‘my own experiences during the development of atomic energy between September 17, 1942, and December 31, 1946, the period during which I was in charge of the Manhattan Project.’ (page ix)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The command channels of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) . . . had no precedent. They grew up with the project and were changed as conditions changed. Yet the basic concept—that of always keeping authority and responsibility together—never changed. (p. xi)
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With the growth of Hitlerism, many scientists gradually came to doubt the wisdom of communicating the results of their work to scientists in the enemy’s camp. Again, this was particularly true of those who had come to America to escape nazi persecution. ( . . ) The American-born scientists in the main, did not have so acute and appreciation of the danger of the situation as did their foreign-born colleagues.
Nevertheless, the Americans and British made a concerted attempt to achieve voluntary international censorship of information relating to atomic energy. The effectiveness of this arrangement was hindered at the start by the refusal of Joliot-Curie to participate ; however, it provided a sound foundation for the strict governmental measures that followed the outbreak of war in Europe.
At the same time, the group of refugee scientists in America became a focal point of the attempts to apprise officials in the federal government of the dangers and the prospects that atomic physics held for the United States. Discussions of developments in this field took place between representatives of the Navy Department and Dr. George B. Pergram and Dr. Enrico Fermi, of Columbia, as early as March, 1939. However, Fermi expressed some skepticism at this meeting and the United States Government did not become seriously interested until October of that year when Alexander Sachs, a Well Street economist and a personal friend and adviser of President Roosevelt, called upon him to obtain his support of the scientific research then under way. Sachs had been following the possibilities of atomic energy for some time and felt that the government should
actively aid in the development. To achieve this he discussed the matter with the Columbia group and with Einstein. The latter agreed to sign a suitable letter to the President if Sachs would prepare it. This he did, had it signed and carried it to the White House. This letter emphasized the seriousness of the problem. The President, impressed by Sachs’ [*] arguments, appointed an Advisory Committee on Uranium to report to him on the situation.
[*] According to other sources I have seen, the initiator of that action was one Lewis Strauss ; the famous letter from Einstein to the President F.D. Roosevelt was written by Szilard and given Einstein to sign etc. ; still another source has it that the letter was actually written by Bertrand Russell and given Szilard to give Einstein to sign. It seems certain that at least some of the gentlemen considered were crooks — but, which ones ? (WPT 28 Jan 05.)
The Uranium Committee, as it was called, consisted of representatives of the Bureau of Standards, the Army and the Navy. ( . . ) The work of the committee gained momentum when it was learned, in April of 1940, that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin had undertaken an extensive research program involving uranium.
( pages 6-7)
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The desirability of investigating more carefully the military possibilities of plutonium was emphasized by Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, of
p8
the University of California, and the following December . . . the Uranium Committee . . . seconded his proposal. ( . . ) Later that same month, an intensive program of research . . . was begun at the Metallurgical Laboratory1 at the University of Chicago, under the direction of Nobel Prize winner Dr. Arthur H. Compton, who had achieved eminence . . . in pioneer studies of cosmic rays. The purpose of the research was to develop the knowledge needed to design, build and operate a plant for the conversion of uranium into plutonium. ( p. 9 )
1 Metallurgical Laboratory was a code name chosen to conceal the nature of the work being done there.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On June 26, Marshall, Nichols and Styer met with the Uranium Committee (etc).
Many of the . . . contracts with the laboratories were being delayed for lack of money, So Colonel Marshall arranged for the transfer of & 16 Million of Corps of engineers funds (etc).
Then the question of a name for the project came up. Toward the end of June, Reybold called Robins, Marshall, Nichols and me to his office and told us that he had conferred with Somervell and Styer, and that they had agreed that the new establishment . . . was to be called the “Laboratory for the Development of Substitute materials” or “DSM.” I demurred on the grounds of security, feeling that the name was bound to arouse curiosity. Several other names were suggested, but Reybold decided that, since Somervell had already agreed to it, no change would be made. (Etc.) (pages 12 - 13 )
On August 11, Marshall handed me the draft of a general order to be published that day announcing the formation of the new district. In it he used the designation “DSM.” I again objected to this term because I felt that it would arouse the curiosity of all who heard it. After some discussion, during which we considered the possibility of using “Knoxville” we decided upon “Manhattan,” since Marshall’s main office would at first be in New York City. Our choice was approved by Reybold, and so the Manhattan Engineer District, or MED., came into being. ( p. 17 )