Die-hard followers of Gadamer would definitely be uncomfortable with the title of this article as biased and prejudiced in favor of Habermas. I know I have to do a lot of explaining. But allow me to start with the idea of prison. The concept of prison present tradition in a bad light, and Gadamer, the prophet of tradition, becomes an unwitting witness to the imprisonment. It is true that Gadamer counter argued with Habermas concerning the issue of critique. Gadamer always insists that interpretation can only be within the perimeters of tradition as this is part of man's being in the world to use Heidegger. Hence no one can escape tradition. To get out of tradition is a repetition of the mistakes of the Romantic School and the Historical School. Husserl too was caught up with the same Dilemma. The entire Crises were written justifying himself from the attacks of Heidegger on the question of inter-subjectivity against a transcendental ego. Gadamer is aware of the loopholes of Truth and Method. He already anticipated the critique of Habermas on tradition. But before coming up with an answer, I suppose, Gadamer has to resolve first two important questions: the first concerns consistency and the other paying lip service. Concerning the first, Part II of Part II in Truth and Method was dedicated to the critique of both the Romantic and Historical School. Both schools exerted substantial influence in Gadamer except on the proper interpretation of history. These schools always posit a historian that gets out of history to know history. Gadamer, influenced by Heidegger, always insists that a historian cannot get out of history. Any form of interpretation must be within the boundaries of tradition and so is any form of critique of tradition. Tradition defines interpretation and critique. And Gadamer has always been consistent in defending tradition. His hermeneutics is essentially connected with the metaphysics of being, a legacy he inherited from Heidegger. To be is to be in the world - a world that has formed us what we are and we cannot get out of it. This consistency lost him an ally in Habermas. Secondly, I suspect that Gadamer wants to get out the weight of Habermas critique of tradition and do away with the burden of proof by saying that this critique is implied already in his system. Gadamer argues that pronesis is a form of critique. This Aristotelian concept of moral judgment provides room for an individual confronted with a particular situation to apply (subtilitas applicandi) the moral law based on the context of the present moment. However, this attempt I consider lip service for the reason that Gadamer did not really elaborate this part lengthily and profoundly like what Habermas did.

Hence let me specify the following objective of this paper. This paper attempts to:

1. provide a deeper understanding of the major issues that constitute the Gadamer - Habermas Debate.

2. see whether Habermas critique of tradition, especially when it is translated into science and technology colonizing the life-world, is justified and the Theory of Communicative Action truly satisfy a demand for a critique of ideology.

Part I. The Habermas - Gadamer Debate

Habermas launched an initial attack in 1967 in his book On the Logic of the Social Sciences directed against the section of Truth and Method which talks about the rehabilitation of Prejudice, Authority, Tradition and the theory of Historical-Effective Consciousness. In the same year Gadamer published in Kleine Schriftin a lecture titled as the Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem (trans. By David Linge) in Philosophical Hermeneutics as well as another essay Rhetoric, Hermeneutic and Critique of Ideology. Habermas replied in a long essay in the book Hermeneutic and Dialectic.

The Debate is centered on whether hermeneutic philosophy can account for the legitimate demand of the Critique of Ideology. Must it sacrifice its claim to universality and undertake a profound reformulation of its programme? On what condition is the Critique of Ideology possible? Can it be detached from Hermeneutic presuppositions?

The Subject Matter of the Debate

1. Elements of Gadamer's Hermeneutics

   The center of the debate is Gadamer's legitimation of the historicality of consciousness. As a matter of fact Part II of Part II in Truth and Method presents a lengthy discussion on the foundations of understanding. These foundations can be traced back to the Romantic School hence I consider it important to provide a brief overview. The Romantic Hermeneutes is divided into two paths: the philosophical romanticists and the theological romanticists. The latter is very much occupied with the issue on how to properly understand the Bible. Among its proponents is Luther. Luther insists that the Bible have a univocal meaning hence there is no need for a dogmatic interpretation of the Church as if the Church interpretation is the best. He is saying that anybody can interpret the Bible. As a consequence a literal interpretation could be enough (Gadamer1989: 175). He looked at tradition (in the Church, there are three sources for the Word of God: Tradition, Bible and Magisterium) as a form of distortion on the originary meaning of the Bible. On the other hand, the second path (philological) considers it important to focus interpretation on the revival of classical literature. Schleiermacher, a philologist was so concerned about how to transform hermeneutics into a universal method. If truth is the object of any interpretation then interpretation must be universalized. The dream for a universal hermeneutics can be attained, Schleiermacher believes, in two ways: through Grammatical and Contextual Interpretation and Psychological or Divinatory Reconstruction (Gadamer 1989: 179, 185-197). While Grammatical-Contextual approach provides certain degree of objectivity and certitude this method does not ensure a universal interpretation. He thinks that language is not completely contained. There are ideas in the text that may be hidden in language. He is concerned of the genetic evolution of the text. It is important to know what the Thou is saying but more important is to know what the Thou is thinking. He believes of a transcendental ego that provides room for the possibility of entering into the author's frame of mind. Universality requires knowledge of the author's intention. Thus can only be done through a psychological interpretation roughly described as "putting one's feet to the shoes of the author." To know the author is to know the text. Gadamer reacted to this vehemently for the reason that a proper interpretation requires that the interpreter must belong to history. What Schleiermacher proposes is an interpreter outside of history. Romantic interpretation paved the way then for the emergence of the Historical Schools, though acknowledged the significance of Schleiermacher's contribution to the art of interpretation, it criticizes the latter about the issue on the subject matter of interpretation. The Historical School represented by Dilthey, Herder, Winkelman, Ranke and Droysen among others, insist that the text in which Schleiermacher considers as the object of interpretation is only important as a source of history (Gadamer 1989: 197-231). What is more important is not the universality of the text but the universality of human history. The text is only part of history. The Historical School wants to do away with the Hegelian system for Hegel was interested only in the end the auto-generation of the Absolute Spirit - the telos of history but not on the individual event of history. The historians believe that the past is essentially connected with the present. Hence to know the present requires knowledfge of history. Hence what connects the past and the present is their primary concern. Later Gadamer is greatly influenced by this idea that he devoted the entire section of Part II and Part III of T.M. trying to present continuity in history. For Gadamer, the Historical School created a great mistake when they postulate a historian that gets out of history as if going to the past then moves to the present going beyond the historical boundaries of one event after another. A historian can only be within history and belongs to history. He cannot get out of history.

