rise of theocratic aristocracy and its despotism (Hegel1956: 113)

      Although the idea of the caste system is very clearly defined in India some subtle form of distinctions are also present in all of Orient. The kings, nobles and freemen identify themselves from the serfs and the slaves, the merchants from warriors and so on. If freedom resides among the few then the idea of the national spirit or a collective spirit could not possibly develop if the subjective spirit is not free. Freedom among few does not result into a national spirit for the national spirit involves the unity in diversity, a collective worldview. To add Hegel describe the situation of the Chinese in these words,

      This is the character of the Chinese people in its various aspects. Its distinguishing feature is, that everything which belongs to spirit - unconstrained morality, in practice and in theory, heart, inward religion science and art so called - is alien to it. The emperor always speaks with majesty and paternal kindness to the people; who however cherish the meanest opinion of themselves and believe that they are born only to drag the car of imperial power (Hegel 1956: 138)

      To sum up, I think the Orientals failed to spearhead history because freedom is practically absent. It is systematically killed by social distinctions, by a philosophy of life and by limited participation in politics. The spirit dies with the death of freedom and with this death so is the death of the role of the Orientals to lead the world as harbingers of the Welt-geist.

   2. Greco-Roman Period.

      Hegel compares the Greek world with adolescence in the sense that growth does not yet present the activity of work, does not yet exert itself for a definite intelligent aim but rather exhibits a concrete freshness of the souls life. The Greeks in many different considerations can be considered as the herald of the coming of a new age. In philosophy we see the Greeks laying the foundation of what we know from metaphysics to postmodernism. In art we also see the Greeks genius in representing reality and their interpretation of reality. The Greeks too excel in music. Phytagoras blended well music with numbers. Homer cultivated the spirit of spontaneity and creativity in literature. But what truly in the Greco-Roman culture that inspires Hegel to look for the tracks of the Absolute Spirit?

      1. The Greeks

         Hegel starts with classifying three periods in the Greek culture. First is the growth of individuality, second that of its independence and prosperity in conquest and conquest with word historical people. And finally is the period of its decline.

         1. Individuality.

            We see the youthful Greek culture in its dedication to and captivation of art. Greece enslavement in art paves the way for a truly Greek ingenuity. The Dionysian Theatre speaks of the Greeks masterful creativity. The plays directed by Sophocles (his interest was on the human relationship and character) and Aeschylus (his interest was on cosmic themes) present man's struggle for independence from the gods (Durant: 392). The story of Oedipus, in Greek mythology speaks of freedom in constant thug with fate and oftentimes it is fate that rules over freedom. The Greeks too spearheaded in the advancement of learning. In mathematics, the likes of Phythagoras and Euclid laid the foundation of science. Anaxagoras is always referred to as the Copernicus and the Darwin of the modern times (Durant: 340). In medicine we too have representations in the person of Hippocrates and the list can go on and on. In philosophy we see the Greeks still exercising considerable influence to contemporary philosophy. Hence, the modern times could not claim independence from the Greeks.

         2. Independence and Prosperity

            Prosperity and independence are very important in order to measure how free are the Greeks. Hegel's argument is that the freer a people is the more the spirit becomes alive. This prosperity starts with winning wars. The Greeks are known for winning wars and probably enjoying the fruit of it too. They conquered Persia in what is known as the Medean wars and the Peloponnessian Wars. But what is important in these wars is that Greece expanded its influence not only in Europe but also in Asia. Second, it facilitates in the discovery of new technologies that put themselves in strategic advantage against their enemies. Hence, through wars the Greek spirit is pushed extremely to conceptualize weapons in order to get considerable advantage against their enemies. The third point, however, the prosperity and independence both nurture and destroy the Greek spirit. With the annexation of lands, Greece became powerful. This power increases sense of security and freedom of movement. These developments are very important in the discovery and cultivation of Greek genius in the field of science, philosophy, literature and art. Continuous fear of the enemy cannot be avoided. However this fear works to their advantage. This helps them identify their enemies and at the same time establish awareness of nationhood and solidarity. These are very important if Greece has to lead the world as the bearer of the Welt-Geist. Leadership requires a strong sense of identity, cohesiveness, and solidarity aside from exercising a wider scope of influence to other nations. The Greeks attained these qualities of leading the Welt-geist but not for long. The same prosperity and security decays this spirit and gradually brought Greece into oblivion.

