THE TREASURY FUNCTION IN THE MEMBER STATES AND THE UNION
Pertti Ahonen, 2000-02-15 / 2000-09-07
Defining the treasury function
The scope of the treasury function receives a delineation once it is put into its broader context of other functions of government financial management:
Despite that there is much common in the treasury function over countries, there are also differences:
The maximum scope of the treasury function is considerable. Following Ter-Minassian et al. (1995) we can distinguish six main subfunctions and their further subfunctions:
Organising the treasury function
In the Member States of the European Union there are different ways of organising the treasury function. There are two basic alternatives. In most of the Member States the function is largely concentrated in the hands of a Ministry of Finance, or there are separately such a ministry and one or several other organisations under that ministry for parts of the treasury function.
To elaborate through an example, in Finland the Ministry of Finance has kept most of the politically relevant functions of the treasury function, and alienated to the Treasury only the technical part of the subfunctions 1.2 and 2. and the functions 3-6. The Ministry drafts the legislation concerning the subfunctions of the treasury function it has delegated, it supervises the implementation of that legislation, and it makes the policy decisions. Let us note that the Finnish Treasury also has important functions outside the treasury function and the entire government financial administration, namely in the administration of government personnel.
Thus one of the dimensions of the treasury function is its separation from or its coexistence with other functions of government financial management. Let us also analyse the case of the United Kingdom in terms of the list of tasks that Her Majesty’s Treasury announces to pursue (Exchequer 1999, 1):
In the list only tasks ii, vi and partially viii belong to the treasury function. Tasks i and in part v can be categorised into other parts of governmental financial management, largely the part numbered as I at the beginning of this section. Tasks iii, iv, vii and ix hardly belong to financial management at all.
Developing the treasury function
Professor Allen Schick (1997) a world authority in budgeting, has made important remarks on three points regarding government financial management including the central budget offices and treasuries:
Professor Schick’s consideration includes an important message for developing the treasury function. The list of its subfunctions as provided by Ter-Minassian et al. (1995) is neutral with respect to the overall orientation of the government financial management. The list applies to an orientation that only covers the meticulous management of the budget items decided upon by the appropriate authorities, executed by other authorities, and recorded as part of the treasury function. The list also applies to an orientation towards efficiency and effectiveness to be achieved in and by the means of performance-oriented public expenditure management.
In a review of recent developments in the OECD countries, most of which are also EU Member States, OECD (1999) distinguishes four trends, by the way largely corresponding to directions that Schick (1997) above saw as desirable:
The OECD message is even stronger than the one of Schick for finding a direction to develop the treasury function. The direction would go towards flexibility and decentralisation, including performance data and indicators in the accounting systems, and promoting the utilisation of the data and the indicators.
Note that the European Commission has lately announced of its plans to scrap a large part of its established treasury function by abolishing the General Directorate of Financial Control and its long-established function of meticulous, centralised ex ante financial control of expenditures. That would be the end of the venerable visa control. (Kinnock 2000.)
The Commission intends to join to the group of the Member State reformers and the other OECD reformers by decentralising financial management to the specialist General Directorates, and establishing a Central Financial Service under the Budget Commissar and an Internal Audit Service under another commissar. At the same time, the Commission takes steps towards a performance orientation by introducing integrated accounting of all costs of each of its activities, thereby making an end to the long-established separation between the administrative and the operational programme expenditures. (Kinnock 2000, Schreyer 2000.)
The Commission – nor the Council nor the European Parliament – have authority over the organisation of the treasury function in the members states. However, the example of the Commission in its treasury reform and its overall financial management reform may have effects of attraction towards those Member States that have hesitated before similar solutions.
Here, it is necessary to issue a word of caution. The World Bank (1998, 8), by the way referring to a study named "Getting the Basics Right" made by the above Professor Schick, forewarns that the promotion of performance in government cannot be achieved at once, but the following advice should be taken into account:
The message to the pre-accession states is clear. First, they have to build the basics in their treasury function and in other parts of the government financial management. Only next they can proceed towards turning the financial management including the treasury function into efficient engines to promote efficiency and effectiveness.
Finally, all Member States must have developed suitable treasury procedures to deal with their contributions to the Communities’ own funds and to fit together with their role as beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy funds and the Structural Funds resources. There are ample examples to follow in this respect in the present pre-accession states. (Sigma 1997.)
To finish, the pre-accession states meet a triple challenge in developing their treasury function:
References
Exchequer. Departmental Report of the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Departments. 29 March, 1999. Cm 4218. London: HMSO 1999.
Kinnock, Neil, in agreement with the President of the Commission and Commission Member Ms. Scheyer. Reforming the Commission. Consultative Document. CG3(2000) 1/17. 18 January 2000.
OECD. Survey of Recent Budgetary Developments. OECD PUMA. http://www.oecd.org/puma/mgmtres/budget/issues.htm. Printed 18 November, 1999.
Schick, Allen. The Changing Role of the Central Budget Office. OCDE/GD(97)109. General Distribution. Paris: OECD 1997.
Schreyer, Michaele. Activity Based Budgeting. Communicaton from Mrs. Schreyer to the Commission, mimeo, n.d.
Sigma. Effects of European Union Accession. Part 1: Budgeting and Financial Control. Sigma Papers: no. 19. OCDE/GD(97)163. Unclassified. Paris: OECD 1997.
Ter-Minassian, Teresa, Pedro P. Parente and Pedro Martinez-Mendez. Setting up a Treasury in Economies in Transition. World Bank Discussion Papers 95/16. Washington, DC: The World Bank 1995.
World Bank. Public Expenditure Management Handbook. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 1998.