   Dilthey's, Schleiermacher's faithful biographer, important contribution to the issue of interpretation is the introduction of the role of human sciences. Human sciences do study very carefully the intricacies of historical development. Knowing this development brings the historian into the knowledge of knowing the background of the text and to properly understand the text. He believes that the experience nurtures the life-word. Knowing the experience of particular historical event somehow provides an idea of the continuity of the life-word. But since there is a tremendous gap between the reader and the experience of a particular event, Dilthey committed a great mistake in proposing a historian that transcends history, a mistake gravely committed by the Historical School. Gadamer observes that history precedes my reflection and me; I belong to history. Dilthey could not understand that, because revolution remained epistemological and his reflective criterion prevails his historical consciousness (Ricoeur: 305). As a consequence of these critiques Gadamer outlined some ontological requirement prior to interpretation as follows:

   1. Tradition

      Although Gadamer rejected both the romantics and the historicist, he utilized some of their ideas. He expounded what he perceives common to both traditions namely the historicity of consciousness. The historians were very concerned about the unity and continuity of history. In fact Gadamer humbly accepts his indebtedness saying that the Romanticists defended with particular ardor Tradition (T.M.: 281). If history is one and continuous entity then knowing that which ensures continuity will make interpretation universal. At this point Schleiermacher influences Gadamer about the universal import of history. Gadamer believes that consciousness or rather historical consciousness (Absolute Spirit in Hegel, Life-world in Dilthey) is the key to understanding. The historicality of this consciousness is embedded in Tradition. The theory of historical consciousness is the epitome of the work as a whole and the microcosm of the great debate (Ricoeur: 65). Ricoeur adds,

      By taking historical consciousness and the question of the conditions of possibility of the human sciences as the axis of refection, Gadamer inevitably turned hermeneutic philosophy toward the rehabilitation of prejudice and the defense of tradition and authority. Placing this philosophy in a conflictual relation with the Critique of Ideology (Ricoeur: 305)

   2. Prejudice

      One of the earlier attacks on tradition was presented during the Enlightenment (Aufklarung). Prejudice must be put aside in order to think so that one may reach the age of adulthood (Ibid: 304). The Latin word praejudicium is synonymous to false judgments. Gadamer describes how Aufklarung describes prejudice saying that the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power. Gadamer says that all forms of interpretation are prejudiced because the interpreter is born out of a particular event in history. That history moulds and nurtures a particular worldview. Man is condemned, so to say, to his own prejudices and for as long as man is he embodies within a particular prejudice. Gadamer borrowed this from Heidegger. Heidegger says that understanding is pre-structured as fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception (TM: 266). As a result in interpretation the reader "anticipates" the meaning of the text. The reader is part of the structure of anticipation. This structure is ontological in the sense that it exists prior to Dasein's being in the world. When man is thrown into the world, he is thrown into a world that is structured. He is nurtured by this world and this is the world that he interacts. This structure is what Gadamer calls as tradition. Just as the reader is created by tradition so is his interpretation of the text is colored by his tradition. All forms of interpretation are prejudiced. However Gadamer is quick to say that prejudice can be rehabilitated. There are legitimate prejudices (TM: 277) and this can be done when the person is aware of his own prejudice and therefore allow the text to express itself.

      This prejudice is therefore a component of understanding linked to the finite historical character of the human being.

   3. Authority

      Tradition is usually identified with authority in the Aufklarung. An authority that is especially identified with the Church - positivistic, dictatorial, and violent stance. The issue on authority is very important in the debate: Gadamer rehabilitates authority whereas Habermas criticizes authority for it is identified with the colonization of the life-world. Gadamer counteracts that this is not the essence of authority.

      Authority of person is based ultimately not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on acceptance and recognition that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that his judgment takes precedence over one's own. Authority cannot be bestowed but is acquired if someone is to claim to it. Authority in this sense, properly understood has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed authority has nothing to do with obedience. It rests on the recognition. This is the kind of authority claimed by teachers, superior and experts (TM: 279-280).

      Authority understood this way contributes to the maturity of free judgments. Hence to accept authority is thus also to pass through the screen of doubt and critique. In saying this Gadamer respond to Habermas critique that the acceptance of the Hermeneutic of tradition is the acceptance of the abuse, domination and violence of tradition. He continues that tradition is constantly an element of freedom and of history itself (TM: 281)

   4. Historically Effected Consciousness

      In general terms historically effected consciousness can be characterized as the consciousness of being exposed to history and its effects in such a way that what this action does cannot be objectified for the efficacy that belongs to the very meaning of the action as a historical phenomenon (Ricoeur: 311). To describe it simply, our belongingness to history means that the way we think, how we think, how we relate, our belief systems are all created by the community that we interact everyday. A Filipino who lives in the Philippines and finds it cool to know the English language perfectly does not mean that he already thinks and behaves like the English speaking people. He still is a Filipino. Language is an expression of a worldview. Hence a Filipino who speaks the Filipino language expresses his worldview through that language. That explains why he is still not particular about coming on time especially if he meets somebody.

