under consideration

  William Stanley Jevons Nothing is more important in observation and experiment than to be uninfluenced by any prejudice or theory. From DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1875) by W. S. Jevons I don�t know that properly speaking we ought to begin with a definition of the science. I believe the truer logical method is to allow a science to become whatever a logical growth makes it. That is the doctrine of Professor* Martineau�that no science shd. be restricted in its growth by a definition,�that it ought to be allowed to collect around it all facts of a similar nature.10 I perfectly agree with that, & therefore when we begin with a definition of the science, it is not because we want to restrict it or because we think it restricts it. It is only in a didactic way, because we want the shortest way to catch some idea of what it is. And if after having taken the definitions of other people we find that really we can include things excluded by them we shall throw their definitions aside. [* I doubt whether I caught this exactly] (H. R.) \Editor Rylett�s note � (WPT)\ 10 James Martineau, �Plea for Philosophical Studies�, an address presented in February 1854 on taking the Chair of Philosophy in Manchester New College, London. See Martineau, Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, 4 Vols (1891) iv, 26-7. Cf. \Papers and Correspondence of Jevons\ Vol. II, Letter 147, n.4, p. 421. PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS London etc. : Macmillan 1977 ; Vol. VI, p. 5 From FATE AND FREEDOM (1923) by Alfred Korzybski A definition of man is, of course, the first concern of human engineering. How shall we define our object, man? We are told by the naturalists that an organism must be treated as a whole�that sounds impressive�but they have not told us how to do it. It seems that the traditional subject- predicate logic leads automatically towards elementalism, and that this organism-as-a-whole theory will forever remain [desiderata?] as long as we use the old logic. Yet this concept of the "organism-as-a-whole" is extremely important for us, particularly in the dealing with man (see Manhood of Humanity), and all experimental evidence seems to prove that it is correct. We are told on the other hand, that the organism is too complicated to be treated mathematically. It seems to me that these two statements are incompatible. Of course, it is true that, if we pursue the elementalist's point of view, then the organism is too complicated ; but, if it is a "whole", then, if a proper generalizations is found, the "organism- as-a-whole" could be treated mathematically because we could deal with this one generalization. By definition I do not mean a nominal definition [..] merely the fixing of a name, a label to an object, but that analytical definition which will enable us to make the greatest number of general and significant assertions. Let us see how we could define man. Man, among all living beings, is the only one which has a chin ; this characteristic is unique. Also he is the only mammal having no tail. We could, if we chose, define man as a "chinful" or "tailless" mammal ; these definitions would comply with the major conditions for a real definition but they would not comply with the major condition, without which a definition is not a real definition, namely, it would not give important logical results. These examples alone show that we could define man in a great many ways, yet the definition would be practically worthless or fruitless. It is simpler by far to find out by reflection, what are the terms in which an ideal definition of man should be made, and a definition which would, if possible, give us the "organism as a whole". To find such definitions is not difficult, but what is extremely difficult is to have the moral courage to admit the sad fact, that, in spite of all advancement of science, man�the creator of science�deals with man on the old mythological base. If we go back to our schoolbooks, we will find in an old edition of the "Elements of Logic" by Jevons-Hill, published by the American Book Co., in 1883, just 40 years ago, that: "It is necessary to distinguish carefully the purely logical use of the terms genus and species from their peculiar use in natural history. . . . If we accept Darwin's theory of the origin of species, this definition of species becomes entirely illusory, since different genera and species must have, according to this theory, descended from common parents. The species then denotes a merely arbitrary amount of resemblance which naturalists choose to fix upon, and which is it not possible to define more exactly. This use of the term, then, has no connection whatever with the logical use . . . " (page 230-231, italics are mine). Surely blind prejudices are still active, and they are doing their work thoroughly, because, as yet, the need for a scientific definition of man is still ignored. To perform our task we will have to observe, and think, and this little old book of logic at once gives us the valuable advice that: "Nothing is more important in observation and experiment than to be uninfluenced by any prejudice or theory" (page 207, italics