1. The Baranggay
is recognized as the smallest autonomous government unit in the
country and intended to be non-partisan. Its government shall
consist of the head of the baranggay and the baranggay council.
The scope of its powers, duties and responsibilities, and terms
of office shall be defined by the state charter, federal law or
this Constitution.
2.1. The Head
of the baranggay can be duly elected by the people (cabeza) or
headed by a non-elected individual (datu, sultan, rajah, apo,
ninuno) whose succession and scope of power is determined by historic
tradition and by law.
This Constitution recognizes the traditional
position held by datus, sultans, apos, and the like.
2.2. Multiple
baranggays may choose to recognize only one traditional head,
and if this is the case, the Head may appoint a Baranggay-Deputy
(deputado de baranggay) per constituent baranggay to act on his
stead in matters concerning promulgation of law and duties.
2.3. A Baranggay-Deputy
cannot hold office in the Sanguniang-Bayan.
Only elected individuals can be members
of the Sanguniang-Bayan, and since a Baranggay-Deputy is appointed,
he can not be a member.
3. The Baranggay
Council shall consist of nine to twelve members, depending on
the population of the constituent, duly elected by the people
and headed by the Baranggay Chairman (Baranggay Captain) who is
elected among themselves. And if the council wishes, also elect
among themselves positions such as Baranggay Secretary (kalihim),
Baranggay Treasurer (ingat-yaman), Baranggay Ombudsman (tanod-bayan),
and other positions amicable for efficient governance. The council
shall be responsible for the day to day governance of the baranggay.
The presence of a Cabeza de Baranggay or Deputado de Baranggay
is not needed in the day to day governance of a baranggay or on
the creation of ordinances.
Wouldn’t this mean that there would
be 2 chiefs in a baranggay, a Baranggay Chaiman and a Cabeza or
Deputado? No. A Cabeza or Deputato is only titular. They should
only show their influence through initiation in the creation local
ordinances. The Baranggay Council holds governance. In essence,
a Deputado de Baranggay is an emissary from a titular head.
Wouldn’t a Cabeza be a sinecure position?
Read the notes on section 5.
4. The council
upon the recommendation of the head of the baranggay, appoint
among themselves a delegate to the Sangguniang-Bayan.
For the sake of debate, wouldn’t
a datu through his influence with the deputados who would in turn
influence the baranggay council be able to appoint a delegate
to the Sangguniang-Bayan? And if this prevails in more than one
baranggay, wouldn’t the datu then have power over a Sanguniang-Bayan?
Yes, he would, hence vigilance is needed. But we should remember
that the baranggay council is elected by the people and shouldn’t
let themselves be influenced by vested interest other than their
constituents.
5. The elected
head of the baranggay (cabeza) and the council, sitting en banc,
under the auspices of a federal or state law, shall have quasi-judicial
powers to resolve disputes among neighbors to maintain a peaceful
and decorous community.
Note that the non-elected baranggay deputy
is not part of this provision.
6.
The tradition of having a Baranggay Tanod (Baranggay Police) is
considered by this Constitution in agreement with the design of
an empowered community, however, its exercise should not infringe
on the statute of THE national or state police, military, and
similar authorities to maintain peace and order, and laws governing
bearing of arms. Its creation and accompanying duties and responsibilities,
scope of power, and termination shall be instituted by a local
ordinance or state law.
7. Though
this Constitution recognizes in high regard the role of its youth
in nation-building, the statute of having a Sangguniang-Kabataan
(Baranggay Youth Council) is not considered as an absolute necessity
in the day to day governance of a baranggay. Nonetheless, through
state law or local ordinance, a state, town or city may favor
its existence, and provide such to its constituency.
Much has been reported that the budget
of Sangguniang-Kabatan has been source of graft and corruption;
hence this Constitution gives provisional abolition, and let it
to the local government.