      Nicholson clearly describes how history affects interpretation. He says,

      that our mode of thought is a horizon we cannot eliminate. To understand something from the past is to experience the fusion of its horizon with our own. True self-understanding is to grasp our own selves and minds as exposed to history's power and history's effects. Since the unity of the historical process is objectively constituted by the ever-renewed fusion of ever-changing horizons, it is crucial to our very being to understand ourselves out of a tradition. Moreover, only a false consciousness would wish to be emancipated from the authority exercised over us both by past works and by intermediaries (Nicholson: 153)

      Let me emphasize a few points. Gadamer is saying that all forms of interpretation therefore are influenced by tradition. Tradition is hiding and silently working at the back of the mind of the author. Habermas refused to agree with Gadamer on this particular issue. Submission to tradition means slavery of reflection and Gadamer is saying that there is nothing we can do about it. But is Gadamer not really aware of the implications of his philosophy? This can be seen clearly in the debate proper.

2. Habermas Critique On Gadamer (1967)
   1. Habermas argues that tradition is subject to rupture brought about by rationality. This means that the flow of tradition is neither stable nor untroubled (continuous). Ruptures create discontinuity. Besides tradition can be oppressive. There are real interests of method and in general of science in tradition that simply being aware of the foundations of understanding may not be enough. Understanding is toothless. We need emancipation especially if such tradition is oppressive.

   2. Next Habermas scrutinizes Gadamer's vindication of Authority and Prejudice as foundations of understanding. He says that the prejudices we acquire from our tradition are all too often shackles upon the mind hence prejudice and authority has to be submitted to critical scrutiny in the name of reason and reflection. Habermas is insisting upon a polarization of the power of rationality against the apparent naturalness of tradition's ways (Nicholson 1991: 156).

   3. Against Language and Being. In Truth and Method Part III, Habermas observes that Gadamer's theory on language (Gadamer insists that understanding and interpretation is always linguistically induced) implies a linguistic idealism. Language is one institution of society, but it is an idealistic fault to suppose that all the other institutions are only present on account of language. There is the central and imperative necessity of human labor too and its facticity and even more its results, as in the division of labor, do not arise out of structures that prevail in language. There is also the matter of domination, and other social fact that cannot be reduced to linguistic structures. Hence it will always be important to recognize other technological sciences and other modes of social analysis, beyond the scope of mere hermeneutics.

   4. To sum up, Habermas says that tradition (as ideology) plays the role of misunderstanding and this misunderstanding is preserved by hermeneutics of tradition. The concept of authority is a figure of oppression and violence in forms of censorship. There is a logical link between ideology and violence, of class domination in the case of the struggle of the workers against the capitalists in a society that is nurtured by the oppressive ideology of capitalism. Domination means distortion of communication because relation between labor and power is altered. If distortion of communication means domination then dialogue in forms of communicative action is emancipation from domination (to be discussed in Universal Pragmatics)

   5. Distortions of language do not come from the usage of language but from relation to labor and power - that remains unrecognizable by members of the community. Hence there is systematic distortion of understanding not just a misunderstanding.

   6. If misrecognition is insurmountable by dialogical route then dissolution of ideologies must pass through a detour of procedures concerned with EXPLAINING not just UNDERSTANDING.

3. Gadamer's Response (1967)
   1. Against Critique 1. It is incorrect to posit a polarization between an ongoing tradition and the reflective appropriation of it. The most reflective scholar will contribute to tradition because the activity of understanding must be seen as part of the movement of history. Gadamer is saying that tradition and any form of critique is not essentially anti-thetical. But critique occurs only within tradition and cannot be outside of tradition for a critique cannot get out hid being historical. Historicality is being's given-ness to the world.

   2. In defense of Authority and Prejudice. Gadamer insists that nothing in his theory oblige him to defend every possible self-declared authority at every possible cost: he sees cases of loss of authority everywhere in history. Authority is not synonymous to oppression. If in case a certain authority is oppressive defiance is still the most reasonable option.

   3. Linguistic idealism of language and being. Gadamer asserts that we could not encounter either labor or domination if there were language at work in articulating the phenomena for us. He rejects a dualistic separation of understood meanings from real forces. Habermas has been misled to infer from the important truth that mere linguistic change will not overcome exploitation and oppression the falsehood that these latter could be experienced without language.

4. Habermas Response to the Critique (1970)

   On the issue of Universal Import in Hermeneutics. Habermas maintains that a science erected in monologue rather than in discourse and that studies the things directly rather as reflected in the mirror of speech would not have a hermeneutical component. To explain such a science to the public might be a hermeneutical undertaking; that would not make the science itself hermeneutical. In other words the kind of interpretation proposed by Gadamer is superficial because we only see an interpreter talking about the text not allowing the text to talk in order to create a dialogue. Because of this communication is totally distorted. What Habermas had in mind are situations were people are cowed by tyrants, bullies and power structures of every description, one cannot always expect uninhibited communication to take place. Language is ideological. If ideology is repressive then understanding language is useless unless ideologies itself are checked. Understanding through language is different from emancipation from language. A political initiative to rectify the situation is more important than a mere interpretation of words.

5. Summary of the Debate
   1. Gadamer and Habermas believe that in moral and political life we seek to be guided by some reason, some form of knowledge. They agree that an idea of reason is needed in order to address the relation between research and social practice and to identify the potential for rationality contained in social practice.

      They both reject the view that the employment of the objective methods of research as such guarantees the adequacy and correctness of findings about the lives of people in society. They are highly critical of any conception of the relation theory (scientific inquiry) and practice which favors the engineering of consent in society and presumes upon the capacity of social researchers, policy-makers and planners to dispense with the need for a public debate and the achievement of a common understandings through the course of the full articulation of possibly incompatible views. They both fear the possibility of new technocratic domination.

   2. Habermas Frustration with Gadamer. Habermas argued that Gadamer had underestimated the power of critical reflection and its capacity to break through collective illusions, especially when it is informed by general theories of the potential for rationality built into the history of modern societies.