are mine). Just that is the first great obstacle in our path, for since our birth, we have been fed with mythological, fundamentally false ideas about the distinctive nature of man. The struggle to overcome this will be hard, as all possible odds are against us and a free independent logical issue. Once this clearing of the way is accomplished, and I know too well how difficult it is to free oneself from prejudices, nothing of importance stands in the way. The ideal definition for man would be a definition in the same terms in which, in the exact sciences, we have attempted the formulation of the universe around us. The benefit of such a definition would be, that it would be in familiar terms and would keep man logically inside of the universe, as an actual part of it. Observing living beings, we find that the plants bind solar energy into chemical energy [etc] ALFRED KORZYBSKI : COLLECTED WRITINGS 1920-1950. International Non-Aristotelian Library 1990, pp. 23-25. From BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932) by Charles Key Ogden Nearly half a century later when George Bentham was at the height of his fame as President of the Linnean Society, Jevons corresponded with him . . . In the "Contemporary Review" for May, 1873, will be found an article by Jevons, for whom the . . important section on Fictions seems to have had no interest. London, New York 1932, p. 151. From OUTLINE OF GENERAL SEMANTICS (1934) by Alfred Korzybski: 'The meaning of a term in extension consists of the objects to which the term may be applied; its meaning in intension consists of the qualities which are possessed by objects bearing the name.' (Jevons.) In the case of General Semantics we deal with intensional and extensional orientations and attitudes, which represent a broader problem than the one defined by Jevons. In ALFRED KORZYBSKI: Collected Writings 1920-1950, p. 193 International Non-Aristotelian Library 1990. From THE IMPORTANCE OF DEDUCTIVELY FORMULATED THEORY IN ETHICS AND SOCIAL AND LEGAL SCIENCE (before 1951) by F. S. C. Northrop Only certain of the social sciences have to date achieved deductively formulated factual social theory. Economics has such theory in the case of W. Stanley Jevons' formulations of the science,4 and also in the case of the very similar theory of the Austrian school. 5 Even so, deductively formulated factual economic theory has been achieved only for statics, and not for dynamics.6 What this means is that the postulates of the deductive theory enable one, when empirical values of theoretically specified variables defining the present state of an economic system are determined, to deduce other characteristics which the state of the economic system must have at that same time; the postulates do not enable one, given the aforementioned empirical values of the present state of an economic system, to deduce the future state of that economic system.7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London, 1911). 5 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London, 1935). 6 Ibid., pp. 122-135. 7 Ibid.. See also Northrop, Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, .. Ch. XIII. In STRUCTURE, METHOD, AND MEANING (Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer) Henle, Kallen, Langer, editors New York : Liberal Arts Press 1951, pp. 103-04 From THE DEVELOPMENT OF MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, 1962 by Peter Harold Nidditch William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) was at the same time head of the school of logic and philosophy and head of the school of economics at Owens College, Manchester (later the University of Manchester,) from 1866 to 1876, going then, because of his heavy teaching work, to University College, London, as head of the school of economics. Like other men of science or letters under the rule of Victoria (for example Darwin and Clifford, Browning and Carlyle), Jevons was often ill, having frequent pains in the head and sleeping badly. So in 1880, when he was only 45 years old, he gave up his position at University College, living after than on his private income and the money from his books. But death came to him suddenly two years later while he was having a swim at Hastings. This event put an end to the writing of a full account of his teachings on economics. However, what had been produced by him earlier in this field had made his the chief name in current English economics. In addition, his was the chief name in the current English logic of deduction and logic of natural science ; this was the effect of his six high quality books on logic. The first of these books was Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality apart from Quantity (1864) ; the greatest of them was The Principles of Science (1874) in which the writer's views on the logic of deduction and the logic of natural science were put, together, in their complete form. One of Jevons's interests was in 'reasoning machines', of which he was the first to make one. Much of his time in the 1860's was given to the building of such an instrument by which the validity of deductions was able to be tested automatically. New York : Free Press 1962, pp. 44-45.