         3. The Fall of the Greek Spirit

            The strategic consolidation and expansion of power is the very strength and weakness of the Greeks. It increases influence on other cultures, strengthens bonds among themselves, and facilitates the advancement in all fields of aesthetic, science, morality and philosophy. However this is also the same prosperity that corrupted and will bring the same spirit into anonymity. Hegel describe this fall,

            The Boethian subjective character had, after the extinction of Theban glory, sank down into indolence and the vulgar desire of course sexual enjoyment. In the internal condition of the states which enervated by selfishness and debauchery, where broken up into factions - each of which on the other hand direct its attention to foreign lands and with treachery to its native country begs for the favors of the kings (Hegel 1956: 276).

            The fall of the Greek spirit can be attributed to three major reasons. First is their overconfident hold for power. Successful wars add new territories but these territories are poorly supervised from the center. They became autonomous regions that eventually connived with other groups and strengthened themselves through further alliances inspired by their disillusionment of Greek governance littered with rampant corruption. Greece downfall from history was the result of internal invasion fuelled by tyranny, of selfishness and indifference that truly extinguished what is exalting in Greek culture. Greece became internally vulnerable that the Revolt by Rome succeed not because Rome was powerful than Greece but Greece even without Roman invasion was becoming weak and destined to be replaced by other rising civilizations.

            Secondly, law abstractly defines freedom. Unlike the Romans who strictly safeguard freedom by effectively institutionalizing it in their constitution and implement it efficiently, Greek freedom is loosely defined. It flows naturally and spontaneously unguarded until it was lost unnoticed and it was too late to keep it. And thirdly, freedom was only limited to the few. The majority of the Greek population was slaves. Hence the expression of freedom is not universal among the Greeks.

      2. The Romans

         If in Greece Democracy was the fundamental condition of political life, in Rome aristocracy of a rigid order was established to keep the entire community. Hegel considers the Greek spirit as filled with cheerfulness and enjoyment as he compared it with youth but this youthfulness had not fully grown to maturity - to abstraction. It was still filled up with natural element, that is the idiosyncrasy of the individual. Universal personality does not appear yet and develop itself into the form of abstract universality. In Rome this abstract universality was given the opportunity to grow and mature in the form of abstract freedom. This is the kind of freedom that is attained by submission to principles defined by the constitution. The Roman constitution defines the limits and exercise of power that calls for the participation of citizens but also secure this participation from possible repression. Hence the advantage of Rome over Greece is the establishment of a secure foundation of the political system that transcends far and above possible distortions of powerful individuals. The care for the majority is institutionalized to a greater extent that personal interest is set aside to pave the way for the common good. According to Hegel there are 2 elements that nurture the Roman spirit. First is the political universality on the one hand and the abstract freedom of the individual on the other. Hegel contends that these two elements appear in the form of Subjectivity. This subjectivity is retreating into one's self, which cause the corruption of the Greek spirit. The Romans take the advantage over the Greeks as regards inwardness like the inward conviction of existence to the visibility of the real word (Hegel 1956: 281). Hegel continues that in the Roman spirit, this inwardness is purified into abstract universality. However this inwardness is only a prelude to the most important virtue, that is the virtue of valor. This valor is not centered on the individual. The individual takes precedence the protection of the interest of the union of associates. Individual leaders preserved Rome's rise to fame. Hegel believes that individuals who are rupturing into history were the ones who brought Rome to fame and defend it by force. Hegel says of them,

         But that which these individuals purpose and accomplishments have on its side the higher sanction of the Word-Spirit and must eventually triumph...the word-wide sovereignty of Rome became the property of a single possessor. This important development must not be regarded as a thing of chance; it was necessary, postulated by the circumstances (Hegel 1956: 310-311).

         In fact Hegel believes that the rise of the Caesars who were famous of brutality and repression who even destroy the Republic did not happen by chance, it was necessary.

   3. The Germanic People

      The rise of the Germanic people in history and the retreat of Rome to oblivion were not explained properly by Hegel. I suspect that Rome's gradual retreat is expected as a natural historical phenomenon. Incidence of corruption is evident also in some parts of the empire that probably led to discontentment among some territories that finally ends up in independence.