   3. Gadamer's Frustration with Habermas. Gadamer's frustration is what he perceives as Habermas failure to see in his theory of interpretation elements of emancipation. He already foreshadowed this in his concept of pronesis. The practice of pronesis is a practice of deliberation aiming at the integration of everything knowable by the sciences into the context of mutual agreement in which we exist. Its main task is the mediation of general ideas of the good with goals of action, as we know them in particular situations. Thus the primacy of application also holds in the case of understanding social and political situations (Misgeld 1991: 163-167).

I would like to end my discussion here by going back to the two questions I raised earlier.

To the question whether hermeneutic philosophy can account for the legitimate demand for a critique of ideology, Gadamer argues that critique and understanding are not mutually exclusive. In fact this is already included (though not substantially) in the concept of pronesis, subtilitas applicandi as in the case of the application of law). However, Gadamer always emphasize that critique of tradition must be within tradition not outside of tradition.

To the second question, whether the philosophy of tradition has to sacrifice its claim for universality or reformulation of its programme is required, Gadamer insists that tradition is always universal. There is no way tradition gives in for the critique. Critique has to be situated in the context of tradition.

And finally, to the question on how is the critique of ideology possible, Habermas start with applying tradition into concrete terms, that is, in science and technology. Habermas is dissatisfied with how Gadamer took his critiques very lightly by paying lip service to it. Gadamer too questioned the epistemology used by science and its claim for (the only) certainty especially in Philosophical Hermeneutics. However, this critique does not take the form of a system why science is synonymous to colonization of the life-world. Science as tradition completely changed our understanding of reality. WE see this very clearly in philosophy. The rise of analytic philosophy and positivism are clear expressions of how scientific epistemology contaminated our understanding of reality without us even aware of it. That is why Habermas always insists that a true critique can take effect only in the spirit of REFLECTION. The second part then is divided into two parts. The first one presents how tradition oppresses reason and secondly, how to dialogue with oppressive traditions so that the life world is preserved. The last part talks about Habermas theory of Communicative Action which as an implicit acceptance of philosophy seeming defeat against, insofar as epistemology is concerned and the necessity for dialogue. Here Habermas presents his contribution to the debate: to understand is not enough, a critique without presenting an alternative is also not enough but a concrete measure has to be done. If understanding is induced by language so is oppression (Barthes even calls language as facist). Liberation can therefore be attained through analysis of language and this is the concern of the second part.

Part II. Critique of Ideology and Communicative Action

Habermas is not convinced with the explanation presented by Gadamer for the reason that understanding is not enough. Where oppression exist communication is altered and solution to the distortion of communication cannot simply be overcome by an interpretation lacking the content of discourse. Gadamer's interpretation is monological not dialogical. Understanding in this sense is one - directional because the text does not speak for itself. In this particular section Habermas outlines his contribution to the critique of tradition especially when distortion of communication exists between reader and text or the alteration of the relation between the subject and the object. This alteration can also be interpreted as class struggle among Marxists.

Habermas believes that all forms of interpretation must also be forms of critique. All forms of texts consist of interest. The concept of interest is similar to Gadamer's concept of prejudice. Just as all forms of interpretation are prejudiced for Gadamer, for Habermas interest is inescapable. Hence it is very important that a reader of a text must be aware of his interest.

Habermas identified three kinds of interest as follows:

The Concept of Interest

1. Technical/Instrumental interest.

   This kind of interest governs the empirical and analytic sciences the kind of epistemology employed by science and technology, which he called, as modern ideology. Habermas calls this interest as the cognitive interest in technical control over objectified processes.

   There is no doubt that technological advancement has created deep in-roads to human life that often times quality of life is measured in terms of the acquisition of the latest technology available in the market. Materialism has gradually eroded most of our treasured values foremost of which is the belief of the metaphysical. Other sectors of our society have fought a good fight in the preservation of the foundations of our society as it is constantly challenged by the outburst of materialism and secularization. But much to our dismay these sectors are losing the fight. As a consequence we are facing the ill effects of a worldview that has dramatically transformed into a new form of epistemology that mesmerized especially the younger generation. Knowledge, for instance, place uncontestable trusts to the empirical, the quantifiable, and the observable, the manipulable - paradigms that find their origin in science. The magical incantation of science has deeply encroached our educational systems. Subjects in humanities and liberal arts are arbitrarily minimized to give way to courses that help students at pace with the current scientific development- and unconsciously discriminating the liberal arts and humanities. In the area of politics much attention is given to the areas of science and technology as far as researches and grants are concerned. Specialists control political and economic policies that consequently led to heavy investments on security and defense. Art is not an exemption. The cubists destruction of forms, architectural designs with increasing clarity, abstract paintings with no more room for the intimate - indeed human existence has truly become functional and alienating. The myopic view of human existence extends its influence in the conflicts of law and morality. Laws are implemented without careful reflection of its possible moral repercussions. In fact Gadamer has carefully described the picture of the present times,

   For as triumphant as the march of modern science has been, and as obvious as it is to everyone today that their awareness of existence is permeated by the scientific presuppositions of our culture, human thought is nonetheless continually dominated by questions for science promises no answer (Gadamer 1976: 108)

   1. Some Notes on Weber

      Weber analysis of social reality dominated by science is catastrophic. Predominantly Marxist in orientation, but he severed ties with Marx when he unfolded the disastrous effects of technology to the life world. He sees the process of modernization as also a process of progressive rationalization. This means an increase in rationality (Zweckrationalitat). Weber identifies three aspects of rationality, namely purposive, rationalization, and discursive. Purposive rationality is a kind of rationality exhibiting a choice of the most efficient means for realizing pre-defined goals. Rationalization in this sense is tied up with the increase in economic or administrative efficiency.

