On November 18, 1943, amid an elaborately arranged appearance before a joint session of the Congress, the Secretary told of his meeting with Molotov and Eden. Russia, Britain and the United States had pledged themselves to prosecute the war to a successfl conclusion. They recognized the necessity of establishing an international organization. They agreed to consult with each other until this was done. They agreed further that after hostilities they wold not use their military forces in other states except after join consultation.

All this, as we now know, was pure show. there had been no triumph. It was a deliberate deception of the American people and they, along with Congress, were thoroughly taken in by it. No mention had been made of the only really controversial question that had intruded itself on this unequal contest of men in Moscow. That was the question concerning those countries in eastern Europe, particularly Poland, whose fate, should russia occupy them, was a subject of grave concern.

It was also a subject of grave political concern to Mr. Roosevelt who by this time was thinking in terms of 1944 and his ambition to be elected for a fourth term. The votes of Americancitizens of Polish birth and descent, to say nothing of great numbers of Lithuanians, Greeks and peoples of other Balkan ancestries who had supported him were a matter of very immediate importance. As we have seen, these votes are powerful altogether out of proportion to thier numbers because they are centered in a number of great industrial areas where they can, in certain circumstances , hold the balance of power when they act in unity. By this time the Russian armies had forced the Germans back to the banks of the Dieper. Hitler was still in possession of the Baltic states, all of the Balkans and of Poland. but it ws evident that the time was not far distant when Stalin's general would approach the Baltic and Polish borders. American Poles and Baltic peoples were nervous about Stalin's intentions inthese menaced lands.

The day before Hull had left for Moscow he hd sentfor Mr. ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador. He wanted an exchange of views with the Ambassador. the ambassador told him the Polish government wanted some arragement that would protect Poland against the danger when Russianarmies should ossupy their country. It felt that as soon as the russians entered Poland, the Polish government in-exile in London should be brought back to Warsaw. The Polish army and government should occupy Poland and cotinue to collaborate withthe Russians. Mr. Ciechanowski appealed to Mr. Hull for a gurarantee by the United States and Britain of Polish territorial integrity and independence.

Hull agreed withthis. He shared the Ambassador's apprehensions about Russia's plans. The Ambssador warned him against the wiles of russian diplomacy. But the aged Secretary smiled and said he was not likely to be taken in by such methods. In bidding the Ambassaodr good-bye, Hull assured hi ",i>He was decided to defend the cause of Poland as he would defened the cause of his own country." Actually, Hull was a sick man. He told friends that, in the last analysis, despite his poor health and the difficulties of the voyage, it was the Polish question which had decided him to make the trip. e declared he