      Above all this developments we see the Germanic people rising to leadership inheriting the legacies of Greece and Rome. In fact to be exact these people is simply a continuation or an extension of the Greek and the Romans. However they also develop a new spirit that brings them over to a new role - of leading the world into the future. By Germanic this does not mean the Germans alone but the entire of European civilization. The German spirit is the spirit of the new world according to Hegel. Its aim is the realization of the absolute truth as the unlimited self-determination of freedom. The destiny of the Germanic peoples, Hegel argues, is to be the bearers of the Christian principle. The Christian principle is described as the principle of spiritual freedom of reconciliation. The Greeks and the Romans had reach maturity within; the Germans began with self-diffusion. This self-diffusion means

      Deluging the world, and overpowering in their course the inwardly rotten, hollow political fabrics of the civilized nations. Only then did their development begin powered by a foreign culture, a foreign religion, polity and legislation (Hegel 1956: 341).

      The German culture took up the Roman culture and religion in their complete form. It follows three important periods. First is the appearance of the German nations in the Roman Empire, which starts with the conversion into Christianity. This transformation is considered a form of cleansing, that is, leaving behind their barbarous acts and put on the new clothes of Christianity. The second part includes the alliance between the Church - governed by theocracy and the state - governed by feudalism. With feudalism we see the formation of states and independence. In the Church we also see the expansion of its influence not only in Europe and Africa but also in Asia and all the continents in the world. The third period is characterized by concrete consciousness of the free spirit.

      From that epoch thought began to gain a culture properly its own: principles were derived from it which were to be the norm for the constitution of the state. Political life will now be consciously regulated by reason (Hegel 1956: 345)

      The third epoch may be compared with the Roman world in the sense that the unity of a universal principle is here quite as decidedly present, yet not as the unity of the abstract universal sovereignty but as a hegemony of self cognizant thought

      To sum up, the Germanic People, under the influence of Christianity, realized that man is truly free and for Hegel the true expression of freedom is attained in Germanic People because here all are free. They ensure that freedom is indeed universal. This freedom is not only abstract but also truly concrete and its concreteness not only practiced but also protected by individual states. This is both the legacy inherited from Rome and Greece. The spirit of these nations is incarnated so to say in the German Spirit.

      To sum up, Hegel believes that certain individuals represent every epoch in history. These people are used as instruments of the World-Spirit. Hegel mentioned Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Constantine, and Napoleon Bonaparte as leaders of the different stages in history representing the spirit of their period. This only proves that the world spirit is truly alive and working very closely with the leaders of the times. In fact, Julius Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon may have been tainted with personal motives but these motives are also used by the World-Spirit in its CUNNING to transform the republic into and empire and to bring the Roman Genius to the peak of its development. The transformation from one period to the other is also preceded by war. Hegel looks at war as a necessary event, an event that creates geniuses, individuals with strong character and unparalleled leadership, who has the heart and courage to lead emerging nations, bringing along with his ascendance to power the spirit of the people that he represents to the future.

Part III. Critical Analysis of Hegelian Metaphysics and Philosophy of History

1. Against Metaphysics: Ground for Atheism
   1. Transformation of the Conception of Man

      I would like to emphasize this: that Hegel's metaphysics of the spirit sowed the seed of atheism. After presenting the finite - infinite dialectic we can say then that man is nothing else but God in its other-ness or that man is intrinsically Divine or divine in its own right. The finite being is not just the contingent reality that can be extrinsically infinitized because the finite is already intrinsically infinite itself. This atheistic undertone resonates in Feuerbach's concept of man. In his anthropological reduction, Feuerbach argues that the worship of the Divine is nothing else but man worshipping himself. Man is infinite reason, infinite will and infinite love- these are important components of God-hood possessed by man. The real reason why man conceptualizes a divine is because he is alienated in the world. These alienation forces in man a false consciousness of a divine, which is nothing else but an illusion.

      Hegel's man is a man regaining independence from God by crowning him elements of divinity. Now that man is divine, he can create his own morality (Nietzsche) a morality (of the master) different from the morality of the slaves (Christian morality).

   2. Transformation of the conception of God
      1. In General: God is now conceived as comprising finitude - a necessary phase of his auto-generation. Whereas God was considered transcendent (beyond finitude) now God is incomplete that can only be filled up through a dialectical relation with the finite. To use the word of Merleau-Ponty, God is an unfinished project.

      2. In Particular: Whereas God was conceived as having absolute freedom, his transcendence unqualified, by essence eternal and immutable, now God is conceived as externally free but internally un-free because he is under the intrinsic necessity to manifest in the world and be part of the world. The infinite cannot achieve Concrete Absolute-ness in reality without the finite. God needs the world for without it God is not God. Hence, the world makes God finite. He is no longer necessitated to create.