      Rationality means an imposition of a coherent and systematic order upon the chaotic manifold of different situations, beliefs, alternatives of actions etc. (Wellmer 1985: 40). Rationalization on the other hand is tied up with the formalization and the universalization of law, calculability, control, systematic planning. With respect to modes of action and interaction this signifies a transition from communal - oriented towards traditional norms and personal characters, to associative social action, impersonal dominated by instrumental or strategic considerations. The discursive form of rationality is related to the question of the authenticity of attitude free from illusions and self-deceptions, the disenchantment brought about by the desacralization of the natural world. It signifies scientific rationality and the new ethos of scientific objectivity. Wellmer describe Weber's analysis,

      ...through his analysis of the institutional correlates of progressive rationalization - capitalist economy, bureaucracy and professionalized empirical science- he shows at the same 0time that the rationalization of society does not carry any utopian perspective, but is rather likely to lead to an increasing imprisonment of the modern man in dehumanized systems of a new kind to an increasing reification.(Wellmer 1985: 41)

      Weber sees rationalization as an effect of scientific epistemology that controls all modes of human interaction. The control is swift because society views this form of change as part of historical development. Hence we see the absence of substantial resistance to this change. However, Weber's interpretation of social ills does not offer a solution. He did not say the possible emancipation of society from the enslavement of rationalization.

   2. Marcuse

      The scientific tradition is viewed as an ideology that subjected society into its control. Marcuse, a proponent of the Frankfurt School espousing critical attitude to all forms of ideology, says in his book One Dimensional Man,

      Technological society structures labor and leisure influencing life from the organization of labor to modes of thought. Consumer capitalism integrates individuals into its world of thought and behavior These developments are threat to human freedom and individuality in a totally administered society

      Kellner defines one-dimensional man as the one that conforms to existing thought and behavior and lacking a critical dimension of potentialities that transcend the existing society. The adjective one-dimensional describes practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms and behaviors, in contrast to multidimensional discourse, which focuses on possibilities that transcend the established state of affairs. This epistemological distinction, Kellner adds,

      presupposes antagonism between subject and object so that the subject is free to perceive possibilities in the world that do not yet exist but which can be realized. In the one dimensional society the subject is assimilated in the object and follows the dictates of external, subjective norms and structures thus losing the ability to discover more liberating possibilities and to engage in transformative practice to realize them.

      Technological society structured human consciousness into believing the beneficiality of technology to human life especially in the standard of living. Technology dramatically changed life-styles, quantify them and measure them in terms of material standards. The luxuries and conveniences brought by technology produced a pattern of mind and behavior, which justified and absolved even the most destructive and oppressive features of the enterprise.

      Scientific technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control. Can one rest with the assumption that this unscientific outcome is the result of a specific societal application of science? I think the general direction in which it came to be applied was inherent in pure science even where no practical purposes were intended.

      The quantification of nature, which led to its explication in terms of mathematical structures, separated reality from all inherent ends, and consequently separated the true from the good, science from ethics. No matter how science may now define the objectivity of nature and the interrelations among its parts, it cannot scientifically conceive it in terms of its final cause.

      Marcuse emphasizes the limitations of science and man's subjection to this limitation if ever man knows that science is limited. Human relations are always guided by conceptions of the Good, of Beautiful, of justice. Physics does not measure the objective qualities of the external and the material world. The realms of the sacred cannot be explained by science.

   3. Horkheimer and Adorno

      These critical theorists accept Weber's negative dialectics of progress but still hopes that this progress created by instrumental reason can still create an emphatic concept of reason that paves the way for freedom, justice and happiness (Wellmer 1985: 44). Weber refused to accept this emphatic reason because in a disenchanted world. There is no rational justification of norms, values, or forms of social organization.

      However, they agree with Weber that rationalization deforms consciousness and reify social relation as a necessary consequence of capitalistic society. This development does not lead to the emergence of classless society but a closed system of instrumental and administrative rationality rooted in the reified consciousness of individuals subsumed under the capitalist production process.

      In disagreement with Marx, they separate dialectics of progress from revolutionary transformation of society. The dialectics of progress destroys rather than realize reason. They believe that the transformation of society is the free historical act by which society liberates itself from dialectics of progress. Changing the structures of society on the other hand cannot liberate man from technical rationality. They accept capitalism as a fact of life. They are against Marx objectivism that capitalistic system would die a natural death due to overproduction and hence a post-capitalist society is liberated. Critical theory spouses a new utopia: that the future is related to the present by a radical but abstract negation of technical rationalization of the modes of existence.

      Considering the negative effects of technical rationality in society, Adorno provides possible solution. He says that it is only in the work of art that the life-world is nurtured. For Adorno the work of art is the last defense that protects man from the possible influence of an objectifying consciousness of rationality. Art is a non-reified cognition, a kind of scientific synthesis versus the repressive logic of conceptual thinking. In his book Aesthetic Theory, he prefigures an order of reconciliation of a highly rationalized life-world. Hence art does become the only possible model for the organization and the rationality of an emancipated society. It is only for this reason that that the aesthetic synthesis can prefigure a non-repressive synthesis. In short, Adorno understands the impossibility of a society freed from all forms of scientifically induced kind of epistemology. But this form of epistemology can still be tolerated if man counteract this with a work of art that brings over human consciousness to the realm of the transcendent. The work of art does not limit itself to the immediacy of human experience. It evades all forms of quantification and objectification. It identifies itself with a particular understanding of reality translated into a piece of something thereby uniting the subject and the object in a tremendous experience of oneness that cannot simply be understood by any form of objectification.

      In the case of technology, Adorno and Horkheimer, like Marx, view it as consisting of an emancipatory potential but this potential has to be taken in the context of a society that is balanced with aesthetic rationality. In other words, instrumental reason is a precondition for a form of reconciliation. Society can only be transformed in terms of a sublation of instrumental into aesthetic rationality.

   4. Habermas: Critique of Instrumental Rationality and Preliminary Solutions

      Against Marx, bourgeois society cannot only be viewed as merely ideological reflexes of the mode of production - but to be distinguished from science and technology. Against Weber, Horkheimer/Adorno, Habermas thinks that rationalization may represent a different kind of rationalization and rational organization of society - based on free agreement - even if distorted, is already contained in democratic societies.

