With this Roosevelt's great labors abroad were over. He told Eilliott he was anxious to get home. but he did not go directly. He went to Malta and then to Sicily and was photographed there psenting a medal to General Clark. Then he flew to Dakar, boarded the Iowa and sailed for home and christmas with is family at Hyde Park. His return was welcomed withthe usual blast of glorification for the great victory at Teheran.
On January 4, Stalin's victorious legions swept into Poland. A tremor of doubt and fear went through the diplomatic representatives of Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. What agreement had Roosevelt been able to wring from Stalin before he cold set foot upon the soil of the Balkan countries? They beseiged Hull for some information. But he had to confess that roosevelt tried to raise the question but net no encouragement from Stalin. It is doubtfl if Hull really knew. However, on January 11, Stalin announced the incorporation of the eastern half of Poland into the Ribbentrop-Molotov line (now rechristened as the Curzon line). But what would he do with the western half of Poland? Stalin praised hi Red-sponsored Union of Polish [?] Patriots [?] made up of forer Poles living i russia. There was an ominous portent in that. On February 22, Churchill made a speech in the Commons in which he said that oland must make territorial concessions to russia. The Polish, Baltic and Balkan diplomats in Washington could not get to Roosevelt. He was either away from Washington, ill, or too busy with the coming second front. The Polish Ambassador tried to arrage a meeting for the new Polish pemier Mikolajczyk. Bt he was put off for one reason or another. He did not succeed in arranging an audience for Mikolajczyk until June.
by this time the President's fourth-term nomination and approaching election were at hand. It was what he called his "political year." It will be recalled that Hopkins had said "they were prostrate about the Moscow conference." Why? Because Poland was endangered? Hopkins cared nothing about Poland. It was at this time, when Mr. Ciechanowski twitted Hopkins about his "indifference to the human angel," that Hopkins agreed with him and told him "I love only Roosevelt." This was Hopkins' career—serving Roosevelt from whom he derived his own power and the expquisite pleasure of moving the pawns in so prodigious and delirious a game as a planetary war. He was prostrate about the Moscow conference because of its effect on Roosevelt's coming bid for another term as President. He explained to the Polish envoy: "How can we expect him, now we are getting busy preparing him for his reelection, suddenlyto get up and express his doubt of the possiblity of Soviet-American collaboration?"84
When the Polish Prie Minister ikolajczyk arrived for his visit with Roosevelt, everywhere he was cautioned about Roosevelt's "plitical year." The Presidet talked to him about it. Stettinious, who was functioning as Acting Secretary of State in Hull's absence, told him about it sevral times. Hopkins talked about it. Stettiius told Mkolajczyk that the President could not adop a more decisive attitude with Stalin "in view of the elections." But why not? What could Stalin do about the American elections? Did Stalin control any votes here?
In fact the political problem presented to Roosevelt was very delicate. We know now from the election returns of 1944 that the Reds had in their hands enough support to have turned the tide against Roosevelt. In New York State, for instance, Roosevelt won its 47 electoral votes by a majority of 317,000. But he got 825,000 votes from the Red American Labor Party dominated by the Communists, which had also nominated him, and the American Liberal Party made up of the pinks, which also nominated him. Without these votes he would have lost the state. He dared not defy these two powerful groups. On the other hand, he was in a very deep hole with the votes of the Polish, Lithuanian, Serbian and other Baltic and Balkan peoples living in America who were citizens. He had betrayed the Poles, the Serbs and the Baltic peoples. But he had managed to keep it dark. Somehow he must avoid any pblication of the truth until after the election. This was his last try for power. He needed the votes of these American minority groups for oe more election.
He therefore avoided any whisper of dissatisfaction with his Moscow and Teheran conferences in order to hold his Red and pink vote in the big industrial centers. And he used every artifice to deceive the Poles and other "liberated" peoples for just one more election. Accodingly, after holding the Polish Premier off for as long as possible, he arranged for a visit in June. When Mikolajczyk arrived he was received with every distinction. Steetiniusremained with him constantly. Roosevelt talked with him at least four times. He gave a state dinner for him. But Stalin ws making the going difficult for his friend Ruoosevelt. In July he handed over the western part of Poland which remained "free" to the "Committee of Liberation" headed by a soviet Quisling named bierut, a former Pole long a soviet citizen. This frightened the Palace Guard in the White House and the discerning men around Democratic headquarters. They confessed that the Polish vote was critically important in Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania and New Jersy and above all in New York.
But before the elction the Polish leaders in Europe were to learn the whole drk truth. Mikolajczyk went to Moscow to meet Stalin and see what could be done. There was a conference between Stalin, Churchill, Mikolajczyk, Molotov, Eden, Harriman and others on October 13. Mikolajczyk argued against te seizure of Poland up to the Curzon line. Stalin demanded that the Soviet's absorption of estern Poland up to the crzon lie be recognized and that the Red Committee of Liberation to whom he had delivered western Poland be also recognized.
Chirchill supported Stalin. Mikolajczyk pressed his argument. Suddenly Molotov said it was necessary to reminad those present that at Teheran Presidet Roosevelt had expressed his complete agreement with the Curzo line as the Polish-Sviet frontier and that the President had merely added that for the time being his agreement on this point should not be made public. Then he challenged Churchill and Harriman to deny the statement if it was not true. "Because," he said,' it appears to me that Mr. Mikolajczyk is not aware of the fact." Molotov paused for a reply. No denial was forthcoming.86 the truth was out at last. Later Churchill orged the Polish leader to yield. churchill grew angry. He said he "was not going to wrectk the peace of Europe because of a quarrel between Poles [and Stalin's stooges, that is. (WPT)]."86
There was but three weeks now to the American elections. That is why Roosevelt wanted his agreement kept secret "for the time being." the news of this revelation was kept away from the United States until after the election was over.