         With regard to transcendence, God, in the sense of identity in distinction between finite and infinite is no longer having a static transcendence but a dynamic transcendence. The concept of transcendence is transformed reducing God to something governed by change. God goes to the finite world then from there going back into itself. This kind of transcendence is no longer unqualified but qualified in virtue of its indispensable relation with the finite.

         With regards to immutable perfection, Immutability is only the ideal but not the actual reality of God. It is a goal to be achieved not an actual state. He is in potentiality not actuality and the historical process is described then as a self-finitization of the infinite and the infinitization of the finite. To sum up we can say then that God is distinct from the world but not independent of the world. He needs the world for his becoming.

2. Against Philosophy of History. The Merits and Demerits
   1. The Merits.

      The development of Hegel's philosophy of history is simply a consequence of his attempt to reconcile his faith and his philosophy. The Christians belief of a transcendent God poses serious metaphysical dilemmas with the question of contingency. How can a transcendent God involve himself actively in the affairs of man without sacrificing his transcendence? But God has to sacrifice heaven if he wants to assert his role in human affairs. At the outset Hegel's problem then was purely epistemological and the entire Hegelian tradition is an attempt to explain how logically possible it is to posit (at least) a dual identity: that he is universal and particular and abstract and concrete at the same time. As I mentioned earlier, this is the problem confronting Fichte and Schelling and both failed to offer logical solution to the dilemma. The idea of abstract particularity or concrete universality is very significant for the following reasons. Firstly in theology, we see God not only as an active participator but a key player in the movement of history. The totality of history is the story of mutual existence and inter-dependence between God and man. This is truly significant for ideas about love and compassion (in theology) do make sense only if God emanates Himself through man in nature and history. This particular view also confirms a pervading technological understanding of the word during his time. As a metaphysician reality is conceived as a structure whose coherence depends on an organizing whole. This whole is not static but moving towards a certain direction, a kind of telos, that is, the realization of itself. Hegel does not only put sense in faith but also make a sense in history. The second point is that if God is a concrete universal that auto-generates towards a telos then there is clearly a unity in history. The past and the present and even the future are closely interrelated with each other. Unity in history is very important in the interpretation of the texts. The historical school (Dilthey, Ranke, Droysen, Winkelman and Ast) recognizes the importance of this unity. Schleiermacher attempted to universalize history (Quito1990: 22-23) but failed because firstly, he is presupposing a historian that transcends history. The only way one can interpret history is some kind of putting one's feet to the shoes of the author (divinatory reconstruction). And secondly, he fails to recognize that a text belongs to history hence it has to be viewed in a larger historical context. Unity in history is personally important to Gadamer. In fact the very gist of Truth and Method is nothing but to always assert the wisdom of unity. Interpretation is always prejudiced because the interpreter is historical (Gadamer 1989:269-277). Prejudice means that the interpreter belongs to tradition.

      Thirdly, Hegel's analysis of the subjective spirit (individual) as sacrificed for the sake of the objective (state) entice passionate reactions in Kierkegaard. This reaction, however negative at the very start proved to be very important in the development of philosophy. Existentialism is a splurge celebration of the rebirth of man or say a liberation of man. Existential humanism in the works of Feuerbach (Michalson 1956: 15, 31) generated new interest in his critique of anthropological reductionism (Feuerbach 1957: 100-115). Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Camus, Beavouir, Unamuno, Marcel, Jaspers and the others were equally divided whether to follow the God of Hegel or the man. Those who are captivated with man and the concept of freedom became atheists. Those who consider God important to existence has to grapple with the issue of human freedom and how this freedom is preserve with a belief in God. In Marxism too we see the constant flow of materialists and converts to materialism every second - the left wing and the right wing quarrel with each other but the quarrel is important to create a new "synthesis", making philosophy very alive.