      1. Technical Progress and Social Life-World

         19th century science entered the conduct of life through 2 separate channels

         1. through technical exploitation of scientific information
         2. through the process of individual education and culture

         All these result into the transformation of social life that can occur in research process focussed on technical conversion and economic exploitation. On the other hand transformation can also occur with regards to revolutionizing the industrial system to technical progress even if such progress is impractical, that is, it is not oriented to the interaction with the community (Habermas: 55). Transformation also teaches the capacity of control. This control is not to be mistaken as an enlightened action. Habermas observes that the overwhelming successful technical control on nature is unfortunately extended or assimilated to solving problems of life-world. Our only hope for the rationalization of the power structure lies in the conditions that favor political power for thought developing through dialogue - through reflection.

      2. The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion

         The scientization of politics can only be completed when the technically schooled staff of the bureaucracy and the technically minded military controls the power in government. In this event technocratic model rules. However the weakness of the technocratic model is that we cannot make cogent statements about value systems, that is about social needs. There are other forms of decisions that cannot be completely answered by technological strategies. The technocratic model reduces the process of democratic decision-making to the control of the technical experts. Habermas says that scienticized society can constitute itself as a rational one only when it is mediated by the conflict of life through the minds of its citizens (Habermas: 80).

      3. Technology and Science as Ideology

         Rationalization has successfully destroyed the foundation of an old society that is anchored on the foundations of the life-world. With this, destruction of society is completed by means of creating a society defined by scientific epistemology. Hence a new form of domination is installed. This kind of domination is defined not by technology but through technology and this absorbs all spheres of culture. Instrumental reason institutes a form of totalitarian society. Habermas describes this development in these words,

         In this way traditional structures are increasingly subordinated to conditions of instrumental or strategic rationality: the organization of labor and of trade, the network of transportation, information and communication, the institutions of private law and starting with financial administration, the state bureaucracy. Thus arises a substructure of a society under the compulsion of modernization. The latter eventually widens to take in all areas of life: the army, the school system, health services, and even the family, whether in city or country, it induces an urbanization of the form of life. That is it generates subcultures that train the individual to be able to switch to any moment from an interaction context to purposive rational action. The power legitimating and action orienting traditions - especially mythological interpretations and religious world views and objectivations lose their power and validity as myth, as public religion, as customary ritual, as justifying, metaphysics, as unquestionable traditions. Instead they are reshaped into subjective belief systems and ethics which ensure the private cogency of modern value orientations (Habermas 1970: 88-89).

      4. Social Integration versus Systemic Integration

         Social integration operates through coordinating the action orientation of individuals in society. Systemic integration operates through steering media like money and power independently of the action orientation of individual actors. These are complementary possibilities that need each other. Systemic integration provides the form. It defines the parameters of interaction because communicative action is too fragile a mechanism of action to carry the whole load of integration. On the other hand systemic integration must be anchored on the life-world. As a result system and life-world relate to each other.

         In capitalistic societies the forces of system rationalization have proved to be superior to those of communicative rationalization. The structures of the life-world is threatened and colonized. The difference between Habermas, Weber, and Horkheimer/Adorno is that

         1. Rationalization is not inherent in modernization. In fact the cultural course which the process of rationalization has taken in the modern world is only one among the number of different courses
         2. He identified the difference between systems and life-world. Rationalization of the life-world was the precondition and starting point for a process of systemic rationalization and differentiation. In my understanding, before any colonization of the life-world occurs, the life-world must be anchored on some grounds with the hope that systemic rationalization is brought under the control of a rationalized life-world. Only in this case that a society can be emancipated, when life-world is no longer subjected to the imperatives of the system. A rationalized life-world would rather subject the systemic mechanism to the needs of the associated individuals. The superstructure (life-world) would no longer depend on the system.

         In short, Habermas' attempt to liberate the life-world contains another form of utopia. The reproduction of the life-world is no longer only channeled through the medium of communicative action but in which the reproduction is brought about by the communicative and interpretive acts of the individual. The life-world is reproduced through communicative action. But the question remains how is this utopia realized? Habermas says that the realization of this grand dream can only happen by the institution of a democratic and egalitarian forms of social and political organizations that is centered on the idealized life-world, society will gravitate toward dissolving the remnants of brute force. This is characterized by mutual recognition embodied in consensual forms of action coordination. In case misunderstanding exists on who gets more or less, communicative action would be the exclusive mechanism to iron out differences.

2. Practical Interest (Subjective Communication or Communicative Action.

   This resides in understanding the meaning of the texts transmitted by tradition or a process of internalizing norms that institutionalize social roles.

   1. What is Universal Pragmatics (UP)?

      Habermas encounters 2 important questions before he can lay down the framework of UP. The first question is: 'Could the universal structures of speech - what is common to all utterances independently of their particular contexts be adequately determined through universal sentential structures?' The second question, whether the semantic properties of sentences, in the sense of the use theory of meaning can in any case be explicated along with reference to situations of possible typical employment?

      The intention of UP is to thematize the elementary units of speech (utterances) the way linguistics doe to sentences. Whereas linguistics puts more emphasis to sentence structures and less to speech utterances, UP takes both equally and provides more emphasis on the aspect of communication. Habermas says when the speaker utters a sentence two things occur. First, the grammatical sentence - the meaning of the words and the tense used, second the use of the sentence in a particular context. In being uttered, a sentence is placed in relation to a]. the external reality - the state of affairs, b]. the internal reality of what the speaker would like to express as his intention c]. the normative reality of what is inter-subjectively recognized as a legitimate interpersonal relationship (Habermas 1979: 28). As far as the external reality is concerned, meaning that resides in every word cannot fail to refer to an object. It explicates the importance of grammar and syntax in order to makes claims comprehensible. However the intention of the speaker cannot be known by a simple analysis of grammar alone. Actual speaking accompanies within it certain actions that may reveal a message accompanying every utterance that we may call the intention of the speaker. Austin and Searle provided a thorough discussion on speech acts. They say that a speech act carries with it a force - an illocutionary force. This force reveals what the speaker wants to do or what he wants others should do like in asking, commanding, and imploring, advising etc. What are not very much developed in Austin and Searle, (but definitely implied in their theory) is the elevation of the speech act to the realm of inter-subjectivity. Any form of speech act establishes a legitimate interpersonal relation. Interactive content in language presupposes 3 essential elements and thereby exposing 3 important validity claims.