      Fourthly, Hegelian metaphysics is an attempt to reassert the lost supremacy of metaphysics and call our attention once again to the wisdom of Parmenides that the ONE is still from the carnage. Though bruised and broken with bandage all around, Parmenides through Hegel still hang on to dear life shouting in the midst of disinterested and noisy discourses that the ONE transcends time and the self-conceitedness of thinkers of the contemporary times is nothing but folly. Parmenides insists that:

      Postulate 1. What is conceivable is possible and what is possible is conceivable

      Postulate 2. What is possible exists and what exists is possible (Ceniza1984: 19)

      The Parmenidian postulates resonate in Plato's bias on the material world over the ideal world draws more critics than alliances (Hegel 1977: 44). This dialectics only enlarges the dichotomy and hence become unbridgeable. Hegel had some problems with the Platonic presentation of reality because the ideal is presented as exclusively transcendent and abstract. Hegel's metaphysics of the spirit is, I think, the most lucid interpretation and final defense of metaphysics which according to a known Filipino metaphysician "had a bad name since Hume and Kant" (Ceniza 1984: preface). Hegel put more interest in metaphysical circle for his attempt to unite transcendence and immanence, contingency and universality. The concept of concrete universality goes beyond Parmenidian postulates but also unquestionably an extension of Parmenides Philosophy of Being as One and that becoming is an illusion (Copleston 1985: 48)

   2. Demerits
      1. The question on originality.

         A very close examination of Hegelian philosophy of history reveals very glaring eclecticism. Firstly, Hegel's spirit is a powerful development of Schelling and Fichte. The dialectical movement of history is not really Hegelian. The word dialectic resonates a famous dialectic of Plato in the Dialogues (or aptly monologues) with his students. On the other hand the spiral or cyclical movement reveals also semblances with Vico and Herder. Herder talks of cultural cycles as moving towards a certain telos or order - God. Hegel used different terms like the absolute spirit, which is essentially different from the God of Herder but similar in content. Hegel talks of history as directed by and end up in "God" (absolute spirit). The cycle of mentalities developed by Vico is also related to Hegel's spirit as working in human consciousness, with particular individuals like Alexander the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. These individuals embody the mentality of the community. Further, Vico's stages of the cycle too resembles that of the three periods in Hegel. Hegel divided the periods in history as Orientals, Greco-Roman and Germanic people. On the other hand if my interpretation is right, Hegel is saying that a nation who insists a page in history has to fight it out with other nations in order to stand in the center page. The object of this fight then is world domination. This idea resonates an earlier version in Heraclitus when he says, "war is the father and king of all things" (Popper 1962: 37). Well Hegel's consolation can only be that nobody indeed is original except probably the Ionians.

      2. The Problematics of Unhistorical Historian

         Hegel's concept of history to some extent, presupposes and external cause directing history to a telos. Hence history is not solely a creation of man or the result of the complexification of human consciousness. If the absolute spirit is working with man without losing both identities then it is very difficult to figure out whether man has real contributions to history. Hegel has to answer the question whether a demarcation line can be clearly drawn identifying which historical event is attributed to man and which the spirit inspires. Man, therefore has no reason to celebrate the grand achievements of the past for they are not purely his own making. Man can be seen as a pawn used by the players to particular directions. Another point is the telos. What is the telos? Why is there a telos? How do we know this telos? Why should history be moving towards it? How certain are we about the directedness in history? My concern here is primarily epistemological. For history to be scientific it must refrain itself from pure speculation. Hence I understand and symphatize with Wittgenstein in saying that,

         To say philosophy is deep is an acceptance of one's ignorance in grammar because what makes philosophy deep is the misinterpretation of our forms of language. Philosophical depth is a grammatical joke (Tractatus: 111).

         It is easy to speculate and to support speculations with the tool of logic but to prove them is another question. This is the reason why Plekhanov, criticizing Hegel, insists that men really create history. Hence the activities of the individual cannot help being important in history. Change never takes place by itself; it always needs the intervention of man (Plekhanov 1898:138).

         George Simmel too is uneasy about the role of the spirit in history. In The Problems of the Philosophy of History, he says that the materials that enter into historical knowledge are comprised wholly of human experience. Unless an occurrence is human, that occurrence is not material which can be formed into history (Simmel 1892:1). Rickert argues on the side of Simmel. He explicitly denies a particular historical development using man as an instrument of the spirit. He says that the empirical reality becomes nature when we regard it with reference to the particular and the individual (Rickert: 227). All this critiques deny the reasonability of an unhistorical historian.