      First is the propositional content. Propositions can be true or false depending on whether they agree with reality or not. Wittgenstein has treated this problem lengthily in his famous book the Tractatus. Russell made the same contribution in the analysis of atomic propositions. Habermas' concern here is that in a successful dialogue, truth of the matter is very important. This can be interpreted as truth existing in a particular situation that necessitates an immediate response. It can also be that our ascent to the matter in question is true. Here we are talking about the disposition of both parties in dialogue. That vested interests exist and that this interest may conflict with the interest of the other. Both are aware of the immediacy of the situation and that this demands taking the issues in dialogue. The idea of a propositional content is discussed in Austin's constatives. Constatives are propositions that can be classified as true or false depending on whether they agree with reality.

      Second, Habermas is aware that propositions containing modal forms or intentional verbs do tell us something about the intention of the speaker. However, Habermas considers such knowledge (of the intention) very superficial and premature. How does the hearer guarantee the recognition of the speaker's intention by simply listening to a particular proposition or sets of proposition in written or spoken discourse except through dialogue? In dialogue, the interactive component of language carries with it-hidden intentions that may be clarified and unfolded in discourse.

      Third, the performative phrases and illocutionary indicatives can be used to establish interpersonal relations. Habermas taps Austin's discussion on performative and constatives to be discussed thoroughly in the next section.

      It is true that propositional sentences can be used to represent an existing state of affairs; intentional verbs, modal forms and so on can be used to express speaker's intentions, performative phrases, illocutionary indicators can be used to establish interpersonal relations between speaker and hearer. However, these three essential elements of speech are not emphasized. The concern of grammar is to make the sentence comprehensible and never explicate freely the intention of the author and the invitation to inter-subjectivity (Habermas 1979: 29).

      Formal semantics does not fit well with linguistic and pragmatic analysis. Linguistic analysis is concerned with sentences. It analyzes semantic content of linguistic expressions in transformational grammar explanations of the surface structures of sentences either start with semantic deep structures or rely on semantic projections into syntactic structure. Part of linguistic analysis is the lexical semantics, which clarifies the meaning structures of a given lexicon by way of formal analysis. The pragmatic dimension of the use of sentences is only taken temporarily. However Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning somehow bridges the gap when he emphasized that situations of linguistic expressions has something to do with their meaning.

      Another form of analysis that Habermas discussed is the Pragmatic Analysis. Pragmatic theories of semantics face the difficulty of delimiting a linguistic expression's typical situation from the contexts to have additional meaning generating power but do not affect the semantic core of the linguistic expressions (Habermas 1979: 30). UP then can be understood as a linguistic analysis when sentences are used only as elements of speech like representational, expressive and interpersonal functions. On the other hand it can also be understood as a semantic analysis, the meaning of linguistic expressions are relevant only insofar as they contribute to speech acts that satisfy the validity claims of truth, truthfulness and normative rightness. Hence, the theory of Universal Pragmatics can be summarized as:

      Theoretical Level	Objective Domain
      Linguistics Grammar Grammatical theory	Sentences Sentences of an individual language Rules for generating sentences in any language whatever
      Aspects of Linguistic Analysis Phonetic Theory Syntactic theory Semantic theory	Inscriptions (language sounds)Syntactical rules Lexical units
      Pragmatics Empirical Pragmatics Universal Pragmatics	Speech Actions Context-bound speech actions Rules for using sentences in utterances
      Aspects of Universal-Pragmatic Analysis Theory of Elementary Propositions Theory of First Person Sentences Theory of Illocutionary Acts	Acts of preference and prediction Linguistic expression of intentions Establishment of interpersonal relation

      Habermas says that an effective speech act is communicated when 3 universal pragmatic functions are met:

      1. Choosing a propositional sentence requires the truth conditions and the existential presupposition be fulfilled (so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker).
      2. To express his intention (so that the hearer can trust the speaker
      3. To perform the speech act in such a way that it conforms to recognized norms or to the accepted self-images (so that the hearer can be in accord with the speaker in shared value orientations (Habermas 1979: 29)

      The first pragmatic function, that which involves the analysis of propositions with regards to grammar, syntax and semantics logically fits the category of linguistics (see table). Habermas explains that propositions must express truth with regards to its actual description of reality. This reality includes the reality of the physical world, the reality of human relations in conflict with each other due to the clash of overarching ideology working behind the speech acts. This reality may describe the situation of the subject, directly confronting the issues of his existence as a person.

      The second universal pragmatic function points to the intention of the speaker. The study of Austin's speech acts (to follow later) reveals that intention may be expressed in modal verbs, in locutionary and illocutionary speech acts as in the case of explicit performative verbs. However, there are some limitations. Austin, earlier, identified one of the limitations in his attempt to clarify overlapping categories between constatives and performatives as vagueness and ambiguity. The distinction between performative and constatives is ambiguous especially when words conflict with the truthfulness of intentions. An example is when I say, "I promise to be early on our date" without seriously doing what I just aid. I really did not intend of doing it.

      Mindful of the danger of misinterpretation, Habermas, suggests (though implicitly) that clarification of intention is achieved only in the process of dialogue. Doubts are clarified and particular speech acts, whether it is in the form of agreeing, dissenting, appealing, enforcing etc... are polished in the course of interaction.

      The third universal pragmatic function underlies the principle of adhering to particular recognized norms. In my understanding, conformity to norms essentially means two things. First, when we talk about dialogue it has to be in accordance with objective norms. This defines the progress of the dialogue. Second, it requires that in the event where ideologies, belief systems, worldviews of both party conflicts with each other, agreeable norms must be abstracted from them in order to ensure preliminary steps for dialogue. It is in this connection that Austin's theory of speech acts proved to be very important for the establishment of UP.

   2. Austin's Theory of Speech Acts
      1. Performatives and Constatives

         Performative utterances mean that to say something means to do something or that in saying something we are doing something. For instance, (Austin: 5-6)

         1. I do (in marriage)
         2. I name this ship as Queen Elizabeth
         3. I give and bequeath my watch to my brother

         In these examples saying something accompanies with it certain action. We cannot categorize these utterances as true or false. When I say 'I do' I commit myself to a to be a husband to my wife. I cannot simply categorize the phrase as true or false. In saying the words I am not reporting something but I am marrying a woman. The act of betting is also not reporting but I am putting myself under a contract that if I lose, I must pay the other what is due to him. Naming something involves an action and not just a statement. Austin contrasted this with constatives. Constatives can be true or false depending on whether they agree with reality or not. They state or report something. Hence the function of the constatives is very traditional - when I say something, I state something contrasted to 'when I say something I do something. These distinctions are not as simple as it seems. Austin says that there are cases it misfires. Consider the following examples:

         1. If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy (happy means understood, binding, or happily brought off our action, and unhappy when the performative is a failure - or as infelicities as called by Austin) then the statement that I am apologizing is true
         2. If the performative utterance I apologize is to be happy then the statement that certain conditions obtain (referring to the rules in obtaining happy performatives)ⁱ those notably in rules A. 1 and A. 2. Must be true.
         3. If the performative utterance I apologize is to be happy then the statement that certain other conditions - those notably in our rule T.1 - must be true

         If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example contractual ones, then statements typically, of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular things are true.

         In these examples there seems to be a similarity between constatives and performatives. If so then our distinctions become ambiguous and thus will dangerously breakdown. Is there some precise way in which we can definitely distinguish the performatives from the constatives utterances or whether there is a grammatical criterion for distinguishing the performative utterance (Austin: 55). Austin offered a solution, that is, to make explicit performatives using the following:

         1. use the first person
         2. Use the word hereby. It does effect the act of warning, authorizing etc. Besides, it is a useful criterion that utterance is performative
         3. the verbs must be specially performative

         Hence, the structure now of an explicit performative would be:

         1. I ... you [verb] that ... [sentence]
            I hereby promise you that I will come tomorrow [or]

         2. You are [verb, p. participle ... sentence
            You are requested to stop smoking [or]

         3. I ... [auxiliary verb] [verb] you that
            I can assure you that it was not I

         This particular structure (the standard form of speech acts) is made of an illocutionary and a propositional component. The illocutionary act is carried out with the help of the performative sentence (CES: 36). Habermas calls this propositionally differentiated speech acts. He knows that there are sentences with referential claims like gestures, or speech acts that are not propositionally differentiated like Hello! As a greeting or check and checkmate! and as performative expressions for moves in a game. While those actions refer to the proposition content, they do not express them.

         The use of this form is very formalistic. Ordinary use of language definitely is different from this. However Austin believes that primary utterances do contain explicit performatives like this form. Example:

         Primary Utterance 1. I shall be there 2. Shut it! 3. Very well then shut it 4. Shut it if you dare

         Explicit Performative I promise that I shall be there I advice/order you to shut it I consent to your shutting it I dare you shut it

         This is the final problem to the question of certainty as far as the speech acts is concern. Explicit performatives clearly identify what particular speech act the speaker intends. While a primary speech act can be ambiguous as it leaves doubts on what kind of speech act is really intended by the author. This form attracts Habermas for the reason that it starts with the first person and the voice is active. This is very important in the sense that the structure is conducive for dialogue.

      2. Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Speech Acts

         Austin identifies 2 basic kinds of speech acts namely the locutionary and the illocutionary.

         1. Locutionary Act. Saying something performs the locutionary act. It consists of three kinds:
            1. phonetic act is the act of uttering sounds
            2. phatic act is the act of uttering words or vocables
            3. Rhetic act is the act of uttering sense and reference, which together constitutes the meaning.

            Hence when A says to B "The bird sings beautifully" the phonetic act is the sound that accompanies every word. In phatic act, the words uttered that compose the sentence and the meaning of each word. The rhetic act is the sense of the entire sentence. To perform a rhetic act, I perform a phonetic act at the same time. They are connected with each other. In the definition of the phatic act 2 things were lumped together, that is vocabulary and grammar. The phatic act is essentially mimicable, reproducible including intonations, winks, gestures etc. (Austin: 96).

         2. The Illocutionary Act. According to Austin to perform a locutionary act is to perform an illocutionary act at the same time (this contention was criticized by Searle). Austin presents the distinction between the locutionary and the illocutionary in this case:

            Point 1. Act A locution: 'He said to me "Shoot her"' meaning by shoot is shoot and the meaning of her is to her.

            Point 2. Act B or illocution: He urged me to shoot her.

            In other words when Austin talks about the illocutionary force it is the force hiding behind the locutionary act. Hence when a person says, "Please forgive" the force behind the words is the act of forgiveness. This is the particular aspect of speech acts that Habermas is interested. When a person says something, he, at the same time does something.

            
            
         3. The Perlocutionary act is the act performed by saying something
            1. intended Perlocutionary act by warning something, you want to alert him
               
               
            2. unintended Perlocutionary sequel - A tells B the tree is falling! B is alarmed and this alarm was unintended by A.