      3. The Problems with Moral Judgments in History

         When Hegel talks of history as a result of the dialectical triad of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, Hegel is saying that an anti-thesis is important in order to induce progress. The word anti-thesis is a euphemism if it is translated in real historical events. The anti-thesis of order is chaos and massive chaos is important in order to effect massive change. War creates a massive chaos hence war is not only acceptable but a necessary element in history. Implicitly, Hegel is saying that barbarous acts identified with the leaders of history are justified or we are not suppose to pass judgments on them because the spirit is working with and in them. Hence Hitler, if he is still alive (thank God he is dead), can always justify the killing of the 6 million Jews. Cruelty of rulers then is justified as expression of freedom of the Spirit. War as a moment of change is also justified as a necessary cause to progress. If one nation attacks another this attack is justified by its success. Hence 'Might is right.' But is it really proper not to pass judgments on history? This is the quarrel that ensued between Butterfield and Berlin. Butterfield insists against Berlin that we have the right to pass judgments on people who create crimes in the past for if not then the present directly condones wrongdoers and this may serve as a precedent for future wrongdoers.

         Another critique I have with Hegelian history is the unacceptable inconsistency especially when the dawn of history was discussed. World history to be logical must end in the conceptualization of a World Society or World State. But Hegel insists that individual persons head this Weltgeist. If history is a progression then it must go beyond individual leadership - that of a nation and not individuals.

Summary and Conclusion

The exposition of Hegelian tradition is primarily based on the Later Hegel believing that the earlier Hegel has its predicament on theological themes especially on the positivism of the Christian religion. Discussing Hegel's philosophy is very important as he is the last philosopher that sows so much controversy and critical reactions from those who was once mesmerized by this lucid and compelling Platonist.

The goal of the later Hegel is establish a form of unity of the finite and the infinite being. To start with, he explains that the real is the rational and the rational is the real. This principle of identification is known as the First Principle. The first principle describes the famous Hegelian philosophy of history capsulized in his analogy of a man who intends to burn a house but what was burnt was the entire village. This explains that man does not create history. Historical development is beyond human intention and comprehension. The absolute spirit is the one that controls and determines the flow of history. With this he conceived of certain finality or determination or a kind of rationality in history. History then is real because it is rational. Hegel's philosophy of history is also an attempt to reconcile the finite and the infinite. The experience of the limitations of the finite beings led Hegel to conceive the infinite -the one that limits the finite. The existence of both finite and the infinite is reciprocal. That means one cannot exist without the other. He rejects any opposition of the finite and the infinite. He also rejects that the finite is caused by the infinite. But he admits the metaphysics of the spirit through the dialectics of the negation of the negation. The dialectic starts with the description of the finite as a negation of the infinite. The finite is concrete; the infinite is abstract but because we cannot possibly conceive without the other so we can say that the abstractness of the infinite is concretized in the finite that in return is infinitized and universalized. The implication of these concepts is twofold: firstly, the transformation of the conception of man to a new level, that he is god in his other-ness. Secondly, the transformation of the conception of God as unfinished and this auto-generation, that means the concretization of the spirit, can only take place in history. Hence the spirit becomes immanent and history assures that this immanence can take place. History as a kind of incarnation of the spirit is personified in Hegel's concept of the State. The state (universal) of Hegel is the source of freedom for man (particular). Because man (particular) is a totality of desires, has private selfish ends and interests, at the same he is called to relate with others in society (universal) then genuine freedom can only be attained by the unity of the particular and the universal. This means that man satisfies the need of the universal first before he satisfies himself. The state humanizes the subject. The importance of this discussion in relation to this paper is that history cannot be changed (the object of Marx critique). Technological encroachment to the life-world is nothing but a simple negation (anti-thesis) of the status quo (thesis) but complementing rather than isolating each other in their march to the future (synthesis).

On the other hand, the interest of the hermenuetes with regards to Hegel's guilt in uniting science and philosophy is Hegel's conception of the object and subject. Science emphasizes the object as totally detached from the subject. Philosophy capitalizes on the subject and this has been the result of Cartesian re-discovery of the cogito. Hegel builds a philosophical system that tries to reconcile all opposing parties and elevate this into a higher reality (Platonic notion of harmony). One form for this quest for a harmony is Hegel's effort to unite philosophy and science. He started with postulating the internal logic inherent in the object-subject relation. The object is nothing else but the subject thrown out of itself in order to know itself. The subject goes out of itself in the object to tell something about itself. And this return is a healing, a harmonious going back a kind of an alienation but in a positive sense. It is a vital component in understanding oneself, a vital awareness of oneself that leads to a kind of recovery. Taking nature as an object Hegel proposes that nature, as the objectification of consciousness, must be seen as ours, a reflection of our humanity. Thus Hegelian phenomenology relates the object and subject as a grand synthesis.

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